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Abstract 
Coronation Hill, located in the Top End of the Northern Territory and now inside 
Kakadu National Park, was the site of what became a major national dispute 
involving a mining company, the local Jawoyn Aboriginal people, two Aboriginal 
organisations and the conservation movement in the years 1985-91. The issue 
arose from the discovery of a mineral deposit there in 1984, and the registration of 
a sacred site that included most of the hill in late 1985. My thesis deals mainly with 
events in the first half of that six-year period, during which management processes 
intended to find informed compromise gave way to non-negotiable political 
dispute. 
The problem around which the thesis is constructed is that of understanding a long 
record of self-contradictory decisions and testimony produced by two of the three 
senior male Jawoyn custodians of the area, as well as by a number of other senior 
J awoyn, regarding the status of Coronation Hill as a sacred site and the 
acceptability of the mining proposal. Drawing on Erving Goffinan and Kenneth 
Burke, I propose a dramaturgical approach that treats separate consultation events 
as theatres. This approach accepts that the contradictions were real, not just 
apparent, and attempts not to resolve them, but to give an account of the conditions 
that generated them. That account refers at one level to the internal dynamics of the 
theatres themselves, and at another level to the way in which different kinds of 
theatre articulated with particular themes in J awoyn history. 
The thesis then considers the implications of theatricality for management of the 
issue by three external organisations. Beginning with their reliance on the policy 
assumption of an authoritative Aboriginal centre, I show how each organisation 
drew, from its o n experience of the J awoyn, validation for a view of the issue that 
was at odds \vith those of the other organisations. I then trace the progress of events 
through a combination of the rise to managerial prominence of the orthern Land 
Council and the continuation of J awoyn theatricality. These, I argue, led to two 
1 
opposed, self-sustaining and involuted Eaison relationships between external 
organisations and the Jawoyn, which manifested themselves publicly in the form of 
overt political dispute. 
. . 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: FROM POLICY TO ACADEMIA 
The request to register Sickness Country 
Aboriginal affairs over recent decades have been punctuated by disputes over 
. development projects proposed in the vicinity of places said to be sacred by local 
Aboriginal people. Noonkanbah, Coronation Hill and Hindmarsh Island are only 
the better known of these. The management of such conflicts has proven difficult 
and contentious for the public policy process. Where they have not been resolved in 
the short run by political fiat, they have been referred to lengthy, and sometimes 
sequential, inquiries that have adopted the approach of trying to empirically 
determine the reality of the religious values claimed by indigenous custodians to 
reside at the place in question. My introduction to the Coronation Hill issue 
occun·ed in the context of such an inquiry. 
In Septe1nber 1989, I was offered a consultancy by the Aboriginal Areas Protection 
Authority, a statutory authority of the N orthem Territory Government, to provide a 
repo1i on an application, received fro1n so1ne senior men of the J awoyn language 
group, to have an area known as Sickness Country registered by the Authority as a 
sacred site. The area involved was unusual in two respects. Of roughly 2500 square 
kilometres, it was much larger than almost all other sites on the Authority's 
Register, 1nost of which were places rather than tracts of country, and much larger 
also than what was conventionally regarded, both in the popular mind and by many 
involved in site protection policy and practice, as appropriate for legal recognition 
under sacred sites legislation. Also, within this area were located proven and 
prospective mineral resources and mining tenements. Proposals to explore for and 
develop these resources by a consortiu1n of companies known as the Coronation 
Hill Joint Venture (CHJV) had, by the time of my involvement, become the object 
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of intense political dispute at local and national levels. The application to have the 
area entered on the register of sacred sites was itself a move by some of the parties 
to that dispute, by which they aimed to impose a restraint upon any further 
development. If the Authority registered it, such registration would constitute prima 
evidence of sacredness before all courts, and all future non-Aboriginal activity at 
any location in that area would have first to be agreed to by those Aborigines 
identified as the senior custodians for the site1. 
The terms of the consultancy required me to consider the history, especially the 
recent history, of Aboriginal perceptions of Sickness Country. The Aboriginal 
Areas Protection Authority, charged with responsibility to identify, document, 
register and protect Aboriginal sacred sites in the Northern Territory, had, in its 
former guise as the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority, been an 
important player in that recent history. Over the -preceding four years, since late 
1985, its officers had frequently sought information and instructions from senior 
Aborigines on two matters, broadly conceived. One was the location and 
significance of sacred sites, or more generally, the nature and distribution in that 
area of powerful and dangerous forces present since the creation era, and whether 
the custodians of places where such forces were immanent wished to have those 
places registered. Several parts of Sickness Country had already been registered. 
The largest such registered site was named the Upper South Alligator Bula 
Complex and included, just _inside its north-eastern boundary, Coronation Hill 
(Map 5). The other matter was the willingness of local Aborigines, and specifically 
the custodians of registered sites, to allow mining exploration and development to 
take place in the vicinity of the sites. In carrying out the former function, Authority 
officers had organised field trips with a number of senior Aboriginal men to locate 
and record stories for sites in many parts of Sickness Country, and for the latter, 
they had convened or attended a series of consultations and meetings which had 
1 Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989, sections 22, 45. 
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addressed, and on several occasions approved, proposals for development works at 
Coronation Hill. 
While Sickness Country was being proposed as a single sacred site, the 
ethnography that could be called upon to substantiate that status showed different 
degrees of sacredness within its total area. In particular, knowledgeable Aborigines 
regarded several locations as of the utmost sensitivity and danger because the 
creator figure Bula had gone underground there. The slightest disturbance of those 
places threatened natural catastrophes of world-destructive di1nensions. A number 
of other concepts were invoked - zones of influence around these underground 
resting places, underground sensory connections between them, random 
distribution of a bodily essence left during Bula' s hunting activity around the 
landscape, motifs said to have been painted by Bula at several galleries - that 
distributed Bula' s presence and danger across the region in varying degrees. 
Another creator being, the Rainbow Serpent, added its own sense of power at some 
of these places. Coronation Hill itself had been attributed some particular Bula-
related significances in the testimony recorded to this ti1ne, but while the ultimate 
danger arising from undue disturbance had been said on some occasions to be 
apocalyptic, human activity there did not involve the same order of sensitivity as at 
those major 'focal' sites where Bula himself was considered to be. 
Rather, the status of Coronation Hill and that of Sickness Country as an entire site 
were 1nutually dependent. Aboriginal perceptions as to the sensitivity of Coronation 
Hill were motivated by its location within the general area of Sickness Country. If 
the custodians opposed develop1nent at Coronation Hill because it was part of such 
a generally sensitive landscape, then that would have a bearing upon the question 
of the degree of protection appropriate across those large stretches of Sickness 
Country between and around the focal sites, and would confirm the status of 
Sickness Country as a single unified area of sacredness and danger. If Sickness 
Country were registered as a sacred site, the objection to mining would be legally 
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anywhere within the site. Conversely, perm1ss1ons granted by Aboriginal 
custodians for development works to proceed at Coronation Hill had the opposite 
implication. If the custodians considered that mining could proceed there safely, 
then the integrity of the larger area marked out as Sickness Country by the 
Authority would be open to question. 
Government decisions 
Policy developments caused my consultancy project to be postponed and my efforts 
re-directed. In 1987 the Federal Government had declared Stage III of Kakadu 
National Park, thereby expanding the Park to the south to include two pastoral 
stations, Goodparla and Gimbat (Map 2). About one-third of that area had been 
reserved for mineral exploration for five years, and called the Kakadu Conservation 
Zone. The south-eastern half of the Conservation Zone, roughly the part located · 
within the former boundaries of Gimbat, also lay within the area tentatively 
identified by the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority as Sickness Country. In 
October 1989, with no further exploration tenements yet allocated, the Federal 
Government took two major decisions. Approaching an election, Prime Minister 
Hawke was persuaded to secure the green vote by incorporating most of the 
Conservation Zone into the surrounding Kakadu National Park, thereby reneging 
on the promised five-year mineral exploration period (Ramsey 1989). The 
Conservation Zone was reduced to a remnant 4 7 .5 square kilometres which now lay 
entirely within Sickness Country, and still included Coronation Hill and another 
promising prospect, El Sherana. 
The Government further decided to institute two inquiries. The first of these was an 
inquiry into tp.e resources of the reduced Kakadu Conservation Zone by the 
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC), a body established by the Federal 
Government to advise it on complex issues of resource management .in Australia. 
The second was a concurrent inquiry, conducted by the same judge that chaired the 
Commission, into another application for official recognition of the sacredness of 
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the area. This was made by the Northern Land Council to the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs for a declaration protecting the Sickness Country under s.10 of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984. This latter 
application could not be granted unless it was shown that the Northern Territory's 
own legislation had been ineffective in protecting the area, and that would not be 
known until my own report was complete and considered by the Authority, but the 
Minister decided that he would seek a report of his own in order that he could act 
quickly if necessary. These two new Federal inquiries, and the new wave of 
research that they would bring upon the J awoyn and the Conservation Zone and 
surrounding country, meant that my site registration report to the Authority would 
have to be delayed. The Authority instead asked me to assist in preparing its 
submission to these inquiries. This was to be an analysis of the historical 
background to the question of sacredness within Sickness Country and at 
Coronation Hill (Levitus 1990). My discussion there of the documented history of 
Aboriginal concerns over disturbance in that area, and of the record of testimony 
regarding Coronation Hill, was only one of a number of submissions to the 
Inquiries that addressed those subjects. 
Sources and issues 
My research began in mid 1990. The Authority's records of a lengthy sequence of 
site documentation and consultation exercises included many statements by senior 
Aborigines regarding the mythological significance of the area as a whole and of 
many places within it, and the allowable limits of disturbance by human activity. 
Most detailed was the recording of Aboriginal views regarding the status of 
Coronation Hill as a site, and the acceptability of the mining works proposed for it. 
I discussed with Authority officers, especially the Chief Executive Officer David 
Ritchie, and Research Officer David Cooper, their experience and views of these 
matters, and began field interviews with Aborigines who had travelled or worked in 
Sickness Country, including the three senior J awoyn men who had throughout the 
issue been recognised as principal custodians for sites in that area, Peter Jatbula, 
6 
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Sandy Barraway and Nipper Brown. I sought out whites with relevant experience: 
Joe Fisher, famous in the Territory for his management of uranium exploration and 
mining in the area during the 1950s and 1960s; Joe Callanan, the son of the former 
owner of the pastoral station, Gimbat, that had covered almost all of Sickness 
Country; Bob Ellis, former Director of the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection 
Authority; and National Parks staff who had managed the area since its partial 
inclusion in Kakadu National Park in 1987 (Map 2). In addition, an earlier history 
of more occasional research into Aboriginal concerns over sites and development 
was available in the form of two articles published in 1962 and 1966 in the journal 
Oceania by the agronomist and amateur anthropologist Walter Arndt, and 
subsequent reports by patrol and welfare officers. 
From all these sources, two inter-related issues emerged for analysis within the 
consultancy, and later became the genesis of this thesis. One was the status of 
Sickness Country as a site for registration. The application proposed the notion of a 
very large and unified area of sacredness and danger that, to satisfy the definitional 
provisions imported into the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act (NT) from the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (NT) Act (s.3), had to have been regarded as such within Aboriginal 
tradition. The degree of antiquity of belief that needed to be shown was unspecified 
within the Act. However, intense political discord and suspicion over the issue of 
mining at Coronation Hill, and a background of populist cynicism, most crudely 
expressed in cartoons and opinion pieces in the Northern Territory News, 
concerning the supposed opportunistic 'appearance' of sacred sites at the location 
of mineral discoveries, meant that any indications of belief dating from prior to the 
announcement of new gold discoveries there in late 1985 were of particular 
evidentiary value. Thus, Arndt's two papers, for example, became objects of 
greater interest and closer analysis than at any time since their publication. Indeed, 
at one point David Cooper remarked, without irony, that · any pre-1985 
documentation of Aboriginal perceptions of sacredness in the area of Sickness 
Country was 'like gold' (pers comm). 
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There were a number of questions here, which were the occasion of many 
discussions with Authority staff. How should one interpret what appeared to me as 
a very uneven and inconsistent, but broadly cumulative, record of assertions of 
mythological power and danger over the forty year period since non-Aborigines 
had first paid attention to Aboriginal concerns in the area? What level of 
accountability should be required of current Aboriginal statements about sacredness 
in the area when placed against that historical record? What, indeed, was the 
relevant principle of accountability? Was it a matter of demonstrating that current 
renditions of traditional belief had some 1ninimum amount of antiquity, or that they 
were essentially continuous in some way with earlier renditions, or that such 
change as had occurred could be understood as organic, or as peripheral? What 
answers to these questions should be required in order to attract legislative 
protection for the places involved? 
The second issue arose from the record of consultations, meetings and inquiries 
concerning development works at Coronation Hill. The notes and transcripts of 
proceedings on these occasions included a corpus of testimony from the three 
senior custodians and other Aborigines that was, on the surface, insistently 
contradictory. By this I refer not only to disagree1nents between different 
individuals, but self-contradiction, or changes of mind, by particular individuals, 
including two of the three senior men, regarding the status of Coronation Hill as a 
site and the propriety of development occurring there. It appeared to me that, taken 
as a whole, this testimony offered no way of conclusively determining what these 
people thought about the importance of Coronation Hill in mythological terms, or 
about the acceptability of mining at that place. 
The Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry 
Once the RAC Inquiry (RAC 1991a: 126-27) found that environmental objections 
were not sufficient to prevent the Coronation Hill mine fro1n proceeding, this 
question of the disturbance of an area of religious significance to the J awoyn 
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became decisive, and it was on this question that policy resolution of the issue 
finally turned. The Inquiry (1991a: 195-98) reported in April 1991 that belief in the 
destructive power of Bula and the notion of a Sickness Country were not recent 
inventions, and that mining at Coronation Hill would seriously affront the religious 
convictions of many J awoyn and undermine the authority of the three senior 
custodians, in return for some possible material benefits. Prime Minister Hawke, 
arguing from a minority position in Cabinet, considered this religious concern to be 
primary and decided to prohibit further mining development and incorporate the 
Conservation Zone into Kakadu National Park. As the threat presented to Sickness 
Country was thereby ended, no decision was then necessary on the Heritage 
Protection Act application. 
I have discussed elsewhere (Levitus 1996) the underlying logic of RAC's approach 
to assessing the impact on the J awoyn of mining in the Conservation Zone. I also · 
canvassed there the Commission's position on the two issues of historical 
interpretation raised by the record of the preceding years: that of the traditional 
authenticity of Aboriginal concerns for a Sickness Country within which a 
dangerous Bula presence was widely distributed in various manifestations, and that 
of the real views of the senior custodians regarding the status of Coronation Hill as 
a sacred site and the acceptability of mining there. In their conduct of the Inquiry, 
in order to give primary weight to Aboriginal evidence on these issues, the 
Commissioners travelled to J awoyn country and attended large meetings of J awoyn 
people, listening directly to men and women, senior custodians and Aboriginal 
trainees at the mine site. J awoyn opinions, as they were expressed at this stage, left 
the Commissioners in no doubt that the three senior custodians were opposed to 
mining at Coronation Hill on religious grounds, and that the great majority of 
J awoyn people considered that those men's views were authoritative for that place. 
These findings as to the current and predominant J awoyn disposition towards 
Coronation Hill and Sickness Country provided the Commission with an anchor, a 
general orientation from which it would address the difficult interpretive issues 
surrounding the documented history. The positions that it adopted on those 
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historical issues deferred to the immediacy and the contemporaneity of the J awoyn 
views that it had directly elicited. These positions, initially set out in its Draft 
Report, were the object of strong public criticism, which the Commission 
subsequently addressed in Volume 1 of its Final Report (see Levitus 1996: 57-60). 
The argument made against official recognition of Coronation Hill as a sacred place 
was that all the evidence indicating sacredness, whether by attributing Bula-related 
significance to that place in particular or by reason of its location within the wider 
area of Sickness Country, had emerged in recent years and within the context of the 
mineral discoveries. Proponents of this argument pointed out that, despite repeated 
investigations of Aboriginal concerns about development in that region over the 
previous forty years, and despite 1nining having taken place at Coronation Hill 
itself in the l 950-60s, no sacred meanings were attributed to that location until a 
sacred site recording trip in late 1985 encountered renewed development work in 
progress there. While it was well-docu1nented and acknowledged that a number of 
other sites in the region were invested with powerful and dangerous 1neanings by 
their association with the Bula story, specific claims that Coronation Hill was 
affected by such meanings post-dated that renewal of mineral exploration. Even 
those spatially diffused concepts of mythological power that substantiated the idea 
of a large, unified, sacred and dangerous Sickness Country, within which 
Coronation Hill lay, were seen as recent elaborations of religious thought that could 
not justifiably attract legal protection. 
In 1neeting this c1itique, the Commission concluded that, as far as could be inferred 
fro1n the evidence of the past four decades, the Bula story and the notion of 
Sickness Country was not a modem invention, but a pre-existing tradition. Further, 
as de1nonstrated by a continuing fear of the consequences of disturbance to sites in 
that area, and occasional performance of Bula songs, it retained some salience 
among the Jawoyn and neighbouring groups. Beyond this, the Commission's 
response shared important common ground ·with the critique. It began by accepting 
as fi rst p1inciple that a capacity for adaptation and change is necessary to all 
10 
Introduction: From Policy to Academia 
systems of belief, and that innovation and elaboration on traditional themes 'is the 
main activity of theology and should not be considered as evidence of pious fraud' 
(RAC 1991a: 32). Jawoyn custodians first encountered new development at 
Coronation Hill in late 1985 and responded by incorporating the gold deposit into 
the Bula myth. This interpretive act, by which they understood the gold to be the 
bodily essence of Bula and his wives, was accepted by the Commission as such an 
episode of innovation and elaboration, 'the result of processes of a genuinely 
Aboriginal kind' (RAC 1991 a: 156). That was important for validating the 
Commission's orientation towards the present in their assessment of J awoyn 
values. It allowed the Commission to construct an authenticating bridge between 
the historically documented force of Bula as a mythological presence in that region, 
and the particular manifestations of that force now perceived by J awoyn to reside at-
Coronation Hill. 
No such authenticating device was available to the Commission in meeting the 
other major criticism of their approach. The problem of serious internal 
contradictions within testimony recorded from two of the three senior custodians 
during the course of the Coronation Hill issue proved more intractable. Though the 
custodians declared themselves unilaterally opposed to mining before the 
Commission, supporters of development referred to these earlier changes of 
position as grounds for keeping open the future possibility of mining in the event 
that the custodians altered their views again. Various attempts to explain this record 
of contradictions were put to the Inquiry. Significantly, the Commission accepted 
that the contradictions were real, not just apparent, and acknowledged that they 
might possibly be explained in different ways (RAC 1991 a: 180-81 ). It avoided, 
however, any direct engagement with the record ot testimony in order to resolve the 
problem, even though such an approach was attempted by their own consultants 
(Keen & Merlan 1990: 67-83) and others (CHN 1990: 15-16, 23-28; Levitus 1990: 
32-43). It appeared instead to consider that this problem of interpretation could 
simply be de-emphasised in favour of the solution it had found to the other 
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interpretive problem of religious change. 
Thus, 
As the Inquiry noted . . . adaptability and ongoing change is more the rule 
than the exception in all religious traditions, including Aboriginal traditions. 
In view of the existence of elaboration in J awoyn religious thought, and its 
political overtones, the Inquiry took the view that underlying cultural and 
religious themes and trajectories of interpretation should be accorded 
primary importance in assessing the nature of Aboriginal cultural and 
religious interests. It considers that this approach is more fair and more 
logical than to focus unduly on the inconsistencies and contradictions that 
exist in the historical and ethnographic record. (RAC 1991a: 155-56) 
[i]n the Inquiry's view, these contradictory statements made in the past 
should not be interpreted as detracting from the present strength of the 
views held by the senior custodians. (RAC 1991 a: 181) 
This treatment of the problem of contradictions was the clearest instance of the 
Commission's deference to contemporary Aboriginal testimony. It was an issue 
that had generated voluminous documentation and intense polemic during the years 
of the dispute, and a further round of representations and argument before the 
Commission. From my experience of the Inquiry processes, I think it likely that the 
Commissioners saw nothing in the records of past meetings and consultations that 
offered a convincing and comfortable way of settling on one side or the other, 
justifiable from the history itself. It is then understandable that RAC sought a 
resolution in the thorough and careful elicitation of current Jawoyn opinion. 
The Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry thus resolved these two maJor 
interpretive problems in a manner that marked an important departure in the way 
such issues were treated at a national policy level. The Commissioners argued an 
approach to the question of the authenticity of Sickness Country and Coronation 
Hill as sacred sites that broke from presumptions of timeless traditionality in the 
assessment of sacredness, and further dealt with the problem of contradictions in a 
manner that dispensed with any requirement of doctrinal infallibility on the part of 
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custodians. While we can therefore see the Inquiry, as I argued elsewhere (Levitus 
1996), as a promising attempt to move beyond the confines of objectively 
documented authenticity and towards a re~thinking of a publicly defensible 
conception of sacredness, some limitations remain. Its very status as a policy forum 
and its attendant need to arrive at determinate findings bearing upon forthcoming 
policy decisions subjected its deliberations to a certain discipline that bracketed the 
play of interpretation, and required that it assess and organise the available 
argument and evidence for their incidence upon the formulation of end 
recommendations. So, for example, probing endlessly into the quandaries of 
contradictions would not have served that purpose. 
Research themes 
Just as the Government's decision had removed the-need for a Ministerial decision 
under the Heritage Protection Act, so it had annulled the tactical urgency behind the 
application for registration of Sickness Country as a sacred site under the Northern 
Territory legislation. In a less pressured climate, I proceeded to research and report 
on that application in 1991-92. In that report I did not return to the interpretive 
issues of traditionality of belief and contradictory testimony that had been 
extensively canvassed by myself and others in the years before. It appeared to me, 
just as it had to the RAC Commissioners, that the only workable approach to this 
practical issue of site management was to privilege current Jawoyn views. That is, 
rather than interrogate the antiquity of custodians' propositions about sacredness in 
order to positively establish or refute their authenticity, I treated those propositions 
that appeared to be generally settled and accepted among the custodians as making 
up a current statement of J awoyn tradition. As it happened, I was unable to 
recommend registration of the site because it was still not possible to define an 
external boundary for Sickness Country around more than half of its circumference, 
partly because two focal sites remained unlocated~ 
The submission of my Report on Registration of Sickness Country to the 
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Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority in October 1992 marked the end of my 
participation in the policy aspects of the issue. My thinking to that point had 
focussed on two themes. The first fell within that area of anthropological discourse 
known as the invention of tradition, and was a product of the opportunity I had 
found in archival and published sources and in the records of the Authority to trace 
in detail the reporting of Aboriginal concerns for places of religious sensitivity in 
and around Gimbat since the 1950s. That reporting had been intermittent until the 
mid-1970s, and more frequent since. During the RAC Inquiry I had searched for a 
term adequate to represent the cumulative appearance in this literature of 
perceptions of power, concepts of danger and sensitivity, place names, applications 
of mythological narrative to landscape, and interpretations of art, supplied by two 
generations of senior Aboriginal men over a large number of field trips and 
interviews. 'Invention' did not suit. Apart from lending itself to polemical misuse 
(Merlan 1991a: 351), it connoted a moment of radical disjunction which, it seemed 
to me, neglected the exploratory and reconstructive character of the enterprise into 
which the various informants, especially the three custodians I worked with, had 
been called. My term 'elaboration' was intended to catch that sense of their 
working from an attenuated and fragmented knowledge base about things known 
from previous times to be important: a creation story about Bula and a field of 
power surrounding the places he went. The RAC Commissioners welcomed 
'elaboration' and I have thought of nothing better since. However, while I still 
consider it an important theme, it is not one that I have room to explore in this 
thesis. 
The second theme was my developing understanding of the history of the 
Coronation Hill dispute. In part this interest flowed from another view I had arrived 
at during the RAC Inquiry, that the contradictions evident in J awoyn testimony 
about development at Coronation Hill were real and had to be taken seriously. 
From that hvo further lines of thought ere emerging. The first arose from that 
immediate interpreti e problem of how to understand or of ho much could be 
understood of contradiction. During the Coronation Hill dispute various parties 
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tried to explain apparent contradictions in ways that realised, in the end, a totalised 
and consistent account of J awoyn opinion. They tried to discriminate between the 
validity of J awoyn testimony reported from different occasions, arguing testimony 
reported from some occasions to be a flawed, and that reported from others to be a 
genuine, expression of Jawoyn views. By contrast, finding no way of satisfactorily 
explaining away incidents of contradiction, accepting, that is, that they were real, 
not just apparent, I conceded that no totalising interpretation was possible. Looking 
as closel as the data Vtrould allovv at each occasion of consultation, meeting, 
interview or inquiry, I concluded that each such occasion had to be treated on its 
own terms that each could be considered as a theatre in its O\Vn right, and that 
consequently none of the testimony recorded from the J awoyn during the six years 
of the Coronation Hill issue could be understood, independently of theatrical 
context, as a pure expression of values. While the arguments that had addressed the 
problem of contradictions to date had used context selectively, to rule some 
te timon out of account, I realised that context had to be acknowledged 
e ·erywhere. I eized upon the notion of theatre, and other notions that it suggested, 
performance~ script and text, as the core of an alternative analysis. 
I , conclu ion that J awoyn custodians really had contradicted themselves led to a 
econd line of thinking regarding the history of Coronation Hill. It ·meant that the 
ab olutel · oppositional terms of debate, of sacredness and tradition vs exploitation 
and de elopment that dominated b the time of RAC, did not reflect essential and 
original alue commitments on the ground. The records for 1986 and 1987 that I 
had een ugge ted that the question of mining at Coronation Hill was open, a 
matter for di cus ion, negotiation and management, and the problem of sacredness 
there was surrounded with uncertainty. During that period, Coronation Hill was an 
i sue but not a di pute. At" some point around the end of 1987 a fence was built 
between o oppo ed po ition and thereafter all parties invol ~ed had to line up on 
one ide or the other I did no at that point understand how the fence had come to 
be built but the explanation clead la with those organisations that claimed a 
management role e .peciall · the orthem Land Council: their internal processes, 
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dealings with the Jawoyn, and with one another. 
On this theme of perceptions and politics within and between organisations, of their 
dealings with the J awoyn and the responses that they elicited, there was much more 
to know. To complement the perspective already afforded by the records of the 
Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority, I gained access to the records of the 
Northern Land Council, BHP Gold, Parks Australia (then the Australian Nature 
Conservation Agency), and the Environment Centre of the Northern Territory, and 
interviewed several Land Council officers and consultants, so few of the former 
BHP officers as would in the end agree to see me, and a number of 
conservationists, Parks officers, and employees or consultants of other 1nining 
interests past and present who had local experience. I was interested in the detail of 
events, what people said and decided, the strategies of organisations and the 
perceptions and suspicions of their personnel, and in how all of that fed into the 
drawn out stages of government fact-finding and decision-making that culminated 
in June 1991. 
This research added greatly to my knowledge of interactions between J awoyn 
custodians and the various agencies that needed to know what they thought. I also 
developed a stronger sense of organisational strategising and inter-organisational 
politicking as a field that had to be treated as an independent source of action, 
rather than as one detennined, in some si1nple and unequivocal way, by relations 
with or instructions from the J awoyn. I began to conceive of the Coronation Hill 
issue as having proceeded at three levels. The first level consisted of programs of 
direct local access that an array of external agencies maintained with the J awoyn in 
order to obtain their advice, knowledge, opinions, decisions, or allegiance with 
respect to the 1nanagement of Coronation Hill and Sickness Country. The second 
level was that of competitive representations and lobbying between those external 
agencies in seeking to influence policy decisions, central to which were their 
representations as to what the J awoyn really thought and really wanted. The third 
was the process of governmental fact-finding and arbitration, in principle in the 
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service of a national interest, and vested in the Senate Committee of Inquiry and the 
Resource Assessment Commission, and finally in Federal Cabinet where some final 
balance had to be struck and the arguments closed down. While I make reference as 
necessary to these second and third levels, this thesis is mostly about the first level, 
the practice of consultation. The thesis takes the record of contradiction thrown up 
by consultations both as its central analytical problem and as a point of reference 
for understanding the two subsequent levels of process. 
The thesis 
This thesis argues that the processes instituted to manage the Coronation Hill issue 
framed an internally contradictory J awoyn orientation to the issue, and that that 
framing generated the textual raw materials from which arose much of the 
substance of the dispute. The argument is presented -as follows. 
The second chapter of this Part presents the historical, cultural and policy 
background of the region within which Coronation Hill is located. I discuss how it 
has been used and perceived in western and Aboriginal terms in recent decades, 
follow the development of concepts of affiliation and custodianship in terms of 
which Aboriginal attachments to the area have been understood, and review the 
stages by which policy had come to focus on the Gimbat area at the time the 
Coronation Hill issue began. 
Part 2 provides a conceptual framework for understanding how contradictions were 
generated. Chapter 3 establishes the problem of contradictions by citing the record 
of statements from senior J awoyn, especially two of the three senior custodians, 
and shows that on the face of it, there are no grounds for discriminating between 
their two expressed positions in terms of authenticity. Drawing on Goffman, I 
approach this problem by treating each consultation as a separate event, a 
metaphorical theatre in which ·the custodians were called upon to perform their _ 
custodianship. In responding to that demand, they had to choose on each occasion 
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between 'reading' from a 'script' of mining, jobs and royalties, or from an 
alternative 'script' of religious power and danger. These readings produced two 
contradictory sets of texts bearing on the issue of sacredness. 
Chapters 4 and 5 address the question of those dimensions of context necessary to 
understanding the custodians' selection of texts in different theatres. Chapter 4 
maintains the focus on individual consultation events, and shows how a question 
raised by Goffman about the actors' interpretation of the theatrical frame is usefully 
answered by Kenneth Burke in terms of the internal dyna1nics of theatres. I use 
Burke's 'ratios' to uncover the criteria that the custodians applied to determine the 
nature of each theatre and the appropriateness of one or other script for that theatre. 
Chapter 5 turns to another dimension of context, the pnor knowledge, or 
'information states', of the custodians. I show how the proposal to mine Coronation 
Hill raised a choice between two sets of values that could be realised from country, 
both of which appealed to the custodians for the way they resonated with different 
aspects of J awoyn history and social experience. I take guidance again from Burke 
by placing this history into an expanded conception of the theatrical scene. The 
alternative outcomes of 1nining and no mining both answered to identifiable needs 
and values. The J awoyn choice of script and production of text at each consultation 
event thus becomes a moment of orientation towards one or other of the alternative 
future potentialities offered by the issue at hand. 
The purpose of Pa1i 3 is to provide a reading of the history of the Coronation Hill 
dispute in the light of my argument about theatricality. The four chapters in this 
Part make up a chronological sequence only broadly, but explore the connections 
between those micro-articulatory processes discussed in terms of theatres, and the 
second level of political action, that of inter-organisational politicking, around 
Coronation Hill. They show how reciprocal interaction between these levels of 
process fed into the external history of the matter and turned it from an issue into a 
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dispute. 
Chapter 6 looks at the presumption of an authoritative Aboriginal centre around 
which sacred sites policy is organised, and shows how that presumption created a 
focus for organisational strategy and inter-organisational manoeuvring. Surviving 
political challenge in 1986, that presumption preserved the necessity of theatres as 
an instrument of issue management. I show how mistrust between the Sites 
Authority and the BHP project team developed initially from a contest over rights 
of access to people and country. 
Chapter 7 looks at the other side of the theatrical relationship and shows how the 
organising agencies, and sometimes individual officers, read different meanings 
into the performances produced by the custodians. These competing understandings 
were informed by the totality of interactions each agency maintained with the · 
custodians, including those outside the consultation events considered in Part 2. 
The chapter thus reveals a contrast between the continuous and cumulative 
interpretation of J awoyn views that each agency composed for itself from an 
ongoing narrative of interactions, and the discontinuous treatment of each theatre as 
sui generis by the custodians themselves. 
Chapter 8 disconnects the analysis from theatres for a time in order to trace the rise 
of the N·orthem Land Council to a position of pre-eminence in management of the 
issue, and the responses of the Authority and the project team in a context of 
Federal policy change. Having achieved that political transformation, the NLC took 
several months and drew on three identifiable sources to arrive at a position 
opposed to mining at Coronation Hill and elsewhere in the region. This 
understanding of its instructions turned the issue into a dispute. 
Chapter 9 shows the continuing theatricality in the participation of most semor 
J awoyn, including two· of the three male custodians, as the dispute entered its latter 
phases. It thereby develops the contrast introduced in chapter 7, between an 
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insistently contextual positioning by the J awoyn, and its selective effect of 
reinforcing opposed readings of the J awoyn position by external parties. 
Theatricality thus both sustained two involuted political relationships between most 
senior Jawoyn and the contending organisations, and entrenched the political 
dispute between those organisations. 
Part 4, chapter 10, concludes the thesis. I turn to Goffman again in asking what the 
record of performance allows us to know of the custodians themselves, and contrast 
my position with those of the protagonists on either side of the issue whose 
understandings of the J awoyn were based on their respective claims for having 
achieved genuine communication with them. I show briefly the continuation of 
theatricality to the last and highest stages of the policy process, and finish with 
some thoughts about the limiting and containing function of theatres for policy 
administration, and the refusal of theatrical performance to meet the assumptions 
about custodianship that underlie that function, in the case of Coronation Hill. 
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BACKGROUND: GIMBAT AND SICKNESS COUNTRY 
Until 1987, Coronation Hill was located in Gimbat pastoral station (Map 2). The 
area of Gimbat is now, following events to be described below, incorporated within 
Kakadu National Park. Sickness Country is the name given to an area that is now 
accepted by management agencies such as the Australian National Parks and 
Wildlife Service as being of sacred significance to the J awoyn people, and is 
managed with regard to the wide distribution therein of sensitivities associated 
primarily with the presence of the dangerous creator figure Bula. Its area is largely 
coincident with the previous area of Gimbat lease, thus it is also now . 
predominantly located within Kakadu National Park, but extends into neighbouring 
areas of Arnhem Land to the east, Eva Valley pastoral station to the south and 
Nitmiluk National Park to the south-west. 
This chapter provides background information for these areas. It begins by briefly 
reviewing aspects of the physical geography of the area in western and Aboriginal 
terms, then discusses how Aboriginal attachments to country have been understood 
in various research contexts, and presents an outline of modem post-settlement 
development history. Much of this material is presented with respect to Gimbat 
. rather than Sickness Country, because that lease, or specific parts of it, was usually 
the relevant geographical context at the time in question. The chapter then 
considers the place of Gimbat v.rithin policy. It shows the way policy developments 
established precedents for land management and a set of political relationships and 
expectations that, from the early 1980s, began to bear upon Gimbat. In doing .so, it 
also introduces some of the major institutional players in the Coronation Hill issue. 
Finally, it looks bri~fly at some indicators of political development and 
consciousness among the J awoyn immediately prior to Coronation Hill. 
Sacredness and Consultation 
Geography 
Coronation Hill is located in the Top End of the Northern Territory, about 220 
kilometres south-east of Darwin and about 160 kilometres inland from Van Diemen 
Gulf. It lies on the southern side of the upper South Alligator River, within the 
boundaries of the former Gimbat pastoral lease (Map 2). Gimbat was taken up as a 
pastoral prope1iy by Joseph Callanan in 1937 (Forrest 1987) over an area that, with 
later additions, included the uppermost reaches of the South Alligator River, part of 
the upper Katherine River, a wide upland valley between the two, a broad flat-
topped extension of the Arnhem Land plateau known as the marrawal in the south-
west, the more uneven main body of the western Arnhem Land plateau and its 
escarpment in the north, and a number of plateau outliers and hills. 
The vegetation is predominantly open savannah woodland, and the terrain is in 
many areas rocky or sandy. The upper South Alligator is a perennial spring-fed 
waterway that rises in the centre of Gimbat and flows north-west, while the 
Katherine is seasonal with a number of permanent waterholes, and curves from 
about the mid-point on the eastern boundary to the southern boundary. Both are fed 
by numerous tributaries. The largest of these are Gimbat Creek and Birdie Creek, 
which drain into the Katherine River from the north-eastern and south-eastern 
comers of Gimbat respectively, and Koolpin Creek and Fisher Creek, which drain 
into the South Alligator from the central northern areas. All of these creeks rise in 
neighbouring areas of the Arnhem Land plateau. Koolpin Creek flows for most of 
its length through elevated terrain. During the monsoonal wet season from about 
December to March, the flow of water in the two rivers and their tributaries causes 
sometimes severe but localised flooding, but there are no significant swamp or 
wetland areas that retain water for long into the dry·· season which extends from 
about April to November. 
In the north-western section of Gimbat, the South Alligator flows north-west 
through a narrow stretch of valley, bounded by the escarpments of the marrawal to 
the south and the Arnhem Land plateau to the north. A number of rocky hills lie 
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along this valley on either side of the river, confining the possibilities for alignment 
of the main access track or, in earlier days, for the movement of stock. Coronation 
Hill lies towards the south-eastern end of this scatter of hills. Two more prominent 
hills are Pulpul, directly north-west of Coronation Hill, and Big Sunday, located 
further upstream on the north-eastern comer of the marrawal. The main track 
follows the river, crossing the main channel three times before leading east across 
the broad sandy plain of the main Gimbat valley to Sleisbeck on the Katherine 
River. A two-wheel track runs north along the Katherine from Eva Valley station to 
Sleisbeck, and can be followed further upstream into Arnhem Land. 
Jawoyn geography encodes many features of the landscape in place names. Merlan 
and Rumsey discuss their types and informational content: 
To an unusual degree, the J awoyn system -of place-names is based on a 
principle of non-arbitrariness of the relation between a toponym, and the 
mythological, physiographic and other characteristics of the place so 
designated. (Merlan & Rumsey 1982: 61) 
In other words, the features of a place - its appearance, meanings, history or uses 
- can often be understood by J awoyn from its name. It may indicate the presence 
of a plant, animal or other object at the locality, its suitability for a certain activity, 
or more often its association with a mythological figure (1982: 60-61). 
The majority of sites have mythological associations. Most sites are 
connected with at least one mythic creator figure, in terms of which it 
makes sense to ask what is the ngan-jarang, or "dreaming", of the site as 
this is commonly expressed locally. Mythic figures are said to have 
performed certain actions, made certain movements or noises, or ·met with 
other figures, and it is these activities which make up the cosmology 
associated with landscape. Frequently, certain figures are said to have "put 
themselves", or some part of themselves, in the landscape; it is to this that 
many place-names allude. (1982: 63) 
Many local landforms are a creation of mythological figures or host to their 
continuing presence. When we travelled up the Katherine River from Eva Valley 
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towards Sleisbeck, Peter Jatbula and Nipper Brown recounted the _ story of another 
such journey that led to the river's creation. The crocodile Nabilil travelled from 
the saltwater up the Daly and then the Katherine Rivers before they were 
watercourses, naming places as he went far up into the top country. There the 
'blackfella bird' Bardaya struck Nabilil with a stone-pointed spear, cutting him 
open to release a great volume of water from inside him. N abilil also then lost the 
firestick, a tree good for making fire now found in that area. 
Other features have other stories. On the western side of the track approaching 
Sleisbeck, and again on the eastern side of the Sleisbeck crossing, the Rainbow 
Serpent vomited the bones of a group of people that he had swallowed at a nearby 
billabong, that now lie as low stone formations. At another mythological moment, 
after fighting each other, Bukbuk (the pheasant coucal) placed bamboo for spear 
shafts at Koolpin Creek crossing, and Jodet (the 'left-hand' kangaroo) left yellow 
ochre at a location on the South Alligator headwaters (Merlan 1992a: 140-41, 150; 
Merlan 1992c: 5). 
Such narratives docu1nent an Aboriginal knowledge of country that is distinctive 
both for its content and its ontology. The characteristics of country can be 
understood as signs or legacies of motivated action, of dreamtime agency. Further, 
because dreamings continue as a contemporary presence, they are something that 
people may encounter and must take cognisance of when travelling through country 
and visiting places. They have specific identities - different forms, personalities 
and attitudes - in different instances. They may be benign, nurturing, productive, 
mischievous or threatening. As illustrated by the stories above or further by the 
naming of places after Gupu the plains kangaroo, or N garradj the white cockatoo, 
the Gimbat landscape hosts a variety of such identities. It is most renowned, 
however, among Aborigines of the Top End, for the Bula dreaming. 
The first brief mention that I heard of Bula associated him with danger and 
prohibition. In 1984 I was at Nourlangie, in Kakadu National Park to the north of 
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Gimbat, talking to an elderly man, Maginnis, who associated himself with Gimbat 
country. For him, Bula signified earthquake. If you get a big barramundie, a long 
fat one, up in that country, you can't kill it, he told me, because it will bring Bula. 
Merlan and Rumsey (1982: 53-56, 68-69) had already drawn public attention to the 
status of Bula as the most powerful and dangerous of J awoyn dreamings, located at 
a number of sites that required vigilance to protect them from disturbance. Later, in 
response to early developments in the Coronation Hill issue, they compiled the 
information they had collected up to that time, a few details of which are given 
here. 
Although Bula is said to have emerged from the ocean and travelled overland, 
entering J awoyn country from the north, all major sites associated with him are 
located within Jawoyn territory, across Gimbat and immediately adjacent areas. 
Bula is thus a J awoyn dreaming, and J awoyn peopre are responsible for protection 
of its sites. This, however, is a responsibility that people of neighbouring groups 
are concerned to see fulfilled, for while Bula, like other dreamtime heroes, was a 
world-creative figure, the principal significance attached to him now is his 
immense destructive potential. If disturbed in any of his underground resting 
places, he will cause massive earthquakes and fires, killing all life and destroying 
the world. Anthropologists such as Bern and Rumsey, with comparative experience 
in other parts of Aboriginal Australia, have characterised this J awoyn complex of 
myth and sites as unusual for its apocalyptic character (Merlan & Rumsey 1986: 
16-18; cf. Kolig 1989a regarding the concepts of spiritual power relevant to the 
Noonkanbah dispute). Maddock, who carried out anthropological research on 
religion and ritual immediately east of J awoyn country in the 1960s (Maddock 
1988: 307), recorded from two Ngalkbon men at Beswick their apprehensions 
about a particular Bula site. If messed up, they said, 
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everyone might die. The effects were likened to an earthquake - "blow 
him up all this dirt, fish" ... "we fright, biggest fright". 
(Maddock 1986: 8)2 
Chaloupka found the same significance in northwest Arnhem Land: 
The bula places are known as far away as Oenpelli and Gumader [in north-
west Arnhem Land] and bula is usually translated as 'earthquake'. 
(Chaloupka 1979: np) 
Keen, researching the small areas of Gimbat initially included in the · Alligator 
Rivers Stage II Land Claim (see below), found similarly among Jawoyn 
informants: 
One of the Bolmo claimants, George Lander Bami:dja, identified his 
dreaming as Bulademu, or "Earthquake". He and others explained that it is 
not quite like an earthquake; it does shake the ground and all the people on 
it, but also bums everything up - trees, grass, even the water. 
(Keen 1980: 190) 
While the Gimbat area thus seems to have figured within Aboriginal geography as 
a zone of earthquakes deriving from this Bula presence, its characterisation as 
'Sickness Country' is an adoption from Arndt's two accounts (1962; 1966). He is 
ambiguous about its geographical extent, but derives the term from that part of the 
myth in which the creator figure, to whom Arndt gives an alternative name, 1s 
rendered sick from the bite of a hornet (1962: 303, 304; 1966: 232). 
The Jawoyn language group 
The distinction between Gimbat and Sickness Country is of some relevance to the 
ways in which Aboriginal attachments to land have been represented. Research 
efforts have clustered around two inter-related themes. One of these has been 
2 (Maddock 1974: 209) also records the volatility of this site as likened to an atomic explosion. 
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concerned with the modelling of Aboriginal traditional ownership of the area of 
Gimbat lease or parts of it, and has struggled with concepts of group responsibility 
for country. The other has dealt with the problem of the distribution of custodial 
roles with respect to sites of mythological significance, especially those associated · 
with Bula, and has tended to proceed from the data of individual performance and 
. knowledge. 
In this and the following section, I review some aspects of Aboriginal relations to 
land in the subject area. Much of this discussion, especially in the next section, is at 
one remove from the primary ethnography in that its focus is the history of the 
models that various researchers have formulated to represent traditional ownership 
and responsibility for sites. I adopt this approach because the representation of 
Aboriginal attachments, that is the ways others have understood Aborigines to 
exercise responsibility for country, is relevant background for a thesis that deals 
with the management processes brought to bear on Coronation Hill. That is 
particularly so where the models are themselves produced in contested policy 
contexts, and their validation or rejection in those circumstances has a precedent 
effect, and is therefore part of a constraining history, for subsequent policy stages. 
How well such models are able to accommodate the totality of lived dispositions 
towards places, accumulated by individuals over time, depends upon the policy 
requirements that the models are required to meet. As may become evident, the 
land claim context demanded more of a concern with the ideology of group 
structure than did the site protection context, and so there is some variability in the 
reducing effect that different representations have upon people's experience. 
The account given by almost all knowledgeable Aboriginal informants since the 
· 1950s and documented in a series of land claims, but most directly and intensively 
during the Jawoyn (Gimbat Area) Land Claim of the early 1990s, is that all of the 
area of Gimbat pastoral lease is, and always has been, the traditional territory of the 
Jawoyn language group (Keen and Merlan 1990: 38-39; Merlan 1992a: 4-5; 1992b: 
16-18). Gimbat lies toward the northern extremes of J awoyn country. At this 
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northern end, where J awoyn country extends into the southern portion of the 
Alligator Rivers region, it meets or merges into countries associated with other 
language groups. To the north-east and north of Gimbat, Jawoyn country merges 
into the sandstone plateau and lowland forest territory of Gundjehmi language 
group, known to the J awoyn as Mayali. Also north of Gimbat but further west, 
J awoyn country meets the South Alligator swamp country language group 
Mbukarla, and to the north-west, the Mary River language group of Uwiynmil, 
which has no surviving members (Map 3). 
The notion of the language group was proposed in Northern Territory land claims 
(Rumsey 1989) to represent a certain mode of identification between people and 
country. It proposes a 'tribal-level' commonality between people, country and 
language to be found among some Aborigines such as those just mentioned, and 
east of the J awoyn, the Mangarrayi of the upper Roper River and N galkbon of 
southern Arnhem Land (Merlan and Rumsey 1982; Merlan 1981; Merlan 1998: 
15). In such areas, 'there is frequent identification of large, continuous land areas 
with particular sociolinguistic groupings' (Merlan 1981: 141 ). People affiliated by 
descent to an area of country to which a particular language belongs are also 
owners of that language (Merlan 1998: 124-26). Descent in the case of the Jawoyn 
is cognatic, so that identification with J awoyn country, and therefore with the 
J awoyn language, can be transmitted through either the mother or father, though 
the owning of the language does not presume competence in the language (Merlan 
1992b: 10). The original identifications of people and language with country is a 
function of arbitrary Dreamtime prescription. 
Thus, ... it is not the case that, for example, J awoyn country is called this 
because it is or was occupied by people who speak the J awoyn language. 
Rather, it is called J awoyn country because it is the region in which that 
language was directly installed or 'planted' in the landscape by Nabilil, 
'Crocodile' , a Dreamtime creator figure who moved up the Katherine River, 
establishing sites and leaving names for them in the J awoyn language. In 
this formulation, the mediated link is not between language and country 
(which are directly linked), but between language and people: J awoyn 
people are J awoyn not because they speak J awoyn, but because they are 
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Map 3: Northern Jawoyn country with language groups to the north and east 
(adapted from Lawrence 2000: 142 and RUEi 1977: 14) 
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otherwise linked (by patrifiliation, matrifiliation, or both) to places to which 
the Jawoyn language is also linked. (Rumsey 1989: 75, italics in original) 
The term J awoyn is consequently an identifier of country and language, and also of 
a social group. The composition of that group is secondarily defined by the play, 
over successive generations, of personal choices of marriage and residence. Thus, a 
person entitled to claim J awoyn identity through one parent but who lives in the 
country of the other, non-J awoyn, parent is establishing the conditions through 
which he or she, or the succeeding generations of that family, will lose J aw_oyn 
identity, through choice, or forgetting, or a lack of recognition and 
acknowledgement by other Jawoyn. Conversely, people of combined Jawoyn and 
non-J awoyn parentage who remain, for at least some periods of their lives, within 
the conventional range of J awoyn residence and therefore of intra-J awoyn sociality, 
are preserving the conditions in which they would wish to assert, and are likely to 
have accepted, a claim to Jawoyn identity. Notably, such mixed affiliations, when 
further combined in marriage, are not transmitted into ever more fragmented and 
multiple identities in successive generations. Merlan (1998: 121-22) notes how dual 
language-group identities on the part of a parent or grandparent, such as Jawoyn-
Ngalkbon (a neighbouring south-west Arnhem language group) or Jawoyn-Mayali, 
are remembered by the children in the simplified form of a single affiliation for 
each progenitor, such that the inheritance by the children of anything more than 
dual language-group, or 'tribal', identity, one from each parent, is rare. 
Such differentiation of possible identifications over time via in-group and out-
group selection results in a reasonably coherent and geographically centred J awoyn 
group. The Jawoyn thus appear collectively as a social or 'communal' entity and as 
a physical presence in the Aboriginal cultural geography and politics of the Top 
End. That presence is concentrated at the township of Barunga, the one large 
settlement that is regarded as an unambiguously J awoyn place (Merlan pers 
comm), and is spread widely to Beswick, Eva Valley, Katherine town and its 
surrounding camps, Pine Creek, and north into Kakadu National Park, beyond the 
territorial limits of J awoyn country (Map 1 ). Gimbat itself, which makes up a large 
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part of the northern reaches of J awoyn country, has sustained a small and 
interrupted Jawoyn presence of generally less than a dozen people in recent 
decades, in the form of independent travelling bands, workers for Joe Callanan, 
trainees for BHP at El Sherana and Coronation Hill, or National Parks field staff. 
Aboriginal attachments to the Gimbat area 
The nature of Aboriginal group attachments to the Gimbat area was first addressed 
by anthropologists whose main focus of interest was land further north or south, 
such that models designed to represent traditional ownership in those areas 
included parts of Gimbat as a periphery or extension. To the north, Brandl (1973) 
identified and mapped the ownership of discrete estates by named patrilineal clans 
across north-west Arnhem Land and most of the Alligator Rivers region. 
Chaloupka (1975) reproduced that model, with different mapping, for the Ranger 
Inquiry land claim in 1975-76.3 For the Alligator Rivers Stage II Land Claim of 
1977-81, Keen ( 1980) elaborated the model to include language groups as an 
additional, sometimes intersecting, patrilineal land-owning entity, and marked the 
extent of individual estates by distributions of named sites instead of boundary 
lines. 
The overriding concern of these researchers was to identify named-group 
affiliations to land with as much local particularity as available. This model of a 
collection of contiguous, discrete, descent-group territories offered a useful fit 
(Rumsey 1989: 70) between the ideal features of each such patrilineal group and 
the concept of the 'local descent group' through which the Aboriginal Land Rights 
Act requires that traditional owners exercise rights over country. Such a fit was 
demonstrated in tenns both of bounded memberships and attachments to sites on 
the land. In both clai1ns, the Aboriginal claimants were listed according to 
3 These years refer to the period from the beginning of field research to the final hearings of 
evidence. 
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membership of each of these local patrilineal land-owning groups. Each group is 
composed ideally of one or more lineages and its membership is transmissible only 
through male members. In effect, then, both claims were presented as a collection 
of more localised claims, such that in the Stage II claim, each group was required to 
satisfy the definition of 'local descent group' in order for the Aboriginal Land 
Commissioner to recommend a grant of freehold title in its favour (ALC 1981: 13 ). 
Pursuant to this land claim model, local patrilineal descent group membership has 
been the primary criterion for determining rights to be consulted, make decisions, 
and receive royalty and other entitlements in the Alligator Rivers region. The 
localised, territorially affiliated clan group as a category of social organisation and 
as a mediator of person-land relations has consequently taken on an enhanced 
solidity in the affairs of the area. 
To the south of Gimbat, Merlan found similarly-that within the Jawoyn language · 
group is found a lower level of formal social organisation consisting of a number of 
named groups that are constituted as patrilineal clans and known as niow urrwurr. 
She (1998: 81) has identified forty-three such groups that are acknowledged as 
Jawoyn, about half of which still have living members. Membership of a 
1novvurnvurr derives from having a father with that identity, so that because 
membership of the larger Jawoyn group allows for cognatic descent connections, 
the memberships of all niowurrwurr together do not account for all Jawoyn people. 
That is, there is a residue of people who can claim J awoyn identity through their 
mothers, but have no 1no1vurrvvurr identity as their fathers were non-J awoyn. 
Differentiation according to descent affords to each niovvurrvvurr a membership 
that is ideally bounded and consistently determinable from one generation to the 
next. Such membership may also serve to differentiate intra-J a~royn territorial 
rights as the mottVUrrvvurr can operate as a mode of more localised attachment to 
country than is specified by membership of theJawoyn language group. 
Clan organisation is also a way of relating people to places. Clans for which 
such information is still knovvn are associated ,vith one or more focal 
places, as Girrimbitjba (clan) with Wetji Namurrgaymi (place), Bagala 
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(clan) with Melkjarlumbu (place), and Jambalawa (clan) with Wubilawun 
(place). In each place inheres at least one focal creator entity that clan 
members consider their own ( sometimes referred to in English as 
"Dreaming" or in Jawoyn as ngan-jarang-ngayu). This is a particular 
regional form of the Australian integration of place-person-totem. 
(Merlan 1998: 79-80) 
The mowurrwurr, however, did not figure in Merlan' s first attempt to model land 
ownership amongst the J awoyn. In the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim of 
1980-84, the task of proving traditional ownership to most of the claim area had to 
overcome the historical problem of a serious attenuation of knowledge about this 
system of associations between clan and place (Merlan 1998: 81). This led Merlan 
and Rumsey (1982) to depart from the localised patrilineal descent group model 
presented in the two previous land claims for areas to the north. Rather, they 
identified the J awoyn language group as a unified local descent group for all of 
J awoyn country. Their position was asserted early in the claim book. 
In the course of our fieldwork our questions about land ownership and 
responsibility were uniformly replied to in terms which left no doubt that 
the J awoyn group as a whole is considered to have primary spiritual 
responsibility for sites on the land. The more important a site, the greater 
the extent to which people asserted a strong responsibility of all J awoyn for 
it. 
With respect to the terms of the Land Rights Act, the J awoyn group is local 
in the sense that its identity is territorially-based in its collective country; it 
is a descent group in that recruitment to it is by a descent principle, filiation 
from a member or members of the group. Members of the group have in 
common primary spiritual affiliations to sites on J awoyn land. 
It is asserted that all persons referred to in the List of Claimants ... are 
members of a single local descent group of Aboriginals who, as a group, are 
the traditional Aboriginal owners of the undivided whole of the land 
claimed. (Merlan and Rumsey 1982: 7-8) 
The mowurrwurr, they argued (Merlan and Rumsey 1982: 7, 36-37), probably had 
never exercised sole spiritual responsibility for sites on the land, and in the period 
since European settlement had become of secondary importance to the J awoyn 
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language group as a whole as a conceptual mediator of people's sense of 
attachment to land. 
Up to this point, no analysis had focussed on Gimbat in its own right. Rather, 
models and maps of traditional ownership that were based on research concentrated 
to the north (Brandl 1973; Chaloupka 1975; Keen 1980) or to the south (Merlan 
and Rumsey 1982) had included Gimbat, or parts of it, as peripheral areas. In two 
of these exercises, the central principles employed in the models were unable to be 
extended without qualification to Gimbat. Thus, Brandl, in his 1973 map of 
'Aboriginal Traditional Territories', showed boundary lines around land-owning 
groups almost as far south as the Gimbat boundary. Placing the names of three 
J awoyn clans just outside Gimbat, he noted 'Boundaries of the territories not 
remembered'. Conversely, when the Jawoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim was 
tested with respect to two small claim areas excised from Gimbat pastoral lease, the 
claimants compromised the single language group model of traditional ownership 
to advance a notion of clan regionalisation. This concept was not fully explained, 
but at least presumed that members of certain niowurn1vurr understood their 
attachments to Gimbat to be of a particular quality that was not shared in an 
undifferentiated manner throughout the J awoyn language group. 
This comprormse of the unitary language group model posited , a relationship 
bet\veen clan and country different to that documented in the northern Alligator 
Rivers region, because it still denied clan-exclusive attachments. ·This difference 
had become apparent to Merlan from the frustration of her early attempts to define 
discrete clan territories. By the early 1980s, she had resolved the many instances in 
which her data on territorial attachments in Gimbat diverged from such a clan-
estate model by settling on a notion of non-exclusive clan regionalisation. Such a 
notion was appearing in accounts of land ownership in some other parts of the 
Northern Territory around that time (Merlan 1992b: 20). Merlan found that the 
affiliati_on claimed by a niowurrwurr to a particular site is not necessarily exclusive 
of other mowurrvvurr. In other words, clan connections vvith country overlap, and 
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more than one mowurrwurr will often be cited in relation to any given locality. At 
the same time, it was possible in some cases to document a strong identification of 
a particular mowurrwurr with a central site, as in the above quoted passage (though 
even these might not be exclusive of other mowurrwurr), such instances carrying 
significances of personal essence and deep sentiment for some, now elderly, 
individual clan members who usually had experience of those places from the 
travelling mode of life pursued years ago as stock workers or in the company of 
their parents (Merlan 1998: 92-93 ). Merlan employed the notion of clan 
regionalisation to suggest characteristics of clear geographical centredness 
combined with overlapping and diminishing identification and concern · at varying 
distances away. She thus conceived of clan territoriality primarily in terms of 
places that are experienced as what might be called a clan heartland, and discounted 
the quest for clear external boundaries (1998: 94). 
The claim for the two parcels of land in Gimbat was unsuccessful, but the main part 
of the claim, over Katherine Gorge (now Nitmiluk) National Park, succeeded in 
large part, validating the unitary language group model of traditional ownership. 
Throughout the latter half of the 1980s, procedures relating to possible mineral 
exploration and development, especially at Coronation Hill, insistently focussed 
J awoyn attention on site custodianship as a practical management issue in the 
Gimbat/Sickness Country area. Formulations of traditional responsibility were 
addressed to the issue of custodianship of the complex of sacred sites associated 
with the creator figure Bula. Though the concern here was with places located in 
this northern Jawoyn region, the modelling of custodianship laboured under the 
influence of the land claim model argued for Katherine Gorge. Reports written 
during that time by anthropological consultants and site research officers sought to 
strike an accommodation between, on the one hand, the regionally acknowledged 
status of Bula as a J awoyn dreaming and the land claim model of the J awoyn 
language group as a unified land-owning descent group (Merlan and Rumsey 1982: 
55-56), and on the other, the prominence in practice of a small coterie of senior 
men, and especially three 1nen of Wurrkbarbar mowurrwurr, in consultations and 
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meetings dealing with site management issues in Sickness Country. While a 
number of senior people, including some non-J awoyn, could be listed for their 
knowledge and authority without compromising the collective responsibility for 
that site complex held by the Jawoyn language group, there was some vacillation as 
to whether the three senior Wurrkbarbar men owed their personal pre-eminence to 
such seniority or to being Wurrkbarbar. 
Only in 1990, by which time those three Wurrkbarbar seniors were the sole 
surviving sources of traditionalist representations regarding the powers and dangers 
of Sickness Country, was the matter referred to the Jawoyn collectively for 
clarification. As the question of Coronation Hill moved into its penultimate stage of 
policy resolution, J awoyn people gathered in large groups at Gunlom to advise the 
Commonwealth Government's Resource Assessment Commission of their views. 
They acknowledged the authority of the three old men, Peter J atbula, Sandy 
Barraway and Nipper Brown, to speak for Coronation Hill (RAC 1991 a: 17 6), and 
thereby implicitly established an order of priority between mowurrwurr and 
language group within the authorised model of custodianship. Later that year, that 
model was given its new formulation by Keen and Merlan acting as consultants to 
the Commission. They noted the widespread deference among J awoyn to the right 
of those three seniors to speak for Coronation Hill, a right which was not directly 
challenged even by those people of opposite view on the question of mining (Keen 
and Merlan 1990: 11-14, 34-35). That right was attributed to the senior men on the 
basis of: 
recognition of their traditional attachment to the area at the level of 
mowurrwurr or "clan" ... Also (b) recognition of each one of these men' s 
association with the area during the course of their lives, and hence their 
greater familiarity with the country than others can lay claim to; ( c) 
recognition of each . one's identification with, and legitimacy of 
identification with, the Bulardemo ( or Bula) tradition via the handing on of 
custodianship from their senior kinsmen, most directly and especially from 
the fathers of Sandy Barraway and Peter J atbula; but also the sharing of that 
identification with a number of other Gimbat-linked Jawoyn, both deceased 
and still living, mainly the senior men of a mowurrwurr or clan usually 
known as "Jawoyn Bolrno". (Keen and Merlan 1990: 12) 
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Keen and Merlan here included both structural and personal factors, combined the 
themes of traditional group ownership of country and of individual custodianship of 
powerful sites, and acknowledged the special connection to Gimbat of a second 
mowurrwurr. Later, they gave to the question of traditional responsibility for the 
Gimbat area an historical and structural account that differentiated it from the 
J awoyn language group model of the land claim. More than in most other J awoyn 
areas, post-settlement conditions had allowed the preservation in the Gimbat area 
of a sense of attachments to country at a local descent group level. Though Gimbat 
is Jawoyn country, it includes places of especial significance to four particular 
mowurrwurr: Bamkiya, Marrkarala, Wurrkbarbar and Jawoyn Bolmo (so named 
because there are other Bolmo clans in western Arnhem Land that are not Jawoyn). 
The latter two had surviving members who could claim rights as traditional owners 
before other Jawoyn, and pre-eminent authority rested with the oldest and most 
knowledgeable among them, the Wurrkbarbar men (Keen and Merlan 1990: 41-43). 
The foregoing survey of the conceptualisation of land ownership in the Gimbat area 
over two decades shows how ethnographic modelling developed with more 
intensive and direct fieldwork experience and in response to both the proof 
requirements of land claims and the contemporary practice of site-related 
consultations. In the year after the Coronation Hill dispute ended, three further 
analyses, two by Merlan (1992a; 1992b) and one by myself (Levitus 1992), 
concentrated, wholly or in part, on the Gimbat area. Two of these were generated 
by policy processes, Medan's (1992b) anthropological report for the Jawoyn 
(Gimbat Area) Land Claim, and my report to the Aboriginal Areas Protection 
Authority on the registration of Sickness Country as a sacred site. 
To summanse, the three reports reiterated the pnmary custodial position of 
Wurrkbarbar and J awoyn Bohno mowurrwurr, and acknowledged a subsisting 
level of ownership residing in the larger J awoyn language group. Merlan further 
found that a third mowurrwurr with living members, Madjpa, was now 
acknowledged as having primary affiliations to an easterly area of Gimbat. For the 
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land claim, these two levels of affiliation, of language group and mowurrwurr, 
produced respectively larger and smaller claimant groups, the latter a sub-set of the 
former, and these two groups were argued in the alternative to satisfy the statutory 
definition of traditional ownership, with the clan group model given the primary 
running (Merlan 1992b: 62-69). The claim was accepted by the Land 
Commissioner on that latter basis (ALC 1996: 16-21, 38-39). In my report, I also 
proposed a third level of site custodianship found among occasional individuals, of 
other mowurrwurr or language groups, such as those who had in the past played 
prominent roles on the basis of knowledge, personal standing and life experience. 
Development history 
The Northern Territory generally is poor cattle country and of the four broad 
regions in which pastoral production has been attempted, the district of Darwin to 
the Gulf of Carpentaria, in which Gimbat lies, is the poorest. Nevertheless a 
disproportionate share of the first wave of stock was introduced into this region in 
the 1880s, including one of the largest herds of an estimated 8000 cattle at Glencoe, 
west of Gimbat. In the depression of the 1890s, huge areas of land in the region 
were surrendered, stocking levels collapsed and the Glencoe herd shrank to 200. 
The high cost of materials and wages, lack of infrastructure, absence of a 
significant local market, cattle disease and environmental difficulties combined 
with the general economic downturn to cause huge financial losses (Duncan 1967: 
3, 24-26, 37, 46-48, 161). It is doubtful that any organised pastoral operations 
penetrated into the Gimbat area during those decades, despite successive lessees 
including it within larger scale holdings marked out on the map of the Top End 
(Forrest 1987). 
In the early twentieth century, individual leaseholders persisted in extracting a 
living from undeveloped runs carrying uncertain numbers of stock. Immediately 
west of Gimbat, George Cooke ran Goodparla station until his death in 193 7, 
assisted by another versatile bushman, Monte Sullivan. According to 'Young Joe' 
37 
Sacredness and Consultation 
Callanan, the son of Gimbat' s first lessee, Sullivan looked around the ridges of the 
upper South Alligator and told Joe Callanan of country there waiting to be taken 
up. Callanan, who had trjed peanut farming, sawmilling and prospecting, had a 
small block on Beswick Creek with about 3 5 head of cattle. He drove them north, 
adding more wild, unbranded cattle (known as 'cleanskins') along the way, to take 
possession. 
From 193 7, Girribat became a remote cattle station that supported a basic standard 
of bush living for Joe Callanan and his immediate family and their Aboriginal 
workers. Cattle were mustered and driven on horseback. The closest sources of 
supplies were the town of Pine Creek, about 100 kilometres to the west, and the 
settlement of Maranboy, about the same distance to the south (Map 1), which owed 
their existence and changeable fortunes to local gold and tin mining respectively. 
Pine Creek, located on the Stuart Highway, is a permanent town that survives on 
mining and tourism. Maranboy now exists only as a police station on the Central 
Arnhem Highway that leads to the Aboriginal settlements of Barunga and Beswick. 
Travel to these places was originally by packhorse, but as the track to Pine Creek 
improved, Callanan used horse and buggy and later a Chev truck. Callanan was 
assisted on the station by Young Joe, who also found supplementary work 
elsewhere. 
The lease was purchased in 1964 by Sir William Gunn and some associates, who 
largely neglected and then in 1976 abandoned the property (Forrest 1987). Helmut 
and Joy Schimmel, of Darwin, occupied the station from 1981, proposing to 
develop a tourism enterprise, but it was resumed by the Commonwealth in 1987. 
Following the cessation of the buffalo shooting industry further north in 1956, feral 
buffalo spread south over Gimbat and grew into a large population, creating serious 
erosion problems in some creek catchments (RAC 1991b: 172). Random visitation 
for camping, fishing, shooting and bush walking and later by small organised 4 WD 
tour groups also developed during this period. Schimmel introduced controls over 
this use of the area by locking the gate on the main access road from Pine Creek. 
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Within Gimbat, the narrow section of the upper South Alligator valley in which 
Coronation Hill lies was the focus of most European activity during those decades. 
The access track from Pine Creek passed through this corridor, the three dwellings 
occupied by Callanan during his time on the station were all located at different 
points along this section of the river, and the main points of recreational interest 
from the 1960s, including Gunlo1n (then known as UDP Falls), the Christmas 
Creek rock art site, and billabongs along the South Alligator River and Koolpin 
Creek, lay along the valley or in the upland areas on its northern side. More 
importantly, however, a small uranium exploration and mining boom was 
concentrated there from 1953 to 1964. 
Mining had been the first of the Territory's industries, with recurrent rushes 
following discoveries of gold in 1870 and 1871 during construction of the Overland 
Telegraph Line south from Darwin (Powell 1982: 92-94). It is likely that individual 
prospectors, venturing out beyond the gold-bearing zones around Pine Creek, were 
among the first non-Aborigines to traverse the Gimbat area, but they left no mark. 
Joe Fisher, a central figure of the 1950s mining era, found no signs in the upper 
South Alligator valley of the kind of small-scale mining intensively pursued, 
mainly by Chinese, in the vicinity of the railway behveen Adelaide River and Pine 
Creek in the late nineteenth century. From the late 1940s, Joe Callanan and the 
Roberts brothers worked small mineral deposits on Fisher Creek and elsewhere 
(Fisher 1988: 2), including a copper deposit on Coronation Hill itself. 
Intense interest in uranium as a strategic mineral in the post-war years turned the 
attention of geologists to the upper South Alligator_ valley. An initial discovery in 
1953, again on Coronation Hill, led to the development of a series of mine sites4 
along a hventy kilometre stretch of the valley, as well as the Sleisbeck mine on the 
Katherine River (Fisher 1988). The mines were operated by three companies, and 
4 The number of mines in .the upper South Alligator valley between Coronation Hill (see Plate) and 
Rockhole Creek seems to depend on how one identifies a separate mine. Although the number is 
usually given as tv,rel ·e Fisher's map (1988 , reproduced here as Map 4) shows sixteen. 
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associated works consisted of four airstrips, upgraded road access from Pine Creek 
into the South Alligator valley as far as Fisher airstrip, extensive local access roads 
into the Arnhem Land escarpment, workers' accommodation camps at Sleisbeck, 
El Sherana and Rockhole, and two small treatment plants. The European population 
of Gimbat rose to over 100. Their efforts were represented in the popular media 
( eg. Farwell 1958) as the overcoming of the difficulties of a remote and 
mountainous area by pioneers of industrial civilisation. 
The activities of this decade were a preliminary exercise in the multiple overlaying 
of peoples and values in Gimbat. The era of marginal, extensive, low-technology 
cattle husbandry supporting a single family continued until the same year in which 
the mining ended, 1964. The mining itself applied an intensive, mechanised, 
landscape-altering technology and concentrated labour force to the recovery of a 
resource that was of scientific, industrial and military significance, instantly 
connecting Gimbat, as a remote periphery, to international systems of various 
kinds. Through the physical access that it created and the information networks it 
tapped, the mining also made both known and accessible those natural and cultural 
features of value for western tourism, research and heritage management. Fisher 
has often cited these as a by-product of mining and a credit to the industry. 
During aerial and ground exploration of the South Alligator and Katherine 
River Valleys, many outstanding Aboriginal cave painting sites were 
located by [North Australian Uranium Corporation] personnel in the 
"Sleisbeck" area, and [United Uranium NL] personnel, including me, in the 
South Alligator River Valley. Major sites located were invariably in 
sheltered areas under sandstone cover and in most instances, appeared to be 
living areas from evidence of charcoal and food remnant accumulations and 
grinding stones for seeds. A prime example was the Christmas Creek 
paintings later to be identified with the "Bulla" archiac [sic] culture ... 
In those early days of exploration and mining, we were conscious of the 
need to record and protect sites of apparent significance, even though there 
was no requirement to do so under the Mining Act. .. 
Fro1n 1955 onwards, the access tracks developed by the mining companies 
were increasingly used to visit and enjoy the delights of the many scenic 
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Map 4: Joe Fisher's map of uranium mines in the upper South Alligator valley 
(from Fisher 1988). 
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sites located around the escarpment, including cave painting sites, 
accessible by company and station roads and tracks. (Fisher 1988: 6, 7) 
Visitor numbers grew rapidly in the 1960s (Fisher 1988: 21). Being a proudly 
responsible miner of the time, Fisher sought protection for the Christmas Creek site 
as a reserve, and during his later political career, formulated one of the first national 
park proposals for the Alligator Rivers region. This proposed park, immediately to 
the north of Gimbat, was conceived in terms of the preservation of the natural 
scenic attractions of parts of the escarpment and wetlands. 
The Aboriginal presence was also sustained through the decade of mining. A small 
labour force continued in employment with Callanan and subsequently with Gunn 
until the early 197 Os, and Gimbat continued to be used by occasional foot travellers 
moving across the western Arnhem Land plateau between Oenpelli and Maranboy . . 
As suggested by Fisher's passage above, these travellers or other seasonal visitors 
may have continued using the large wet season rock shelters in the northern upland 
area contemporaneously with the mining. The Gimbat station workforce was not 
dominated by any tribal group, indeed for those years in the 1960s for which census 
data is available, J awoyn people were usually in the minority, and Callanan himself 
understood the area to be Mayali country. Similarly, the 1955 data recorded in the 
Register of Wards· lists eleven people of four languages: Jawoyn, Kunwinjku, 
N galkbon and Rembarmga. The last three are all language groups of Arnhem Land, 
which suggests that Gimbat, a poor and remote outpost of the pastoral economy, 
was, like other stations bordering the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Reserve, a point of 
first access to western commodities for peoples from the reserve. 
In the early 1970s, the NT Welfare Division asked some of their field officers to 
report on the heritage and Aboriginal significance of the 'Christmas Creek Cave 
Paintings' in the narrow corridor of the upper South Alligator valley. Their 
comments are inconsistent on the current cultural import attributed to the motifs by 
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J awoyn people interviewed at several locations, 5 but jostling with this varying 
cultural concern are a few statements on other kinds of interests that Aborigines 
might have in Gimbat. The two main Aboriginal assistants on these trips were Mick 
Lora and his brother Soupy Marapunyah (see Merlan 1998: 38-41), members of the 
Gimbat-focussed Jawoyn Bolmo mowurrwurr (see above). Brandl recorded 
separate comments from both, which he found to be indicative of wider J awoyn 
sentiment, that Gimbat is their country and they wished to have possession of it. 
His reports recommended acquisition of the lease and contemplated the 
possibilities for J awoyn management and ultimately ownership of tourism or 
pastoral ventures (see further chapter 5). When in 1973 the property was offered by 
Gunn to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Brandl reiterated his findings, but · 
no transfer of the station was effected. 
The Alligator Rivers region in policy 
The decade-long efflorescence of mining activity in the l 950-60s drew official 
attention to Gimbat both for reviving industrial activity in the Northern Territory 
and for expanding the connection between the Northern Territory and the 
international nuclear industry that had been established by the Rum Jungle deposit 
near Darwin. The next two sections further review those aspects of the Gimbat area 
that are of importance to major interest groups in Australian public affairs , and 
discuss the beginnings of the modem policy era for land management in that region 
from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The story presented here replicates the 
pattern of my previous discussion of the modelling of Aboriginal attachments to 
land, in that for some time policy debates that had their principal geographical 
focus elsewhere had implications that overflowed into Gimbat, so that it was only 
against a background of settled policy history that Gimbat itself became the focus 
5 A.Bishaw, 30.9.71, Letter to Administrator (Welfare): Christmas Creek Cave Paintings; E.Brandl, 
30.3.72, Letter to Director Welfare Research: Christmas Creek Cave Paintings; E.Brandl, 20.12.72, 
Letter to Director Welfare Research: Christmas Creek Cave Paintings; Australian Archives (NT) 
Series Fl, Files 69/4013 , 74/4732. 
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of interest. Its significance derived in most respects from its relationship to parts of 
the Top End of the Northern Territory defined variously in geological, 
mineralogical or ecological terms as the Pine Creek Geosyncline, the Uranium 
Province, or the Alligator Rivers region. 
The Pine Creek Geosyncline is a major geological formation that stretches across 
the western Top End from Oenpelli in the east to the Batchelor/Rum Jungle area in 
the west, and from the coast to Katherine. As the host formation for uranium, gold 
and many other minerals (Needham & Roarty 1979), it has been of major 
importance for Northern Territory history since the first gold diggings between 
Adelaide River and Pine Creek in the 1880s. In recent decades the Pine Creek 
Geosyncline has attracted international attention from geologists and has yielded 
the resource base for a disproportionate number of the Northern Territory's most 
important mining operations. Gimbat is located entirely within the extent of this · 
formation and the upper South Alligator uranium field of the 1950s and 1960s was 
one if its economic manifestations. 
The Uranium Province, or the 'Alligator Rivers Uranium Field' (Needham & 
Roarty 1979: 139; Needham et al. 1973), is located across the north-eastern section 
of the Pine Creek Geosyncline, and was so named following discovery of the major 
uranium prospects of N abarlek, Ranger, Koongarra and J abiluka in the years 197 0 
to 1973 (Map 2). Those discoveries drew Federal Government attention to the area, 
and so initiated the current policy era in that part of Australia. In the first instance a 
detailed and extended assessment was required of the character of the local region 
in which the discoveries had been made. A number of interests were already 
established there (Saddler 1980: 188-89) and the prospect of large uranium mines 
had implications for all of these. Small safari camps were catering for Australian 
and international tour groups. Two pastoral stations in the north of the region were 
planning further development of their buffalo operations, and were concerned about 
radioactive contamination of water and pasture. 
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Another interest group was represented within government by the Northern 
Territory Reserves Board which, from 1965, had promoted a number of proposals 
for a national park in the Alligator Rivers region. The last of these, in 1971, 
included the north-eastern comer of Gimbat. The history of the Board's efforts to 
have an adequate area conserved in the face of competing pastoral and mining 
interests were set out in a booklet (NTRB nd) circulated in mid-1972. It documents 
the urgency and frustration felt by members of the Board in 1970 as mineral 
exploration progressed and the discovery of what became the Ranger uranium 
deposit was announced. Their response illustrates prevailing notions of 
incompatibilities in land use. The Chairman's letter to the Northern Territory 
Administrator, 
stated that Authorities to Prospect had been granted over almost the total 
area proposed to be reserved [ as a Park] by the Minister. The letter 
concluded as follows:-
"Is it too much for my Board to expect an indication of policy, for if this be 
in favour of the mining interest, my Board will be advised by me to 
abandon all further attempts to secure this area as a National Park for 
posterity, and will commence a search for another area somewhere else in 
the far North." (NTRB nd: 7) 
Senior decision-makers, however, were looking for a balance, and the Federal 
Minister for the Interior now wanted to delay settling land use questions until 
mineral exploration was more advanced (nd: 10). Subsequent discussions between 
mining companies and government led to an agreement to jointly fund the 
Environmental Fact-Finding Study of the Alligator Rivers Region of the Northern 
Territory. Its various research projects were planned by a committee consisting of 
bureaucrats, miners and the Australian Conservation Foundation, and were carried 
out in 1972-73 over an 'Alligator Rivers Region' defined as the entire East 
Alligator River catchment and the main channel and eastern catchment of the South 
Alligator. 
Previously a remote and little developed region, it has become an area of 
considerable interest and activity in the last decade, primarily because of: 
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a growing awareness of its scenic, recreation, and tourist attractions, and its 
highly diverse wildlife and native flora; 
pressure for a large part of the region to be declared a national park; 
the discovery of very large resources of uranium; 
a renewed interest in developing the pastoral industry; 
an increasing concern for the preservation of Aboriginal sites of cultural and 
scientific significance. 
Because of the opportumties for allocating land in the area for various 
economic and cultural purposes, there has been growing interest in having 
the various possibilities assessed, and in the future uses of land being 
planned with a full awareness of the consequences to the environment and 
to one another. It was evident that, if rational decisions were to be made 
about the future of the region, taking the environment and all interests into 
account, much more factual information about it was necessary. 
(Christian & Aldrick 1977: 1) 
Consistent with the laws, though not with the changing political culture (Rowse 
2000), of the time, the studies were restricted in the terms in which they conceived 
'· 
of an Aboriginal presence or interest. The projects on archaeology and rock art 
were framed with the scientific, heritage and curiosity values of academia and 
cultural tourism primarily in mind. Carroll (1973: 16), then the Oenpelli mission 
linguist, was the first to register a protest at disregard for Aboriginal feelings about 
the use of their land, both by researchers and by proponents of a national park. 
While the majority of the region's population, concentrated at Oenpelli, was 
acknowledged to be Aboriginal, their concerns were represented solely in terms of 
sacred site protection (Christian and Aldrick 1977: 143). 
The limited definition of the Alligator Rivers region adopted by the Fact-Finding 
Study included, at its southern end, a triangle of country that extended into Gimbat 
fro1n the northern boup.dary to the centre. That portion, however, did not figure as a 
prominent component and attracted little attention from the researchers in the field. 
Neither the archaeological survey of Kamminga and Allen nor the rock art survey 
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of Edwards included any Gimbat sites (Christian and Aldrick 1977: 62, 67), though 
Edwards (1979: 104-5) discussed a major site near Sleisbeck for its comparative 
mythological significance. While the documentation of such local particularities 
would ultimately be essential for informing policy outcomes in Gimbat, the Fact-
Finding Study was still significant for its general approach. It was conceived as a 
regional assessment of environmental values, that is, as a preliminary grounding 
exercise for the policy process over an area conceived on a geographical scale that 
took particular development proposals as its starting point, but was not restricted to 
their areas of direct impact. Further, it weighed the policy significance of its 
findings within a framework of possible combinations of interests: the multiple 
land-use paradigm. 
A characteristic of the region is that most parts of it have multiple values 
and multiple use possibilities. Future land use planning will of necessity 
involve consideration of alternatives, compatabilities [sic] and 
incompatibilities. An endeavour has been made to delineate those parts of 
the region which have related values, and similar multiple use possibilities 
or sensitivities. The following three 'Tracts with Multiple Potential' are the 
broad areas of the region about which environmental decisions are likely to 
be required in the foreseeable future. They are: 
the Escarpment Tract 
the Lowland Tract 
the Drainage Tract (Christian and Aldrick 1977: 107) 
Again, in the acco1npanying map (1977: 109), little of Gimbat was included in this 
typology. Only the upper South Alligator River valley and the northern escarpment 
line were marked. 
The next stage of the policy process was instituted by the Federal Labor 
Government that took power from the conservative parties in 1972. This stage 
addressed more directly the question of what developments should be allowed in 
the region. Some changes were already in place. The Northern Territory 
Administration in 1972 establis4ed an Alligator Rivers Wildlife Sanctuary within 
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boundaries that included the Koongarra uranium deposit, and a small number of 
rangers were appointed. By 1974, construction of the all-weather Arnhem Highway 
was completed from the Stuart Highway to J abiru, allowing a rapid increase of 
uncontrolled four-wheel-drive tourism. Then, in 1975, the Ranger Uranium 
Environmental Inquiry was instituted under the Commonwealth's Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act of 197 4, · and required to look into 'all the 
environmental aspects' (RUEI 1976: 1) of the mining of the Ranger uranium 
deposits. 
This Inquiry, and its surrounding circumstances, were again of general significance 
for the policy environment affecting Gimbat. It became a focus for the redefinition 
and enlarged participation of two public-policy interest groups, the environmental 
and Aboriginal. It arose from emerging concerns within government about 
Australia's participation in the nuclear industry, -and turned the attention of the 
Australian environmental movement to the Alligator Rivers region with the energy 
of a burgeoning, multi-organisational, anti-nuclear campaign (Falk 1982; Hutton & 
Connors 1999: 137-43). It also coincided with the passage of the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act by Federal Parliament in 1976. Section 4 
authorised the Minister to transfer to Aboriginal ownership the area of the Arnhem 
Land Aboriginal Reserve which bordered Gimbat to the east and included part of 
what was later identified as Sickness Country (Maps 3, 4). In addition, the Inquiry 
delayed preparation of its Second Report in order to hear the first land claim under 
the Act, over a further area west of the Reserve and immediately north of Gimbat 
(RUEI 1977: 5-7, 253-83). Section 4, and the Inquiry's recommendation that the 
further claim be granted, meant that the Aborigines of the region could be regarded 
as land owners with a legitimate interest in resource management decisions, a status 
that they did not have at the outset of the Inquiry. 
Moreover, even before they acquired that status, local Aborigines were identified as 
important and perceived as sympathetic to the lobbying efforts of both 
environmentalists and miners. As occurred again at Coronation Hill, both groups 
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developed contacts with local Aboriginal people, seeing them as allies who were, 
however, easily subject to deception or manipulation by the opposing side (Grey 
1994: 193-94; Leichacz 1975; Marshall 1975). Once the Federal Government 
decided in 1977 to allow uranium mining at Ranger and N abarlek, environmental 
activists emphasised their common cause with the anti-mining Aboriginal 
sentiment that the Ranger Inquiry Second Report had overruled (RUEI 1977: 9). 
Later they joined in criticism of the Northern Land Council for having carried out 
inadequate consultation with local Aborigines before signing the Ranger 
Agreement in November 1978 (Graves 1979; Hutton & Connors 1999: 142-43). 
The experience of this campaign established within conservationist thinking a 
preconception that Aborigines in remote Australia, oriented to traditional values, 
would be natural allies in any struggle against mining on their lands. This 
preconception proved durable well into the 1980s, despite a substantial shift in 
Aboriginal opinion regarding other uranium deposits in Kakadu National Park. 
The Ranger Inquiry expanded the Fact-Finding Study's definition of the Alligator 
Rivers region to cover the catchments of the West, South and East Alligator Rivers 
and much of the Wildman River, thereby including the north-western half of 
Gimbat (RUEI 1977: 14). Much of that portion, however, lay within the 'southern 
hills and basins' sub-region, which attracted least attention in the Inquiry's review 
of the values and potentialities of the Region (RUEI 1977: 15). Nevertheless, the 
broad trend of the Inquiry recommendations posed a new future for the Gimbat 
lease area. The Inquiry had before it a range of proposals for the establishment of a 
national park, ranging from the most minimal previously documented by the 
Northern Territory Reserves Board, to blanket inclusion of all Alligator and 
Wildman River catchments (RUEI 1977: 200-1). Several of these overlapped into 
Gimbat. Following from the management philosophy of the Fact-Finding Study, 
the Ranger Inquiry had to decide where conservation was to fit amongst other 
possible uses of the Region. 
The fact that a national park has still not been established is clearly linked 
with the competing claims of other land uses, particularly mining. Prospects 
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for uranium mining emerged in the early 1970s concurrently with proposals 
to reserve land from mining. A problem with proposals put forward earlier 
by the Northern Territory Reserves Board was that they conflicted with the 
responsibilities and interests of some branches of the Territory 
Administration or with the rights of holders of land already allocated for 
other purposes. 
In part the failure can be attributed to the lack of a co-ordinated land use 
plan and an established plan of land use management for the Region, a 
situation by no means limited to this part of Australia. Allied to this is an 
apparent reluctance to give top priority to the reservation of large areas for 
national park or conservation purposes if there is a possibility of substantial 
economic returns from some other form of land use. (RUEI 1977: 202) 
The Ranger Inquiry Second Report (RUEI 1977: 291-92, 305-10) went on to 
remedy this by formulating a land use package for the entire region that prioritised 
and coordinated the claims of a number of interests (Saddler 1980: 191-93 ). In its 
recognition of mining, conservation and tourism, that package sought to · 
acknowledge and regulate a set of claims that were not only already to some degree 
established within the local law and practice of land use, but had substantial 
implications for elevating the significance of the region at national and 
international levels. In two other respects, however, the package departed from past 
policy priorities. The recognition of Aboriginal entitlements to land was new, as 
was the concern that all other interests in the region should be pursued in a manner 
that at least minimised adverse impact on, if not elevated the morale and economic 
standing of, the Aborigines (RUEI 1977: 231-33). Conversely, the most parochial 
of white economic interests, pastoralism, was offered no long-term security. 
Fallowing from the finding that ' [ t ]he pastoral industry does not appear to us to be 
a desirable form of land use in this Region' (RUEI 1977: 290), its interests were 
explicitly subordinated to those of environmental conservation. Moreover, the 
Ranger Inquiry conceived of the conservation values of the region in broad 
ecological terms, framing its national park proposal around a principle of total river 
catchment protection. That had direct implications for areas a long way from the 
proposed uranium mines, such as Gimbat. 
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Many expert witnesses have stated, and the Commission accepts, that it is 
desirable to include at least one large total river catchment in a regional 
national park. Whether or not uranium mining proceeds, the South Alligator 
River catchment is clearly the most suitable. It includes most of the area 
within the boundaries which were proposed in 197 5 for the Kakadu 
National Park; it includes the valuable Woolwonga wildlife area; it 
comprehends most of the land types which exist in the Region; and it avoids 
major encroachment onto the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Reserve. To include 
this . whole catchment, all of Goodparla and portion of Gimbat pastoral 
leases, in which the river and some of its tributaries have their headwaters, 
would have to be resumed. We are not sure whether this would be 
acceptable to the present leaseholders. (RUEI 1977: 288) 
Though located some distance north of Gimbat, the uranium discoveries thus 
instigated the development of a complex and highly-determined policy regime that 
ultimately included Gimbat within its purview. The size and value of the deposits 
allowed the mining industry to argue an ultimately successful case for multiple land 
use in an environmentally sensitive area, a precedent on which the industry has 
since sought to capitalise, including during the Coronation Hill dispute. The ethos 
of a balanced accommodation of interests that guided the Ranger Inquiry is 
tellingly illustrated at one point in its Second Report (RUEI 1977: 283-85), dealing 
with circumstances that later arose again in Gimbat. The Ranger uranium deposits 
lay directly north of Mt Brockman, one of the most mythologically dangerous 
locations in western Arnhem Land. On the question of how close to that site the 
southern boundary of the mining lease would be put, the Inquiry marked a line 
between the Northern Land Council's preferred boundary, which cut across a 
proven ore body, and the company's, which ensured access to another radioactive 
anomaly further south. The ore body could thus be mined, but the anomaly could 
not be further investigated. Archetypally incompatible values of 1nining 
development and Aboriginal sacredness were thus placed into a position of mutual 
accommodation within a secular policy regime of land management, by means of a 
territorial compromise. 
Accompanying or following upon these striking developments in the philosophy 
and practice of remote area regional planning were important institutional changes 
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in the Northern Territory. Two new institutions responsible for protecting and 
advancing the Aboriginal interest in land were established. Both of them played 
major roles in the Coronation Hill issue. The Northern Land Council was one of 
two major land councils created by the Commonwealth Government's Aboriginal 
Land Rights (NT) Act 197 6 and its functions are governed by that Act. Its 
membership consists entirely of Aboriginal representatives of several regions 
making up the top half of the mainland Northern Territory, and its work is carried 
out by a substantial professional bureaucracy divided into branches such as law, 
anthropology and resource management. In the period to the late 1990s, now 
thought of as the first generation of land rights, the NLC's major responsibility was 
to assist Aborigines to establish their traditional ownership of unalienated Crown 
land before the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, who could then recommend the 
granting of inalienable freehold title to an Aboriginal Land Trust. More generally, 
its functions may be summarised as ascertaining the wishes and representing the 
interests of traditional Aboriginal owners of land within its area with respect to any 
issue relating to ownership or use of that Aboriginal land. Such issues have 
prominently included negotiating the conditions under which mineral rights will be 
granted over Aboriginal land. Its first negotiations began immediately after its 
establishment, leading to agreements with respect to the Ranger (1978), Nabarlek 
(1979) and Jabiluka (1982) uranium mines (Altman 1983: 56-61 , 64-66; von 
Sturmer 1984: 89-94). While the Land Rights Act allows an Aboriginal veto over 
mineral exploration on Aboriginal land, such a veto does not apply to mining 
interests existing prior to the passage of the Act. In such circumstances the NLC 
has power to negotiate an agreement with the company, but can support traditional 
owner opposition to mining only by political means. 
The Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority \¥as a Northern Territory 
Government agency established in 1978 under the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 
(NT) and responsible for documenting and registering Aboriginal sacred sites 
throughout the Territory (see Ritchie 1996). It was re-established under new 
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legislation in 1989 as the Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority.6 The Authority 
itself consists mainly of senior Aborigines nominated by the NLC and its southern 
counterpart, the Central Land Council, from all regions of the Northern Territory. 
Its work is carried out by a staff of anthropological field researchers and supporting 
technicians. The Authority has compiled maps and locational data of sites across 
the Territory in two categories. Registered sites are those for which Aborigines 
responsible for them, referred to in the Act as the 'custodians', have requested the 
protection of the Act, and recorded sites are those that have come to the Authority's 
attention from various sources but for which custodians have not requested such 
protection. The Authority has accumulated detailed documentation regarding the 
significance of these sites within contemporary Aboriginal belief systems. 
Anyone wishing to work upon land that is a sacred site can seek permission from 
the Authority. Under the original Act as a matter of practice and under the current 
Act as a matter of law (Ritchie 1996: 214-15), the Authority arranges consultations 
between the proponents of work and the custodians, mediated or at least observed 
by officers of the Authority. Those officers have the responsibility of ensuring that 
the custodians understand and approve of proposals put to them, before 
recommending to the Authority that site access be allowed. The Authority under its 
original legislation then issued a permit or written permission, and under its current 
legislation a Certificate, allowing access subject to appropriate conditions. An 
Authority Certificate provides the applicant with an absolute defense to prosecution 
for violating the registered site. The Act and the Authority thus do not ensure the 
absolute inviolability of a site, only that consultation occurs and informed consent 
is obtained before any interference. The Authority has powers of prosecution for 
unauthorised interference with any sacred site, whether registered or not (Castan & 
Hartnett 1982), but it is a defence to show that the trespasser had no reasonable 
grounds for suspecting the site to be sacred (Renwick nd: 27-28, 44). Under the 
6 The original legislation consisted of the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Ordinance 1978, and the 
Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act (No. 2) 1978. The new legislation was the Northern Territory 
Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989, on which see further Avery (1993: 126-27). 
52 
Background: Gimbat and Sickness Country 
original Act in force until 1989, registration had no strict legal effect, but provided 
the Authority with some of the information it needed to administer site access or 
prove sacredness, and along with the Authority's practice of erecting signs, could 
weaken a defence of ignorance in the event of prosecution (Ellis 1994: 31-33; 
Renwick nd: 29). Under the current Act, registration creates a prima facie legal 
presumption that the site is a sacred site. 
In 1978 the Northern Territory was granted self-government, but Kakadu National 
Park, uranium mining, and most aspects of the Land Rights Act, were retained 
under Commonwealth jurisdiction, the Park to be managed by the new Australian 
National Parks and Wildlife Service (Lawrence 2000: 66-69). The entire area over 
which Kakadu might finally extend under the Ranger Inquiry scenario, including 
Gimbat and Goodparla, was transferred in fee simple to the Commonwealth. A 
clawback of jurisdiction in the Alligator Rivers region has since been a Territory 
Government objective (Dreyfus 1982). Control of Kakadu, its expansion and World 
Heritage listing, and limits imposed on mining and tourism within its boundaries 
became perennial points of complaint for successive pro-development Territory 
governments throughout the following decades (Lawrence 2000~ 196, 203-5, 227-
32, 236). 
Gimbat in policy 
In the 1980s, against this substantial background of policy settings adopted over the 
larger region, the interest groups mobilised and institutions created during the 
1970s turned their attention to Gimbat. To this point, there had been coordinated 
legal recognition of the three major contending interests - Aboriginal, mining and 
conservationist - in the region. Declaration of Kakadu National Park proceeded in 
stages. Stage I was declared in 1979 over the central, central-eastern and far north-
eastern areas, and Stage II in 1984 over the northern and north-western areas (Map 
2). In both cases, pre-existing mining leases over the major uranium deposits were 
excised from the Park. By the mid-1980s, declaration of Stage III was on the 
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Federal Government's agenda, and this was expected to extend Kakadu south into 
Gimbat and Goodparla Stations to protect most of the remaining South Alligator 
catchment The Ranger Inquiry land claim had led to the transfer of almost all of 
Stage I of Kakadu to Aboriginal ownership before its declaration as park. -That 
procedure was repeated when the Alligator Rivers Stage II Land Claim (Keen 
1980) was heard prior to declaration of Stage II. Those areas successfully claimed 
were then leased back by the Aboriginal owners to the Parks Service. 
The N orthem Land Council therefore anticipated an opportunity to claim Gimbat 
and Goodparla Stations on behalf of the traditional owners in between resumption 
of those stations by the Crown and their declaration as National Park. The 
Australian Conservation Foundation had attempted unsuccessfully to purchase the 
Gimbat lease in the late 1970s, and viewed inclusion of the area in Kakadu as 
essential to proper management of its heritage and environmental values. The 
mining industry wanted all prospective areas within the two leases preserved for 
future exploration. The Coronation Hill Joint Venture, under another name, had 
resumed exploration in the upper South Alligator valley in the 1970s. When in the 
early 1980s the international price for gold rose, the old uranium workings became 
of renewed interest for the indications of gold that had been noticed in association 
with the uranium. BHP, the on-site operating member of the Joint Venture, began 
drilling at the old mine on Coronation Hill in 1984, and soon obtained very 
promising results. 
Among the Territory Government's first strategies was to challenge the idea, first 
given serious credibility by the Ranger Inquiry (RUEI 1977: 331), that Kakadu 
could ultimately extend over Goodparla and at least part of Gimbat. It convened a 
Gimbat/Goodparla Land Use Study group of Territory and Commonwealth 
agencies in 1980 to gather resource information for that area as a basis for land use 
decisions. The final report of the Study (NTG 1982) argued that inclusion of the 
two leases in Kakadu would not achieve the Ranger Inquiry' s vision of total 
catchment protection for the South Alligator River, and that the area offered major 
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alternative development opportunities 1n pastoralism, agriculture and of course 
m1n1ng. 
At that time the upper South Alligator valley was part of the Gimbat pastoral lease 
and was therefore not available to be claimed as Aboriginal land, and Coronation 
Hill was not subject to any other form of legal protection for environmental or 
Aboriginal values. The only legislation able to protect Aboriginal interests in 
Gimbat was the Northern Territory's Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act. Research 
conducted for the Sacred Sites Authority (Merlan & Chaloupka 1980) had led to 
the registration in 1980 of two focal Bula sites in Gimbat, and documentation of a 
third (Merlan & Rumsey 1980). Awareness within both the Authority and the NLC 
of the importance of Gimbat sites grew with a succession of land claims and other 
local issues. NLC research for the Alligator Rivers Stage II Land Claim identified 
two Bula-related sites in northern Gimbat (Keen 1980: 188, 190-91). Although that 
section of the claim was withdrawn, Keen provided a confidential appendix giving 
details of previous researches by Arndt, Brandl and Chaloupka concerning Bula 
sites, mythology and ritual. From the south, researchers dealing at that time with 
such issues as a proposed dam on the Katherine River and mineral exploration in 
northern Eva Valley by Mobil, or preparing for a proposed land claim over Eva 
Valley Station, also became aware of Bula sites around the Eva Valley - Gimbat 
boundary as objects of primary concern to knowledgeable Aborigines. The 
Authority gathered such documentation as was available to put a case for the 
protection of significant areas to the Gimbat/Goodparla Land Use Study. This 
material listed a large number of art sites and a limited number of sacred sites, 
including some of Bula significance, drawn from such occasional, uncoordinated 
and sometimes preliminary research as had to that time been carried out 
(Chaloupka 1980; Josif 1981; McLaughlin 1979; Merlan & Chaloupka 1980). 
Further appreciation within these agencies of the geographically broad spread of 
Bula-related sensitivities, and an understanding of Bula as a dominating presence 
within the Gimbat landscape, developed from Merlan' s ·work in two land claims. 
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Following a field expedition for the Stage II Land Claim, she wrote to the 
Authority Director of an incident in which the three men later accepted as senior 
custodians for the Gimbat area, Peter J atbula, Nipper Brown, and Sandy Barraway, 
expressed anxiety about a drilling rig found about ten kilometres from a focal Bula 
site. Barraway especially was worried about any form of uncontrolled and 
uninformed movement of people in the general area of these sites. Merlan 
wondered what measures might mitigate the alarm and lack of control felt by 
Jawoyn people at the prospect of disturbance. 
These Bula sites seem quite problematic, and I would like to ask what you 
think we can reasonably do .... When people think of declaring sites, they 
usually envision demarcating a reasonably small area. Now it is not plain to 
me what sort of an area would allay the owners' fears about activity in the 
environs of Bula sites.7 
The Director, Bob Ellis, thought 'a reasonable area of influence' 8 could be included 
in a site registration. The existence of a major regional complex of Bula sites 
known to contemporary senior J awoyn and related people was established soon 
after during the preparation and presentation of the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land 
Claim. Although none of the sites lay within the area of this claim, the 
anthropologists responsible for preparing the claim book, Merlan and Rumsey 
(1982: 53-55), stressed that these were the most powerful and dangerous sites 
known to the Jawoyn. Their relevance to the claim was argued generally in terms of 
the threat that disturbance of them posed to all J awoyn country, and specifically in 
terms of an extensive sphere of influence overlapping into the claim area from the 
focal point of one site in southern Gimbat near the claim boundary. Information in 
the claim book was complemented by a confidential video prepared for the Land 
Commissioner showing visits to the vicinities of these sites by Aboriginal claimants 
who testified as to their significance and danger. It is this material that seems to 
7 Merlan letter to Ellis, 2.12.80, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
8 Ellis letter to Merlan, 5.12.80, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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have impressed the extensive and powerful religious values of the Gimbat area on 
senior NLC thinking. Merlan posited a unified regional Bula sphere of influence: 
Whilst the matter cannot be measured precisely it is submitted that all of 
Gimbat and the Upper Katherine River at least as far south as Upper Eva 
Valley, are thought to be in "Bula country" and to lie within the sphere of 
influence of the Bula sites. . . . The Bula sites are widely distributed, 
generally within the area of Gimbat Station and quite far flung over the 
station's total area. . . . [T]he Bula sites dominate the entire Gimbat and 
Upper Eva Valley landscape. (NLC 1984: 22.9) 
While Gimbat itself could still not be claimed, both the NLC and the Sites 
Authority sought to insert the Aboriginal interest into a policy debate about the 
future of the area that was dominated by miners and environmentalists. In addition 
to the sites data that it supplied to the Land Use Study, the Authority also 
forwarded a paper by Chaloupka (1980) arguing that the immediate resumption of 
Gimbat pastoral lease was necessary to preserve its Aboriginal art and mythological 
sites, a concern that he subsequently argued to be even more important than 
catchment protection of the South Alligator River (Chaloupka 1981: 20). 
Chaloupka, the Authority and the 1\TLC further referred to contemporary Aboriginal 
attachments to the area, and proposed that its incorporation into Kakadu would 
provide the means by which the concerned clans could properly monitor and 
control development there. In successive years 1983-85, the NLC highlighted to 
the Federal Government the importance of protection of the Bula site complex 
within any proposal for future management of the area. 
B,y the time Coronation Hill emerged as an issue in late 1985 then, sacred site 
protection ,, as installed as an important element in representations of the 
Aboriginal interest in proposed land-use regimes for the area. At the end of 1985 
and in earl 1986, such representations ere directed to two audiences. The Senate 
Standing Committee on ational Resources began an inquiry into the potential of 
the Kakadu Jational Park region, and nvo Federal departments began work on a 
Cabinet submission on the future of the proposed Stage III area. V/hile the T 
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Government again argued for a return of jurisdiction over Gimbat and Goodparla to 
allow planning for multiple land-use development, the Authority and the NLC 
emphasised to Ministers the gravity of the sacred site protection issue, again 
attempting to introduce the Aboriginal perspective as an independent third voice 
alongside mining companies and environmentalists. 
The Jawoyn 
Notably, however, that third voice was still learning to speak for itself. Gimbat lay 
within the northerly reaches of the territory of the J awoyn language group. By the 
mid-1980s there were no Jawoyn resident there, though small numbers had worked 
and lived there under previous lessees. Now they resided in many directions, but 
predominantly in a large arc from Pine Creek to the east, in and around Katherine 
town, to Eva Valley station and Barunga settlement to the south. In the still new 
and unfamiliar legal environment of the early 1980s, the Jawoyn were taking their 
first tentative steps towards community organisation, commercial enterprise and 
political assertion. There seem to have been three factors in local affairs at the time 
that tended to highlight J awoyn identity as a relevant orientation for people, and 
which might thus have promoted a collective J awoyn self-consciousness. 
The first was the politics of Aboriginal living areas around Katherine town. In the 
decades of the 1950s and 1960s there were many small informal Aboriginal camps 
scattered around town, mostly along the river. They were occupied by people of 
several language groups from different directions, many of whom came in 
seasonally from the cattle stations to the south and west. This was the period during 
which the language-group identity of the town area was shifting from a mix 
between Dagoman - the original owners - and J awoyn, to a widely 
acknowledged unilateral J awoyn-ness (Merlan 1998: 131-40). This process had 
been fostered in part by the long-running physical encroachment of J awoyn from 
the north-east, such that, 'in the immediate postwar period, J awoyn ( and Mayali) 
58 
Background: Gimbat and Sickness Country 
were the only ones left in any numbers on the river to the north of the township' 
(Merlan 1998: 132). 
From the mid-1960s, · dismissal of workers and removals from the stations and 
rising unemployment on the government settlements increased the numbers and 
permanence of Aboriginal campers of various affiliations, while the development 
of Katherine town reduced their camping options (Merlan 1998: 19-20, 41-42; 
Lange 1981: 1-2). Municipal planning addressed the problem with a development 
at an area known as the High Level, immediately north of town across the Stuart 
Highway bridge, that served as a common residential area for incoming town 
campers in the 1970s. This culturally inept strategy appears to have affronted a 
Jawoyn sense of priority and separateness. A report written after the abandonment 
of the project accords them a traditional status. 
The Miali Djuan people, the traditional and permanent residents of 
Katherine who had always resided on this site were forced to vacate the area 
because of the social disharmony the new idea caused. These people moved 
to the area now known as Miali Brumby some 200 yards from the High 
Level ... 
In the next few months developments at Miali Brumby will commence. 
Kalano [Association] envisages this area will go a long way towards 
satisfying the needs of all long term permanent Aboriginal residents of 
Katherine. This basically means the Djuan Miali clique. These people have 
told Kalano they do not wish to share this Lot with any other tribal groups 
and in fact at a number of Kalano meetings they have forcibly voiced this 
op1n1on. (Lange 1981: 1, 3) 
The second circumstance was the mode of presentation of the J awoyn (Katherine 
Area) Land Claim (see above). Ritchie (1999: 260-61) comments that the intensive 
work involved in preparing and presenting a claim under the Northern Territory 
legislation will predictably impress upon the claimants aspects of their own descent 
and ownership that they would previously have had no cause to reflect upon. The 
experience, characteristic of claim hearings, of being asked to identify the group of 
people that exercises spiritual responsibility for various sites on the land under 
claim, and of repeatedly answering or hearing others answer 'Jawoyn', must, I 
59 
Sacredness and Consultation 
surmise, have made more salient than before the standing of that collective J awoyn 
entity as a land-owning group in the consciousness of the claimants. 
The third circumstance was made up of a range of practical issues that people, in 
their capacity as J awoyn, were being called upon to consider during the early 
1980s, mainly by attendance at meetings convened by the Northern Land Council. 
Thus, when David Cooper of the Sacred Sites Authority attended a meeting of 
about 120 Jawoyn people at Barunga in September 1985 to propose a site survey of 
the upper South Alligator valley (see chapter 3), his opportunity to speak came near 
the end of a lengthy agenda. The other matters put to the meeting by the NLC 
related to the progress of the Katherine Area Land Claim, the legal status of the 
J awoyn camp at Katherine Gorge, the prospects for a tourist enterprise in the 
Gorge, a land claim over Eva Valley Station, a buffalo contract, royalty 
distribution, the construction of a major gas pipeline through J awoyn country, 
planning for management of the anticipated Kakadu Stage III with the Parks 
Service, mineral exploration clearances on Eva Valley, development of Tindal air 
force base to the south of town, and other sacred site protection issues at a local 
quarry and at sand mining areas on the Katherine River. 
Progress on all these fronts depended critically on the advice and professional 
services of the NLC and the Authority in Darwin, and on the commitment of a few 
white 'helpers' in Katherine (Bauman 2001: 209-11) who sought, through personal 
friendship and politically conscious alliance to assist local Aboriginal people to 
make a transition from subordinance to effective self-determination. An emerging 
local infrastructure of community organisations was fostered by these activists in 
conce1i with an equally small number of educated Aborigines who began to adopt 
secular leadership roles . Personal connections and familiarities established in this 
period later played through the Coronation Hill dispute. Notably, four people who 
worked in Katherine Aboriginal organisations during these years later worked for 
the NLC during the dispute, including the NLC Director, John Ah Kit. Ah Kit's 
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successor, Mick Dodson, was born in Katherine and worked as a legal officer in the 
NLC Katherine office in the mid-1980s. 
In 1985 the NLC established the J awoyn Association as an incorporated body that 
could manage land titles and funding flows from government and business 
enterprise on behalf of the J awoyn. Throughout the rest of that decade, the 
Association remained weak and poorly organised, acting mainly as a political front 
for the Jawoyn during several years of contention with a conservative white 
political culture in the Territory. Political animosity in Katherine reached its zenith 
in the late 1980s, when Katherine Gorge, the region's primary environmental, 
recreational and tourist attraction, was transferred to J awoyn ownership. 
Conclusion 
Thus, at that moment in October 1985 when the Authority registered a sacred site 
over most of Coronation Hill, thereby turning exploration work there into a public 
administration issue, several sets of interests were already in play over the future of 
the area (eg. Adams 1986), and the attention of the Federal political arena was 
engaged. But in terms of capacity, knowledge and awareness, the J awoyn were not 
well prepared for this debate. They did not yet have the organisational maturity or 
political experience to manage the issue themselves, and in any event the law 
required that they operate through the mechanism of instructions to those external 
organisations with a protective and supportive charter. When in early November 
1985 a group of eight senior J awoyn toured the proposed Stage III and other parts 
of Kakadu to learn of future management options, NLC and ANPWS officers 
accompanying them agreed that in view of the group's evident limited knowledge 
of the area and unfamiliarity with Park matters, all proposals should be treated as 
preliminary and subject to further research and consultation over the next few 
years. 
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If knowledge might take time, Jawoyn awareness could be raised more rapidly. 
Three senior Jawoyn visited the upper South Alligator valley and Coronation Hill 
with David Cooper in September 1985, and that larger group just mentioned visited 
in November. A Jawoyn Association meeting of 52 people at Rockhole camp in 
·1 anuary 1986 gave the issue of mining at Coronation Hill their concerned and 
somewhat anxious attention amongst twelve other matters for discussion. Then at a 
smaller J awoyn meeting at the Katherine Low Level Reserve attended by Authority 
and NLC personnel early in February, Coronation Hill and Bula sites in Gimbat 
were the first matter on the agenda. Ellis, the Authority Director, displayed site 
maps and advised of discussions with BHP concerning its mining proposals and 
with the Gimbat lessee, Helmut Schimmel, on his tourism proposals. He arranged a 
process by which he could consult with the J awoyn on these matters, and explained 
the need for further field research and site documentation. Authority officers 
recorded video footage of the three senior custodians, another senior J awoyn man, 
Peter Mitchell, and a prominent Barunga woman, Phyllis Wiynjorrotj, making 
statements about the dangers of mining in the Bula area. Ellis arranged for Peter 
J atbula and Sandy Barraway to assist in preparing a public video explaining 
J awoyn sacred site concerns, and to travel to Canberra to show it. He explained: 
Our voice from Northern Territory, little tiny voice compared to their voice. 
So we've got to try and talk up strong, talk up loud so people hear it and 
understand what's happening up here because, Northern Territory's a long 
way away from Canberra ... 
So it's very important this year that we work hard on this one. It's gonna be 
big story, big one.9 
With this, the Jawoyn were shepherded into the first public self-presentation of 
their interest in the Gimbat area. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTRADICTIONS AND THE THEATRICAL FRAME 
The debate over sacredness at Coronation Hill that went on between the various 
organisations and interest groups with an administrative role in the process or a 
political stake in the outcome, was driven by a presumption that it was at all points 
a secondary discourse. That is, it was presumed by its protagonists to be a contest 
over how to correctly understand another discourse that they imagined was located 
within the J awoyn community, concerning the intrinsic values of Coronation Hill 
and Sickness Country. The relevant laws10 labelled that primary discourse 
'Aboriginal tradition', and took it to be an endogenous entity. The consequent 
procedures and politicking had in principle to share that presumption, and so placed 
great weight on the instrument of direct consultation with the J awoyn, especially 
the senior individuals. I therefore continue in this and the next two chapters with an 
inquiry into the detailed substance of J awoyn performance, before moving 
outwards to the dispute between organisations and the external play of debate and 
strategising over land management in that area. Fundamental to this structure, and 
to my view of the debate, is that J awoyn performance was an elicited response, not 
an autonomous expression, and that there is no separation possible between the 
substance of the response and the conditions of elicitation. 
This chapter begins to look in detail at certain events that took place during the 
course of the Coronation Hill issue from late 1985. I have selected these events for 
their bearing on the argument, so the material discussed here suffers from a lack of 
narrative continuity. While I try to ameliorate this by providing a few preliminary 
comments prior to each detailed description, I also refer readers to the Appendix 
10 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, s. 3; Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act (NT) 
1978,s. 3. 
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where I provide a chronology which will more fully supply the missing context of 
sequenced events. 
The starting position 
I ended the last chapter with reference to the meeting of 3 February 1986, and 
mentioned the video recording conducted there by the Authority. This event offers 
us a starting position. It occurred a few months after Cooper introduced Coronation 
Hill to some senior custodians as a site of current management concern, but before 
the BHP project team had begun putting their countervailing interest in the area 
directly to the J awoyn. This meeting thus took place near the end of a period of 
unilateralism in the way J awoyn assessed the values of the region. The statements 
recorded here offer a concise account of what five senior people considered to be 
the relevant considerations in the light of proposed mining at Coronation Hill. They 
thus also offer a starting position for my analysis of the way they managed that 
. issue. 
The five people who faced the camera gave extended statements. Ellis began with 
Phyllis Wiynjorrotj, asking her 'to say something about those Bula places and that 
Coronation Hill, and about why they are important to you, why Aboriginal people 
worry for those places'. 11 Wiynjorrotj responded by emphasising the cataclysmic 
effects threatened by mechani_sed work, the distribution of authority and rights of 
access within Aboriginal society, and the need for white men to defer to Aboriginal 
knowledge. 
Well, that dreamtime. You know, you can't go there. Even me-fella woman 
can't go there, only for man. That's all they allow, man. But woman no 
allow. If they drill 'em that thing now there, well might be, you know, him 
bit shakin', and blow up. That one we frighten, me-fella Jawoyn people. 
Him very important really. Very hard you know for white man. Might be 




why we talk to white man, hi1n really important, well they should listen. No 
matter what him. Big high man, or low man, him should listen, longa 
Aboriginal people you know? Old people. But before, only old people been 
all day used to go there, for that sacred site, I just say dream site, because 
really big one that one. If they drill him now, well that mean finish. We all 
bum, you know? Grass gotta bum, tree, and water, that one. Me-fella bit 
worry you know? Really, you know, important one. Before, young people 
no more been all day go. Young teenager, and their sister. Old people. 
Really grey. That one they been all day used to go and sit down you know 
one side longa him. And talk to him. But, no more. Really him [unclear] 
one, you know, very hard. Very hard, I'm worry myself too. If something 
happen there now, or a white man just push 'em up, you know why we talk, 
tell 'em, and they don't listen, they go through there, well they damage 'em 
might be put a machine, well that one you know, him bit shakin' now. 
Shakin' . Yeah. You know I can't say much, because when I been young I 
didn't go there. Only my grandfather and my father used to go there. 
Belonga old these two old man here, my grandpa. It's only old people been 
all day look after 'em that place, not young people. Even not woman. Not 
kid. Can't go near. Really important. 12 
The microphone was next placed in front of Nipper Brown. He began in language, 
named several places, then restated the unique dangers that Bula presented - 'him 
different altogether' - using English similes of volcano and earthquake. He 
repeated the prerogatives of old people, confining their exercise to the past as 
Wiynjorrotj had, and talked also of how individual deaths could follow wrong 
behaviour in that area . 
. . . Young boy not go. Only that one old man sit down. No more. Only old 
people him go there, before, they been all day [unclear] , all the old people. 
No 1nore young boy, nothing. He [unclear] no good. By and by they die 
there. Something him kill him. That rock. When you bump ' em you gotta 
finish there. That thing 1night be, he kill you sometime .. . 13 
Sandy Barraway, seated next to Brown, elaborated on the theme of the separate 
capacities of young and old, and the unmanageable and inexorable nature of what 
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... All that lot old people my grandpa, used to talking about you know. 
Before, all young people we didn't near that country. No more look about 
sugar bag, goanna, all that sort of business. Sugar bag or kangaroo. All that 
country, used to walk round long way. Out, we been keep out from that 
country. We never go down that place you know. No humbug round that 
rock. No more go down that place. No more kill 'em fish longa that 
[unclear], when that dreaming place we never even kill 'em fish or goanna 
like that. We used to keep out long way from that business . . . We used to 
keep out. Eat 'em plum long way, or goanna or sugar bag, all that business. 
Old man old my father, father belong me-two-fella Peter, all that lot my 
grandfa, all that lot old people. They used to go out meself, climb up that 
place. Sit down. Clean 'em place. Put 'em 'nother paperbark [to cover holes 
where Bula had entered the ground]. All that. They used to do good job. Old 
people. But today, you know white man no more go there. Other way might 
be him double up knee [a reference to a detail of the Bula myth]. He'll be 
dead that place, he won't come back no more. That man climb up there, to 
that Gimbat thing, you know, look around, [if] him bump 'em rock now, 
he'll be double up forever. Him can't come back, no more. He'll be dead 
that place, if it they go down there. If it they put that gelignite, what we 
gotta do? Bird, kangaroo, bullock, dog, you-and-me-now, white people, 
blackfella, everybody dead. This thing, this one on top here, cloud, him 
gotta cover 'em up you and me. N other man gotta stay now. We all, all this 
lot, people, tree, all clean up. We won't alive no more. That's the dreaming 
we're talking about Bulademo now ... Everyone, no matter who. No matter 
what area. No matter salt water. That salt water, him got a fire come out. 
Biggest fire. There'll be no fish. Whole lot, everybody die. All right. 14 
Peter Jatbula recorded two passages. He talked of how the ground would shake 
from daybreak to sundown, and if it didn't then stop, destruction of the world 
would ensue. He dwelt upon the role of his own father in secretly looking after 
Bula places and monitoring white activity, and explained that his own past 
employment commitments with whites and his father's early death had prevented a 
full transmission of knowledge from father to son. Nevertheless, his father's 
injunctions placed him under a continuing responsibility to prevent mining . 
14 Ibid. 
. . . When my father used to alive you know he used to take me-fella all 
round, all this area now. He used to show me-fella that, but, too young to go 
see him, that Bula business. Only that, we used to see him that, anbim we 
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call 'em, that draw [paintings] now. That's all. Not that main one. He's 
[ referring to Bula] there. If him been alive he tell 'e1n me to go see him 
now, but him too late, you know, my father, like, him ready to pass away. 
But him been tell me not to white man go there. "Tell 'em not to go there, 
when I finish, so you remember this one", him been tell me. So he told me 
like that. So I still remember. N other way I could have been tell 'em "Yes, 
go ahead", you know? We tell 'em, we like more have white people, use 
mine, anything like that, gold . . . Plenty gold there. Like Mt. Todd and 
some other places you know where they been have 'em old 1nine before. 
That been all right because they been there, old people been there too. 
Work, watch hi1n them whitefella. Like, what this place, like Eva Valley, 
they been work that mine over there, J awaluk. That been all right. Because 
my father been working, I been little boy. They used to look after them 
whitefella. They never been like 'em go through [ named sites] and all that. 
Because that all Bula site ... 15 
In a brief statement, Peter Mitchell added burning rivers to the apocalyptic iinagery. 
Taken as a starting position with respect to J awoyn management of the Coronation 
Hill issue, two further points can be made. The first relates to the status of 
Coronation Hill as a site. It is notable that, despite Ellis' repeated references to it 
prior to the recording, Coronation Hill received almost no mention in these 
statements. Rather, they dealt more generically with the area containing the Bula 
presence, from which the sensitivities of Coronation Hill, within that area, might be 
inferred. Wiynjorrotj had at that time probably never been into the upper South 
Alligator valley (Merlan 1998: 88:..89, 103). However, Barraway had travelled the 
valley on several occasions between 1976 and the early 1980s, initially to check on 
how close mining exploration had come to significant sites, and later for the 
preparation of the Alligator Rivers Stage II Land Claim and then the J awoyn 
(Katherine Area) Land Claim (Keen 1980: 187-88; Merlan and Rumsey 1986: 4-8). 
J atbula and Brown also participated in those land claim trips. By 1982, a complex 
of focal Bula sites, considered to be of extreme sensitivity and danger, had been 
documented by Merlan and Ru1nsey (see chapter 2), but Coronation Hill was by 
then recorded merely as a na1ned place, Guratba, meaning wild rope. The first 
15 Ibid. 
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Bula-related significances were attributed to it by senior custodians during 
Cooper's preparation of the report for the registration of the Upper South Alligator 
Bula Complex in September 1985 (see below). Now, in February 1986, Coronation 
Hill seemed to figure in the attention of these five speakers by reason of the 
exploration work in train there, but not as one of the points of origin, an 
endogenous source, of the powerful religious meanings in the landscape that cause 
mining to be a matter for concern generally within that region. 
Secondly, the statements acknowledged that historical conditions had created inter-
generational discontinuity and a relative incapacity of custodianship. These five 
people had seniority and knowledge within the contemporary Jawoyn polity, so 
they spoke confidently and fluently, but they didn't know these places like their 
fathers did. The old men were not heirs to a practice of management, the techniques 
of approach and curatorship by which their forebears used to venture into close 
proximity with powerful places and ensure the forces immanent there remained 
quiet. They were conscious of their lack of qualification. As Barraway said, if there 
is disturbance, 'what we gotta do?' 
So these impressive testimonials to high sensitivity and absolute destruction imply 
two domains that lack definition or commitment for the custodians. One is the 
grounds upon which Bula' s response to particular interferences might be predicted 
or prevented, and the other is the standing of Coronation Hill within the Bula 
cosmology. These might be seen to have opposite potentials for the practice of 
management. The former recommends that the custodians apply the precautionary 
principle and defend against any possibility of retribution, but the latter asks 
whether Coronation Hill is properly included within the field of such concerns. 
First field trips 
Management of the Coronation Hill issue had already begun, but had not yet 
become problematic. To give an idea of the quality of the interactions that took 
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place and the contradictory outcomes that they soon generated, I continue here with 
events from before and after the meeting of 3 February just discussed. This is a 
comparison of two field trips, one organised by David Cooper in September 1985 
which served substantially as the basis of his report to the Aboriginal Sacred Sites 
Protection Authority for registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex, 
and the other organised by three officers of the BHP Coronation Hill project team, 
Allen Linke, Foy Leckie and Peter Rush, at the end of April 1986 as part of their 
infonnal familiarisation efforts with the J awoyn. 
Once the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority became aware in September 
1985 of renewed mining interest in the upper South Alligator valley, its Research 
Officer for the J awoyn region, David Cooper, put to a J awoyn meeting ( see chapter 
2) the need to treat the area as a priority for site survey. The following week, 
Cooper visited the valley with Peter J atbula, Nipper Brown and Larry Ah Lin, the 
first two being senior custodians of J awoyn sites in Gimbat, and the last Chairman 
of the J awoyn Association, and later supplemented their information by 
interviewing the third senior custodian, Sandy Barraway, and several other people 
likely to have relevant knowledge. c ·ooper then prepared a report for the 
registration of an area of about 250 sq kms on the south-western side of the valley. 
The Upper South Alligator Bula Complex was registered by the Authority in 
October 1985 (Map 5). It included most of Coronation Hill within its boundaries, 
and hence required BHP to negotiate permission to proceed with development. 
Following rejection of the BHP team's proposed work plans by a Jawoyn meeting 
in March 1986, the team management settled on a program of informal liaison with 
Jawoyn people by which they hoped to establish good personal relations with 
senior individuals, ascertain from them the extent and nature of sacred sites in the 
upper South Alligator v_alley, and promote greater understanding and a more 
accommodating attitude among them concerning the Coronation Hill project. 
Pursuant to that program, the BHP team travelled up the valley in April 1986 with 
the three seniors, J atbula, Brown and Barra way, as well as two other senior men, 
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Cooper had access up the valley as far as Coronation Hill, and stopped also at 
Christmas Creek, Pulpul, and at several points along the road. The BHP team 
travelled up the valley about 4 kms further to just north of the Dinner Creek 
crossing, stopping also at several points including El Sherana, Christmas Creek and 
Coronation Hill. Cooper's trip took one day, supplemented by later interviewing. 
The BHP team hosted the J awoyn visit at their camp at El Sherana over two nights, 
and spent one day inspecting the valley and a further morning in discussion. For 
both Cooper and the BHP team, it was the first occasion that detailed field data had 
been sought from the Jawoyn. These two research exercises, seven-and-a-half 
months apart, thus sought information from small groups of overlapping 
membership, including in both cases the same senior custodians, concerning almost 
the same tract of the upper South Alligator valley. Cooper's work led to his Report 
for the Registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex to the Aboriginal 
Sacred Sites Protection Authority, which included -a transcript of his interview with 
Barraway. The BHP team's work was documented in a ten-page file note entitled 
'Meetings with Aborigines and others'. The four men who signed the request to 
register the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex all participated in the BHP team's 
trip. 
With respect to the general distribution of religious sensitivities reported in each 
case, no complete comparison is possible. Cooper attributed most statements to 'the 
custodians' collectively, and merged those statements with material recovered from 
previous reports prepared for the Authority to produce an integrated account. The 
BHP people attributed statements to individuals. They also had Amdt's and 
Chaloupka' s works to refer to, and their notes include a number of comparisons 
between these sources and their informants' statements about the places they 
visited as they travelled up the valley. 
Some interesting points can still be noted. While both documents report expansive 
notions of sacredness, it is differently distributed. In particular, no mention was 
noted by Cooper of any concern for the north-eastern side of the valley, where a 
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number of small uran1u1n mines had operated in the 1950s and '60s. In his 
interview with Barraway, he referred to a statement by J atbula that mining activity 
is 'O.K. that side'. The important sites were said to 'line up' along the south-
western escarpment, the boundaries _ of the recommended site encompassed the 
upland area south-west of that escarpment, and Sickness Country was said to 
extend further again to the south and south-east to the Katherine River catchment. 
By contrast, the BHP team noted that J atbula considered lengthy sections of the 
north-eastern escarpment, and some of the plateau country behind, to be sensitive, 
while Barraway and Nunggulawe expressed concern for more limited sections of 
the same area. 
A number of other places that the miners expected to be significant evoked no 
statements of concern or were apparently not known. Although there were some 
important religious values to be acknowledged at particular points, the general 
impression conveyed was of a lack of intimacy with the landscape and with its 
sacred meanings. An art site on the south-western side, by then an established 
tourist destination, was of particular interest for the custodians. These paintings had 
been previously documented by researchers and patrol officers, who had at times 
noted some suggestions of a ritual and restrictive attitude towards them from an 
earlier generation of informants. The main motif showing two figures was 
interpreted differently to Cooper and the BHP team, but their reports both record 
the significant point that it was understood to have been painted by Bula. The BHP 
team further noted that J atbula and Nunggulawe thought Bula had gone 
underground 'somewhere nearby' , a belief which would have dramatically 
intensified the sensitivities of the area. Both writers also recorded restrictions 
associated with the site, Cooper that women and children would have been 
traditionally excluded, the BHP team that photographs should not be shown to 
women. The two reports, however, convey contrasting tones. Cooper described the 
si_te as one of 'two Bula site foci' along the south-western escarpment, the other 
being the very prominent and dangerous site at Big Sunday, and his report treated 
the meanings and management of such places as matters of deep concern to the 
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custodians. The BHP report noted the custodians' relaxed, even jocular, behaviour, 
around the site: 
Driving the vehicles in, walking around, photographing (permission to 
photograph was asked and given, except that the photos should not be 
shown to women), talking etc. did not worry the Aboriginals at all, and I 
(JFL) thought that behaviour would have been much subdued if the site was 
an extremely important site .... A painting of a man with an extended penis 
drew ribald laughter. 16 
That contrast is characteristic of the whole of the two documents. Cooper's was an 
official report in which he urged the importance of the area, the dangers it faced 
and the arixiety of the custodians, and mounted an argument for extensive site 
registrations. The BHP team's was an internal file note that recorded the events of a 
fact-finding exercise, including such unwelcome facts as the views of Peter Jatbula. 
When I . . . said to Peter that the floor of the valley between the two 
escarpments might be a good place to look for gold, he said that that area 
was also "sacred registered for Bula", but did not elaborate on the northerly 
or southerly extent. I ... replied that there wasn't much ground left then in 
the area to explore for gold. 17 
A still greater substantive contrast related directly to Coronation Hill. Describing 
his arrival there with the three J awoyn men, Cooper wrote: 
Aboriginal custodians expressed deep shock when they inadvertantly came 
across the excavations and drilling while involved in a site survey with an 
officer of the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority. There seems 
little excuse on the part of BHP for not consulting on the site as it is marked 
on the Jawoyn Land Claim map (a public document) as a site of 
significance, and even the most cursory inquiry would have revealed it to be 
a site of significance. Because of such experience, Aboriginal custodians 
have expressed distrust for the mining companies and have resolved to seek 
urgent protection for all Bula sites. (Cooper 1985: 13-14) 
16 JFL and PMR, 15.5.86, Note to File, Meetings with Aborigines and Others, CHN, 




The attention focused on Coronation Hill by discovery of mining works evoked 
from the custodians further statements about its significance. Cooper was initially 
inclined to consider it a focal site on the basis of one custodian's assertion that Bula 
went into the ground there, but the claim was not corroborated by others. Two other 
elaborations of Bula mythology were put forward. It was known from Medan's 
linguistic and land claim research that the J awoyn name for Coronation Hill, 
Guratba, ref erred to rope made from the Kurraj ong tree, but this name was not then 
attributed mythological significance. 18 While preparing the site registration report, 
Cooper was told by Jatbula and another senior Jawoyn man, Willie Byers, that 
Coronation Hill was a wild rope dreaming place. In the report itself, a further 
connection to the Bula narrative was made: Jatbula and Barraway stated that Bula 
made wild rope at Guratba (Cooper 1985: 7). In addition, Barraway told Cooper 
that the gold at Coronation Hill was really a transmuted form of the Bula dreaming, 
and that use of explosives in mining there would unleash world-destructive forces. 
During the BHP trip, the custodians saw again the old mine workings, but 
attributed no special significance to the hill or to the back valley which was being 
considered for the siting of infrastructure. In response to the miners ' focus on the 
visible 1nateriality of sites, the custodians confirmed that no art sites were located 
on the hill. That night at the El Sherana ca1np, the BHP team began an after-dinner 
discussion by explaining again that the trip was intended to foster mutual 
familiarisation that would open the way to compromise over the things in the valley 
that were i1nportant to both groups. 
It was pointed out that although the work at Coronation Hill was only at the 
exploration stage, and much more needed to be done before we even knew 
if we had a mine there, the project could offer them some benefits. 
There would be e1nployment and limited training of Aborigines, and maybe 
use of some contractual services operated by them. It was also mentioned 
that these would be limited at the exploration stage, but if a mine developed, 
they could be quite significant. 
18 F.Merlan, 22.9.85, Letter to D.Cooper, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files . 
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Sandy Barraway asked if we were going to make a "deal". He was told that 
we could make no deal until we knew that we had a mine, and that would 
take a lot more w.ork. When we knew we had a mine, after the exploration 
stage, then we would know what we had, and we may be able to make a 
deal with them. 
Sandy Barraway then became very vocal and enthusiastic about the project 
and said it should be possible for us to resume work on Coronation Hill. 
Much discussion took place between the Aborigines, some in their own 
dialect and in pidgin. Sandy used the word royalty a number of times. 19 
In my view, the contradiction between what Barraway said to Cooper in September 
1985, and what he said to the BHP team in April 1986, is not resolvable. It was, 
moreover, the first of a series of such recorded occurrences both from him and from 
Nipper Brown over the next two years. In some cases, these contradictions 
occurred from one week, or even one day, to the next. Listening to statements made 
by the c-q.stodians or other prominent J awoyn at consultations and meetings at 
which they were present, agencies that maintained inconsistent or even absolutely 
opposed views about Coronation Hill thus each received repeated reassurance that 
they and the Jawoyn were of one mind. 
Consultation events: frame, theatre, script, text 
During the media debate over Coronation Hill, pro-mining representatives often 
referred to the custodians having repeatedly changed their minds about the mining 
proposal. · In the light of the record of consultations and meetings, and the rapidity 
with which inconsistent statements came upon one another, I will argue in this and 
the following chapters that it is more accurate to view the custodians as having 
maintained two contradictory positions over the same period. Consultations, 
interviews and field trips provided the occasion for expressing one or other of these 
positions, and the records made of those interactions are thus in total inclusive of 
both positions, and in parts detailed with respect to each. This corpus thus offers an 
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approach to the problem of contradictions that takes as its first step a focus on 
separate consultation events. 
A consultation event, in Goffman's (1975: 247) terms, was a frame. That is to say it 
oriented the custodians to a particular mode and purpose of interaction; it posed a 
structure and idiom by which custodians could understand proceedings and within 
which they could conduct themselves. I propose to treat the consultation frame as a 
theatre. There has been debate on whether social action is really a form of dramatic 
performance, or can only be represented as such metaphorically (Hare & Blumberg 
1988: 11). Kenneth Burke (1968: 448) sees his dramatism as a literal mode of 
inquiry into what people do, and at a different level, the playwright Arthur Miller 
(1988: 433-34) was struck by the theatrical appearances of life. I do not need to 
decide the question, but even though I rely on Burke I do not wish to claim that the 
theatricality I am invoking in this thesis is anything more than metaphorical. 
Metaphor is not identity and it works by selecting common relationships between 
elements. In taking consultation events as theatres metaphorically, I mean that there 
are some identifiable elements present in consultations that exist in the same 
relationship to one another as do some elements present in theatre, such that the 
former elements can be re-named as, and new meaning thereby imported into them 
from, the latter. 
This notion of how metaphor can work shares much common ground with that 
cited by Turner (1974: 28-31) as an 'interaction view', the defining features of 
which he takes from philosopher Max Black (1962: 3 8-4 7). Thus, a metaphor 
works with two subjects, a principal subject that is being analysed and a subsidiary 
subject that is used to throw light on the subject of analysis. Each of these subjects 
are systems of things, multivocal symbols. They enter into relation with one 
another when a system of commonplace implications associated with the subsidiary 
subject are applied to the principal subject. Statements that normally apply to the 
19 JFL and PMR, 15 .5.86, Note to File, Meetings with Aborigines and Others, CHN, 
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subsidiary subject implicitly act to select, emphasise, suppress and organise 
features of the principal subject. Thus, if we take the metaphorical statement 'man 
is a wolf, man is the principal subject and wolf the subsidiary. 
A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct 
a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject. But 
these implications will not be those comprised in the commonplaces 
normally implied by literal uses of "man". The new implications must be 
determined by the pattern of implications associated with literal uses of the 
word "wolf'. Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked 
about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot 
will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some 
details, emphasizes others - in short, organizes our view of man. 
(Black 1962: 41 - italics in original) 
Thus, theatre and consultations are not the same, and their major differences are 
apparent from those features taken as definitive-by Goffman himself in Frame 
Analysis (197 5) and by Beeman (1993: 3 78-79) in their discussions of real theatre. 
So, consultations were for . efficacy, not entertainment, the custodians and other 
participants presented themselves in some aspect of their real-life personas, the 
action was not make-believe, and there was no necessity for a spatially and 
functionally separated audience. 
Both in parts of Frame Analysis and elsewhere, however, Goffinan (1958) also 
analyses social action outside the literal theatre using the terminology of drama -
act, part, show, performer, audience, backstage, cues - without requiring those 
elements of real theatre listed above to be present to legitimise what amounts to a 
casual and diffuse application of the metaphor (and see the 'Varieties of 
Enactment' selected by Hare and Blumberg 1988). In this looser usage, Goffman 
practised an analytical strategy which Watson, following Burke, labels a 
'perspective by incongruity' (1999: 140), and which Drew and Wootton call the 
'method of the "natural metaphor"' (1988: 8). This involves the systematic re-
BHP IN ewcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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describing of the analysed field of activity using terms from another field, including 
organised fields such as the theatre, team games or ethology. 
[I]ncongruous metaphors work by occasioning a "look-again" technique in 
order to see unremarked objects anew, to render them "anthropologically 
strange", by getting us to see them ( or selected features of them) at one 
remove from the standpoint of the natural attitude. (Watson 1999: 141) 
In what follows, I adopt this method of systematic re-describing. The most formal 
consultation events, which were those meetings called specifically for the purpose 
of receiving instructions from the custodians and other local Aboriginal people on 
some matter to do with Coronation Hill, had a number of features that sustain the 
theatrical metaphor. Some of these are of no special account for my argument. So, 
for example, those who organised transport, personnel, food and accommodation 
might be called the producers, and the person who set the agenda and conducted the 
event, the director. Similarly, there could be identifiable bracketting and episoding 
conventions to organise the proceedings analogous to use of the stage curtain. Such 
things have the cosmetic effect of making the metaphor ' thicker', but they are not 
what makes it useful. 
The aim is to better understand the statements recorded during consultations by 
casting certain aspects of consultation events in dramaturgical terms. I thus want to 
view each consultation event as a theatre in which the custodians were called upon 
to perform their custodianship. Complementarily, they were occasions suitable for 
these individuals to treat their custodianship as an 'actable idea' (Hale and 
Blumberg 1988: 57-58). I take the two alternative positions - the anti-mining 
position asserting religious power and danger, and the pro-mining position seeking 
jobs and royalties - as scripts from which they could read, and the statements they 
made from one or other of those scripts as the texts that they generated in satisfying 
the requirements of their roles. This bundle of correspondences makes up the core 
of the theatrical metaphor that I pose as a starting point. 
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As these uses of 'theatre', 'script' and 'text' (and of 'producer', 'director' and 
'stage curtain') are all instances of a perspective by incongruity, I note Watson's 
criticisms that Goffman' s use of such a perspective tends to the gratuitous, applied 
to any number of domains of action - the 'Goffmanizing of the world' (Watson 
1999: 152)2° - and that it acts to legitimate Goffman's own prescription as to the 
form and process of social encounters at the expense of situational uniqueness and 
the actor's understandings of content. The former criticism is not relevant here. My 
use of the theatrical metaphor is restricted to the range of consultation events that I 
next describe. The latter, that Goffman's analysis is presumed but never 
demonstrated to be in accord with the participants' perspective (see also Schegloff 
1988: 107-8), is a point on which I seek to differ from Goffman. The theatrical 
frame is, I argue, productive precisely in that it opens a way of approaching what 
the custodians thought they were doing when they said all those contradictory 
things about Coronation Hill. This is something r-will begin to address in the next 
two chapters dealing with context. 
It is necessary now to specify the range of occasions that can be treated as 
consultation events, appropriate for interpretation in terms of the theatrical frame. 
One class of these has just been mentioned. Perhaps the ideal type is that series of 
consultations conducted under the auspices of the Aboriginal Sacred Sites 
Protection Authority to inform custodians and other significant senior individuals 
of works proposed by the BHP team for Coronation Hill and to ascertain their 
instructions with respect to the acceptability of those works. In these cases, the 
BHP team advised the Authority office of each successive stage of project 
development, specifying the further work involved and the areas of their tenements 
lying within the registered site that would be affected. On a date agreed between 
the team and Authority officers, company or Authority vehicles collected 
Aboriginal people from various · camps across the J awoyn residential range and 
transported them into the South Alligator valley. Drivers made a special effort to 
2° Citing a personal communication from Edward Rose. 
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locate and pick up the three senior J awoyn custodians as well as at least some other 
older or politically prominent people, but the precise composition of the groups 
collected depended on what camps were visited and who was in residence at the 
time, and which individuals were willing to come. Numbers varied from less than 
ten to over thirty, including the Jawoyn trainees employed on the project. Northern 
Land Council officers sometimes attended. These consultations took one or two 
days, consisting of a site inspection at Coronation Hill followed by a meeting to 
discuss and decide. The site inspections took place under the guidance of BHP 
team members who explained their work proposals. The meetings were conducted 
in an open manner by the Authority Director, Bob Ellis, but after representatives of 
the organisations in attendance had concluded their presentations and statements, 
the J awoyn men were given the opportunity to discuss matters privately. Where 
they wished to have such a discussion, the others present withdrew and re-
convened when the J awoyn indicated they had concluded their deliberations. 
The BHP team and the N orthem Land Council conducted their own consultation 
programs as well. The miners adopted a practice of informal liaison, field trips and 
site inspections with small groups of J awoyn, often including the family members 
of the men employed as trainees at the project. These efforts began in early 1986 
following the initial rejection of their development plans by a J awoyn meeting, 
were later motivated by the need to satisfy Federal Government requirements for 
Aboriginal community consultation and approval, and stimulated again when they 
felt they needed to maintain J awoyn allegiance in the face of challenge from the 
Northern Land Council and conservationists. Liaison exercises varied from 
individual conversations in Katherine to organised group visits to the BHP 
manganese mine on Groote Eylandt in the Gulf of Carpentaria. Many of these 
exercises, such as visits to the upper South Alligator valley by the trainees' 
relatives for hunting and socialising or to allow them to keep a watching brief over 
activities in the valley, probably are not properly regarded as theatres, and in any 
event no records were kept of most of them. Others, such as the trip described in 
the previous section, can be included within the theatrical frame. 
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The Northern Land Council's own consultation program was oriented more widely 
to the future of Aboriginal interests in Kakadu Stage III, and the theatres convened 
by its officers usually took the form of large community meetings at one or other of 
the major Jawoyn residential areas organised with the assistance of the Jawoyn 
Association. These ran according to an agenda, with briefings and discussion on 
each issue. While the NLC insisted that instructions with respect to Coronation Hill 
and Stage III should come from the Jawoyn collectively (see chapter 8), the three 
senior men were accorded special attention in these matters, and NLC officers also 
maintained more intimate communication with them both at and between the larger 
meetings. The Senate Inquiry and the Resource Assessment Commission also 
convened meetings that can be regarded as theatres. 
There were in addition a number of field trips into Gimbat and contiguous areas 
conducted by researchers working for the NLC octhe Authority in the company of 
the senior custodians and other knowledgeable men, for the purpose of 
documenting cultural attachments to country. These cumulative and extended site 
recording efforts were aimed either at proving land claims or protecting sacred 
sites. The most important of them for my purposes were the trips carried out by 
David Cooper or the consultant Ben Gunn for the Authority, focusing on 
mythological and art sites related to the Bula story. Some extended over several 
days of field work, so that as theatres they were divided internally into episodes of 
documentation and research separated by periods of eating, sleeping etc. The first 
of Cooper's trips was described earlier in this chapter. 
Across this variety of forms, I take the qualifying criterion to be that the 
custodians' involvement in the proceedings arose from their status as custodians 
with respect to Coronation Hill or Sickness Country. This was their explicit role, 
and their actions in providing information, expressing opinions and making 




Whenever an individual participates in an episode of activity, a distinction 
will be drawn between what is called the person, individual, or player, 
namely, he who participates, and the particular role, capacity, or function he 
realizes during that participation. And a connection between these two 
elements will be understood. In short, there will be a p erson-role formula. 
The nature of a particular frame will, of course, be linked to the nature of 
the person-role formula it sustains. One can never expect complete freedom 
between individual and role and never complete constraint. But no matter 
where on this continuum a particular formula is located, the formula itself 
will express the · sense in which the framed activity is geared into the 
continuing world. (Goffman 1975: 269 - italics in original) 
Indeed, for the custodians, it was their awareness of the expectation of others that 
they were to perform that role in the company of some assembled group that 
established the theatrical frame. Such awareness was informed by context, defined 
here in Goffinan' s terms 'as immediately available events which are compatible 
with one frame understanding and incompatible with others' (1975: 441). The three 
senior custodians, and other senior people to a lesser degree, were selected for 
participation in these theatres by the match between their pre-existing status in the 
Aboriginal domain, and the criteria of structural entitlement, age and knowledge 
that were indicated by the use of 'custodian' within the legislation (see chapter 6). 
In dramaturgical terms, there was a high degree of congruence between self and 
role (Hare and Blumberg 1988: 81). Thus, even in cases where meetings were 
organised as general community events, the person-role formula operating with 
respect to discussions about Coronation Hill was always constrained in a way that 
1nade the performance of the senior custodians a matter of special attention. 
Jobs and royalties: the events of June and July 1986 
At the end of 1985, the BHP team began preparing work plans for the next dry 
season. Ellis advised the Jawoyn meeting of 3 February 1986 that he had asked 
BHP to formally submit those plans for consideration by the J awoyn. In response 
Peter J atbula asserted a prohibition on people entering the area, and he and four 
other senior people recorded the statements detailed at the beginning of this 
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chapter, emphasising that damage to the site would bring indiscriminate deaths and 
natural calamity. On 10 February the BHP team submitted its proposals to the 
Authority and requested site clearance for the next stage of testing. At a site 
inspection with custodians on 25 February, the team explained both its immediate 
plans for work in Area 1 and then Area 2 shown in Map 6, and the anticipated 
extent of mining and placement of infrastructure if exploration were successful. At 
a J awoyn meeting on 6 March, BHP' s proposals were rejected. 
Up to March 1986 then, statements recorded from the senior custodians and other 
significant Aborigines consistently opposed mining development in the area 
affected by the presence of Bula. All the texts generated until then, such as those 
recorded by the Sites Authority at the meeting of 3 February, were drawn from the 
script of religious power and danger. In the first few days of July 1986 several 
consultation events took place that publicly interrupted that pattern and caused 
surprise, even consternation, among many people, especially those who believed 
J awoyn opposition to Coronation Hill was a settled fact. The significance of this 
crowded sequence of interactions lies in the signals it produced that the script of 
jobs and royalties had by then become established in the minds of significant 
Aboriginal actors as an alternative source of texts that could be drawn on at such 
events. 
The records of participant organisations show that the events of July were not 
entirely unheralded. The meeting of 3 February 1986 itself provides the earliest 
indication that there was a potential for the project to be evaluated in terms of 
material reward, in several comments critically comparing the money typically 
received by whites with the absence of benefit to blacks. As shown in the previous 
section, in the consultation theatre at El Sherana in April, Barraway then 
demonstrated by his statements in the presence of the BHP team that that 
alternative script had some currency. By May, the BHP team felt that their 
relationships with a number of prominent J awoyn people were developing to a 
point that would re-open the possibility of gaining approval for the project. In mid-
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June, the team organised another overnight visit to the South Alligator valley at the 
request of Wiynjorrotj. The trip included the three senior male custodians and two 
other senior women. The group visited UDP Falls and the Christmas Creek art site, 
then went to Coronation Hill. Part of Rush's notes read: 
Then asked if they wanted to go and have a look at the old workings, which 
they did, so we drove up to the entrance of the old open cut. Showed the 
workings, our drill hole collars and the area that we wanted to work in. 
At the open cut, Sandy volunteered that it would be alright for us to work, 
and a discussion took place on the benefits that the J awoyn would get if we 
were allowed to work, that is, jobs and training, as they had seen on 
Groote. 21 
After escorting a group of seven J awoyn, including J atbula and Barraway, on a 
second visit to inspect BHP operations on Groote Eylandt, Rush then made another 
visit to Pine Creek, Edith Falls camp (Werenbun), Katherine and Rockhole, talking 
with people he already knew and with others he was introduced to. One of the latter 
was Willie Byers, a J awoyn man who had no special custodial role with respect to 
Gimbat sites but was a well known and knowledgeable figure in the social 
networks of the region. Rush was introduced to him at Kalano by Larry Ah Lin, 
who by now was well-known to the BHP team as a helpful advisor. They entered a 
detailed discussion about Coronation Hill from which Rush noted, 'Willie emphatic 
Coronation Hill not a sacred site and that we could work there' .22 
On 28 June, the BHP team and David Cooper from the Sites Authority travelled 
into the South Alligator valley with nineteen people from various camps, including 
the three senior custodians, for an overnight visit. On the first day they talked at 
Christmas Creek, Coronation Hill and El Sherana, and the next day the senior men 
21 P.M.Rush, 16.7 .86, Note to File: Notes on Meetings with Various Aborigines, 11 th to 13 th June, 
1986, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
22 P .M.Rush, 16. 7 .86, Note to File, Notes on Meetings with Various Aborigines, 24-25th June, 1986, 
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Map 6: Map submitted by BHP project team to Sites Authority showing priority 
areas for development of Coronation Hill project. Irregular line passing through 
Area 1 is part of boundary of Upper South Alligator Bula Complex registered 
site. 
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and women of the group convened for a meeting at Coronation Hill. Peter Rush 
arrived at the meeting after it had begun. His notes portray a theatre in which the 
custodians occupied centre stage, and other actors entered from the wings. 
When I arrived back at Coronation Hill, J awoyn people were already having 
a discussion amongst themselves and J.A. Linke and D. Cooper were 
waiting some distance from the meeting. 
I asked directions to find J .A. Linke and D. Cooper and as I left, they asked 
if J.A. Linke could return to the meeting. He went to talk to the Jawoyns 
whilst D. Cooper and the writer waited away from the discussion. 
After perhaps 15 to 20 minutes, Sandy left the meeting and the writer went 
to the meeting. They said they had heard Allen speak and now wanted to 
hear me, so I talked for a short while, principally about the Groote visit and 
how BHP works well with Aboriginal groups, as they had seen at Groote, 
and how we could help them if work proceeded at Coronation Hill. 
During this period, D. Cooper returned to -the group. At the end the writer 
was told that they wanted a full meeting of the J awoyns on Tuesday to 
consider giving permission for us to proceed with work at Coronation Hill. 
The group were apparently happy with letting us proceed, but wanted that 
decision to be made at a community meeting at Bahlnga. Peter J atbula was 
apparently the main proponent of this course of action, the others being 
happy to give the go ahead at the Sunday meeting. 
Allen spoke briefly to the meeting and then David asked to address them in 
private. Writer and Allen left and David spoke to them for about 5 to 10 
· 23 minutes. 
Commenting on the meeting a few days later, Ah Lin corroborated Rush's view 
that the people present were prepared to give consent to development, having seen 
the effects of the earlier mining, but J atbula had prevailed. After a liaison effort 
pursued since mid-March, Rush and Linke of the BHP team were by now clearly 
associated in the minds of the Jawoyn with the script of jobs and royalties, and they 
were able here to revisit the theme of the benefits that could flow to the Jawoyn 
from the project. While it is not clear what Cooper said to the meeting, his prior 
23 P.M.Rush, 16.7.86, Note to File, Notes on Meetings with Various Aborigines, 28 th to 29th June, 
1986, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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dealings with the Jawoyn included researching the site registration report in the 
previous September, video-recording state1nents asserting sacredness and danger at 
the meeting of 3 February, and counselling individual Jawoyn against providing 
information about sites to the BHP team. He was thus by now equally clearly 
associated by the J awoyn with the script of religious power and danger. In this 
theatre of 29 June, then, advocates of the alternative scripts were immediately at 
hand, though it is not clear if they were equally able to proffer each script for the 
meeting to select as the source of its final text. 
The meeting of 1 July at Barunga, the first general J awoyn meeting called 
expressly for a formal decision on development works at Coronation Hill since 3 
March, took the same form. It was organised by the BHP team, conducted by Larry 
Ah Lin and attended by about thirty J awoyn including the three senior 1nen. After 
an initial J awoyn discussion, Cooper was invited in to address the meeting first, and 
he explained the requirement for the Authority to authorise works on the registered 
site, and the need to verify the site boundaries. Rush and Linke then entered and 
spoke of BHP' s good record on Groote and its willingness to respect J awoyn 
concerns in the South Alligator valley, explained and illustrated their work plans, 
and offered jobs and training at Coronation Hill and support for the J awoyn cattle 
station venture at Eva Valley. They then exited, the men and women divided for 
lengthy discussions and Cooper, Rush and Linke were invited back in to be told 
that the meeting had approved the development proposals. 
The next day a fresh intervention occurred from a different direction. During June 
1986, the conservative and pro-development Northern Territory News had 
published front page articles and editorials incorrectly reporting that BHP was 
leaving the Northern Territory out of frustration with Coronation Hill negotiations, 
and claiming that the site registration was fraudulent and the Sites Authority 
Director was driven by an anti-development ideology. The Minister for Mines and 
Energy employed a consultant, Stephen Davis, to inquire into the registration of 
Coronation Hill as part of a sacred site (see chapter 6). Davis knew the senior 
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custodians from his clearance work on a gas pipeline through J awoyn country. 
Aware of the Coronation Hill issue, he had already made his own inquiries around 
Katherine concerning custodianship and knowledge of Bula, contacted the BHP 
team to advise them of his findings, and visited the site near Sleisbeck with the 
Darwin mining consultant Joe Fisher and his brother Stan between 24 and 26 June 
1986. 
On 2 and 3 July Davis carried out his field research for the Minister. He first 
recorded interviews on 2 July at the J awoyn camp of Werenbun in which, 
according to his notes, Brown stated that Coronation Hill is 'nothing', 'just big hill' 
and that 'B.H.P. they can drill there', and that the Christmas Creek art site is 
'nothing, it's nothing that one, just draw' (Davis 1986a: 3-4). His video of an 
interview the next day with Barraway and Brown at the Sleisbeck site, 
independently transcribed, included the following: -
Davis: What about Coronation Hill? 
Barraway: Coronation Hill nothing, [Bula] just came past through there. 
Davis: Nothing, just came past there? 
Brown: Yeah, go past, nothing there. 
Davis: ... you don't want that Coronation Hill registered? 
Barraway: No, he'll be right. 
Davis: That's all right? 
Barraway: It's all right. They can work if they want to. 
Davis: It ' s all right, it's open for work it 's not a sacred site. 
Barraway: No, they can drill it. 
Davis: · They can drill it. What about after that, what about when 
they ask you after that if they find a lot of gold there and 











mining, what are you going to say when they say "we want 
to mine that" then? 
Well, we been tell them longa meeting. I told hi1n already, 
you can go ahead, mining, more gold, well, you can do that. 
That's OK if they find gold they can mine it, if they find 




That's what we told them people. That royalty money can go 
to Katherine bank, Crossway. They can put him there, 
mining people. All the . young people going to work there, 
woman, young boy. 
Young boy they gonna work there now. 
Them fellas, lot of them school men, you know, when they 
read and write, they be work there, some fella officer, some 
fella they been drive him this truck. (Cooper 1986: 10, 13) 
The following day, newspapers reported BHP's success at the meeting of 1 July. 
The Chairman of the J awoyn Association, Larry Ah Lin, was reported in the 
Canberra Times as saying: 
On Groote we saw for ourselves how well BHP and the traditional 
landowners get on together and that BHP really means what they told us. 
We hadn't realised before that arrangements like that are possible. Our 
agreement shows what can be achieved with proper discussion and 
consultation. The J awoyn people regard this as a very important occasion 
and we are now looking forward to the development of Coronation Hill. 
(na 1986) 
Any attempt to explain the altered positions of individual custodians and J awoyn 
1neetings in the period from early March to early July must look initially to the 
changed circumstances of the intervening months. It is notable that during the first 
formal site inspection conducted on 25 February, the BHP team presented only 
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their work proposals, and no mention is recorded in the minutes of any benefits that 
the project might offer to the Jawoyn. At the meeting of 3 March, the team's 
request for approval was refused. Since then, BHP team officers had ample 
opportunity during their liaison efforts to apprise the J awoyn of the employment 
and other benefits that might arise from the mining proposal. The texts produced by 
J awoyn speakers in the four-month period to 3 July are most readily understood as 
a response to that new information, transmitted in a series of theatres which 
friendly and now recognisable members of the BHP team produced, acted in and 
sometimes directed. In the light of subsequent events (see later), and consistent 
with my focus on individual theatres, _ it makes little sense to take these texts as 
evidencing an absolute change of mind about Coronation Hill, but they do show 
that prominent J awoyn, including two of the three senior custodians, no longer 
regarded the script of religious power and danger as the only legitimate source from 
which to draw their texts during consultation events. 
I have given these texts in some detail in order to plainly pose the problem of 
contradictions and to begin substantiating my approach to it. The detail itself is 
significant. During the Coronation Hill debate, each side attempted to explain away 
the decisions and testimony - the texts - adduced in support by the other side by 
reference to vitiating factors that went to the status of these texts as authentic 
indicators of custodians' feelings. These matters will be discussed in more detail in 
Part 3, but for the moment I want to have accepted the point that, on the face of the 
texts themselves, there are no grounds for discriminating degrees of authenticity 
between the corpus of texts drawn from the script of religious power and danger, 
and that drawn from the script of jobs and royalties. During the RAC Inquiry, Keen 
and Merlan argued such a discrimination on the grounds of voluntarism. 
One kind of response has involved the assumptions that: Coronation Hill is 
not as central a site as some others where (for example, at Sleisbeck) there 
is much evidence of ritual activity, but is rather a place through which Bula 
passed as he -moved through Gimbat ( e.g. Sandy Barraway to Stephen 
Davis). Therefore, exploration and perhaps mining may proceed. From this, 
Aboriginal people may expect to derive benefits, most notably including 
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employment and royalties .... In these assumptions, there is an atte1npt to 
reduce the incommensurability between beliefs and statements concerning 
cosmological significance of the area, and the possibility of mining it. We 
have not ever known these men to suggest that mining is to be solicited or 
promoted; rather they have apparently sometimes accepted that it might 
proceed under the suppositions outlined. (1990: 81) 
Similarly, Cooper (pers comm) denied ever hearing any of the three senior 
custodians express approval for development in enthusiastic terms. As this chapter 
has shown by reference to a wider range of texts, the custodians' readings from the 
script of jobs and royalties were not always rendered in cautious and qualified 
terms, nor were they restricted to narrowly functional responses to the terms of the 
questions put. Rather, comments in elaboration were sometimes offered, and 
Barraway' s paraphrased statement of April, which went beyond what the miners 
were asking, is perhaps the clearest example of a voluntary endorse1nent of mining. 
Indeed, while the selection here of several quoted texts from Barraway reflects his 
own verbal facility and readiness, it also documents the most telling individual 
corpus of contradictory texts from among the entire cast of J awoyn actors. 
Barraway was the first and most insistent of a number of local people who 
impressed upon Merlan the current religious importance of Bula to the J awoyn 
when she began fieldwork in the region in 1976. Having taken up residence at 
Barunga (then Bamyili), she was approached by Barraway and his brother Dick 
Wotbuy with their concerns for the security of two Bula sites from mineral 
exploration activity reported to have begun in northern Eva Valley and Gimbat. 
Merlan was itnposed upon by .them and encouraged by others to take them into the 
area to see what was happening (Merlan and Rumsey 1982: 54; Merlan and 
Rumsey 1986: 4-6). Merlan describes Barraway as having been at that time 
'thoroughly distressed about Bula matters, especially about rumours of exploration 
in Gimbat' (Keen and Merlan 1990: 25). 
I have thus spent 1nore time docu1nenting readings from the script of jobs and 
royalties than from the other for two reasons. The first is historical: to show that in 
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the period from early March to early July 1986 senior Jawoyn figures began 
responding to proposals with respect to Coronation Hill by reference to a script of 
jobs and royalties, that that script now existed as an alternative to the pre-existing 
one of religious power and danger, and was available to be drawn upon for texts 
during consultation events. The second reason is a response to the effect of the 
political outcome of the Coronation Hill dispute. That outcome bestowed upon the 
script of religious power and danger an appearance of greater authenticity than the 
script of jobs and royalties. My aim has been to establish that, judged on the face 
value of the texts produced, there are no grounds for discriminating between the 
scripts as to their credibility in the attitudes of custodians. I have thus tried to 
remove any presupposition that the script of religious power and danger has to be 
taken as the privileged script and any deviations from it explained by a set of 
secondary rationalisations. Once that is done, each theatre has to be seen in its own 
terms, sui generis, and not against a background-of assumptions about what the 
custodians really thought. I hope that the data I have given so far and will present in 
the remainder of this chapter will be sufficient to suspend any such assumptions. 
The Senate Inquiry 
The Senate Inquiry into the potential of the Kakadu region provides a further 
instance. The Inquiry was announced in October 1985, just two weeks after 
registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex, so that by the time it 
commenced hearings in March 1986, Coronation Hill was among the resource 
management issues that fell within its brief. It reported in 1988. 
In March 1987 the Inquiry heard evidence at Barunga. Through three sequences of 
questions, Nipper Brown, Phyllis Wiynjorrotj and Sarah Flora denied that 
Coronation Hill is of any significance with relation to Bula or that there are 
traditional restrictions on women going there, and affirmed that mining could 
proceed there safely (SSCNR 1987a: 71-72, 77-79, 88-89). David Cooper of the 
Sites Authority, Raymond Fordimail, a young man who had for several years taken 
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a prominent role in J awoyn public affairs, and even the Chair of the Inquiry, 
Senator Olive Zakharov, tried to qualify the finding of an absolute denial of 
sacredness to which these proceedings appeared to be leading. Fallowing the first 
interchange, Cooper faced sceptical questions from conservative 1nembers of the 
Committee as to why Coronation Hill had been included in the registered site. 
Senator Crichton-Browne then returned to the senior J awoyn people before him for 
another laboured effort to verify the status of Coronation Hill as a question of fact. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Before you went up to Coronation Hill 
did you once think that there was a Bula on Coronation Hill? 
Ms Wynjorroc -No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - You never thought there was one on 
Coronation Hill? 
Ms Wynjorroc-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Did anybody ever think there was a 
Bula in that area of Coronation Hill? 
Ms Flora-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Do you know why there is a sacred site 
registered which covers Coronation Hill? 
Ms Wynjorroc-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Has anybody in this room ever asked or 
talked about a sacred site, a Bula, on Coronation Hill? 
Ms Flora-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE-You know nothing about it? 
Ms Flora-No. 
CHAIRMAN-Who put in the application for registration for that area? 
Ms Wynjorroc - I know myself they were mining there before, a long time 
ago. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Mining on Coronation Hill? Did that 
cause any problems? 
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Ms Wynjorroc-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE -Nobody cared? Nobody worried? 
Ms Wynjorroc- It was all right. Everything was okay. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - There were no sacred sites, no burial 
sites, no area of significance, nothing special at all? 
Ms Wynjorroc - Nothing. 
Ms Flora - No. 
Ms Wynjorroc - There is just the one Bula place now. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Where is that? 
Ms Wynjorroc - Up this way. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Sleisbeck - that is the big one. Is the 
/ big one the important one? 
Ms Wynjorroc - Yes, very important. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - But not on Coronation Hill? 
Ms Wynjorroc-No. 
CHAIRMAN - Do the other people here agree with that? 
Mr F ordimail - I disagree. 
CHAIRMAN -Would you tell us why you disagree? 
Mr Fordimail - That is what I said in the first place. My father told me 
about the cycle of the Bula site. 
CHAIRMAN - Would that be knowledge that would be just for men? 
Mr Fordimail -Yes. 
CHAIRMAN - So there could be a sacred site that women might not know 
about? 
Mr Fordimail - I think that Bula is only men's business. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Ms Wynjorroc, Mr Fordimail says there 




Senator TOWNLEY - Are you allowed to go anywhere on Coronation 
Hill that you want to? 
Ms Flora - Yes. 
Senator CRJCHTON-BROWNE -You can go on Coronation Hill? 
Ms Flora - Yes. I was there for a couple of weeks; we camp out there, 
come back. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Is there a senior elder amongst the men 
here today? Who is the senior man? 
Mr Brown - I am. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE-You are the chief? 
Mr Brown-_ Yes. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Do you agree with Ms Wynjorroc and 
Ms Flora that there is no Bula on Coronation Hill? 
Mr Brown-No. No Bula. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - There 1s no Bula, no sacred sites, 
nothing at all? 
Mr Brown-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - So mining on Coronation Hill would 
not hurt Aboriginal sites? 
Mr Brown- It can go ahead? [sic] 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE- Is that one, Coronation Hill, okay? 
Mr Brown - Yes. 
Mr Fordimail - I just want to mention that the other senior custodian, who 
is not here at the n1oment, agrees with me. We both disagree that there is 
not any connection with Bula on Coronation Hill. (SSCNR 1987a: 77-80) 
Because of Fordi1nail's youth, the full extent of the disagreement between 
custodians was not revealed until Peter J atbula arrived. As far as can be told fro1n 
the transcript, J atbula walked into an extraordinary episode of public repudiation by 
the other senior people present. He began by affirming that the law he had learned 
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from his father prohibited mining in the area affected by the presence of Bula, and 
that mining should therefore not proceed at Coronation Hill. Proceeding on the 
incorrect assumption that there is a visible Bula site located on top of Coronation 
Hill, Senator Crichton-Browne asked J atbula if he had seen the Buia at that place. 
Jatbula replied that they had seen 'bits of it' recently during a visit with BHP 
officials. Possibly he was referring here to indications of gold in BHP's drill 
samples. Following direct contradiction by Barra way and Brown, J atbula retreated 
to the statement 'We have only seen the picture', but re-affirmed his knowledge of 
a Bula presence there from his father. During the same line of questioning, J atbula 
stated that women should know they are not allowed to walk around on Coronation 
Hill, after which Sarah Flora affirmed that women go there and that children are 
also allowed (SSCNR 1987a: 92-103). 
The Senate Inquiry was the first occasion on which what I have characterised as the · 
third level of political process to be involved in Coronation Hill, the level of 
Federal inquiry and arbitration, sought its own direct access to indigenous input. I 
have quoted some of that input, if not as a reading directly from the script of jobs 
and royalties, then at least as a repudiation of the script of religious power and 
danger. The Inquiry could also readily draw from it a sense of intra-J awoyn 
disagreement arising from the singular fortitude of Peter J atbula. Further, however, 
J awoyn testimony also offered to that third level of the process its first taste of 
contradiction. Prior to Jatbula's arrival, the Chairman had made these perplexed 
comments on the proceedings, referring to a site inspection the Inquiry had 
conducted earlier that day: 
CHAIRMAN - When this Committee was at Coronation Hill, some people 
felt very strongly that it was a Bula sacred site and now they seem not to 
feel that. Can you account for that, please? 
Mr F ordimail - When we had a talk at Coronation Hill I felt the same way 
that I do now. I cannot explain why they have changed their mind in saying 
it is not a sacred site or a site of significance. (SSCNR 1987 a: 86-87) 
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At least some of the four custodians who were denying the significance of 
Coronation Hill had thus, apparently, asserted its significance during the site 
inspection. In addition, Cooper, caught between his need to defend the integrity of 
the Authority's site registration and his desire to avoid embarrassing the custodians, 
in the end had no choice but to apprise the Inquiry of a further instance of 
contradiction. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Nipper Brown, do you remember ever 
asking the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority to register 
Coronation Hill as a sacred site? 
Mr Brown-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Did you ever want Coronation Hill for 
a sacred site? 
Mr Brown-No, never. There is nothing there. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE -There is nothing at Coronation Hill? 
Mr Brown - Nothing. It is free. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - You never signed any piece of paper 
saying: 'Make Coronation Hill a sacred site'? 
Mr Brown-No. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Is Sandy Barraway here? 
CHAIRMAN - Yes. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Mr Barraway, have you ever signed 
anything asking for Coronation Hill to be made a sacred site? 
Mr Barraway - No, I have never. 
Senator CRICHTON-BROWNE - Have you ever thought of Coronation 
Hill as a sacred site? 
Mr Barraway-No. 
Crichton-Browne then left that issue, but the Chair quickly returned to it. 
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CHAIRMAN - Raymond, do you know who requested the registration of 
the sacred site? Who asked for the registration of the sacred site on 
Coronation Hill? 
Mr Fordimail - I do not know. They could have a list of names that 
applied for that registration of the sacred site. 
Senator DEVLIN - Someone 1nust know the names. 
Mr Cooper-The names that are on the request are Sandy Barraway, Peter 
J atbula, Nipper Brown and Frank Dalak. Frank is not here. They are the 
names that appear on the request. (SSCNR 1987a: 88, 89) 
The following year, the Authority produced another video, Bulajang: Sickness 
Country, and submitted it to the Inquiry. It featured readings from the script of 
religious power and danger by all three senior custodians, similar to those of 3 
February 1986. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have documented the problem of contradictions, and begun to 
address it by disaggregating the senior custodians' participation in the Coronation 
Hill issue into a series of separate consultation events. Drawing on Goffman, I have 
framed each such event as a theatre, and pursued that metaphor by posing the 
statements and decisions made by custodians or by group meetings at each event as 
a selection of text from one or other of two available scripts. Custodians produced 
texts either from the script of religious power and danger to express opposition to 
development at Coronation Hill, or from the script of jobs and royalties to express 
assent to that development. 
Two questions flow from this, through which the problem of contradictions can be 
further pursued. Sustaining the present focus on individual consultation events, I 
need to inquire into the criteria that the custodians appeared to apply in selecting 
their text from one or other script for each theatre. Then, stepping back, I need to 
look for the cultural salience of the scripts themselves, to ground them in some set 
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of circumstances pertinent to the engagement of the J awoyn with Coronation Hill, 
but originating outside the theatres of that engagement. So, for the texts of the kind 




CONTEXT 1: WHAT KIND OF THEATRE? 
Text and context 
In the previous chapter I introduced the idea of treating consultation events as 
frames. In this chapter I want to be more specific about what was being conveyed 
to the custodians by their involvement within these frames. Goffinan elaborates his 
notion that primary frameworks, social or natural, 
are not merely a matter of mind but correspond in some sense to the way in 
which an aspect of the activity itself is _organized - especially activity 
directly involving social agents. Organizational premises are involved, and 
these are something cognition somehow arrives at, not something cognition 
creates or generates. Given their understanding of what it is that is going on, 
individuals fit their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the 
ongoing world supports this fitting. These organizational premises -
sustained both in the mind and in activity - I call the frame of the activity. 
( Goffman 197 5: 24 7) 
Two of the concepts at play here - the actor's point of view, and the definition of 
the situation - are expressly considered by Goffman at the beginning of Frame 
Analysis. In his introduction to that book, and in diverse illustrations of the 
arguments that follow, Goffman is constantly exploring actors' perceptions, 
manipulations and management efforts around what it is that is going on, some 
initial -physical and social arrangement that is objectively real. These · structuring 
realities, 'external and prior to the individual' (Collins 1988: 58), must be taken 
account ofby an actor in settling upon a definition of the situation. The actor is thus 
not free to create such a definition, but rather arrives at one that appears consistent 
with the data of pre-structured appearances. The understanding arrived at is verified 
or modified in interaction with other actors in the situation, each operating with 
their own definition. 
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The task of understanding the data of appearances, however, requires other data, 
drawn from fore-knowledge, to be brought to bear upon those appearances for their 
interpretation. This is evident in Goffman's concept of the 'information state' of an 
actor, by which he means, 
the knowledge an individual has of why events have happened as they have, 
what the current forces are, what the properties and intents of the relevant 
persons are, and what the outcome is likely to be. In brief, each character at 
each moment is accorded an orientation, a temporal perspective, a 
'horizon'. (Goffman 1975: 133-34) 
Thus, in interpreting the nature of the frame they were required to participate in, the 
custodians had reference to more than 
an immediate here-and-now, dissociated from all pasts and futures, and 
from connections to the lives, activities and arrangements which take place 
outside the instant purview of those in the situation under definition. 
(Sharrock 1999: 125) 
Encountering the data of appearances in the light of their accumulated infonnation 
states, custodians addressed the question 'what is it that is going on?'. An answer 
was readily to hand at the level of Goffman's primary framework: what is going on 
is a consultation event. I have suggested that the frame of the consultation event 
can be productively analysed through the metaphor of theatre. To this point, I have 
used that metaphor to present the custodians' participation in consultation events in 
terms of a choice between two scripts. To account for the selection of text from one 
script or the other on each occasion, I now need to place performance in context. 
Hanks (1989: 97-100) considers three levels at which a text may be contextualised. 
The first takes text as a coherent and limited unit of speech and studies its 
contribution to the transmitting of information within the structure of some larger 
verbal discourse. The second focusses on the more linguistically self-contained 
'text-work' - a novel, newspaper headline, or conversational exchange - and 
seeks its full interpretation in its interaction with social context, which 1night 
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include performative, institutional, or historical dimensions. The third denies any 
boundedness or unity to the text-work, locates meaning as an indeterminate 
function of the interaction between author, text and reader, and thus tends to merge 
the text into the ideological . environments of its creation and reception. The 
approach I adopt here falls more clearly within the second of these rather than the 
linguistic and deconstructionist alternatives. 
Social context, however, is an infinitely expandable thing. If 'it is only in union 
with the sociocultural world outside that [a text] becomes whole' (Hanks 1989: 
104), how much of that world participates in the union? This is Hanks' issue of 
scope (1989: 110), or for Bauman and Briggs, the problem of inclusiveness or 
'infinite regress' (1990: 68), the question of how much context is needed to 
understand a text. The aim of this and the next chapter is to identify two 
dimensions of context necessary to understand ihe texts generated by J awoyn · 
custodians with respect to Coronation Hill, or more specifically, to understand their 
acts of selection of one script or another. The orientation of the custodians was 
worked upon both by the character of individual theatres, and the themes of J awoyn 
regional history. 
Scene and script 
The former is the subject of this chapter. What the metaphor of theatres allows us 
to see is that the initial orienting question 'what is it that is going on?', once 
answered at the level of primary frame, then has to be answered again at a more 
discriminating level. If a consultation event is a theatre in which custodians are 
called upon to perform their custodianship, then the question in its supplementary 
form is whether a particular theatre is appropriate for a reading from the script of 
sacredness and danger, or from the script of jobs and royalties. The kind of theatre 
as apprehended by the custodians, then, is the subject of this chapter. Like the first 
framing question, it necessarily involves both the data of appearances and 
accumulated information states, the latter bearing upon such things as the identity 
101 
Framing Contradictions 
and organisational affiliations of known individuals, local geography, personal 
histories and structural positions, laws and administrative procedures, and the 
current state of government policy. 
A review of the various consultation events and their outcomes suggests a pattern 
to begin with. Where the custodians were called on to inspect and consider 
proposed mining development works, they were inclined · to make pro-mining 
statements; where they were engaged in field trips for the purpose of documenting 
Bula sites in Sickness Country, they were inclined to make anti-mining statements. 
In other words, the overt purpose for which the theatre is constructed seems to be a 
criterion guiding the custodians' choice of script, and production of text, for that 
event. 
In these instances, however, the purpose cannot be said to dictate the choice of 
script in any transparent way. Considering proposals for mining development does 
not of itself require pro-mining statements, only a choice one way or the other. 
Documenting sacred sites at a distance from the proposed development does not 
require anti-mining statements, or any statements about mining at all, unless the 
subject is raised and the custodians in responding are put in mind of prohibitions by 
clear pre-existing doctrinal knowledge of a mythological connection between the 
documented site and the mining site, which categorical knowledge, as I have 
indicated, they did not possess. There is thus the question of what aspects of these 
exercises were salient in influencing the custodians to produce texts of one kind or 
the other. 
One aspect appears to be physical location, the scene. I am invoking here what 
Burke has called the scene-act ratio, to label the correlations by which the scene 
can be understood to 'contain' the acts that take place against its background. 
It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be 
consistent with the nature of the scene .... The nature of the scene may be 
conveyed primarily by suggestions built into the lines of the verbal action 
itself, as with the imagery in the dialogue of Elizabethan drama and with the 
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descriptive passages of novels; or it may be conveyed by non-linguistic 
properties, as with the materials of naturalistic stage-sets. In any case, 
examining first the relation between scene and act, all we need note here is 
the principle whereby the scene is a fit "container'' for the act, expressing in 
fixed properties the same quality that the action expresses in terms of 
development. (Burke 1945: 3) 
Within this relationship of containment, the scene implies what the actors should 
do. 
From the motivational point of view, there is implicit in the quality of a 
scene the quality of the action that is to take place within it. This would be 
another way of saying that the act will be consistent with the scene. Thus, 
when the curtain rises to disclose a given stage-set, this stage-set contains, 
simultaneously, implicitly, all that the narrative is to draw out as a 
sequence, explicitly. Or, if you will, the stage-set contains the action 
ambiguously (as regards the norms of action) - and in the course of the 
play' s development this ambiguity is c_onverted into a corresponding 
articulacy . The proportion would be: scene is to act as implicit is to explicit. 
One could not deduce the details of the action from the details of the setting, 
but one could deduce the quality of the action from the quality of the 
setting. (Burke 1945: 6-7 - italics in original) 
So we can imagine that, during development consultations, as people are brought 
into the presence of friendly and familiar mining company employees, 
accommodated and fed at the El Sherana camp, shovvn around the exploration site 
with its roads, drilling benches and machinery, that an identification with the 
purpose implied by all of this may occur, enhanced by the presence of J awoyn 
trainees in work boots and hard hats. Similarly, travelling around country by 
vehicle, helicopter and foot for the purpose of placing the narrative details of the 
Bula myth -into the terrain as it was encountered, matching places seen against 
fragments of stories remembered, and being struck here and there by large galleries 
with vivid and suggestive motifs which Bula himself must once have painted, the 
same people were put in mind of the expansive reach of his power casting a sheen 
of mythological presep.ce over the Gimbat valley and its upland surrounds, perhaps 
more so when their finds included ochred bones from the ceremonies and burials of 
. 
. 
their antecedents, sometimes including their own identifiable relations. 
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But this can only be a beginning, for two episodes given earlier already contradict 
this correlation. On the first, little can be said. It will be remembered that at the 
Senate Inquiry hearing at Barunga on 9 March 1987, the Chair made reference to 
an earlier site inspection of Coronation Hill at which 'some people felt very 
strongly that it was a Bula sacred site'. That inspection was apparently conducted 
informally, and I have located no descriptions, let alone transcripts, of the event. 
The second episode was Davis' interview with Barraway and Brown of 3 July 
1986, in which they denied the mythological significance of Coronation Hill. This 
occurred at the focal Bula site near Sleisbeck, a site striking for the immediate 
physicality of a very large bone deposit and a gallery featuring a series of 
mythological motifs, and for the nearby presence of a point where Bula is said to 
have gone underground. Here we can follow Burke's lead again, expanding the 
notion of scene and treating it as more perspectival (from the actor's point of view) 
and more evolving, by including within it the other actors present, especially those 
who actively 'set the scene', so to speak, explicitly or implicitly framing the theatre 
by outlining its purpose or intention. 'For the characters', says Burke, 
by being in interaction, could be treated as scenic conditions or 
"environment," of one another; and any act could be treated as part of the 
context that modifies (hence, to a degree motivates) the subsequent acts. 
(1945: 7) 
Davis had been unusually explicit in framing the intent of his field trip with the 
custodians into the upper South Alligator valley. He had discussed Coronation Hill 
with some senior J awoyn in the weeks and days before his trip, and formed the 
mistaken impression that Barraway had never been to the Sleisbeck site before. The 
story that he was preparing for his report to the Northern Territory Minister for 
Mines and Energy was that the custodians had agreed to the registration of the 
Upper South Alligator Bula Complex because they had been led to believe that 
Coronation Hill was the location of a set of 'site elements', consisting of a 
waterhole, stone pathway and rock shelter as docu1nented and illustrated by Arndt 
(1962), that were in reality located at the Sleisbeck site (Davis 1986b: 3-4). 
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Moreover, now that he had provided them with the opportunity to see the Sleisbeck 
site and satisfy themselves that it was safe, they could comfortably resile from their 
previous statements asserting the importance of Coronation Hill, allow mining to 
proceed, and begin looking after and transmitting knowledge about the Bula cult 
and its genuine location. With respect to fact, interpretation and argument, many 
criticisms could be made of the report that Davis later built around this story, but I 
am here concerned with the story as scene-setting for the consultation event that 
followed. Showing several prominent men and women the Arndt photos of the 
Sleisbeck site, he proposed his field trip as a necessary complement to the approval 
for development given at the Barunga meeting the day before, and using leading 
questions, he elicited statements in accord with aspects of his story before the field 
trip began (Davis 1986a). Later then, within the theatre of the Sleisbeck interview 
(see chapter 3), Davis established a scene that could be interpreted by Barraway 
and Brown as implying a reading from the script of jobs and royalties with respect 
to Coronation Hill. 
The following day, in another theatre in Katherine where the scene was set by an 
individual favouring a reading from the other script, the custodians delivered such a 
reading. The main organiser here I will call Darren Bennett, a young man who 
played a prominent public role in J awoyn affairs. Bennett had telephoned an NLC 
lawyer on 1 July and said that the J awoyn had consistently opposed the Coronation 
Hill project and would stand by that position. He was present at the 1 July meeting 
for a short time during which he made some comments affirming the status of 
Coronation Hill as a sacred site, then left when he felt confident that the sentiments 
of the people in attendance were firmly against development. As he walked away, 
he told David Cooper that the meeting would vote against the BHP team's 
proposals and would further tell the team to cease its liaison efforts with J awoyn 
people. When Bennett was advised that the vote had been to the opposite effect, he 




In opening the meeting of 4 July at the Low Level Reserve, Bennett called over the 
people in attendance to inspect models of Coronation Hill and its surrounding area 
that the BHP team had provided as part of its liaison program. As people looked 
down on the models, Bennett pointed out the line marking the boundary of the 
registered site and emphasised firstly, that drilling was proposed for an area inside 
the boundary, 'right where them sites are', and secondly, that people had to keep in 
mind that Bula was of concern not only to Jawoyn, but that 'we've got all the other 
tribes watching us' .24 Sacredness was thus asserted in a manner that called for 
deference or compliance from those present. B-ennett thus attempted to frame the 
theatre as one appropriate for a reading fron1 the script of religious power and 
danger. 
As the group settled into discussion, Bennett twice responded to questions from 
Dick Garrad about money by explaining that the J awoyn would not be entitled to 
royalties, and by casting doubt on any promises of employment. The alternative 
script that some custodians had drawn on since March was thereby dismissed. 
Barraway endorsed that dismissal: 
If you give it now, you won't get any royalty money. Nothing. You get 
h . 25 not 1ng. 
Discussion then turned to the 1 July meeting and the BHP team's liaison program. 
After the meeting had been in train for forty minutes, Peter J atbula stood up, moved 
to the middle of the group to look down at the models, then quietly made some 
statements that provided the meeting with its deciding text. He said that they would 
have to stop the 1nining because the place was their sacred site, that he sought to 
carry on his father's record in preventing mining in such areas, and that Larry Ah 
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Lin had not been strong enough as Association Chairman in his dealings with the 
BHP team. Ah Lin replied: 
Well daddy, if that's your decision, we'll have to take it. All right?26 
Bennett announced he would have Barunga Council revoke the BHP team's permit 
to visit the settlement, and Barraway added another statement, in contrast to the 
other texts he had produced in recent months: 
You got to listen to me now this one story I tell you mob. This one story 
everybody talk "yes". You just close him up that thing. I don't want to drill 
him, that mining. He says "no", he says "yes". Everybody talk "yes", well 
you finish, close him up. All right? You all the J awoyn here you fella want 
to talk "yes". Everyone. Even white man come up say, BHP mob [unclear] 
"here, I'll give you money. You run me down there, you show me". That 
sort of business no good [unclear] talk yes, yes. 27 
The framing, the 'scene-act ratio', operating through the efforts of Bennett, thus 
invited readings from the script of religious power and danger by the two brothers, 
J atbula and Barraway, whose centrality to the discussion was repeatedly 
acknowledged by others. Bennett's framing tactics, however, did not ensure 
unanimity throughout the discussion. Nipper Brown loudly insisted that the drilling 
should be allowed, but, being intoxicated, he was ignored or reprimanded, and at 
the end of the meeting he joined in the vote against mining. Dick Garrad at first 
made brief comments acquiescent to development, then vacillated, but he was not 
one of the three acknowledged senior custodians and he deferred to their opinions. 
The positions adopted by J atbula and Barraway now changed the scene for him so 
that, following Barraway, he offered: 
26 Ibid. 
27 :1-.. ·d lul . 
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Ceremony is there, ceremony ground, please. We just close it and close it 
and leave it. No whitefella go there. 28 
It is notable that Brown and Garrad expressed dissent in terms that did not violate 
the presuppositions Bennett had presented as a scene for the meeting. There was no 
denial by either that the proposed works were to occur at the location of a sacred 
site. Their statements during the first half of the meeting instead recommended that 
the place be surrendered, or 'given up', to the miners. Bennett's framing work was 
thus left unchallenged, but it could not eliminate a residual latitude for those 
divergent texts. J atbula and Barra way allowed their own acts to be contained by 
Bennett's scene, and their statements at the mid-point of the meeting settled the 
issue, bringing Garrad into agreement and leaving Brown in silence. The meeting 
then moved to its next phase, a lengthy discussion of strategy. Unlike at the 1 July 
meeting, Bennett saw the event through. At its close, he mustered everyone to raise 
their hands in support of the negative vote. 
Bennett's role as convenor and participant thus went beyond the neutral framing of 
the occasion as a consultation event, in Goffman's terms, to an active setting of a 
scene that would contain the acts unfolding within it, in Burke's terms. Ellis had 
done the same in a more transparently directorial manner at the meeting of 3 
February (see chapter 3). In regard to the choice of script that they recommended, 
these contrasted with Larry Ah Lin's scene-setting introduction at the 1 July 
meeting at Barunga. There he referred to the era of mining in the 1950s and showed 
literature sources by Arndt and Chaloupka that documented a distribution of 
significant sites different to that now marked by the site registration. Indeed, Sarah 
Flora's single contribution to the discussion on 4 July featured a repudiation of Ah 
Lin's efforts on 1 July, by his 'little bit smart talk there', to set a scene that would 
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First time we been go have meeting, we been say ''No". First meeting we 
been say "No". Second meeting again we been go, we been take that bloke 
over there, Larry. Now, that's why maybe, Larry, you been little bit smart 
talk there .... What you been say, you been ask him that old man Peter 
J atbula, and two-fella that old man Sandy Barraway, and me and Phyllis, 
and Captain Andrew, when we been go, all right. You said that and Nipper 
and that olgamun Queenie, and we went there, and, you been say, "May as 
well, just give it one way" .... Right, I been thinking about this. Those old 
man there, Peter, this old man we no been like to say you know, ''Yes". Me 
and my sister we been say ''No". All right we [unclear] for that. Well you 
been say "Oh, let us all have to give it, make him one job". That been why 
European come and humbug round.29 
_ 
Flora's insistence at this meeting that she ( and Wiynjorrotj) had previously opposed 
development at Coronation Hill is of interest also in that, as shown previously in 
the extracts from the Senate Inquiry hearings at Barunga, it adds to the cast of 
senior J awoyn who read from different scripts on different occasions. 
Development consultations 
In the last section, I posed the relationship between scene and act for its 
significance in determining the production of texts at consultation events, and 
expanded the concept of scene to include such scene-setting factors as introductory 
comments, and further, the ongoing roles of some actors as part of the evolving 
scene for other actors. In this section I intend to look at the sequence of approvals 
for development works at Coronation Hill that J awoyn groups gave at a number of 
consultation events held between October 1986 and August 1987, in order to 
further explore the character of those scenes that consistently favoured readings 
from the script of jobs and royalties. 
Despite the resolutions passed at the meeting of 4 July, the Authority confirmed the 
authorisation it had sent to the BHP team to proceed with development works. The 
team resumed work in August 1986. Two further consultations regarding 
29 ibid. 
109 
Framing Contradictions .. 
development proposals took place over the remainder of the year. The first of these 
was arranged for the end of October, to consider an application fro1n the BHP team 
for permission to begin work in the back valley on the south-western side of 
Coronation Hill to assess its suitability for tailings and infrastructure sites (Map 7). 
The second occurred in early November and followed upon what Ellis considered 
to be inconclusive outcomes on some points considered at the October consultation. 
In October Ellis advised Rush that he was arranging a site inspection for the next 
stage of development works requested by the BHP team. In late October, Rush 
began preparing for what the team clearly regarded as an important meeting. He 
contacted Darren Bennett and Raymond Fordimail in their capacity as community 
organisers on 20 October, and again on the 23rd and 29 th , to confirm a site 
inspection and meeting in the valley at the end of the month. A group of thirty-six 
J awoyn from Barunga, Beswick, Eva Valley, Katherine, Kalano and Werenbun, but 
not including Darren Bennett or Peter Jatbula, were driven in two BHP vehicles 
and a Jawoyn vehicle to El Sherana on the 30th. They proceeded to Coronation Hill 
where in two groups, each accompanied by members of the BHP team, they walked 
along access tracks looking at existing and proposed drill locations on the hill. 
When Fordimail raised the issue of protecting the South Alligator River, about half 
the people were driven to the back valley where Leckie and Linke explained the 
siting and engineering of a proposed tailings dam and plant. 
The entire group convened the next morning at El Sherana to discuss the BHP 
team's proposals. No recordings were made of this meeting, but both Rush and 
Ellis wrote accounts. Linke began by expressing appreciation of the relationship the 
BHP team had been able to establish -with the Jawoyn, crediting Ellis with having 
introduced the1n and Ah Lin with having seen the employment potential of the 
project, and anticipated another visit to Groote Eylandt and assistance to the Eva 
Valley cattle enterprise. Fordimail, chairing the meeting, commented favourably on 
the employment. He asked people's feelings about such visits to the valley and to 








Map 7: Map submitted by BHP project team to Sites Authority showing location 
of proposed infrastructure developments in Area 2, the back valley. 
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should also work at Coronation Hill. Leckie then spoke of the drilling work that 
had so far been approved and the opportunities that visiting J awoyn groups and the 
new Jawoyn employees had had to oversee it, and of the project team's wish to 
have more people participating in approving their future work. Ellis then reviewed 
the difficulties that Coronation Hill had caused for the J awoyn, but said BHP had 
behaved properly by consulting, keeping promises, hosting J awoyn visits, and 
seeking permission before doing work. Linke described the proposed new stage of 
development, Ellis advised the J awoyn that any approval they gave could have 
conditions attached, and Fordimail then asked for others to leave the Jawoyn to 
their deliberations. When Leckie and Ellis were called back, F ordimail advised that 
the group was happy for the work to proceed. Rush reported the conclusion of that 
stage of the meeting. 
Leckie thanked the meeting for their decision and said that the [BHP team] · 
would continue to work with the Aborigines as we were at present. The [team] looked forward to more meetings and visits and were very pleased 
with our present association. 
Ellis also expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting and the 
BHP/Jawoyns association and communication.30 
The meeting had taken about one-and-a-half hours. A memo from Ellis to his 
Minister reported: 
At the recent meeting held at El Sherana with custodians particular note was 
made of the fact that the relationship between B.H.P. and the custodians 
was well advanced and positive as a result of B.H.P.'s continued co-
operation and their active implementation of a programme of employment 
of Aboriginal personnel in their activities.31 
30 PMR, 15.12.86, Note to File, Aboriginal Meetings, 28th to 31 st October, 1986, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Rep·orts. 
31 R.W.Ellis, 14.1.87, Memorandum Director ASSPA to Minister for Lands, Coronation Hill -
consents for proposed B.H.P. development, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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Without a video or transcript of the internal J awoyn discussion, we are left with, by 
way of prelude and prologue, a scene set by the mutually reinforcing impressions 
of a site inspection, the hospitality of the mining camp, and a series of speeches 
approving of the quality of the relationships to date between the parties at hand, and 
then subsequently as climax, the formal decision reporting a reading fro1n the script 
of jobs and royalties. 
One thing that probably did not operate to set a scene that would contain the 
meeting's act of choosing that reading, was the role of Fordimail. In that respect, 
this theatre contrasted with those of 3 February, 1 July and 4 July, discussed 
previously. Keen and Merlan (1990: 27-28) note that Fordimail's position derived 
from his social embeddedness as a local Jawoyn person, his work roles within 
various community organisations, and his capacity to understand the interventions 
of the wider organisational and political environment within local issues. They 
assess his attitude to the Coronation Hill issue as one of concerned neutrality and of 
preparedness to support the authority of the senior custodians. He therefore did not 
attempt to operate tactically within theatres in the manner of Bennett and Ah Lin. 
Consistent with this, still, he had a view about the conduct of the issue, which he 
had made clear in the v1eeks prior to this meeting of 31 October. In mid-October he 
told a Four Comers television crew that exploration had been allowed despite 
Jawoyn fears and the decision of 4 July, and that the BHP liaison program was 
pressuring people into an attitude of resignation over mining. Seeking to preserve a 
space within which the senior custodians could assimilate the questions being put 
and decide their position, Fordimail was wary that the effect of the BHP team's 
efforts was to leave less room for the script of religious power and danger to find 
expression. Whatever his concerns in that regard or with respect to the absence of 
J atbula, his manner of chairing the consultation event of 31 October at El Sherana, 
in between his request that the J awoyn be left alone to consider the matter and his 
declaration of their decision, did not produce a reading from that script. Similarly at 
later events, he maintained the attitude of an impartial mediator, moderator and 
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questioner. The first of these later events occurred on 19 November, again in the 
upper South Alligator valley. 
As had also occurred following the 1 July meeting, Ellis' letter of approval for 
works to be carried out within the boundaries of a registered site did not cover all 
those things for which the miners believed this meeting of 31 October had given 
approval. Specifically, the BHP team wished to upgrade the track over the saddle in 
the middle of Coronation Hill to connect the mine site with the back valley 
infrastructure sites, but Ellis considered the matter had not been adequately 
discussed. He thus organised another smaller on-site inspection and consultation for 
19 November. Rush expressed his uncertainty as to the purpose of this further 
meeting given the apparent satisfaction expressed by the gathering of 31 October. 
Nevertheless the BHP team took the opportunity of another site inspection to 
expand their request, this time including a larger area of the saddle for the possible · 
location of a treatment plant. 
The Authority brought only a select handful of people to the valley for this 
November meeting, including Jatbula, Barraway, Fordimail and the senior Mayali 
man, Dooley Nunggulawe, rather than the large numbers collected by the BHP 
team in October. Ah Lin and the three other Jawoyn BHP employees also .joined 
the consultation, but the significant difference was the presence on this occasion of 
Peter Jatbula, who had explained his absence from the earlier meeting by vehicle 
breakdown. Leckie indicated to the group the road intended for upgrade and the 
area around it for a possible plant, accompanied them on an inspection of testing 
sites in the valley, and showed them a drilling rig in operation on Coronation Hill. 
The J awoyn then retired to a private meeting, to which Ellis and David Ritchie of 
the Authority were called over a number of times. Over the course of more than an 
hour's discussion, no consensus was reached. As occurred the follo wing year 
before the Senate Inquiry (see above), Jatbula insisted that Coronation Hill was a 
sacred site and that his father had instructed him as a boy that works of the kind 
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proposed were not acceptable. Barraway, with Nunggulawe indicating assent, said 
that the place was of no significance and clear for mining, and mentioned royalties. 
Despite Ellis' attempts to explore and resolve the disagreement, the meeting broke 
up without a decision. Ellis explained to the group, and with special concern for 
J atbula, that the consistent opposition of just one person would not be enough to 
prevent development, and that the Authority, in view of the inability of the J awoyn 
to find unanimity and the efforts that BHP had made to consult and to assist the 
Jawoyn in other ways, would probably authorise building of the road. He took the 
impasse to an Authority meeting of 26-27 November which decided to defer 
approval with respect to the road and the treatment plant until it met with 
custodians. At the next Authority meeting in March 1987, one of the members 
asked that in the absence of any Jawoyn representative, Ritchie's notes from the 
November consultation be read out. The Authority then authorised the BHP team to 
proceed with the requested works. 
The next major community consultation for development approvals did not take 
place until a site inspection and meeting on 3--4 June 1987. By that time the Federal 
Government had decided that Coronation Hill would be allowed to proceed if it 
satisfied all necessary assessment procedures, and Rush had been advised by senior 
bureaucrats that a final terms and conditions agreement with the Aboriginal owners 
of the area would be required regardless of the progress of a land claim. As it did in 
preparation for the October consultation then, the BHP team made an effort to 
gather a sizeable group for this next event in order to ensure that consent to 
development was widely based among the J awoyn. One BHP minibus and a 
Barunga Council minibus brought people from Barunga, while another BHP 
minibus collected people from Katherine and Pine Creek. An Authority vehicle 
picked up others from Werenbun. About thirty J awoyn people thus joined the 
J awoyn BHP employees, now numbering six, for a site inspection on the afternoon 
of 3 June. J atbula attended, but Barra way refused and remained at Pine Creek. A 
range of work proposals were explained, broadly including further testing and 
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planning of infrastructure and accommodation sites, . further drilling and surface 
sampling beyond the known mineralised zone, gravel extraction for road 
upgrading, and blasting for bulk sampling of the ore body. 
The following morning, F ordimail and the current Chairman of the J awoyn 
Association, Geoffrey McDonald, chaired a meeting convened at El Sherana to 
consider the BHP team's requests. The new senior member of the team, Bill 
Hewitt, reviewed some past work and detailed the next steps that required approval. 
Ellis spoke briefly. When the time for Jawoyn discussion came, unlike at the 
October event, women and children left but the whites were allowed to stay. This 
allowed observation of the J awoyn deliberations, but the only detail noted by Rush 
in his account was the interesting one that J atbula and especially Willie Martin 
spoke 'at length' about the Bula story. After much discussion, all work proposals 
were approved except blasting for bulk sampling, on which J atbula expressed · 
concern and F ordimail recommended further discussion at the next J awoyn 
Association meeting. Thus, even where prominent actors delivered texts drawn 
from the script of religious power and danger, the act of the meeting in approving 
this next stage of development was contained by the scene of a consultation event 
held in the environment of the project and the presence of its proponents. On 5 
June, the Authority gave permission for various test drillings and excavations and 
ground observations as approved by the custodians the previous day, with further 
drilling and excavation with blasting deferred for future discussion. 
In August 1987, consultations entered a new phase, with a request from the BHP 
team to use explosives to clear access tracks and widen benches for drilling rigs. 
Cooper had long argued that blasting was seen by custodians as a qualitatively 
different and more dangerous interference with the site than drilling. Before 
discussing the consultation event of 18 August, however, I want to tum again for a 
moment to Burke in order to say something about Peter J atbula. To this point, the 
BHP team's development proposals had been considered and approved by the 
Authority on the basis of consultation events held on 1 July, 30-31 October and 19 
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November 1986, and 3-4 June 1987. Treating each of these as a theatre, I have 
presented the consent given by custodians as a reading from the script of jobs and 
royalties, and have understood that choice of text to have followed from an 
interpretation of the nature of the theatre made by the custodians. In Burke's terms, 
the act of the custodians in producing such a text was contained by the scene of the 
consultation event. 
On a number of these and other occasions, however, I have noted J atbula' s 
discordant and sometimes lone voice. At the site visit of 29 June 1986, J atbula had 
prevented the meeting from giving consent to the resumption of works, and 
deferred the matter to a larger J awoyn meeting. At the development consultation of 
19 November, he had refused to move towards a consensual position in favour of 
the project team's plans. Before the Senate Inquiry on 9 March 1987, he held out 
for the truth of what his father had told him in the face of disagreement from other 
seniors. On the 4 June, his opposition caused consent for the use of explosives to be 
held back from the BHP team. Plainly, the scene contained J atbula' s act only when 
he allowed, as he did on 4 July 1986, when his decisive text was contained by a 
scene set by Darren Bennett. Thus, my central interpretive problem of contradiction 
does not arise from the performances of Peter J atbula. These performances conform 
rather to another of Burke's theatrical ratios: the act-agent ratio. Here Burke refers 
to acts that can be understood to arise not from the surrounding scene, but from the 
interior character of the actor. He illustrates the distinction between the kinds of 
explanation allowed by the scene-act ratio and the act-agent ratio by the example of 
I 
the 'democratic' motive. 
Many people in Great Britain and the United States think of these nations as 
"vessels" of democracy. And de1nocracy is felt to reside in us, intrinsically, 
because we are "a democratic people." Democratic acts are, in this mode of 
thought, derived from democratic agents, agents who would remain 
democratic in character even though conditions required the temporary 
curtailment or abrogation of basic democratic rights. But if one e1nployed, 
instead, the scene-act ratio, one might hold that there are certain 
"de1nocratic situations" and certain "situations favorable to dictatorship, or 
requiring dictatorship." The technological scene itself, which requires the 
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planning of a world order, might be thought such as to favor a large 
measure of "dictatorship" in our political ways (at least as contrasted with 
the past norms of democracy). By the act-agent ratio, a "democratic people" 
would continue to perform "democratic acts"; and to do so they would even, 
if necessary, go to the extent of restoring former conditions most favorable 
to democracy. By the scene-act ratio, if the "situation" itself is no longer a 
"democratic" one, even an "essentially democratic" people will abandon 
democratic ways. (Burke 1945: 17-18) 
But even over J atbula' s determination to be guided by his own lights, the 
consultation event of 18 August demonstrated the containing power of the scene-
act ratio. Members of the BHP team visited the Katherine area a number of times 
early in August to arrange for J awoyn attendance. The group transported into the 
valley was about half the size of the two previous large development consultations, 
but it included Jatbula, Barraway, Bennett and Fordimail, the last of whom acted as 
spokesperson after J awoyn deliberations. A number of the BHP team were present 
and greeted the attendees personally, knowing them already. At Coronation Hill, 
Leckie introduced the shot-firers and explained that the demonstration would test 
whether blasting was acceptable. Ellis and Cooper of the Authority paused the 
proceedings to allow the J awoyn to discuss whether they were happy for the 
exercise to proceed. They consented to a three-stage progression from a detonator 
exploded above ground, to a detonator blasting apart a boulder, to a line of four 
half-sticks of gelignite on a hillside drilling bench. That done, the group was given 
cold cordial at the Coronation Hill camp, then driven back to El Sherana for a 
barbecue lunch. 
In June, a J awoyn Association meeting had instructed the N orthem Land Council to 
seek negotiations with BHP for an agreement on Coronation Hill, and an NLC 
representative now proposed that J awoyn consent to blasting should await the 
outcome of initial agreement discussions, a strategy that Bennett had also promoted 
the previous year, and which the J awoyn group no'Ar initially endorsed. Thus, even 
I 
the NLC, the one agency present arguing explicitly against J awoyn approval at this 
event, was doing so with mining ultimately in view. In addition, according to Ellis' 




strongly for a majority vote of approval on the grounds that the uraniu1n mining of 
earlier years had occasioned none of the disaster that was feared would follow upon 
disturbance. This person thus appears to have been adopting a scene-setting role 
akin to that of Ah Lin and Bennett at the meetings of 1 and 4 July respectively. The 
discussion thereafter was complicated by an extended debate between 
representatives of the BHP project team, the NLC and the Authority over the scope 
of negotiations and respective jurisdictions (see chapter 8), but the upshot was 
formal consent from the J awoyn to blasting on the scale demonstrated. 
Ellis remembers feeling especially concerned about J atbula's response: 
I said to Peter, 'Peter, do you realise what that means, do you understand 
what's happened, that's what they're going to do, they're gonna blow, make 
that noise'. And he was obviously disturbed, it was a sort of, you know, he 
wanted to say 'I don't approve', but in the context of Sandy, Nipper and all 
the others there, he didn't feel able to. So I think we actually took him 
physically out of that area, and sat him down quietly for a while, away from 
everybody, and said 'Just sit down, have a drink of tea or something and 
have a think'. [Then we] ask him again. It was something like: 'Oh well, 
what can I do? It's all right' .... It was more like ... 'No-one's gonna take 
any notice of me anyway'. So [I said] 'Look, Peter, you can say "no", and 
we will stop it now' .... He wouldn't say it. 32 
At this moment, Ellis tried to open the way for J atbula to step outside the 
containment of the scene . and ~nto the persona that Ellis had seen stand against 
circumstance on other occasions. In Burke's terms, he was inviting J atbula to 
perform within the act-agent ratio instead of the scene-act ratio. Jatbula's moment 
of incapacity left Ellis with only one authorising text, read on the day by the other 
Jawoyn fro1n the script of jobs and royalties. The Authority's letter of 27 August 
granting permission noted that the senior custodians 'regard more extensive use of 
32 Interview 29.7.90 . 
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explosives at the site as having a potential to disturb Bula' ,33 and that such use on a 
larger scale would require further consultation. 
In the previous chapter, I expressed my view that there are no grounds for 
presuming that the senior Jawoyn figures (other than Jatbula) maintained any 
subsisting predisposition, something th3:t could be regarded as their 'genuine' 
attitude, towards the mining project. In •. the absence of that pre-existing 
determinant, the relationship between consultation and outcome is thus to be 
understood as internal to each consultation event. It is the relationship between 
theatre and text. I have presented this sequence of descriptions of development 
consultations to show that a sequence of like theatres produced like texts. By 
drawing on Burke's scene-act ratio, we can infer something from this about the 
motivations of the custodians as actors: that the consistency of scene led custodians 
to interpret these theatres as all of a kind, and to select the script of jobs and · 
royalties as the appropriate source of their texts at every such event. That act of 
selection was contained by scenes in \Vhich the project, the proposal for further 
work and the proponents as hosts and guides, were all at hand. The August 1987 
consultation on blasting is particularly demonstrative of the 'containing' influence 
of the scene, because even J atbula, who had previously demonstrated that his 
motivation did not align with the scene, could not dissent. To put the matter 
differently, these theatres vvere publicly observable moments from an underlying 
trajectory of progress in an enterprise, that surrounded the custodians even as they 
ere invited to formally pronounce their attitude towards it. By their 
pronouncements, they placed themselves formally in accord with that situational 
discourse; their acts were contained by the scene. Development consultations 
thereby became theatres of enablement for the mining project, in which custodians 
and other J awoyn selected texts that affirmed and hence propelled the purpose 
implied by circumstances. 
33 R. , .Elli 27.8.87, letter to M. .He, itt, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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The theatre as an event in itself 
The previous section described a particular sequence of consultation events in order 
to show that different theatres, 1notivated by and embodying the same underlying 
discourse, that is with the same scene, tended to generate the same kind of text or 
act. Different theatres could be understood as theatres of the same kind by the 
custodians, and therefore appropriate for a reading from the same script. The aim of 
the present section is to show that such theatres were nevertheless different events. 
I argue that they were similar, but not continuous or cumulative in the sense of 
sustaining an attitude towards Coronation Hill that carried over from one to the 
next. In other words, the custodians did not go through periods of feeling 
favourable towards mining, interspersed with periods of feeling unfavourable 
towards mining. They did not 'change their 1ninds' in that sense. In this section, I 
demonstrate this point by looking at brief periods in which consultation events 
came hard upon one another and generated contradictory results. I want to show 
that each theatre was sui generis, an event in itself, interpreted by the custodians as 
a separately framed occasion appropriate for a reading either from the script of jobs 
and royalties or from that of religious power and danger. 
The first such brief period has already been covered in the previous chapter and 
needs only summary reiteration here. On 29 June 1986, during a visit to the valley 
organised by BHP, a group of nineteen was prepared to agree to the resumption of 
development works, but the decision was deferred under the influence of Jatbula. 
On 1 July at Barunga, a J awoyn meeting consented to that resumption. On 2 and 3 
July, senior custodians made statements to Davis denying the mythological 
significance of Coronation Hill or that there were any impediments to mining 
proceeding there. On 4 July at the Katherine Low Level Reserve, another J awoyn 
meeting that included several senior individuals present at the preceding events, 
adopted a set of resolutions repudiating development works at Coronation Hill. 
The second such period occurred over two days in November 1986. I have already 
discussed the development consultation of 19 November in which a small group 
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sitting in a circle on Coronation Hill heard conflicting statements from Barraway 
( and Nunggulawe) and J atbula. By way of preface to this consultation, David 
Ritchie, a Sites Authority officer, had explained to the small group that the story 
that Coronation Hill was of no significance to the J awoyn, supported by J awoyn 
statements on video to that effect, had been widely circulated among government 
people. This was a reference to the impact of the Davis report and video and a 
prominent newspaper article by Joe Fisher in July, which had called into question 
the grounds on which Cooper had recommended registration of the Upper South 
Alligator Bula Complex. Ritchie requested that at some time during their current 
visit to the valley, the custodians should clarify the distribution of place names and 
dreamings in the area. The outcome of this consultation event on the side of 
Coronation Hill (see above), with Barraway's and Jatbula's accounts unreconciled, 
did not augur well for that objective. 
The next day was a different theatre in which Barraway chose a different script. 
. Ritchie took both custodians along the valley with microphone and video · camera, 
stopping at three places to record. The first stop is not identified on the video, but 
the second was in front of the tall conical hill Pulpul, and the third was on the 
roadside with Coronation Hill in the background. At each of the first two places, 
both custodians spoke of the distinction between the river flats and valley floor, 
where people could camp and women could forage and fish, and the rocky hills on 
either side, where only adult men could hunt, where they had to move carefully, 
where minor injury could have serious consequences. The main river channel and 
its surrounds provided a safe corridor of movement through upland areas that could 
themselves be entered safely only by those people appropriately equipped with 
knowledge and an attitude of caution. Arriving at Coronation Hill, with the script of 
religious power and danger already selected as the source of readings for this 
theatre, the custodians included it too in this cultural topography, declaring that 
women and young boys could not go there. Barraway added that movement around 
Coronation Hill for those incompetent classes of people was restricted to the main 
South Alligator corridor on the north-east side of the hill, and that they were not 
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allowed to go along the small creek to the south. That creek flowed from the back 
valley where the BHP team had received approval to locate mine infrastructure. 
Barraway also repeated the significance of the hill, known by its Jawoyn name of 
Guratba, as a wild rope place within the Bula mythology. J atbula spoke in greater 
detail, describing a secret practice that connected knowledgeable men with the 
symbolic association identifying gold deposits as a manifestation of Bula, an 
association that Barraway had made in the 1985 interview that Cooper had relied 
on in his site registration report. Barraway quietly confirmed some of J atbula' s 
points. In this theatre of 20 November then, Barraway joined Jatbula in producing a 
text of religious power and danger that incorporated Coronation Hill into the rest of 
the upper South Alligator valley, in contradiction to the theatre of the previous day 
( and of preceding consultation events) in which Barra way had insisted that such a 
text was not relevant to that place. 
Brief reference only again can be made here to the experience of the Senate Inquiry 
on 9 March 1987. In the morning the committee visited Coronation Hill in the 
company of a group of senior J awoyn. According to the transcript of the hearing at 
Barunga that afternoon (see chapter 3), that visit evoked from the custodians 
present a text from the script of religious power and danger. I have located no 
descriptive accounts of that event, and can only identify it as a discrete theatre on 
the basis of the Chairperson's own expressed bafflement the same afternoon, when 
she heard the same people produce a contradictory text. One point that can be made 
about the morning event was that J atbula was not present, so on this occasion the 
selection of text was not his. 
The next brief period of clustered consultation events occurred in late May and 
early June. This close sequence arose from the overlap of two field programs. In 
early May 1987, the Authority resumed its site documentation program in Gimbat. 
It was carried forward by David Cooper and Ben Gunn, the former concerned with 
documenting mythological sites for registration and the latter contracted by the 
Authority to investigate and record rock art sites. In December 1986 the Federal 
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Government had announced its intention to resume Gimbat and Goodparla Stations 
for inclusion in Kakadu National Park, subject to one third of the area being 
reserved as a Conservation Zone and available for mineral exploration. A major 
concern for Cooper was to ascertain those areas within the Conservation Zone over 
which Jawoyn custodians considered mining activity to threaten disturbance of 
Bula sites. Gunn's research took place between 9 May and 20 June, and Cooper 
joined him on some days in the company of up to five senior men, Jatbula, 
Barraway, Brown, Frank Dalak and Dick Garrad. 
The second program in train at this time was oriented towards the development 
consultation in the first week of June (see above). In the preceding week, Peter 
Rush and a new men1ber of the BHP project team, Jim Green, visited Jawoyn areas 
to notify people of that approaching meeting. 29 May was a day of general liaison, 
during which they were asked for vehicles by Geoffrey McDonald, Chairman of the · 
Jawoyn Association, and Phyllis Wiynjorrotj. The next six days was a concentrated 
period of serial consultation events for a number of senior people, consisting of a 
visit to El Sherana and the project site with the BHP team on 30 and 31 May, a 
return to the site documentation program in Gimbat with Cooper and Gunn on 1 
and 2 June, and the large development consultation in the valley on 3 and 4 June. 
On 30 May, Rush and Green took Barraway, Brown, Frank Dalak and Brown's 
wife Queenie Morgan for an overnight visit to El Sherana and the mine site. They 
looked at the drill rigs and the old open cut, and discussed the current work. Rush's 
notes indicate that, even in the middle of the Cooper and Gunn field program, the 
Coronation Hill site visit brought the script of jobs and royalties prominently to 
people's minds. 
Sandy talked about his forth coming [sic] trip with David Cooper (1 st and 
2nd June) and explained about two important areas on the main escarpment, 
east of CH. He said they should not be mined but other areas could be such 
as the small hills opposite CH on the east side of the S.A. river and the knoll 
where the accommodation site may be located. I asked him if it was alright 
to mine where we were (the deposit at CH) and he said yes. 
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Earlier he had specifically asked if we were going to pay royalties as it was 
his land and the Ranger mine pays money to the Aborigines. I said it was a 
matter for the Government to decide. 
Sunday 31 st 
Returned Nipper, Queenie and Frank to Pine Creek and Sandy to Katherine. 
At a number of ocassions [sic] the questions of royalties and the J awoyn 
land claim arose. Sandy also wanted a vehicle. He said that the NLC at a 
recent meeting had said that they should ask us about vehicles. 
In general, there was no indication of any problem about us mining at CH, 
but there is a definite expectation of "royalties" (Nipper talked several times 
about his "land" money). 34 
The next day, all five of the senior men returned to fieldwork with Cooper and 
Gunn. On 1 June they located two sites, including one said to be a focal Bula site, 
and had discussions at Dinner Creek regarding the general significance of Bula 
sites and the question of the closure of art sites, and on 2 June, they visited a major 
art site complex located by Gunn near Waterfall Creek. Three weeks before, during 
field investigations around the Sleisbeck area, Cooper had recorded statements 
indicating that across wide zones of territory around and between focal Bula sites, 
the senior custodians regarded mining activity as a dangerous level of disturbance. 
Now in the upper South Alligator valley, he was again concerned with zones and 
distances, so that he could further document those parts of the Conservation Zone 
from which his informants wished mining to be excluded. In an interview at the 
Waterfall Creek site, where J atbula, Barraway and Brown identified painted motifs 
as illustrative of Bula mythology, Cooper took up the question again with Brown. 
While he did not appear to regard the sensitivities of that art site itself as extensive, 
Brown conceived of a zone of influence emanating from the focal site at Big 
Sunday, located well upstream, as a reason for concern about mining at the 
intermediate locations of El Sherana and Coronation Hill. 
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BROWN: Well him, you no more touch him rock, you know ... you can 
hear him on top from dynamite you know. Well, that old man [Bula] him 
hear him, him kick him out you know. Well might be you start him then. 
Then gotta root him up you an me all over. 
COOPER: Right, so what about that place up there, like where that mine is 
at El Sherana there - is that too close or not close - that old mine there? 
BROWN: Long time ago? 
COOPER: Yeah. 
BROWN: They got him mine there too eh? 
COOPER: Yeah, that's where -you might not have known about that one. 
BROWN: Oh no, I don't know that mine. 
COOPER: It's an~old one that one. Is that too close? 
BROWN: Him too close from there right l!P to Nilaynjurrung. 
(Cooper 1987: 16) 
When Cooper then explained to Brown that the drilling at Coronation Hill was 
preliminary and that mining there would require explosives, Brown replied 'Oh 
well, that wrong again'. The next day again, 3 June, the five custodians present 
here, except B arraway, joined the development consultation at Coronation Hill ( see 
above), and on 4 June they attended the meeting that consented to the next stage of 
exploration and planning work requested by the BHP team. 
Conclusion 
The accounts just giveµ of consultation events coming hard upon one another are 
important for illustrating the incidence of contradictions at their most intensive. As 
such, they bear upon a number of arguments that I have put so far. It seems to me 
that it is impossible in the face of such a record to talk sensibly about the 
34 P.M.Rush, 1.6.87, Note to File, Various Meetings, Aboriginal Affairs, Coronation Hill Project 
N.T., BHP ewcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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custodians 'changing their minds' about Coronation Hill. We are not dealing here 
with interiorised intellectual positions, but with situational responses. Taken as a 
totality, they allow no conclusion about what the custodians 'really' thought 
outside the moments of consultation, nor about the relationship between the 
testimony recorded during consultation events and the content of an endogenous 
J awoyn tradition with respect to Coronation Hill. 
Each such response can thus be interpreted only in terms of the consultation event 
from which it emerged. The metaphor of theatre respects this conclusion, and 
Burke's scene-act ratio opens the way to a useful account of the internal dynamics 
that led to the production of text on each occasion from one or other of the two 
available scripts. Although the quality of data available varies for the theatres I 
have discussed, there is sufficient here to indicate those characteristics of scene that 
enabled the custodians to ascertain the kind of theatre in which they were being 
invited to perform their custodianship, and thus the appropriate script for each 
performance. The scene-act ratio also explains the pattern of consistency and 
inconsistency between theatres. While I have argued, and the last section clearly 
shows, that there was no relation of chronological precedent between theatres, that 
is, the text adopted in one theatre was no guide to what would be adopted in the 




CONTEXT 2: JAWOYN HISTORY 
The data of appearances and accumulated information states are always necessarily 
in interaction as grounds from which custodians could interpret the kind of theatre. 
But as has been shown so far, in discriminating the influence upon motivation of 
that first dimension of context, that is the kind of theatre as apprehended by 
custodians, we are impelled to treat information states as largely a given and pay 
most attention to the data of appearances for their impression upon the custodians 
from one event to the next. 
The second dimension of context must again -acknowledge the interaction of 
appearances and information states, but here the weight of explanation in 
accounting for motivation shifts to the latter. This is an attempt to arrive at a more 
organic logic of motivation, still operating within each theatre, but grounded in 
experience of the world outside. I want to step back from the custodians ' act of 
selecting between scripts as a source for texts at each consultation event and 
address the significance of the scripts themselves for the custodians. The argument 
of this chapter is that each script took on meaning as a pertinent source of texts 
because of the relationship identifiable by custodians between it, aspects of J awoyn 
history, and the future realisation of the distinct values of place that it implied. 
History and the theatrical metaphor 
My use here of the notion of information states presses against the limits of that 
notion as expressed in the passages quoted earlier from Goffman and Sharrock, in 
that these formulations seem to confine the information state to an actor's 
awareness of the strategic environments from which other actors emerge to interact 
within each consultation event. In referring to the custodians' 'horizons' however, I 
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wish to include anything within their consciousness that bears upon motivation. 
Burke accommodates this expanded reach within his conception of 'scene', and its 
variable 'circumferences'. So, 
the concept of scene can be widened or narrowed ( conceived of in terms of 
varying "scope" or circumference). Thus, an agent's behaviour ("act") 
might be thought of as taking place against a polytheistic background; or 
the over-all scene may be thought of as grounded in one god; or the 
circumference of the situation can be narrowed to naturalistic limits, as in 
Darwinism; or it can be localized in such terms as "Western civilization," 
"Elizabethanism" "capitalism " "D day " "10 Downing Street " "on this 
' ' ' ' train ride," and so on, endlessly. Any change of the circumference in terms 
of which an act is viewed implies a corresponding change in one's view of 
the quality of the act's motivation. Such a loose yet compelling 
correspondence between act and scene is called a "scene-act ratio". 
(Burke 1968: 446, and see 1945: 77-78) 
By allowing a less constricted account of relevant knowledge than 'information 
states', Burke's 'scene' offers the further advantage of accommodating this second 
dimension of context within the theatrical metaphor. At the same time, it presents 
the risk of very wide-ranging circumferences that might supply motivation for an 
act: the placement of an actor in an era, in the history that brought about that era, in 
the 'generically human' etc. (Burke 1945: 84). Meaningful explanation requires 
selection, the identification of salient factors. 
But in actuality, such a graduated table of circumferences would be 
cumbersome and unmanageable. Most circumferences are felt to be, not so 
much wider or narrower than one another, as merely different. We might 
say that they mark out a circumference by spotlight, while the rest of the 
stage is left dark. (1945: 87 - italics in original) 
How did the spotlight play across J awoyn history as part of the background in the 
theatres of the Coronation Hill issue? The pertinence of each script for the J awoyn, 
I argue, lay in its advocacy of those possibilities presented by the Coronation Hill 
issue that answered to the needs and aspirations produced by certain distinguishable 
themes in J awoyn history. The aim of this chapter is to distinguish those themes to 
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reveal the motivations that ran from history, conceived as part of each theatre's 
scenic background, through each script to the selection of text by the custodians. I 
begin with those themes that articulated with the script of jobs and royalties. 
But first, there is the possibility that I am pushing Burke's notion of scene too far, 
because a problem of causation arises. Up to now the causal direction is clear, as 
suggested by the term 'containment'. The physical location, the interventions of 
other actors, and the subsequent act that they contain, participate in what Signorile 
(1989: 81) calls a relationship of 'symbolic requiredness': the act requires such a 
scene. This linearity breaks down when we introduce history, because certain 
aspects of Jawoyn history can figure as part of the scenic background only after the 
custodians have ascertained from those other features of scene the kind of theatre in 
which they are performing. A to-and-fro movement is suggested, in which the 
custodians' initial act of interpreting the kind of theatre at once illuminates the · 
appropriate historical circumferences in the scenic background that then join to 
motivate the choice of script. If this trespasses into teleology, Signorile, for one, 
doesn't seem to mind. He writes of a 'mutual round of requiredness' (1989: 81) 
among all the key terms that Burke uses to explain motivation. If the reader does 
mind, then an alternative formulation might involve removing history from the 
scene, and locating individual awareness of history within each of the agents, so 
that two motivational relationships, or ratios, are being invoked in sequence. The 
first is the scene-agent ratio, in which the theatrical scene puts the custodians in 
mind of a certain perspective on their own life experiences and prospects, and the 
second is the agent-act ratio, in which that consciousness of self causes them to 
select a particular script for that theatre (see Burke 1945: 16-20; Rueckert 1982: 80-
81 ). 
Historical motivation for the script of jobs and royalties 
Keen and Merlan (1990: 29-34) and Merlan (1992b: 39-49) have provided 
summary accounts of the interaction of northern J awoyn people, including the three 
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senior custodians, with a diverse and varying array of non-Aboriginal places, 
enterprises and agents since the late nineteenth century. The major mining fields 
around Pine Creek and the railway line to the west and later at Maranboy and 
Y euralba to the south, pastoral stations to the south and west, saw mills exploiting 
suitable stands of bush timber here and there, small farms along the Katherine 
River near the town, and the towns of Pine Creek and Katherine themselves, were 
sites of encounters between Aborigines and whites that could remain transient . or 
develop into relationships that were sustained or repetitively renewed over some 
years. Their principal material expression was the exchange of labour or sex for 
European commodities such as flour, tea, sugar, tobacco, alcohol, clothing, swags 
and mosquito nets. Beginning with the Army control compounds in World War II, 
many J awoyn were subject to closer institutional supervision in later decades 
(Maddock 1977: 15-16). After the war, the Northern Territory Administration's 
Welfare Branch established settlements in the south-eastern part of J awoyn country 
with the intention of separating Aborigines from unauthorised white contact, and 
providing education, training and health facilities to promote assimilation. 
Payment in kind and by rations, the dominant form of exchange and provisioning 
from whites to Aborigines, was in the post-war years complemented or replaced by 
cash both on these settlements and in private employment. Following the granting 
of pastoral award wages in the late 1960s and the extension of welfare entitlements 
in the 1970s (Altman & Sanders 1991), money became the necessary mediator 
between Aboriginal consumers and the European commodities that were by now 
thoroughly integrated into all Aboriginal lifestyles. Access to such goods took on 
an aspect of compulsion in the case of addictive substances, notably tobacco from 
the earliest years of contact, and later alcohol, use of which beca1ne widespread 
within the Aboriginal population of the Jawoyn region, in common with other 
northern frontier areas (Albrecht 1966: ; Brady 2002). 
Within the Aboriginal don1ain, money became subject to the same pressures for 
constant circulation and short-term consumption as other material goods. 
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Prestations and demand sharing (Peterson 1997) tum money into another currency 
of inter-personal relatedness and obligation and frustrate efforts at individual 
accumulation. Those pressures are exacerbated by the usually limited individual 
cash incomes available from welfare and intermittent employment, for most of the 
time inadequate to meet expanding commodity demands, especially the desire for 
alcohol. Everyday Aboriginal sociality consequently displays an insistent money 
hunger. The urgent need for a regular source of disposable cash is illustrated by the 
importance that people place upon being present to pick up their pension money as 
soon as the cheques arrive at the usual collection point. They will insist on 
arranging other commitments for times that do not interfere with that pick-up. 
Following the periods of direct payment in kind and graduated access to cash 
incomes, the self-determination and land rights era created a third generation of 
commodity relations in which proliferating government grant programs and the 
negotiating rights that came with legal ownership of land brought substantial 
moneys under collective, and sometimes individual, Aboriginal control. Among the 
expanded range of consumption items now able to be purchased, four-wheel-drive 
Toyotas were an object of widespread special interest and competitive politicking. 
Occasional royalty distributions, like the smaller fortnightly welfare payments, 
were commonly subject to a binge psychology of immediate consumption. 
The people of the J awoyn region became aware of the potentialities of the new land 
rights regime in the early 1980s from the experience of traditional owners of the 
uranium province to their north in Kakadu National Park. A number of central 
individuals in the Park acknowledged close kin or territorial connections to 
J awoyn, and J awoyn country itself extended into the southern limits of Stage I of 
the Park as it then was. When the Gagudju Association was formed in 1979 to 
receive payments due to Aborigines of the region from the Ranger Uranium Mine, 
Northern Land Council field officers organised a series of meetings to determine its 
membership (Levitus 1991: 157-59). They took a geographically broad and 
unsystematic approach to the question of entitlement to benefit from Ranger. Each 
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meeting expanded the list of members, including some J awoyn people whose clan 
territories overlapped into the southern parts of the Park. At the first Annual 
General Meeting of the Association in 1980, 49 more people were admitted, two 
thirds of whom came from Pine Creek, Katherine and Barunga and listed 
themselves as members of Jawoyn Bolmo mowurrwurr. In 1981 the Association's 
Executive Officer turned away a further attempt to gain admission by people from 
the Katherine region. When the Association adopted a policy of periodic cash 
payments to every adult me1nber, a number of people of both Jawoyn and Mayali 
language groups living in J awoyn camps were on the distribution list. By the time 
the Coronation Hill issue arose then, J awoyn people generally were aware of the 
individualised benefits that could flow from mining, and aware also that the 
entitlement to receive such benefits was related to the location of a mine on country 
to which one could claim some affiliation in Aboriginal terms. 
Indeed, it may be that the character of royalties as an entitlement made them 
especially appealing. At a late stage in the issue prior to the RAC Inquiry, an NLC 
officer, Keith Taylor, was discussing its progress with the three senior custodians at 
Gimbat. Recalling past occasions of inconsistency, J atbula and Barraway endorsed 
the need to maintain a consistent anti-mining position, but Nipper Brown 
responded to them in a manner that gave Taylor pause. 
Certainly Nipper's response to J atbula, I think, and to Sandy was ... "You 
two too hard. What, you want us to be beggar all our lives?" . . . My 
interpretation of what Nipper was saying was essentially ... he was dealing 
with that dilemma that Guratba was important to him to some degree but 
was it really sufficiently important for him and for J awoyn to remain being 
beggars all their lives when there could be substantial millions that could 
flow from this .... It gave me pause for thought. It certainly wasn't an 
interaction. That was a discussion between those three old men in terms of 
those three old men, to some degree influenced by alcohol at the time, 
debating their predicament.35 
35 Interview 14.3.94. 
132 
Context 2: Jawoyn History 
Brown's comment suggests dissatisfaction with the material relationship of the 
Jawoyn of his generation with white society, and a desire to grab the opportunity 
that Coronation Hill appeared to offer to re-make the interactional quality of that 
relationship. It implies that the strategy of 'humbugging' - nagging and badgering 
- for access to goods and favours controlled by whites, can be experienced as 
onerous, even humiliating, by Aborigines, rather than being the creative and 
empowering mechanism suggested by Gerrard (1989). Taking Peterson's (1997: 
187, 190) point that making a demand creates a status asymmetry in favour of the 
party who satisfies the demand, the unrelievedly one-way flow of demands 
involved in the humbugging of any white person within one's social field (von 
Sturmer 1981: 23) means that these inter-racial relationships are experienced by 
Aborigines as a constantly reinforced status deficit. Merlan (1991 b: 16-17) further 
refers to the elements of what senior men consider a desirable lifestyle as including 
'(crucially) escape from the necessity to earn -a living under someone else's · 
direction, and under the constraints of a European work-regime'. Autonomy is 
founded on entitlement, rights directly exercisable over places or things and 
unmediated by other relationships. Royalties from the Ranger Mine are colloquially 
known as 'land money'. The prospect of royalties from Coronation Hill similarly 
offered the dual promise of income flowing from the recognition of ownership. 
Brown's retort challenged the two other seniors over their disregard for the 
possibility of using the mine to rejuvenate their standing with respect to white 
society by revising the material relations that connected them to it. 
To this point I have been addressing the royalties half of the 'jobs and royalties' 
script, and indeed the testimony referred to in earlier chapters seems to show that 
half to be the more compelling in the minds of the senior custodians. The 
employment of young men does also figure, however, as a regular theme in pro-
mining statements. Speaking from impressions, and against a background of 
experience in the northern Kakadu area, it seems to me that the motivation 
operating here derives from a morality of individual right conduct more than a 
secular program of community socio-economic advancement. Two propositions 
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can often be heard from elderly Aboriginal people about this. One sees employment 
as a proper channel for the energies of young men who are otherwise responsible 
for much socially disruptive behaviour. This is usually expressed in terms of 
despair at the effects of drinking, but could also reasonably be understood, like 
royalties, in terms of money circulation. That is, the elderly may wish to reverse the 
relationships of material subvention that often pertain between young and old, so 
that instead of having to hand over amounts from their pension moneys in 
performance of an endless 'looking after' role towards young adults, they could 
themselves expect to receive portions of their younger kin's wages. The other 
proposition translates the absence of consistent work histories among young men, 
the fact that 'they don't know how to work', into a judgment of personal 
inadequacy, a failure to emulate the skills and experience of their fathers and uncles 
whose sense of personal integrity is informed by the long achievement of working 
lives spent in cattle or buffalo camps. There is probably a gender correlation here 
too, the first proposition put more by senior women and the second more by senior 
men, but both carry a distinctly disapproving and disciplinary tone. So, with respect 
to both jobs and royalties, the motivation that emerges is the senior custodians' 
desire to re-work the terms of monetised relationships both internal and external to 
Aboriginal society. With respect to jobs, there is also the desire to assert the inter-
generational validity of a certain career mode of hard physical work as a ground for 
respect. 
Historical motivation for the script of religious power and danger 
Unlike its alternative, the script of religious power and danger is anchored 1n 
locality. Its content testifies to the importance within Jawoyn cosmology of 
particular places and the region in which they cluster. The first aspect of J awoyn 
history that makes that script relevant within theatres concerning Coronation Hill 
addresses the question of how this particular mythology and its places have been 
able to retain their force for knowledgeable Aborigines. Keen and Merlan (1990: 
29-30) argue that colonialism came late and lightly to Gimbat, in that the settler 
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presence did not establish itself permanently until the 1930s, nor intensively until 
the mining of the 1950s (see chapter 2). The region thus retained the character of a 
preserve for site-specific religious meanings. In this it contrasted with other parts of 
Jawoyn country, either where non-Aboriginal action steadily destroyed those 
particularities of place meaningful to Aborigines in the process of establishing less 
differentiated and more settled environments, as in the town space of Katherine, or 
where Aboriginal movement away from country to other sites of employment and 
residence had been sufficiently lengthy and sustained to have allowed an absolute 
diminution of geographical knowledge, as occurred over a number of mowurrwurr 
territories to the west and south of Gimbat (Merlan 1998: chapter 3; and see 
Maddock 1977: 20-21 for the latter process at a stage one generation less 
advanced). 
Indeed, if we take the European enterprises of mapping and surveying as symbolic · 
and substantive acts of colonisation (Harley 1988), then it is worth noting that a 
map of pastoral interests in use by the Northern Territory Administration as late as 
1913 showed a mapping error in the Gimbat area attributable to the explorer 
Leichhardt in 1845. Leichhardt did not recognise the upper Katherine River, which 
he crossed at a point east of the Gimbat boundary, as a significant watercourse, 
believing its local tributary, Snowdrop Creek, to flow into the South Alligator 
(Leichhardt 1847: 471-74). Consequently, the Administration map shows 
Snowdrop Creek connected by a speculative line to the upper South Alligator 
through present-day Gimbat. Though the next explorer, Stuart, identified the 
Katherine further downstream in 1862 (Stuart 1996: 46), and it appears as a major 
watercourse separating the catchments of the Waterhouse and South Alligator on an 
1895 map of metalliferous regions, this was apparently still only partially 
understood in official circles into the early decades of the last century. Precision in 
recording land interests in the area was similarly late. The Pastoral Lease document 
granting Gimbat to Joseph Callanan in 1962 notes that the government could not 
guarantee the accuracy of the boundaries shown as surveys were not sufficiently 
advanced. In 1970, the government surveyor issued instructions for survey of the 
135 
Framing -Contradictions 
boundary between Gimbat and the Arnhem Land Aboriginal Reserve, noting that 
'[t]here is no survey information in this area and the boundary must be located by 
observation'. 
So far, however, this history is enabling rather than motivating. It shows that 
Gimbat was a part of J awoyn country for which a script of religious power and 
danger could still be compelling. Keen and Merlan summarise as follows: 
The existence of a major religious tradition in the area, together with a 
history of minimal intrusion, account for continuing intensity of Aboriginal 
feeling about it, despite Aboriginal movement to other residential centres. 
(1990: 29) 
Plainly, however, this continuing intensity of feeling did not manifest itself on all 
occasions with respect to Coronation Hill. The script of religious power and danger 
was not compelling in all theatres. We might settle for the view that the presence of 
a religious field of power, taken as part of the historical scene, was able to motivate 
the textual production of custodians only in those theatres where countervailing 
scenic factors, those in favour of readings from the script of jobs and royalties, did 
not operate. While absence of the latter may be relevant, that by itself is a poor 
story to put against my interpretation of those latter readings as an act of aligning 
the possibilities of Coronation Hill within the past and future trajectories of Jawoyn 
history. The same kind of interpretation, I suggest, is available for the script of 
religious power and danger as well. With respect to the script of jobs and royalties, 
I argued that the project at Coronation Hill, considered under the light of the new 
land rights regime, offered possibilities for remedying the dissatisfactions felt by 
senior J awoyn people with aspects of both the supply of material wants and the 
social relations of provisioning. With respect to the script of religious power and 
danger, the debate over Coronation Hill, considered again under that new regime, 
offered other possibilities for finding in the values of Gimbat a basis for one 
component of a renovated political standing for the J awoyn. 
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We need to begin, however, with the values of Gimbat as perceived by an earlier 
generation. In 1972, Eric Brandl, an anthropologist working for the Northern 
Territory Welfare Division, while investigating the concerns of Aborigines with 
respect to the rock art site at Christmas Creek in the upper South Alligator valley, 
made further inquiries into attitudes towards Gimbat, particularly of his two main 
informants, Soupy Marapunya and Mick Lora, two brothers of J awoyn Bolmo 
mowurrwurr who were at that time prominent custodians. Brandl found limited 
concern with site protection, but his first report noted that 'Lora, a former station 
hand, "wants" Gimbat Station, as this is his "country"'. 36 His second report 
similarly noted that 
Soupy (and other Djauan) clearly stated that it was the country, and not the 
paintings, he and his people were interested in. 'This is our country,' he said 
repeatedly. 37 
Brandl emphasised the secular interest of northern J awoyn people in the property 
and thought that long-term consideration should be given to acquiring Gimbat as a 
cattle station training facility and as a future tourism enterprise, 'with a view to 
engaging Aborigines, as employees and, in the end, as independent managers or 
owners' .38 
[I]t must be emphasised that the El Sherana/Sleisbeck area, covering a large 
portion of the Gimbat Pastoral Lease, is uppermost in the mind of some 20 
or more Aborigines who now live at Pine Creek and Katherine. They insist 
that this is "their country" and the older Aborigines say that their young 
people "should go back to it."39 
I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Levitus 1990: 9-21) the history of Aboriginal 
concerns for sites in the Gimbat area as recorded by various observers in the period 
194 7-72. While I pointed out there that Brandl' s reports are anomalous in the 
36 E. Brandl, 30.3 .72, Christmas Creek Cave Paintings, Australian Archives Series Fl, File 69/4013. 37 E. Brandl, 20.12.72, Christmas Creek Paintings, Australian Archives Series Fl, File 74/4732. 38 E. Brandl, 30.3.72, op.cit. 
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relative lack of interest in site meanings and protection that they attribute to 
particular named informants, even those other sources that record a higher level of 
knowledge and commitment specifically note two particular Bula sites as an object 
of anxiety over any form of disturbance and one art site as a matter of unresolved 
concern over access. While the number of such sites might well have been 
multiplied, the worries that existed, however unsettling, seem to have been 
defensive in nature and minimalist in extent. Brandl' s reports are significant in that 
Aboriginal interest in the Gimbat area is portrayed as aspirational and expansive 
with respect to objectives that are said to be separate from site protection. 
This distinction between the sacred mythological and secular utilitarian 
significances of Gimbat for the J awoyn corresponds to a more general 
differentiation of their worldly affairs according to a two-laws model. Keen and 
Merlan (1990: 35-37) discuss a broad conceptual distinction that has long been 
made by J awoyn people between the domains of 'blackfella' and 'whitefella' law, 
each of which offers a set of rules and procedures for organising the affairs of life 
(Maddock 1977). They explain that, as such areas as community governance, and 
Maddock refers to marriage and the production economy, have been progressively 
penetrated by European ways, 'whitefella' law has gradually spread its jurisdiction 
to the point where it now dominates general or secular affairs. 'Blackfella' law has 
correspondingly become more specialised around tradition as manifested in 
ceremony and its related concerns of myth, country and sacred objects, that is those 
matters at the centre of what people call 'culture', a hard, unchanging Aboriginal 
way (see Kolig 1981: 88-89 for the same process in the Fitzroy valley). Bula, say 
Keen and Merlan, is identified absolutely as a matter of 'blackfella law'. 
If we apply this distinction to the Gimbat of that earlier time, blackfella law seems 
to have been not just conceptually, but geographically, a domain that was contained 
and perhaps contracting. In the land rights era of the early 1980s, that changed. 
39 E. Brandl, 20.12.72, op.cit. 
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Custodians now operated under the newly legitimating legal regime of the Land 
Rights Act and Sacred Sites Act, and in cooperation with researchers such as 
Merlan who viewed the protection of discrete sites as a policy exercise that was 
ancillary to the broader anthropological task of understanding structure and 
meaning in Jawoyn relationships to country generally. This shift in focus from sites 
under threat to sites of any sort provided a policy and research context in which 
custodians now expressed an expansive interest in the Gimbat area in religious 
terms (see chapter 2, and Levitus 1990: 23-28). They not only added to the 
distribution of Bula focal sites, where he was conceived to have gone underground, 
but enunciated other concepts of influence, communication and bodily presence 
around and between those sites that infused the topography of Gimbat with the 
nodes, lines and zones of a broad religious field of power. The change in the values 
of country recognisable to different generations of policy was thus reflected in the 
values seen by corresponding generations of custodians to ground their stake in 
Gimbat. 
r As the balance between the two laws in Gimbat altered, Bula was re-positioned 
both geographically and symbolically. By placing the script of religious power and 
danger within the domain ofblackfella law and placing that domain in an hydraulic 
relationship with whitefella law, Keen and Merlan raise for us the issue of identity 
and the role of Bula as a symbol of Aboriginal self-assertion in a cross-cultural 
political field . . The ideology of land rights valued a traditionalist vision of 
Aboriginal culture, and the legislation reified specific forms of attachment to 
country as criteria for the recognition and return of rights in land. Though the 
legislation itself presumed a fund of traditional knowledge, the motivation, 
substance and transmission of which were all matters internal to Aboriginal culture, 
it ascribed new significance to this knowledge as charter recognised by white 
institutions, thereby transforming it into a currency of articulation. This new policy 
domain thereby made specifically Aboriginal values of land into a new ground of 
recognition for Aborigines, and its processes added a new dimension to the 
Aboriginal presence within regions and the wider Northern Territory setting. The 
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ideology of rights and sites thus does not simply elevate traditional knowledge 
from a subsisting presence to a formally acknowledged one, it also fosters 
reassertion and revaluation by its Aboriginal custodians in terms of its new 
significance as a cultural form that is present to public consciousness. European 
political and legal changes thus created the ground for the senior generation of 
Aborigines, who had for decades sensed the wider irrelevance of such knowledge 
and cares (Keen and Merlan 1990: 24), to develop a new awareness that these 
things were worth thinking about, that they now constituted a new political 
currency over which they had control, recognised by white law and focussed on 
land. For the Jawoyn, it transformed Bula from a set of residual cultural meanings 
into a doctrine available as a resource in cross-cultural affairs (Merlan 1991 a: 348, 
350). 
The changed evaluation of Bula as a part of blackfella law is specifically illustrated 
by comparing incidents across the generations under discussion. During the 1980s, 
as NLC, Sites Authority and National Parks consultations repeatedly confronted the 
custodians with the responsibility of prescribing what amounted to an 
administrative regime to control the availability of Bula places and materials to 
white audiences or purposes, they had to consider what restrictions to apply to such 
things as site access and publication of images, some of which had also been 
considered by their predecessors. In 1964, Maddock (pers comm) heard no adverse 
comment from three Aboriginal men, including Soupy Marapunya, concerning the 
presence of a white female researcher with them on an archaeological visit to the 
Sleisbeck site. Research in the 1980s identified the Bula cult as male and secret, so 
that during preparation and hearing of the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim in 
the early 1980s and the Jawoyn (Gimbat Area) Land Claim in the early 1990s, 
white females, including the anthropologist responsible for preparing the claim 
books, did not accompany field visits to focal Bula sites including Sleisbeck. 
Between 1967 and 1972, a number of patrol officers' reports gave inconsistent 
accounts of the importance of the paintings at Christmas Creek and as to whether 
senior J awoyn men were worried about tourist access and its effects upon them 
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(Levitus 1990: 16-21 ). During the Coronation Hill issue, the J awoyn instructed the 
Parks Service to close the site, and no other art sites in the area designated as 
Sickness Country within Kakadu National Park have been approved by Jawoyn 
traditional owners for public visitation (KBM & PA 1998: 97-98). The first paper 
on Bula published in Oceania in 1962 (there called the Nargorkun-Narlinji cult) by 
Walter Arndt included extensive photos and drawings, mostly from the Sleisbeck 
site. Arndt located a second informant in 1963, on whose testimony he based a 
further publication. This man, he said, was 'aware of the author's genuine interest 
in mythology and was impressed by the reprint of the first paper on the cult which 
was circulating in the camp' (Arndt 1966: 231). Similarly, when Maddock (pers 
comm) first met the principal informant for Amdt's first paper, Soupy Marapunya, 
in 1964, Marapunya happily showed Maddock a copy of the 1962 paper. The senior 
custodians of the 1980s considered the images in Amdt's paper to be restricted, and 
instructed the Authority to take legal action against Fisher and Davis to gain 
possession of photos they took on their visit to the Sleisbeck site in June 1986. 
Circulation of the same images for a white public seems to have been thought a 
validation by one generation of custodians, and considered a violation by the next. 
That change signals a change also in the underlying political ethic. Validation by 
exposure implies a seeking of respect through awareness and understanding. 
Restrictions against exposure implies a demand for recognition of authority, a 
symbolic territoriality. In general, the senior custodians have had to consider what 
level of respect and deference they would require from a non-Aboriginal public 
towards the signs of blackfella law associated with Bula, now that they had the 
authority to insist on_ such a thing. As illustrated here, their generally restrictive and 
exclusionary response has in some cases diverged from the attitudes shown to the 
same materials by previous custodians. This is one aspect of a more generalised 
process of intensified secret-sacredness that became ascribed to Bula places and 
materials during the late 1980s. Such instances as have been cited here are often 
made to serve the polemical purpose of invalidating the more restrictive current 
attitude by comparing it with an earlier liberal attitude which, by reason of being 
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earlier, is assumed to be closer to an authentic pre-contact traditionalism. The 
comparison serves my argument differently, marking successive stages of the 
political culture of Jawoyn embeddedness in a non-Jawoyn world. Thus, while the 
sway of 'blackfella' law had contracted to the religious domain, the symbols of that 
domain were now being invested with the weight of contemporary Jawoyn identity 
and could be asserted, and expect deference, in the new contexts of consultation 
and adjustment produced by the larger political environment of land rights and self-
determination. The land rights regime, having arisen from a metropolitan 
traditionalist discourse in Aboriginal affairs, became further generative of that 
discourse at local levels. 
Keen and Merlan interpret the J awoyn response to Coronation Hill in terms of a 
transition of this kind in Jawoyn political sensibilities. They see the inconsistencies 
in J awoyn testimony as arising from a phase of tentativeness. 
It seems to us that the principals have experienced some genuine doubts and 
shown some vacillation, not about the nature of Bula tradition, but about the 
possibility of publicly sustaining claims to the tradition's legitimacy. We 
think this has been particularly in the period from around 1985, as they saw 
their version of the significance of Gimbat to be at odds with strong, outside 
or non-Aboriginal interests. 
(Keen and Merlan 1990: 80 - italics in original) 
Merlan argues that the custodians' version of the significance of Gimbat subsisted 
as a level of resistance maintained by an older generation 'that knew it was ri:ght 
about certain fundamentals, but could do little to force others to recognize this' 
(1991b: 19). These fundamentals consisted ofa set of meanings, about such things 
as the true nature of mineral deposits, that allowed the custodians to understand the 
real implications of non-Aboriginal interventions in the area. They found ethical 
expression in the concern custodians expressed for the welfare of everybody, 
Aboriginal and white, if those interventions continued in disregard of the true 
character of the country (Merlan 1991b: 21-26). 
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Subsequently, in the later stages of the dispute when the script of religious power 
and danger was being asserted as the official Jawoyn position by the Jawoyn 
Association, Keen and Merlan perceived among some Aborigines a growing sense 
'of the controversy over the Bula matter as a question of resistance to 
encroachment upon an Aboriginal domain' (1990: 82). Merlan (1991b: 31) 
interprets their response as a shift from an ethical to an overtly political mode of 
assertion. That theme manifested itself in the texts produced in some theatres. From 
the senior custodians, it could take the form of a defiant fatalism, as when they 
commented with ironic finality that if those who had been warned about the power 
of Bula didn't believe the danger, then they should proceed with their development 
works and see what happened. Barraway took the point one step further during a 
site documentation field trip in March 1988. He was in the company of the two 
other seniors, three younger J awoyn 1nen, and three researchers from the Authority 
and the NLC. Visiting a site painted with Bula motifs near Koolpin Creek in the 
uplands on the north side of the upper South Alligator valley, he delivered a 
lengthy monologue on the importance of continued custodianship of that place, the 
physical deformities and universal destruction that would follow disturbance, and 
the need to keep mining away from this and other sites. If mining and government 
people did not believe these things, if they thought 'blackfella tell him about 
bullshit story' or 'we can't believe that man all that lot Jawoyn people' , then, 
Barraway said, he would return to one of the focal Bula sites and take away the 
layers protecting Bula's entrance point into the ground, and the world-destructive 
shaking would begin, killing him and everyone else. 40 
The processes involved appear to be a variant of those observed by Kolig in the 
Fitzroy valley region in the Kimberley with respect to the management of esoteric 
knowledge and artefacts. In that case the sacred materials were readily to hand and 
already in active circulation, unlike the place-specific and distant Gimbat sites, and 
4° Cooper, David, 1988, Report for the Registration of Sites in Stage 3 of Kakadu National Park and 
the Bula Sickness Country, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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Kolig understood the general change agent in terms of pervasive modernisation 
pressures, lacking a specific legislative regime. But he recognised the increasing 
confinement of Aboriginal law to religious affairs, and how religion itself was 
simultaneously losing its force as an instrument for the reproduction of the social 
and natural environment and instead 'becoming the vehicle of ethnic awareness in 
the wider Australian society' (Kolig 1981: 7, 69-70, 178; 1989b: 112, 161). 
Just as the senior custodian Nipper Brown provided for Taylor a moment of extra-
theatrical legitimation for the script of jobs and royalties (see above), so he did the 
same again for the script of religious power and danger. When the Federal 
Government at last announced in June 1991 its final decision that Coronation Hill 
would not be mined, Merlan (pers comm) was in Katherine. She found all three 
seniors delighted with the decision, but Brown's response was ecstatic. He kept her 
up for hours making her read through portions of the J awoyn language dictionary 
she was compiling, providing cultural information, behaving in an elated manner 
she had never seen before, one she interpreted as arising from a sense of 
vindication at having had their story listened to. I think this reaction can be 
understood as an outcome of the reciprocal symbolic relationship that developed 
between Coronation Hill and the Bula region as a whole within the script of 
religious power and danger. Prior to the last and most politically contentious phase 
of the dispute, and especially before the resumption of exploration there in the mid-
1980s, Coronation Hill derived significance from its location within the region 
within which Bula was present. It lay within the zone of influence of other sites, or 
more diffusely, of his story. Even the special significance attached to the mineral 
deposit by testimony recorded in 1985 was only so attached because Coronation 
Hill was within the geographical reach of Bula. The meaning of the gold was 
derived from its location within that region. As the debate continued, the argument 
over Coronation Hill took the mining proposal as a test of the legitimacy of a wider 
cultural claim about Sickness Country. In that way, as Ritchie (pers comm) has 
observed, Coronation Hill came to carry the symbolic weight of the entire religious 
complex. For Brown, a governmental prohibition on mining was thus 
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simultaneously a high-level white acknowledgement of Bula and of what the 
Jawoyn knew about him. 
White laws and Jawoyn ownership 
A point that will be noticed from the two preceding sections is the epochal advent 
of a land rights legislative regime, consisting of the Land Rights Act and the Sacred 
Sites Act, as a critical condition of the historical motivations backgrounding both 
scripts. This regime raised the prospect of a new order of material benefits flowing 
to Aboriginal interests from mining developments, and simultaneously worked 
upon Aboriginal conceptualisations of blackfella law as a domain of fresh political 
relevance. The confluence of historical legacies within the theatres of the 
Coronation Hill issue is a function of this contemporary policy regime. 
There was always a potential for crisis lurking in the rationale for land rights from 
the time of its first formulation by Woodward in the early 1970s, for land was seen 
not only as cultural artefact and the basis of rights, but also as resource, the basis 
for economic improvement, especially through mining agreements. That potential 
for crisis was realised in the case of Coronation Hill because, for the senior 
custodians, the issue presented a choice between different realisable values of 
place. The Land Rights Act acknowledged an Aboriginal right to realise either set 
of values, and the senior custodians had seen countrymen affiliated to the uranium 
province to the north realise both. 
Significantly, however, the senior people did not have a clear technical grasp of the 
legal regime that governed the granting of ownership or consequent rights and 
entitlements (Keen and Merlan 1990: 27). In Marcus' (1995: 111) terms, and to 
once again extend the sense of Goffman' s information states, the senior custodians 
had limited hierarchical 'system awareness'. This is identifiable in two specific 
respects. The first is · their expectation that royalties could flow to them from a 
Coronation Hill mine, if the company would agree to pay them. Despite the best 
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efforts of people like Bennett and Fordimail and external advisors to explain that 
royalties flow only from mines on Aboriginal trust land under the Land Rights Act, 
that expectation continued to be expressed, as shown previously. The second is 
revealed by their denials that Coronation Hill was a place of any mythological 
significance. Ellis' view of the site registration was that it allowed the custodians a 
space in which to consider a steady, managed compromise of the general concerns 
that they had for the area in order to accommodate a carefully planned 
development. On those occasions on which they denied significance, the J awoyn 
. 
were contradicting the grounds for registration itself and thereby subverting the 
only legal standing they had at that time to manage anything. 
As it happened, these misconceptions didn't matter. The BHP project team made an 
early decision to proceed on the basis that the J awoyn had a legitimate interest in 
the area that it would accommodate by direct liaison with custodians (see chapter 6) 
and through the Sites Authority's permit procedures. In early 1987, senior 
government bureaucrats made clear to Rush that a terms and conditions agreement 
with the J awoyn would· be required to satisfy the government that Aboriginal 
concerns were being fully met, and statutory amendments in mid-1987 created an 
Aboriginal right to negotiate an agreement, including royalties, in anticipation of 
Gimbat becoming Aboriginal land. 
What is nevertheless important about these misconceptions is that they tell us 
something about the senior custodians' own perceptions of the new regime. Their 
failure to be mindful of the qualifications that surrounded consent and negotiation 
rights was a concomitant of what they saw as the really important facts, that 
Aboriginal ownership of country now counted for something and they were the 
owners of Coronation Hill. So, although at this time in the mid-1980s, the J awoyn 
had no legal ownership of any portion of Gimbat, the land rights legislation figured 
as part of the scene against which they considered proposals about Coronation Hill. 
It did so not exactly in its form as given by Parliament, but as the source of what 
the custodians understood to be a new regime of potential relationships and rights 
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under which they were now living. 
Operating with an understanding of their existing rights as owners that was 
technically imperfect but, as it turned out, practically adequate, they endorsed each 
set of values on different occasions with respect to Coronation Hill. In doing so, 
they revealed the capacity of that gold deposit to articulate with, and disentangle, 
the themes of post-settlement Jawoyn history, and to separate them into potential 
new alignments _ for the future. To compound my metaphors, Coronation Hill was a 
prism, absorbing some of the intertwined meanings of J awoyn history, then 
separating them out and projecting them forward along alternative trajectories. 
With each selection of script, the custodians endorsed and speculatively positioned 
themselves within one or other of those trajectories. The problem of contradictions 
arose from the refusal of the . custodians to unequivocally commit themselves to 
either trajectory and by implication reject the other, as the management processes 
around Coronation Hill insisted they do. 
At the end of the last chapter, I remarked that it was impossible to read the 
contradictory texts emanating from successive theatres as indicative of changing 
interiorised intellectual positions with respect to the issue. Having introduced into 
the scenic circumferences of theatres those themes of J awoyn history that 
articulated with the realisable values of place, we can now revisit that conclusion. 
We can ask again whether the custodians held a securely interiorised position about 
anything. The functional link between historical needs and the values that might be 
realised at Coronation Hill, was of course the status of custodianship itself and its 
implicitly assumed right to decide. The relationships operating within the scene-act 
ratio thus allow contradictions to be understood as alternating end-manifestations 
or expressions of the custodians' interiorised conviction as to ownership, now 
endorsing one future realisation of the values of place, now another. Indeed, 
considered from the position of the custodians as actors, we could say that the 
custodial role itself drew substance from another scenic circumference supplied by 
J awoyn history. Merlan has probed the character and origin of the conviction of 
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ownership for some J awoyn of that semor generation, including the senior 
custodians of Coronation Hill. 
The anchoring of subjectivity in the linkage among person, place and 
Dreaming - not only as a matter of one's own sense of self, but also as a 
general scheme of reference - is rendered vivid through presence and 
founded in close experience in differentiated country with similarly oriented 
others. The firm setting of this conceptual and emotional foundation seems 
to make it possible for Aboriginal people who have lived this to continue to 
experience themselves as part of distant places and milieux, despite 
considerable remove; thus, the familiar image of the Aboriginal person who 
is possessed by the feeling "My country!" and also "My uncle!" "My 
granny country!" and so on, though miles and a mode of life away .... But 
this feeling for continuing psychic presence in distant places, on a basis of 
sometimes long-term absence rather than simply presence ... can only be 
felt once it is established as a ground of subjectivity. If it is not established 
early in the individual's formation through close experience, not just of the 
country but of it in the terms of differentiated human relationship (one's 
own and others'), to it, attachment must be psychically on a different basis. 
(1998: 93) 
Conclusion 
\Vith that, we can also return to my comments at the beginning of chapter 3, 
regarding the status of the Coronation Hill debate as a secondary discourse about a 
primary discourse presumed to subsist within the Jawoyn community and labelled 
'Aboriginal tradition'. The consultation event was the mechanism that was intended 
to provide the public administration process with access to that authoritative 
Aboriginal centre. As I have shown in the intervening pages, the theatres of 
Coronation Hill produced a corpus of texts that subverted that expectation and 
thereby left radically uncertain the content and indeed the status of any such 
Aboriginal centre. The influence that that presumption as to the existence of an 
authoritative Aboriginal centre had upon management of the Coronation Hill issue 
is explored in the following chapters. For the moment, my analysis offers an 
alternative understanding of the content of that Aboriginal centre, and therefore of 
ho\ it did participate in the issue. Rather than a corpus of religious doctrine to be 
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dipped into to guide land management decisions, what the senior custodians carried 
into each consultation event was the more fundamental and elementary conviction 
of their ownership of country, just as Brandl had discovered in 1972. 
This chapter has identified the implications of that conviction by posing it as the 
ground from which the custodians evaluated the possibilities of place that were 
evoked by this development issue. The themes that I have drawn from J awoyn 
history are not intended to imply that that history was itself bisected. They were, 
rather, instances of Burke's spotlit circumferences in the scenic background of the 
theatres of Coronation Hill. They suggest a different level of motivation to that 
uncovered by my discussion of the scene-act ratio in the previous chapter. That 
discussion addressed the question of why certain theatres seemed appropriate to the 
custodians for a particular choice of script. Here I am talking not about the 
explanation of choice on each occasion, but about why the alternatives to choose · 
from had anything to recommend them, that is, why the custodians should find each 
script at all chooseable, and therefore why there was a real choice to be made. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ABORIGINAL CENTRE: ACCESS, DEFERENCE AND 
DENIAL 
Site protection and consultation 
The Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act of 1978 defined a sacred site as 'a site that is 
sacred to Aboriginals or is otherwise of significance according to Aboriginal 
tradition'. The Act also introduced the legal concept of the custodian, defined as 
'the traditional Aboriginal owner or other Aboriginal to whom the protection of a 
sacred site is entrusted by and in accordance with Aboriginal tradition'. The 
legislation thus began with acknowledgement of a discourse of sacredness 
embedded within another culture, separate and reified, responsibility for which was 
vested in an endogenous authority whose legitimacy was similarly embedded. 
Metropolitan law made no assumption of transparency. This was conceived as a 
domain apart, but one to which, if legal protection was to be extended, access must 
somehow be had. 
The solution ultimately settled upon by the Northern Territory legislature (Ritchie 
1996) was to establish a statutory authority, the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection 
Authority (see chapter 2), which would mediate between that Aboriginal domain 
and external parties wishing to enter upon or carry out works on sacred sites. The 
Act required the Authority to establish a register (s.24) in which any site referred to 
it by an Aborigine and which, after examination and evaluation, it accepted as 
sacred was to be entered (s.25). The Act also provided that entering upon a sacred 
site, registered or not, was an offence unless the site custodian and the Authority 
were satisfied that such entry was proper and the Authority issued a permit (s.29), 
and it provided further that carrying out works upon a site was an offence without 
written permission from the Authority (s.31 ( 4)). So in addition to the program of 
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field research implied by s.25, the Authority understood s.29 to require 
consultations with site custodians in order to ascertain their wishes regarding 
requests to enter upon a sacred site. S.31 did not require permission from anyone 
but the Authority itself for works to be carried out, but as a matter of policy the 
Authority extended its consultation procedures to such cases as well (Ritchie pers 
comm). 
It is significant that this recounting of relevant sections from the sites legislation 
omits those provisions for declaration of sites that appear on the surface to be 
central to the protection regime the Act offered. Under these, the site custodians 
could request the Authority to apply to the Administrator of the Northern Territory 
to publicly declare the existence of a sacred site. The manner of the Act's 
administration by the Authority during the 1980s left these provisions unused. The 
Director of the Authority, Bob Ellis, has provided an account of the origins and 
development of the Authority's philosophy of site protection in his Master's thesis 
(Ellis 1994). His discussion of the early involvement of the Authority in site 
protection issues around the town of Alice Springs points up two inter-related 
conceptual changes as central to this new regime. One of these was the movement 
beyond earlier heritage protection laws that had drawn on the scientific paradigm of 
prehistoric archaeology and were concerned with relics as valuable evidence of the 
traditional Aboriginal culture of the pre-European past. Now the primary concern 
was with the significance attributed to places by contemporary Aboriginal people 
acting as the bearers of current and dynamic indigenous belief systems. The other 
was the broadening of concern from sites conceived as isolated points identifiable 
by geographic coordinates, to a notion of 'landscape cultural amenity' (Ellis 1994: 
52) that could be applied to areas of land that were culturally significant and within 
which particular sites existed as points of special sensitivity. 
Upon taking up the position of Director, Ellis recognised, from a close reading of 
the land rights and sites protection legislation then in force in the Territory, that an 
effective regime of protection informed by these concepts was possible by utilising 
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the provisions for the registration of sacred sites by the Authority. This strategy 
circumvented the probable intention of the legislators by not utilising the procedure 
for declaration of sites, and by so doing sacrificed the evidentiary force of 
declaration in the event of prosecution for site violation. Toohey J. understood the 
absence of site declarations to arise from the reluctance of Aboriginal custodians to 
expose sites' to the publicity required (Renwick nd: 28). Ellis, however, regarded 
registration as preferable because it meant that Aboriginal custodians could 
themselves decide whether and under what conditions a site should be given the 
protection of European law, even to the extent of considering appeals from non-
Aboriginal interests as to the detriment that a proposed registration may impose 
upon them (Ellis 1994: 26-33). 
The registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex in October 1985 
brought both new concepts of site protection - into play. It was an area of 
approximately 250 square kms, the 'landscape cultural amenity' of which derived 
from its location within a region made significant by the travels and continued 
presence of Bula. Cooper, the Authority officer who prepared the registration 
report, considered there was potential for an even larger registered area within that 
region. Ellis, appearing before the Senate Inquiry in May 1986, explained the 
registered site as part of a 'first order of zoning' of areas of Aboriginal concern, 
within which further differentiations of significance were now needed to delineate 
no-go areas, accommodate bushwalking and perhaps negotiate mining development 
(SSCNR 1986b: 830, 841). 
Once the Authority established this legal Aboriginal interest in the valley and over 
much of Coronation Hill, Ellis immediately made plain to the BHP project team a 
further aspect of the site protection regime that arose from the two concepts above. 
What flowed from the site registration was not a ban on any further land use 
changes, but a · requirement to communicate, inform and consult with the 
custodians, with a view to negotiating permission to proceed. The Authority wrote 
to the B.HP team advising of the site coordinates and offering assistance 1n 
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arranging consultations with custodians. The team replied that its work plans for 
1986 were not yet finalised, and attached a map of all BHP interests in Gimbat. The 
Authority then advised in greater detail of overlaps between those mining 
tenements and sites known to the Authority, including registered sites affecting 
Coronation Hill and Sleisbeck. It advised BHP that any development within these 
registered sites would require permission from the Authority, and asked again 
whether the company wished the Authority to begin consultations with the 
custodians. 
While the BHP team was required to defer to Authority procedures, its 
acquiescence was not passive. Rush immediately proposed an independent 
anthropological survey to verify the findings of the Authority's own work, and to 
add to its area coverage if necessary. When he found that papers by Arndt and 
Chaloupka revealed a distribution of sites in the South Alligator valley that did not 
impinge upon Coronation Hill, the proposal for an independent survey .was 
endorsed by senior management, but did not ultimately proceed. The project team 
was willing, however, to approach the J awoyn, outside the formal mediatory role of 
the Authority. Ellis himself suggested that team members establish informal 
personal relationships with relevant J awoyn people, but counselled against any 
attempt to directly discuss the issue of how sacredness might impinge upon 
development. Project team members moved beyond these constraints from an early 
stage as they sought directly to discover and weigh the Jawoyn interest in the upper 
South Alligator valley. 
As the issue proceeded they were not alone in this, indeed officers and consultants 
from other agencies, including the Northern Land Council, the Northern Territory 
Government and environmental organisations, established direct liaison with 
Jawoyn traditional custodians and political leaders, occasionally, periodically or 
almost continuously, over the next five years. This pattern of multiple direct 
communications gave to the contest over sacredness a peculiarly personal 
dunension. Many of the interlocutors of the J awoyn, and especially those from the 
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BHP team, the Authority and the NLC who were able to sustain continuous 
relations with the1n, valued the quality of communication that they believed they 
had achieved. Disagreements between these agencies over representations of 
sacredness implied mutual challenges to the quality of their respective liaison 
relationships. The confidence of individual officers in the veracity of the assertions 
about sacredness they had elicited from their J awoyn informants was often 
grounded in the personal investment they felt in those relations, and in their 
satisfaction that they had achieved honest, friendly and productive interactions. 
The dispute over sacredness, carried out at the level of competing secondary 
representations (Keen 1993: 344-45), therefore also called into question the quality 
of personal relationships and dealings. This became explicit in accusations of 
cultural insensitivity and inappropriateness, pressure, or even outright invention. 
Such mutual mistrust in tum created a felt need -to sustain direct liaison with the 
J awoyn, in order to nurture and reinforce personal ties with particular individuals 
and their community, to protect them from undue influence, to encourage them to 
repeat in public and official forums what they had said in private consultation, and 
to test assertions from opposing interests as to what they really thought. Each of the 
organisations involved felt constrained to verify its position on sacredness by 
repeated reference back to the J awoyn source. 
The contest over access 
This pattern of competitive liaison was established almost immediately following 
the registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex and it constituted a first 
level of inter-agency conflict, over legitimacy of access to country and people. 
Rush and Leckie had met with Ellis on 27 September 1985, prior to the registration, 
for a briefing on the state of sacred site documentation in the Coronation Hill area. 
Following this, Rush reported: 
It should be noted that even if a sacred site is found in the Coronation Hill 
leases and is verified as being genuine, discussions with the 
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custodians should take place. Destruction of a site can take place with the 
permission of the custodians and this has happened in some instances, such 
as at the lease area of the Enterprise Mine at Pine Creek.41 
In mid-December 1985, after receiving the advice from the Authority regarding the 
locations of six registered or recorded sites impinging upon their tenements in 
Gimbat, Rush and Leckie met custoqians for the first time. The following week 
Allan Linke wrote up a tentative strategy: 
Acknowledge Aboriginal interest in the general area and do not dispute that 
Coronation Hill is a sacred site based on our present knowledge. 
Try to ascertain more about the exact location, size and significance of the 
site at Coronation Hill. 
Undertake (b) by face to face contact with custodians and develop a good 
working relationship with them. Also learn about other areas of importance 
to them. 
Do not undertake any major work at Coronation Hill until permission is 
given by custodians. Do not seek such permission until a better relationship 
has been developed. 
Assess joint venturer legal position but do not for the time being pursue any 
legal options until a better knowledge of total situation is obtained. 42 
Linke felt the results of Rush and Leckie' s initial meetings suggested that 'we can 
reach a satisfactory compromise at Coronation Hill'. 
The project team's thinking was influenced by two considerations. Firstly, BHP 's 
expenence at Groote Eylandt, where it had developed and operated a large 
manganese mine for many years, gave the team confidence that satisfactory 
relations could be directly negotiated and maintained with Aboriginal communities. 
The company's records disclose no sense of hesitancy or reticence about dealing 
41 P.M.Rush, 28 .10.85, Memo to N.J.Rowlands, J.F.Leckie re Notes of Meeting with R.Ellis re 
Aboriginal Sacred Sites in the Coronation Hill Project Area, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and 
Reports. 
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with problems of cross-cultural communication and mutual understanding. Indeed, 
giving evidence to the Senate Inquiry into the resources of the Kakadu region in 
March 1986, Linke referred to the problems created by intermediary organisations. 
He cited his own experience of maintaining good relations with the Aborigines of 
Groote, and of making sure 'that people who worked for me also learned and got 
on well with Aboriginals'. He further ·argued against reliance on anthropological 
research to establish traditional ownership of an area, favouring direct inquiries by 
the personnel attached to the project (SSCNR 1986a: 256, 269-71). 
Secondly, BHP had particular reason to be concerned about external organisations 
in this case, given the policy environment of Coronation Hill. The Ranger Inquiry 
recommendation that the entire South Alligator River catchment be given national 
park protection meant that Gimbat and Goodparla pastoral stations would at some 
time be considered for resumption by the Crown prior to declaration of a Stage III · 
of Kakadu National Park (see chapter 2). By late 1985, the Federal Government's 
attention was turning to the matter, and the conservation movement was preparing 
for another Kakadu campaign. If resumed, the area would become available for 
claim under the Land Rights Act. The company was aware that its mineral 
tenements did not provide a form of tenure sufficient to insulate them from the land 
claims process, and that any land claim would thus include its mining interests. The 
project team saw the development of close and direct personal relationships with all 
relevant Aborigines in the Katherine area as its best defence against these policy 
outcomes. Indeed it anticipated the possibility of presenting a united front of 
mining company and Aborigines to Federal policy-makers, hoping thereby to 
forestall exploitation of the sacred sites issue by conservationists, and to secure 
approval to mine before the instigation of a land claim gave the NLC legal grounds 
for involvement in the affairs of the area. The project team's efforts with regard to 
obtaining approvals for development in Gimbat and especially at Coronation Hill, 
42 A.Linke, 19 .12.85, Text of Telex to N.J.Rowlands, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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are dealt with in this and the following chapter. Its good neighbour policy with 
respect to the wider J awoyn group is discussed in chapter 8. 
The new legalities presented by the site registration required that the project team 
obtain the Authority's formal permission to proceed with development works. Ellis 
assured Rush that the Authority had in the past facilitated accommodations between 
Aboriginal and development interests · in areas of traditional significance by 
arranging for information and views to be freely and dispassionately exchanged. He 
maintained both the need and room for negotiation, avoiding any appearance of 
direct incompatibility, by referring to 'the sacred significance of an area associated 
with Coronation Hill ' 43 (my emphasis). At the J awoyn meeting at Low Level on 3 
February 1986, he explained the site registration as a way of serving notice on the 
mining company that its project was not its business alone. 
We've registered that whole area, that whole area's covered now. We need 
to do some more, some more work to find out more about that country. 
David [Cooper]'s gonna have to come down and talk to people and collect 
more information about what's inside there. But that was just so we can tell 
that BHP mob 'Stop. Don't do any more, until you get permission. ' Just to 
hold it.44 
With Ellis' assistance, the project team presented its proposals to a small meeting 
of predominantly Jawoyn people at Coronation Hill on 25 February 1986, 
answering their questions and trying to correct 'the impression that we wanted to 
remove all the hill'. 45 A general J awoyn Association meeting in Katherine on 6 
March rejected these proposals. Such an outcome was unexpected for the project 
team because it had to this point understood that, while there were Aboriginal sites 
of significance in the valley, no attributions of sacredness related specifically to 
Coronation Hill, and the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex protected a broad 
43 R.W.Ellis, 20.2.86, Letter to P.M.Rush, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
44 Meeting At Low Level About Coronation Hill 3.2.86, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority 
video. 
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area within which places of real concern were not yet fully identified. Following 
the rejection of 6 March, Rush wrote to Ellis: 
Arising from the meeting, we would like to know more details about the 
claim that Coronation Hill is a bula site. In particular, the site's actual 
location and its aerial [sic] extent, also its significance to the Aboriginal 
people. 
The joint venture would like to know the names of the people who made the 
decisions at the Katherine meeting, what clan they belonged to, whether 
they were a custodian and/or traditional owner of Coronation Hill, and their 
standing in terms of their traditional Aboriginal authority for Coronation 
Hill.46 
The project team thus moved into a fresh round of information gathering and 
liaison. Rush contacted the former uranium miner Joe Fisher, the former Gimbat 
station owner Joe Callanan, and a former Joint Ve;iture geologist Geoff Pietsch. He . 
noted their memories of a minimal Aboriginal presence in the valley, no indication 
from such Aborigines as were there as to any importance attached to Coronation 
Hill, and no expressed concerns about mining, from the 1950s to the 1970s. These 
oral historical sources augmented the scepticism that had already arisen from 
Rush's initial research into Amdt's and Chaloupka's ethnographic reports. 
The BHP team advised the Authority of its intention to proceed with informal 
direct discussions with the Jawoyn. With a scale model of Coronation Hill, Rush 
and Leckie visited the Katherine area on 19 and 20 March for talks with a number 
of significant individuals, including the three senior custodians. In the face of 
objections by Ellis and the suspicion of a local Katherine NLC officer, Rush and 
Leckie politely insisted that they were only trying to exchange information and 
understand Aboriginal concerns. Ellis had advised the project team to develop 
informal personal relationships with Jawoyn, and that it confine discussions to the 
45 P.M.Rush, 28.2.86, Memo to N.J.Rowlands, C.Gregory, J.F.Leckie, A.Linke, Meeting with 
Aboriginal Custodians, Coronation Hill, N .T. , BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 46 P.M.Rush, 13.3.86, Letter to R.Ellis, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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social and economic possibilities of the project and the likely landscape alterations 
involved. He had not intended that they use these relationships to pursue research 
into the anthropology and cultural values of the upper South Alligator valley (Ellis 
1994: 85). This visit represented the first clear public break with the formal 
consultation procedures organised and authorised by the Authority. It led to public 
criticism by Mick Dodson, then an NLC legal officer in Katherine, and a series of 
letters from Ellis to Rush, attacking the project team's approaches to individual 
custodians and its failure to wait a reasonable period after the rejection of 6 March 
before addressing site protection issues again. Ellis called for adherence to proper 
procedure: 
In your own interests and in the interest of your company I strongly 
recommend that you reconsider any further "informal consultations" and 
operate as originally agreed with the benefit of advice from this Authority. 47 
It is plain, however, that the project team had decided to foster as independent a 
relationship as possible with the J awoyn. A Proposed Strategy formulated by Rush 
proposed, over six to twelve months, developing mutual understanding and trust 
with Aboriginal people, acquiring precise details regarding sacredness at 
Coronation Hill and its custodians, and demonstrating on the part of the project 
team a responsible attitude and a willingness to consult. This should be done 'by 
direct contact with them with as little as possible use of intermediary organizations 
or authorities' .48 This liaison effort was to be complemented by the development 
and implementation of an Aboriginal employment policy, and consideration of the 
possibility of a broad agreement with Aborigines for mining. The whole strategy, 
Rush suggested, should be under the control of one long-term Joint Venture officer 
likely to be on site for reasonable periods, and put in place before a land claim was 
made, after which 'subsequent dealings with them would be through the N.L.C. 
47 R.W.Ellis, 3.4.86, Letter to Rush, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
48 P.M.Rush, 21.3.86 , Memo to .I.Rowlands, A.Linke, C.Gregory, Proposed Strategy, Aboriginal 
Affairs, Coronation Hill Project, BHP ewcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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where we would lose the opportunity for unimpeded access to theni' .49 In the 
meantime, no further ground-disturbing work should be carried out in the project 
area, nor any pressure placed upon custodians to grant permission for such work. 
A second Proposed Strategy document went into greater detail. It accepted that 
Coronation Hill was of significance to Aborigines, despite a lack of specific 
information about the site, and that the J awoyn had affiliations to the upper South 
Alligator valley. It proposed 'to build up a relationship and confidence in us by the 
Aborigines with us working substantially independently of other organizations' .50 
The Authority would be called in for 'a final meeting' to allow it to 'verify the 
wishes of the Aborigines', once it became apparent that the responsible Aborigines 
were happy for BHP' s work to proceed. Further field work on other tenements in 
the valley should also await documentation of all areas of significance. The strategy 
aimed to gain Aboriginal support for exploration and mining, and thereby· 
demonstrate to Federal policy-makers that Aboriginal concerns could be adequately 
met without declaring the area a National Park to the exclusion of mineral-related 
activity. 
The BHP team's overall strategy, based on close and direct engagement with the 
Jawoyn, was thus in place within a month of the first rejection of its plans by a 
Jawoyn meeting. The strategy intended to minimise the Authority's mediating role, 
anticipating that it need only provide a formal seal of approval at the end of the 
project team's own liaison process. It was also in competition with Ellis' efforts up 
to that time to have the Aborigines represented as an independent third interest, 
alongside miners and environmentalists, in Federal deliberations over the proposed 
Kakadu Stage III area. BHP wanted the J awoyn on its side. The miners, moreover, 
had some sense of urgency. Rush saw that a decision on Stage III, a subsequent 
49 lbid. 
50 P.M.Rush, 1.4.86, Memo to A.Linke, Proposed Strategy, Aboriginal Affairs·, Coronation Hill 
Project, Northern Territory, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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land claim, and amendments being considered to the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) 
Act, were all ' events which may overtake the project'. 51 
During their two days of discussions in the Katherine area in March, Rush and 
Leckie displayed the Coronation Hill model, inquired as to what responsibility or 
anticipated role each person might have with respect to the issue, and identified 
Barraway, Brown and Jatbula as the three central individuals. They receiv·ed 
interested responses to their suggestion of a visit to the upper South Alligator valley 
and the project site, and promised no further work on the registered site area for the 
present. They also began developing first impressions concerning the dispositions 
of relevant J awoyn individuals to their proposed project. They concluded that their 
main problem in this regard was Peter J atbula, as he appeared to have the most 
extensive notion of the distribution of sacredness in the valley, and he alone 
directly expressed concern about their work. Rush and Leckie were sceptical about 
Jatbula's notion of a broad expanse of sacred country, preferring Sandy Barraway's 
identification of specific sites as 'more "Aboriginal" and probably closer to the real 
situation' .52 Nevertheless they arrived at the impression that Jatbula was the more 
important custodian, and wondered if his expansive and unspecific view of 
sacredness derived from a desire to promote a land claim. They concluded their 
report on their visit with the judgment that ' [t]here is a light at the end of the tunnel 
but the length of the tunnel is unknown'. 53 
Further pursuant to the agreed strategy, in April 1986 the BHP Minerals accountant 
prepared calculations showing ways of providing for an Aboriginal financial stake 
in the project. The Joint Venture partners held a meeting on 16 April ' to discuss 
Aboriginal Policy', and stated that they were 
51 Ibid. 
52 P.M.Rush, 3.4.86, Memo to N.J.Rowlands, A.Linke, C.Gregory, Meetings with Aborigines, 
Coronation Hill J.V., N.T. p.9. BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
53 Ibid. 
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prepared to acknowledge that the Jawoyn people are Aborigines who have a 
valid interest in land in which our project area lies. The project team will 
attempt to confirm for the J.V. 's own satisfaction that the people we are 
dealing with are the right (legitimate) people. 54 
They thereby indicated their intention to rely on their field operatives, rather than 
on the Authority, as their primary guide for correct and effective communication 
with the J awoyn. The Joint Venturers thus accepted the presumption of an 
authoritative Aboriginal centre enshrined in the sites legislation, and endorsed the 
project team as their preferred instrument for identifying and engaging with the 
individuals who embodied that centre. 
By the end of April 1986, the project team was ready to further its program of 
Aboriginal liaison by organising a field trip with custodians into the upper South 
Alligator valley. Rush telephoned Ritchie, a Sites h.uthority officer, regarding entry . 
to the registered site. This fairly lengthy discussion gave rise to a subsequent 
dispute as to whether Ritchie had approved entry onto the Upper South Alligator 
Bula Complex. Their conversation was more significant, however, as a low-key 
clash of two strategies. Ritchie tried to preserve the Authority's statutory mediating 
role by arguing that the intended trip could prejudice sensitive negotiations being 
pursued by the Authority concerning the project, and advised that properly 
constituted meetings were preferable. Rush aimed to ensure the project team's 
unmediated access to Aboriginal information by insisting on the importance and 
innocence of the exercise as a means by which the company and the Jawoyn could 
'get to know' one another. Ellis (pers comm) remarked that 'getting to know' the 
J awoyn, a purpose of which he approved, had for the BHP team got caught up with 
'getting to know country' of which he did not approve. Dodson and Ellis also 
asserted the legitimacy of each other's intermediary role, Dodson asking 
rhetorically if BHP was trying to usurp the role of the Authority in conducting site 
clearances, and Ellis affirming the right of the J awoyn to have Dodson present as 
54 
n.a., 28.4.86, Coronation Hill - Aboriginal Affairs Proposals, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and 
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their legal representative on all occasions. Instead of relying on the Authority, Rush 
and Leckie developed their relationship with Larry Ah Lin, Chairman of the 
J awoyn Association, welcoming his advice and assistance in organising the trip. 
They also noted that Willie Martin, then working as a cultural teacher at Barunga 
school, might be useful in identifying suitable J awoyn candidates for training and 
employment at Coronation Hill. 
The notes made by Leckie and Rush of their first trip into the upper South Alligator 
valley over three days with five Aboriginal custodians include a good deal of 
information on matters of no direct relevance to the issues at hand about sacredness 
and belief. These notes give an impression of a general sizing up of personalities, 
including comments about people's demeanour, dress, and states of inebriation. 
The BHP account also shows that Rush and Leckie's claims to be merely interested 
in promoting mutual understanding and Aboriginal confidence, which they 
repeated in response to criticisms by Ellis and Dodson, were disingenuous. As 
shown in chapter 3, they were plainly interested in ascertaining the location of sites, 
recording Aboriginal concerns for country, and thereby developing an independent 
knowledge base from which to negotiate the sacredness issue, consistent with their 
strategy documents. Their findings could only have added to their scepticism 
concerning the status of Coronation Hill as a sacred site, and reinforced their 
confidence that Aboriginal approval for their work could be negotiated. 
Claims for cross-cultural competence 
The contest over direct access to the J awoyn was argued partly in terms of 
adherence to proper process and legality, but it quickly revealed a more substantial 
argument about cultural knowledge and sensitivity, and competing claims for 
effective cross-cultural communication. From early in 1986, criticisms of the 
project team's liaison campaign from Ellis and Dodson were put in terms of 
Reports. 
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cultural appropriateness. In his newspaper column Dodson instructed BHP that the 
security of sacred sites was a matter that could concern many groups, often at some 
distance from the places in question, and that singling out individual custodians 
forced them to take responsibility for something that should properly be a matter of 
wider account. In an address to the NT Chamber of Mines (Rush 1986), Ellis tried 
to locate knowledge about sites within an Aboriginal social context. He represented 
sites not as things but as a focus of intellectual activity, and site protection therefore 
as an issue able to be discussed and negotiated within the relevant group according 
to its internal notions of political authority and structural responsibility. The 
business of Authority officers, he explained, was to accumulate the historical data 
and cultural acumen that would allow them to understand those internal concerns 
about sites and foster acceptable arrangements for their management. In a series of 
communications with members of the BHP team, Ellis emphasised that ignorance 
or disregard of the internal Aboriginal dynamics governing such issues as 
Coronation Hill could create serious problems. At a point of particular exasperation 
over reports of the project team's ongoing liaison program, he wrote: 
I have repeatedly off erred [ sic J you my assistance and co-operation with 
little or no response from you .... I have previously warned you that your 
actions · in meeting, apparently 'secretly', with some of the Custodians is 
inappropriate. The group, as a whole, are likely to be suspicious of your 
proposals as a consequence and may not only reject your exploration 
proposals on this basis, but may apply sanctions against the individuals seen 
to be co-operating with you. The resultant disruption and community 
division lives on long after your departure, to the long-term detriment of the 
Territory's economic and social development. 55 
Such misgivings were informed by more than a perception in the abstract that the 
BHP team was treading on dangerous ground. Ellis' warning was itself prompted in 
part by a report from David Cooper in which he referred to resentment being 
expressed by Barraway and J atbula over the inclusion of another senior man in the 
BHP team's site visits. Cooper considered the project team to be ignorant of local 
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political sensitivities and referred to the intra-community trouble likely to anse 
from BHP' s 'blundering approach'. 56 In fact Linke (nd: 17) had noted an argument 
over traditional ownership between the two custodians and this other man d~ring a 
visit to the valley, and attributed this man's later change of residence at Barunga to 
friction with Barraway and others. 
Attempts by Authority and NLC officers to reign in the project team's campaign, 
and the latter's resistance to those attempts, was, in effect, a contest for the control 
of theatres. Ellis' distinction between informal familiarisation and inquiries into 
matters concerning country seemed to tum on the frame in which the custodians 
were required to operate. He approved of casual interactions in which J awoyn men 
were not placed explicitly in a role of custodianship. Exercises in which access was 
sought to a knowledgeable Aboriginal centre on matters of sacredness did frame 
them in that custodial role, becoming theatres in which they were asked to produce 
relevant texts. Ellis regarded that as a clumsy and risky trespass upon the function 
of the Authority. His claim for the Authority's precedence was made, again, not as 
much from statutory requirement as in terms of professionalism and superior 
cultural competence. Thus, for example, after the project team carried out their first 
field trip into the upper South Alligator valley at the end of April 1986, Dodson 
reported that Jatbula had felt 'humbugged' into going on the trip and revealing 
information about sites, while Leckie and Rush were sure he was not put out. In 
discussing the matter with Ellis, they assured him that 
we could not understand the basis for the complaint as we had a cornpletely 
different impression of the situation .... After discussing our view of the 
events and the divergent view he had obtained with Mick Dodson, [Ellis] 
said that it was the aboriginal way not to object directly to Europeans but to 
55 R.W.Ellis, 12.5.86, Letter to P.M.Rush, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
56 D.Cooper, 10.5.86, File Note: BHP 's Unofficial Consultation with Jaowyn [sic] Custodians, 
Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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try and take them or lead them away from important areas and also to 
discuss their problems. with people they knew better. 57 
In the face of such objections, BHP officers continued their direct liaison program 
through May and June 1986. They first developed their contacts in the Katherine 
area to ensure close advice on local sentiment and events. During four days of 
discussions and meetings in early May, Leckie noted comments from Ah Lin 
critical of the NLC and from Darren Bennett critical of the Authority. He sat with 
Peter J atbula in a cafe and satisfied himself that, contrary to complaints relayed to 
him by Ellis, Jatbula was happy about the trip to the South Alligator valley. He 
talked with several other senior Aboriginal men, and tried to understand, as it now 
seemed to him, why Barra way was more important as custodian than J atbula, 
speculating on the significance of Barraway' s cicatrices and the fact that he had 
sons and Jatbula only daughters. Leckie also began arrangements for another trip 
the following week, which turned out to be a briefer and more casual exercise of 
looking around and discussing a limited section of the valley with two custodians. 
Later he distributed sets of photos of the field trips to Barraway, Ah Lin and 
Nunggulawe. 
Leckie was satisfied with the quality and results of his developing contacts, and 
was encouraged to believe that there was significant local resentment of the NLC 
and the Authority. This belief tended to subvert the impact of complaints from Ellis 
to the effect that the BHP team's informal program of consultation about sites and 
cultural concerns was culturally inept and politically risky. The miners were 
developing confidence that they were more directly in touch with J awoyn opinion 
than were those Darwin organisations, and that continued open and direct 
discussion with the people of the Katherine area could only advance their cause. 
Allen Linke summarised their progress in May. 
57 P.Rush, 8.5.86, Memo to I.A.Linke: Meeting with R.Ellis re Coronation Hill Project N.T., 
BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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Continued direct discussions with Coronation Hill custodians and other 
J awoyn people through meetings at Barunga, Katherine, Pine Creek, Edith 
Falls, and camping trips into the South Alligator Valley. It is apparent that a 
successful relationship is developing between the Aboriginal people and the 
project team (Peter Rush, Foy Leckie and Allen Linke - representing the 
Joint Venture). 58 
They continued also to pursue independent research. While in Katherine, Leckie 
borrowed from the library the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim book to copy. 
Later in May, Allen Linke reported that several volumes of the land claim 
transcripts had been researched and two volumes copied, and that the NT Mines 
Department had been requested to extract all reports relevant to exploration 
licenses issued over the South Alligator valley, in order that they could be 
'searched ... for Aboriginal cultural information'. 59 
The miners also maintained an anti-alcohol posture, refusing demands for 
gratuitous cash handouts that would be spent on drink, and trying to arrange 
transport in a way that would minimise the presence of alcohol on field trips. This 
appears not only to have been a matter of maintaining proper appearances in the 
conduct of their discussions, but to have arisen from the conviction that alcohol 
was a nuisance, a cause of disruption and wasted time, which impeded the process 
of transmitting information to, and encouraging cooperative relationships with, the 
J awoyn. In this they were subject to the same compromises as any other 
fieldworkers. Leckie realised that day-payments made to custodians for their 
participation in field trips could be spent on grog. The ready availability of alcohol 
from multiple outlets in the region, and the access that some custodians had to their 
own transport, often made plans to restrict the amount of alcohol taken on site visits 
ineffective. Under such circumstances, the miners allowed drunk custodians a night 
to recover at El Sherana before beginning discussions the next day. 
58 I.A.Linke, 26.5.86, Memo to C.M.Gregory, Aboriginal Affairs - May 1986, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Reports. 
59 Ibid. 
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The Senate Inquiry into the resources of the Kakadu region conducted a site 
inspection and hearing at Coronation Hill on 21 May 1986. This event 
demonstrated two attitudes that were current among the miners. The first was their 
confidence that J awoyn views were, in the main, favourable to their proposals. This 
was shown by their willingness to facilitate the direct expression of those views to 
the Inquiry. During discussions in the Katherine area the previous week, Leckie 
was concerned to encourage custodians to be available for the Senators' visit, and 
following the hearing, Linke claimed credit for the project team having 'organised 
(behind the scenes) the attendance' 60 of four Jawoyn on the day. The second was a 
disposition to conspiratorial interpretations of NLC and Authority behaviour. Allen 
Linke in particular seemed to have a developed sense of external powers attempting 
to prevent Aborigines from freely expressing their own views, claiming on this 
occasion that those two organisations had given 'instructions that Aboriginals 
should not be present' 61 at the Senators' Coronation Hill inspection (a point denied 
by Ellis and not supported from NLC files). Linke was set on defying what he saw 
as their wish to thwart a genuine and productive engagement between the BHP 
team and the J awoyn. 
Although our developing relationship with the J awoyn people has caused 
negative reaction from the ASSPA and the NLC (via Katherine), we will 
continue to consult and work with them - it is currently anticipated that we 
will ask the ASSPA to get the Jawoyn people to reconsider their decision in 
July.62 
Linke looked back on the company's experience at Groote Eylandt as a precedent 
for all this. Appearing before the Senate Inquiry's earlier hearing in March, he 
referred to the good relations the miners were able to develop there by talking 





A Perspective on the Political History of Coronation Hill 
That was, in fact, the situation in the mid-1970s when the Land Councils 
were created and things then became very protracted. In fact, there were 
divisions created between ourselves and the traditional owners and, in the 
end, that division was broken down by the Aborigines. They just found it 
was untenable to continue to treat us the way that they had been told to do. 
(SSCNR 1986a: 256) 
The project team, especially Linke, thus made its own claim to cultural 
competence. The next major step in the team's cultivation of its relationship with 
the Jawoyn was the organisation of a visit in June by seven people to Groote 
Eylandt to allow them to see an operational mine and to display the relationship 
that BHP had achieved with the Groote Aboriginal community. As mentioned 
above, the company's experience there appeared to underpin its confidence that, 
left to its own resources, it could reach a genuine and mutually acceptable accord 
with the J awoyn. The miners were therefore happy to take every opportunity to use 
the Groote precedent to impress their good intentions upon significant J awoyn 
decision-makers, and proposed further trips to the island in the future for those 
unable to join the first one. 
In the last week of June 1986, Rush and Leckie pursued a broad and relatively 
indiscriminate liaison effort among people in the Katherine region. They discussed 
photographs of the Christmas Creek paintings with people who had been with them 
to the site, had general life-history conversations with individuals at Barunga, the 
Katherine Gorge camp and a Katherine old people's home, and socialised with 
custodians gathered for a barbeque at the Low Level Reserve. But just as the 
project team drew reassurance from such interactions with the Jawoyn that its 
familiarisation campaign was proceeding positively and causing none of the 
offence claimed by its critics, so others drew the opposite conclusion from their 
own liaisons. In early May, discussing the BHP team's past and proposed trips with 
four senior men, Cooper told them that, contrary to their understanding, the trips 
were not approved by the Authority and NLC. He reported them angry at the 
dishonesty of the BHP officers who they said had made that claim (which the 
project team later denied). They agreed not to participate in the forthcoming trip, 
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and arranged to visit the same area, Dinner Creek, with Cooper instead, the 
following week. At this point, the Authority was intervening directly to undo the 
project team's arrangements and forestall its further liaison plans. 
The challenge from Arndt 
As I have shown, the project team's approach to the Coronation Hill issue 
following the site registration was based upon two things. Firstly, it accepted the 
notion of an authoritative Aboriginal centre, implicitly conceived as an endogenous 
discourse carried primarily by a set of senior people of the Katherine region 
concerning matters of sacredness in the upper South Alligator valley. Secondly, it 
was confident that direct engagement with Aboriginal people interested in the area 
and specifically with those seniors would create a climate of relations, both 
between individuals and between community - and company, in which the 
development of Coronation Hill would be accommodated within the terms of that 
endogenous discourse of sacredness. 
The Proposed Strategy formulated in March had contemplated putting the question 
of further development to the J awoyn only after some months of informal 
discussions had sufficiently advanced the process of providing information, 
developing personal familiarity and encouraging confidence in the intentions and 
goodwill of the company. It is not clear whether the miners' decision to raise the 
issue at the end of June arose from their judgment that such a point had now been 
reached, or, as Ellis charged, that the NT Minister for Mines and Energy had 
pressed BHP to push the matter forward. In any event, as described in chapter 3, a 
small meeting of senior custodians and women on site reconsidered the issue for 
the first time since the refusal of 6 March, but decided to refer the matter to a 
general J awoyn meeting at Barunga. The decision of that meeting on 1 July was 
accepted by the Sites Authority as grounds for a qualified authorisation to resume 
the drilling program. 
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However, probably anticipating that the 1 July meeting would reject development, 
conservative political circles in the NT had by then organised a challenge to the 
registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex. When on 4 July another 
Jawoyn meeting did reject development, the challenge was publicly launched. Its 
significance for this discussion is that it explicitly located the authoritative centre 
on questions of sacredness outside the current J awoyn custodians, and in the work 
of the amateur ethnographer, Walter Arndt. The four individuals associated with 
this challenge were disparately placed in an institutional sense. Barry Coulter, 
Minister for Mines and Energy in the conservative Country Liberal Party 
government, gave the challenge official standing by comm1ss1omng an 
anthropological report into the circumstances surrounding the registration of 
Coronation Hill (see chapter 3). He hired Stephen Davis, a Darwin consultant who 
operated outside the existing professional anthropological network, and who had 
developed somewhat idiosyncratic understandings of Aboriginal territoriality from 
experience in north-east Arnhem Land. His consultancy firm offered the NT 
Government and developers in the Territory a source of information regarding 
Aboriginal responsibility for sites that was independent of the Land Councils or the 
Sites Authority, and assistance in negotiating Aboriginal consent to proposed 
projects. Joe Fisher was a mining consultant well known for his views in favour of 
the mining industry, Territory development generally and the removal of 
Commonwealth authority in the Alligator Rivers region. His newspaper article 
denying the sacredness of Coronation Hill (Fisher 1986a) was used by Coulter as 
public justification for instigating the Davis inquiry, although Fisher had taken 
Davis into Gimbat to the Sleisbeck site eleven days earlier in preparation. Frank 
Alcorta was an NT News journalist and editorialist who maintained a stridently pro-
development position against what he saw as the imposition of southern 
environmental and social engineering ideologies. His populism was directed at 
those, such as Ellis, he accused of being intent on preventing working families from 
building a future from the opportunities available in the Territory. Of these four, 
Fisher and Davis provided historical argument to challenge the propriety of the 
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Authority's site registration. 
Joe Fisher had managed most of the small uranium mines in the upper South 
Alligator valley in the 1950s and 60s, and sat in the NT Legislative Council from 
1961 to 197 4. 63 In the land rights era of the 1980s, he retained his perspectives 
from that earlier time. He defended not only the legacy of that decade of mining in 
that region, but asserted the claims of mining in general as a legitimate and 
desirable land use. In terms considered enlightened when he first made the 
arguments in the early 1960s, he continued to propose that Aboriginal and 
environmental concerns could be adequately provided for as residual interests. His 
writings and public statements (Fisher 1986a, 1986b, 1988: 6-7; SSCNR 1986b: 
1070-84 and see chapter 2) recounted his early efforts to gain official protection for 
some Aboriginal art sites and to have a Park established, still advocating that earlier 
conception of what effective protection would entail in those domains: small, · 
fenceable areas of relic heritage value or contemporary Aboriginal concern, and 
demarcation of limited, scenically attractive zones of escarpment and wetland for 
public enjoyment. He rejected the notion of a Kakadu National Park planned 
around the ecological rationale of catchment protection for the South Alligator 
River if such an area was to be set apart from n1ultiple land use. Participating in a 
parochial Territorian politics that had long resented southern domination and 
interference, he saw the Park's staged expansion as an exercise in Commonwealth 
bureaucratic empire building to the criminal neglect of the potential for mineral 
exploration. Similarly, for Fisher, registration of an Upper South Alligator Bula 
Complex of some 250 square kms offended any reasonable and common-sense idea 
of sacred site protection, endangered public tolerance for site protection in general, 
and represented another instance of ideologically driven land alienation to the 
detriment of the Territory's development prospects. 
63 The Legislative Council provided Territorians with a very limited degree of representative 
democracy from 1947 until the formation of a Legislative Assembly in 1974 (Powell 1982: 229-31). 
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These were the perspectives of a man who had been a mid-twentieth century 
coloniser in the personal sense of having devoted his working life, including years 
of bush work, to uncovering a particular set of valuables in the landscape and 
bringing them into the reach of the commercial economy, and promoting an 
appreciation of such uses as the dominant political mode of evaluating landscape. 
His career made a direct connection between the personal experience of discovery 
and extraction and public legitimation of the industrial pioneering of country. That 
personal colonising experience more particularly informed his attack on the 
registration of Coronation Hill as part of a sacred site. Essential to that attack was a 
denial of any current authoritative Aboriginal centre on the subject of sacredness in 
the upper South Alligator valley. He argued that loss of knowledge rendered the 
present custodians unable to substantiate their status, and referred to them instead 
as the 'descendants of the custodians' (pers comm). Moreover, he gave only 
conditional acknowledgement to the previous generation. He reported that, during 
the years that he worked in Gimbat, he found neither knowledge nor interest on the 
part of local Aborigines in the art and burial sites located during exploration, and 
no concern about the mining then under way at Coronation Hill itself. Among the 
wider J awoyn group, he allowed that senior custodians then retained knowledge of 
the Bula cult, but asserted that none knew of the whereabouts of the cult's physical 
centre, which he conceived of as the one true Bula ceremonial place, near 
Sleisbeck, thirty kilometres away from Coronation Hill (Fisher 1986a). In 
conversation with me, he acknowledged that some of these older people may have 
known its location, but he recalled no Aboriginal visits to the site during his time in 
the valley. 
Presuming a continued personal right of access, he guided Davis to the registered 
site near Sleisbeck at the beginning of Davis' consultancy work, without reference 
to the Authority or the custodians. Such actions are often legitimised by white 
Territorians of long local experience by reference to their own record of discovery, 
knowledge and use of places. That experience stands for them as foundation for the 
privileged first knowledge of the pioneer, and against the claims to authority 
174 
The Aboriginal Centre: Access, Deference and Denial 
implied by more recent layers of distant and depersonalised administrative control 
over land access. The extent to which Fisher internalised his status as the 'first 
knower', so to speak, of Gimbat sites, is revealed by his conviction that 
contemporary investigators would not be able to find what he had found. He 
claimed that two anthropologists and a group of Aborigines he had met researching 
the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim in about 1980 had been unable to locate 
the Sleisbeck site. 64 
When I met this party returning from the "Sleisbeck" area I was asked if I 
knew of significant sites in that area and from the information given I 
presumed that they were searching for the site of "Bulla". 
Though I knew the location I had no intention of divulging its whereabouts. 
If the Aboriginal elders did not know the site then it could not have the 
significance that it has now assumed. (Fisher 1986b: 8) 
He also believed that a map, showing sacred sites in Gimbat registered by the 
Authority including Sleisbeck, was compiled by copying sites from a map he had 
submitted to the NT Welfare Branch in the 1950s which had been deposited in the 
archives (Davis 1986b: 12; Fisher pers comm), rather than from information 
independently acquired from the Authority's own extensive field research 
programs. 
On the meaning of the Sleisbeck site, Fisher (1986b: 2-3) argued, real authority lay 
in the writings of the dedicated, unpaid, amateur anthropologist Walter Arndt. 
Arndt' s first paper (1962) identified six sites, two near Sleisbeck, one to the north 
on Gimbat Creek, and three in the upper South Alligator valley in the catchment of 
a small tributary. While Arndt attributed significance to five of these only for the 
mythological content of their paintings, he described the main Sleisbeck site, 
physically larger and more elaborate, as a ceremonial and initiation centre, .and 
composed in part of features created by the main creation figure as he crawled, sick 
64 In fact that site had been visited on a previous field trip and they were not then going there 
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and crippled, to his underground resting place. His findings relied on a combination 
of two sources of knowledge available in the 1950s. The first was the local 
knowledge of the uranium miners, who had come upon many Aboriginal painting 
sites in the course of their prospecting and develop1nent work. Fisher himself 
guided Arndt to the sites in the upper South Alligator valley, and an employee of 
another company showed him the Sleisbeck site. The second source was cultural 
information preserved among Aborigines of the Katherine area to whom Arndt 
showed photographs of the rock paintings. Fisher considered that, 
Mr. Arndt was a professional, he had a degree in Agricultural Science and 
his expertise in anthropology developed from field experience and his 
rapport with the Aboriginal people. 
Mr. Arndt was not paid for this work, he was not polarised and the only axe 
he had to grind was his interest in anthropology. In my opinion he was a 
true professional who made a significant contribution to our knowledge of 
Aboriginal culture, and it is distressing that his professional standing as 
anthroplogist [sic] has been questioned by those who should know better. 
(1986b: 3) 
Davis took this effort to re-locate ethnographic authority over Gimbat one step 
further. Like Fisher, he accepted Arndt' s work as the authoritative account of 
Aboriginal belief. He reported (Davis 1986b) that the current custodians recognised 
photos published by Arndt of the physical site features and associated them with 
the most important Bula site, but did not know the location of that site near 
Sleisbeck and had been led to believe that those features were located on 
Coronation Hill. Davis recounted that when he revealed to them that the photos 
were taken of the Sleisbeck site, they acknowledged their 'mistake' and retracted 
their concerns over drilling at Coronation Hill. They subsequently accompanied 
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Upon seeing the stone pathway the men confirmed that this was indeed the 
site they had been looking for and had assumed was at Coronation Hill . ... 
Upon reaching the overhang the men exclaimed their confirmation of this as 
the critical Bula site which they had assumed was at Coronation Hill. 
(Davis 1986b: 6) 
My purpose in citing this is not to give credence to Davis' assertions,65 but to 
illustrate the full extent of his intervention. Having joined with Fisher in relocating 
authority outside the custodians, he now sought to install Arndt' s account of the 
sacred geography of the area as authoritative among the custodians. Here Davis 
purports to guide them to the one true path, literally and metaphorically, to 
knowledge of the centre of the Bula cult as established by Arndt. In part, this was 
critical to the strategic intent of his consultancy. By introducing senior Jawoyn to 
the one true Bula site and thereby restoring correct doctrine to their minds, he 
sought to relieve them of any concern over development works at Coronation Hill. . 
As well, however, he suggested to them that the conditions were now established 
from which they could resume their custodial responsibilities for Bula. Davis 
thereby inserted Arndt and himself as links in the transmission of knowledge and 
custodianship. 
Coulter and Alcorta were thus able to argue their case against the site registration 
from the local testimony supplied by Fisher and Davis. The direct access that Davis 
had to the current custodians was yet another line of liaison over Coronation Hill 
alongside those already established by the Authority and the project team, but it 
was informed by an entirely contrary political ethic. Rather than seeking access to 
an authoritative Aboriginal centre from a formal position of deference, his liaison 
was more activist, aiming to lift the attention of the custodians away from 
65 Davis' report was given detailed rebuttal by officers of the Authority and was ultimately 
unsuccessful in challenging the registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex ( though, as 
indicated below, it had significant indirect implications for the Authority). The particular errors 
involved in the point under discussion were his claims that the custodians had believed, even up to 
the time of his consultancy, that the features of the Sleisbeck site were present at Coronation Hill (see Levitus 1990: 33-34), and that none of them had visited the Sleisbeck site before. Barraway, at 
least, certainly had. 
177 
A Perspective on the Political History of Coronation Hill 
Coronation Hill and re-focus it around the place documented by Arndt. In the terms 
of my earlier chapters, Davis' activism was evident in his arrogating the choice of 
text for the theatre he was planning for Sleisbeck. On the day before the trip, he 












"What do you reckon, when they registered that or made that 
sacred site to start off with, do you reckon they may have 
made a mistake about that one, Sacred Sites (A.S.S.A.)?" 
"They got to clean him up." 
"They got to clean him up ... Coronation Hill?" 
"They need to clean him up from old time." 
"They need to clean up from that old mining operation. How 
do you feel about that? You're not sure how you feel, you 
reckon you'll feel better about mining operation if you can 
go down and see this other place, see this big place, this 
proper Bula one." 
"That one (Sleisbeck) no one cut." 
"Nobody is to touch that one. Will you feel better about this 
Coronation Hill when you know really then where that 
proper Bula is?" 
"We know that one. It's a long ... " 
"It's a long way from Coronation Hill. That's right it is. 
That's why it's alright to go ahead with Coronation Hill 
because this other proper Bula is a long way away?" 
"It's a long way." 
"Alright, well." (Davis 1986a: 6) 
The Davis report further questioned the ethics and professionalism shown by 
officers of the Sacred Sites Authority in registering both Coronation Hill and Big 
Sunday as part of a sacred site. These allegations were used by Ministers in the NT 
Government to establish an inquiry into all aspects of site protection laws and 
procedures, announced in August 1986. The conservative challenge thus went 
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beyond the registration of Coronation Hill to place the overall regime of site 
protection under review. The BHP project team was already aware from its own 
research of the existence of ethnography, including Arndt's, that did not attribute 
sacredness to Coronation Hill, and of local white memory that adamantly denied it, 
mostly from sources consulted amongst the preceding Aboriginal generation. Peter 
Rush had also been told by Davis, a month before his consultancy project, that 
Davis' inquiries around Katherine had revealed that Arndt' s informant, Soupy 
Marapunya, had died without passing on his exclusive knowledge of the Bula cult, 
and Nipper Brown had forgotten his early ceremonial experience of it. This culture-
loss perspective, however, was now being asserted as a truth that informed 
powerful political moves to overturn the regime that had stymied development at 
Coronation Hill. 
Still, the company stood on the sidelines. The BHP project team had pursued its · 
liaison efforts during the first half of 1986 in the expectation that the Coronation 
Hill project would ultimately proceed with Aboriginal approval. Regardless of what 
it thought of the ethnographic basis of the Authority's site registration, the team set 
out to meet the formal authorisation requirements that flowed from that 
registration. Regardless of what it could ascertain of Aboriginal knowledge and 
concern with respect to the upper South Alligator valley and Coronation Hill, the 
team deferred to the presumption that underlay the Authority's involvement in the 
issue, that an authoritative Aboriginal centre on these matters existed and was 
represented in the persons of the senior J awoyn custodians. This was a strategic 
decision by the project team, and it was adhered to against those countervailing 
indications that they accumulated from anthropological and oral historical sources 
such as Arndt, Chaloupka, Fisher, Callanan and Pietsch. 
When Alcorta (1986) wrote a front-page newspaper article in June claiming that 
BHP was abandoning Coronation Hill out of frustration over negotiations with 
Aborigines, and the NT News followed vrith an editorial tirade against the site 
registration entitled 'Stop this madness', senior company executives denied the 
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report and Leckie told NLC officers that the company had been 'acutely 
embarrassed' 66 by the publicity. The NT News attacked BHP's reticence to join a 
campaign against the Aboriginal industry as locally represented in the Sites 
Authority (Ellis 1994: 103). Only once, after the reversal of the meeting of 4 July, 
did the company make adverse public comment. BHP Minerals General Manager 
Rod Harden issued a press statement criticising the legislation that allowed the 
Authority and the NLC to intervene without accountability or recourse for 
disadvantaged parties. He specifically targetted what the company perceived to be a 
strategically motivated misuse of the Authority's legislation: 
We are concerned that the NT Government legislation apparently allows the 
Aboriginal Sacred Site Protection Authority (NT) to take on a role similar 
to the NLC by helping advance Aboriginal claims on lands which are not 
eligible for claim under the Land Rights Act. It also appears that the 
legislation is being used as leverage to negotiate formal agreements for 
access and conditions of development as though, as in the case of 
Coronation Hill, the land concerned were Aboriginal land. 67 
However, after emerging from a subsequent Authority meeting of 11 July with its 
development authorisation confirmed, the company did not pursue the matter. 
Following resumption of its work at Coronation Hill in August, the project team 
adhered to existing Authority procedures for the authorisation of further 
development work later in the year (see chapter 4). The NT Government's inquiry 
led initially to a proposed weakening of the sites legislation, but the superior force 
of the Commonwealth Land Rights Act caused policy-makers ultimately to 
negotiate a revamped and in some respects strengthened statutory regime of sacred 
site protection that was introduced in 1989 (Ritchie 1996: 214). The push described 
here thus failed to dislodge the presumption of an authoritative Aboriginal centre 
that underlay the existing legislation, and the procedural reliance upon 
66 Record of Conversation, June 17, 1986, NLC Office, Katherine, Aboriginal Areas Protection 
Authority fi les. For a more detailed account of the media activity surrounding the Davis report, see 
(Maddock 1987: 126-30). 
67 Rod Harden, nd, Statement by BHP Minerals General Manager, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence 
and Reports. 
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contemporary Aboriginal testimony that followed from that presumption in 
management of the Coronation Hill issue. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has concentrated on the early stages of the Coronation Hill issue to 
mid-1986, and has shown how the senior Jawoyn, being the 'custodians' under the 
sites legislation, were thereby installed into a position structurally central to 
administrative and political processes. The external agencies with an interest in the 
issue responded to that centrality in diverse ways, and the character of those 
responses in tum determined the public politics of issue management that followed. · 
Most importantly, every . external agency sought direct access to custodian 
testimony "in theatres of their own design, and the preservation of the authoritative 
Aboriginal centre against conservative challenge ensured the continuation of such 
multiple and competing liaison relationships. Theatres thus remained an essential 
instrument of issue management, informing both the formal site protection 
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In the previous chapter I considered the contest that developed between agencies 
involved in the management of the Coronation Hill issue over direct access to 
Aboriginal custodians and the discourse of sacredness of which they were 
understood to be the bearers, competing claims to cross-cultural competence in 
communicating with them, and the unsuccessful conservative challenge to the 
underlying presumption of an authoritative Aboriginal centre. Here I will consider 
the outcomes of the communication that the Authority and the project team 
maintained with the J awoyn, especially the senior custodians. The focus here is not 
on the texts produced by the custodians, but on what various interlocutors believed 
they were being told by the J awoyn. The first section looks at the Authority's 
approach to the consultations process as practised and justified by Ellis, and at the 
project team's disaffection with it. I will show that inconsistent interpretations of 
Aboriginal wishes emerged even from those formal consultation events such as 
those discussed in Part 2 at which officers of both agencies were present. Emerging 
as they did from such simultaneous experience, these inconsistencies not only 
expressed with greatest immediacy the competing claims to understand Aboriginal 
action, but implicitly referred back to what each agency thought it had 
independently found out about the status of Coronation Hill as a sacred site. 
I will then look at outcomes from two · other fields of interaction with the J awoyn. 
One of these is the program of informal liaison, which covered a diversity of 
dealings, that the project team sustained in the Katherine region and the upper 
South Alligator valley. This suggests an understanding of the team's disaffection 
with the development approvals process by reference to the signs of unqualified 
consent that it noted elsewhere from the J awoyn. The other is the site 
documentation program across Gimbat and neighbouring areas to which David 
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Cooper of the Sites Authority, and some other researchers, devoted a number of 
field periods. It addresses the dissenting perspective that Cooper sought to 
articulate from within the Authority, informed by the readings from the script of 
religious power and danger that he recorded. 
The contest over development approvals 
The Jawoyn meeting of 1 July, mentioned in chapter 3, produced the first of what 
became a sequence of development approvals. Under consideration was Area 1 on 
Map 6, which had been extensively disturbed by drilling benches, tracks and an 
open-cut pit during the earlier era of uranium mining (see Plate). The meeting 
seems to have been a poorly structured affair, concluded by no formal resolution or 
summing up. Both the BHP officers and Cooper had to inquire as to its outcome as 
the meeting broke up. They were told it had agreed that the drilling program could 
be resumed provided that it remained within the area already disturbed by mining, 
and that this work was to be monitored by a Jawoyn representative on site. For 
David Cooper, who had researched the site registration report, this was a strategic 
retreat by the J awoyn. Upon being told the decision, he 
questioned a number of individuals to see how they felt. No one was happy 
about the decision and most qualified their replies by stipulating that they 
only agreed to drilling in the area that was already desecrated and that a 
custodian would be present to make sure they didn't go further. Comments 
also expressed a feeling that the decision would relieve the humbug and 
pressure that had been placed upon the J awoyn. Willie Martin explained to 
me that the men had discussed ways of dealing with retribution for allowing 
the site to be further desecrated and it was suggested that somebody had 
volunteered to take any consequences (later I found out this was Larry Ah 
Lin). 68 
68 D. Cooper, nd, File Note: Meeting Organised by BHP Barunga 1st July, 1986 Re: Coronation Hill, 
Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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The BHP officers simply recorded Ah Lin's advice that 'the people were happy 
with us to proceed' .69 They presumably saw this, finally, as the outcome to which 
all of their liaison efforts over the preceding months had been trending, and at 
which they had very nearly arrived during the site visit two days before (see chapter 
4). The Authority, acting on Cooper's account of the meeting and on the absence as 
yet of any comprehensive plan for the project, granted authorisation for the drilling 
program to proceed in Area 1 subject to the continuous presence and approval of a 
senior custodian. In response, the BHP team pointed out to Ellis 'several matters in 
your letter which are at variance with the decisions reached at the 1 July meeting at 
Barunga'. 70 Rush accepted that further consultation was necessary for development 
work outside Area 1, but insisted that the meeting had given approval for all works 
inside Area 1 including the development of a mine, and that the J awoyn observer 
was to satisfy himself only that work did not extend outside that area for the time 
being. 
As in all these disagreements, the BHP team could only protest. For Ellis and the 
Authority, Coronation Hill had to be treated as an exercise in guided negotiation. 
That approach called for a graduated sequence of consultations, overseen by the 
Authority, about successive stages of exploration and mine and infrastructure 
development. In the wake of criticism of the incremental approvals granted by the 
Authority in the years 1986-87, Ellis (1994: 86-90) later offered an explanation and 
defence of this approach. Had the Coronation Hill project been presented in its 
entirety at a single consultation, assuming that project planning was sufficiently 
advanced to do so, it would have outstripped the capacity of the Aboriginal 
community to assimilate change. 'Such a process', Ellis argued, 'offered neither 
procedural f aimess to the proponent, nor opportunity for informed judgment by the 
custodians' (1994: 87). Staged consultation would ensure that each decision by the 
custodians was properly informed, and that each new proposal could be put against 
69 P.M.Rush, 17.6.86, Note to File: Notes On the 1st July, 1986 Meeting at Barunga, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Reports. 
70 P.M.Rush, 9.7.86, Letter to R.W.Ellis, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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a background of works already understood and approved. Mutual understanding 
and exchange might allow modifications to the project that were desirable to the 
custodians. Ellis believed that damage to a location could be intellectually 
accommodated, and that giving the project team opportunity to broach the benefits 
that the Jawoyn might realise from the project as it advanced was to do no more 
than allow an appeal to Aboriginal notions of reciprocity and acknowledge the 
dynamic character of the evaluation and management . of sites by custodians. 
Finally, the whole process might facilitate a positive relationship that offered other 
future benefits. Ultimately, Ellis affirmed his underlying conception of the 
custodians as bearers of authority and responsibility, continually concerned and 
involved in a matter of ongoing land management. 
In accord with this orientation, Ellis' management of the consultation program 
emphasised careful communication of the full extent of all proposed work and · 
cautious interpretation of J awoyn responses, especially those of the senior 
custodians. Thus, following the next development consultation of October 1986, at 
which proposals to extend exploration and testing outside the previously disturbed 
area were presented and, in the view of the BHP team, fully approved, Ellis 
withheld permission for upgrading an access track connecting the ore deposit on 
the north-east face with proposed infrastructure developments in the back valley 
(Map 7) because he was not satisfied that the Jawoyn in attendance had fully 
understood that aspect of the intended work. He wrote to Rush that Ray F ordimail 
had agreed a further inspection was warranted. While the BHP team had to defer to 
Ellis' judgments on these events, their own continued direct access to the J awoyn 
left them sceptical of the need for such caution and· concern. In the case of the last 
instance, when Rush visited Fordimail at Barunga and explained the work 
requested, he noted that Fordimail 'said that should be alright!' .71 
71 P.M.Rush, 16.11.86, Note to File: Meetings With Various Aborigines 13-14th November, 1986, 
BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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The contrasting interpretations of J awoyn behaviour to which officers from each 
organisation were inclined were demonstrated again at the development 
consultation of 3-4 June 1987. The site inspection and meeting over those two days 
was the first major community consultation for development approvals since the 
trip of October 1986. Pursuant to Rush's concern to be able to assure the 
Government of the consent of all relevant Aborigines, three minibuses and other 
vehicles brought about thirty people who, with the J awoyn project employees, 
inspected proposed work areas at the mine site and in the back valley. During a 
lengthy discussion at the men's meeting the following day, the whites in attendance 
were, contrary to usual practice, not requested to leave even when two speakers 
addressed the gathering about Bula. Rush noted that 'this was the first time that 
CHJV staff had been allowed to remain whilst these matters were discussed'. 72 
Project team officers recorded that all proposals were approved with the exception 
of blasting for bulk sampling. Peter J atbula disapproved of the use of explosives 
and Raymond F ordimail deferred the matter to a forthcoming J awoyn Association 
meeting. Leckie' s site report for that fortnight commented: 
The visit was very successful and the J awoyn are becoming more relaxed in 
our relationship. 73 
Ellis, however, had doubts. He and Cooper arrived independently with J atbula and 
several other J awoyn and camped with them on the river rather than at the El 
Sherana accommodation provided by the project team. During the site inspection 
he expressed reservations about the behaviour of a number of senior custodians, 
and wondered if their absence or reticence should be interpreted as disquiet about 
the proposed developments. 
Bob Ellis tried to attach significance (related to their concerns about CH) to 
the fact that Sandy ·was not at the meeting, Frank did not want women to go 
72 P.M.Rush, 9.6 .87, Note to File, Subject: Aboriginal Community On-Site Meeting, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Reports. 
73 D.Carville and J.F.Leckie, 9.6. 87, Coronation Hill Joint Venture Fortnightly Report to 5/6/87. 
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up on CH, that Peter was camped with them and that he thought Nipper did 
not want to come to the meeting. The writer said that he was placing undue 
significance on these matters and that they could be explained by other 
reasons.
74 
The Authority gave permission for all works approved by the formal gathering held 
the next day, except for drilling on the north flats between the hill and the river that 
was intended to verify the north-western limit of the deposit. Ellis expressed 
uncertainty as to 'whether the full impact of this proposal was understood or that 
clear approval was stated' .75 Leckie responded impatiently. He recalled how he had 
clearly and repeatedly enunciated the request during the site inspection, and argued 
that the project team should pressure Ellis for permission, rather than allow him 'to 
continu_e his prevarication as he has in the past'. 76 When Hewitt pointed out the 
detail with which this intended drilling had been explained both on site and at the 
El Sherana meeting, Ellis responded in terms that suggested he was not entirely · 
happy with any of the approvals that had been recorded at that meeting. 
The manner in which people sought to avoid final resolution of issues was a 
clear sign that they were discomforted. In traditional behaviour, it is good 
manners to not refuse a request but to change the subject and avoid further 
reference to the request - it still implies a "no". It was, in fact, quite rude 
and illmannered of me to insist on "decisions" favourable to your other 
requests when confronted with the behaviour we observed.77 
With respect to both the site inspection and the meeting the next day, then, the 
project team and Ellis disagreed. What appeared to He\vitt, Leckie and Rush as a 
transparent and effective process of consultation leading to unqualified informed 
consent, was for Ellis _a matter of reservation and doubt based on his claim of more 
74 P .M.Rush, 9 .6.87, Note to File, Subject: Aboriginal Community On-Site Meeting, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Reports. 
75 R.W.Ellis 5.6.87, Letter to W. .Hewitt, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
76 F.Leckie, 17.6.87, Mem·orandum to B.Hewitt, Aboriginal Affairs, BHP ewcrest Correspondence 
and Reports. 
77 R. vV.Ellis, 30.6.87, Letter to W.V.Hewitt, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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subtle, culturally infonned observation. In this, he echoed the tone of Cooper's 
reservations about the approval given by the meeting of 1 July 1986. 
Indeed, while Ellis had always emphasised gradualism, he now seemed to have a 
heightened sense of the issue of development at Coronation Hill as a matter of the 
carefully timed management of J awoyn apprehension. This arose presumably from 
the new stages of work now being broached, involving the extension of exploration 
and testing more widely around the project area and away from the hill itself (Map 
7), and a higher level of disturbance associated with the proposed use of explosives 
at the mine site. With respect to the extension of the miners' activities, the 
Authority acted on the principle that everything required approval, that 
authorisation for a given level of disturbance at one location within the registered 
site did not provide precedent for similar or even lesser disturbance at another 
location. Thus, in February, the Authority had granted permission for flora and 
fauna studies, necessary for the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, 
to proceed within the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex provided that 
'environmental disturbance, particularly the breaking of rocks, be avoided at all 
costs' .78 At the time this stricture was imposed, the project team had, with 
authorisation, drilled 28 holes into Coronation Hill. All research and experience to 
date indicated to the team that Aboriginal concerns were focussed on particularities 
in the valley landscape, but the Authority's own work suggested a model of diffuse 
mythological danger varying in degree across large areas, in none of which could a 
presumption of free space be safely made. 
Explosives raised the complementary problem of intensified disturbance. After the 
inspection of 3 June, Ellis, Cooper and the project team had discussions in the site 
office. According to Rush, Ellis correctly anticipated that the only current proposal 
that might not be approved at the next day's meeting would be blasting. The project 
team soon after agreed to delay pursuing that approval. Now moreover, Ellis' letter 
78 D .Ritchie, 25.2.87, Letter to BHP, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files . 
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to Hewitt of 30 June referred to anxieties felt by custodians after a recent earth 
tremor79 that they associated with Bula. He suggested that the option of siting an 
accommodation camp near the escarpment north-west of Coronation Hill should be 
abandoned, presumably on the understanding that the escarpment zone tended to be 
more sensitive, and that for the time being work programs be 'restricted to essential 
studies'80 and no further discussion of drilling or excavation be sought. 
Informal liaison and the theatrical frame 
.The development consultations discussed so far in this chapter were analysed as 
theatres in Part 2, as were some other significant organised consultation events. In 
chapter 6, however, I began dealing with a wider range of interactions that the 
project team sustained with the Jawoyn, and now need to consider the significance 
of these for infonning the team's perceptions of the Jawoyn and their views, in 
other words, for filling out and contextualising their efforts to securely engage with 
the Aboriginal centre. 
To consider these liaison efforts in terms commensurable with what has been said 
so far, I ask here how well, or how usefully, they might be included in the theatrical 
metaphor. Ellis' distinction between informal liaison that aimed to enhance 
personal familiarisation and provide information to the J awoyn on secular aspects 
of the Coronation Hill project; and liaison that framed senior J awoyn in the role of 
custodians and sought responses from them in that capacity regarding the values of 
place in the upper South Alligator valley, is pertinent here. It is only the latter 
instances of liaison that are relevantly considered as theatres for the purpose of 
interpreting J awoyn performance with respect to the status of Coronation Hill. 
79 This was probably the tremor that occurred on 17 June, centred in the Banda Sea about 600 kms 
north of Darwin. It registered an intensity of 3 in the Katherine area and, ironically, an intensity of 0 
in Gimbat. Thanks to Kevin McCue of the Australian Seismological Centre. 
80 R.W.Ellis, 30.6.87, Letter to W.V.Hevritt, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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A further distinction might be made in terms of brevity of interactions. Plainly the 
concept of theatricality is most suitable for the elaborate and often drawn-out 
occasions that I used to establish the metaphor in Part 2. At the other extreme were 
a range of more momentary dealings between various external agents and Jawoyn 
custodians, often for the purpose of arranging those more substantial consultation 
events. What were, from the points of view of the BHP team, Cooper and others, 
exercises pursued to a purpose, the custodians must have experienced as random 
hits in the form · of chance encounters on town sidewalks or vehicles unexpectedly 
pulling up on the edge of their camps. In these scenarios of one-on-one 
conversation, there was no space and no call for consideration and judgment about 
theatrical context and appropriate script, but the greater immediacy of propositions 
being put and answers required. On the face of things, custodians' statements are 
often amenable to explanation in terms of the familiar 'saying what they thought 
people wanted to hear' syndrome (Harris 1987: 2), and thus not appropriately 
interpreted as a considered and contextualised choice of text. A notion such as 
Goffman' s 'participation framework' (1981: 13 7) might be useful for setting apart 
these interactions as discrete intervals in the run of daily affairs that otherwise 
engaged the participants, but the data do not warrant an analysis of such 
frameworks in terms similar to my analyses of theatres. 
So not all liaison exercises are properly or usefully considered as theatres, but I do 
not want to propose any clear dividing line, either with respect to Ellis' distinction, 
or brevity. My point here is only that it is a question of circumstance as to whether 
J awoyn responses on any particular occasion should be made to bear much 
analytical weight. The liaison carried out by the project team in the week before the 
development consultation of early June 1987 is one instance that can be considered 
in theatrical terms, both because it included a field trip that was more than a 
momentary interaction, and because it recorded a number of unelicited comments 
from senior Jawoyn (see end of chapter 4) that were plainly not a rote function of 
what they thought the project team wanted to hear. In that week, Rush visited a 
number of J awoyn camps to encourage people to attend the meeting, and took four 
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senior J awoyn to El Sherana and Coronation Hill. His notes, which were copied to 
Leckie, recorded requests for vehicles and inquiries concerning payment of mining 
royalties from several people, including Barraway and Brown, and concluded that 
in general, 'there was no indication of any problem about us mining at CH'.81 The 
following week, Leckie himself wrote an account of the development consultation 
which he introduced with the comment that it was to consider permitting work 
within 'the alleged sacred site encompassing Coronation Hill'. 82 
Another instance followed similarly from the BHP team's encouragement of 
Jawoyn people to see what it was doing in the valley. When, after the decision of 1 
July 1986, the J awoyn Association did not nominate a custodian to monitor the 
drilling work that resumed in August, the BHP team took matters into its own 
hands and brought Nipper Brown and his wife Queenie out to the valley for an 
overnight visit. Leckie gives this account of the Friday's activities: 
They both appeared in reasonable shape about 7 .3 Oam Friday, and we had 
breakfast. Mark Gardiner took them down to the South Alligator (Flying 
Fox) crossing for a wash. The four of us left for Coronation Hill about 9am. 
At Coronation Hill we first visited the drilling rig on site CHDDHl 8 and 
watched a run. Photos were taken and the process of drilling explained to 
Nipper, who was very interested. Nipper's comment was that it was "good" 
and that he had no worries. We spent approx. ¾ hour at the site, and Nipper 
and Queenie met the driller Peter Heffernan and his offsider Gordon 
Atkinson who were both very helpful. 
The prepared areas at proposed sites 1, 2 and 9 were also inspected and 
Nipper and Queenie were both happy about future drilling there. 
We also visited the driller's pump station on the South Alligator. Nipper . 
was a bit worried that taking too much water out of the South Alligator 
might make it dry up and this would be a big worry for him. We reassured 
Nipper that we were only pumping a small amount of water and we would 
not dry up the river. Nipper was satisfied with that. 
81 P.M.Rush, 1.6.87, Note to File, Various Meetings, Aboriginal Affairs, Coronation Hill Proje'?t 
N.T. , BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
82 D.Carville and J.F.Leckie, 9.6.87, Coronation Hill Joint Venture Fortnightly Report to 5/6/87. 
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On returning to El Sherana camp we showed Nipper and Queenie the 350m 
of core we had on drums and pointed out some gold. They were pleased 
with this. 
The four of us had lunch at El Sherana at approx. midday and Mark 
Gardiner returned Nipper and Queenie first to Ah Toy's store in Pine Creek 
to collect their supplies, and then to their camp at Edith Falls where they 
arrived approx. 3pm. 
On Friday both Nipper and Queenie were very approachable and friendly. 
They were both happy about the work we were doing at Coronation Hill and 
Nipper was quite interested in the drilling process. Nipper also offered to 
tell Peter Jatbula about our work and it appeared that Nipper did not expect 
any adverse reaction from Peter. 
Nipper was paid $100 consulting fees and a box containing a small amount 
of food and tobacco was given to Nipper and Queenie when they left our 
camp. 83 
In terms of the analysis I presented in Part 2, a visit such as this could be placed in 
a theatrical frame to contribute to the analysis of the J awoyn position, but it is 
perhaps more apt here to introduce another distinction. For understanding process 
within the Coronation Hill issue, the theatrical frame is significant both inwardly, 
for its effect on what the custodians said, and also outwardly, for the conclusions 
that it led external interlocutors to draw about J awoyn wishes. 84 The point of what I 
have said so far in this section is that the performances, especially the more 
informal and impromptu ones, elicited from the senior J awoyn are not in all cases 
to be relied upon for an analytical inquiry into J awoyn motivation such as that 
essayed in Pa1i 2. That is, the inward effect of such theatres, in framing Jawoyn 
responses, often cannot be attributed much significance. Outward significance is 
more widely identifiable, however, because each such occasion provided for one or 
other external agency private verification of the perceptions that it held about the 
83 J.F.Leckie, 24 .8.86, Note to File, Aboriginal Affairs, N.T., BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and 
Reports. The project team included a photograph of their visit, showing them standing next to a 
drilling rig at Coronation Hill, in a submission to the Senate Inquiry (SSCNR 1987b: 2647). 
84 This distinction between the inward and outward effects of theatres might be re-stated as that 
between the significance of theatres as understood by me, the analyst, and as understood by the 
external agencies involved in Coronation Hill. 
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disposition of individual J awoyn towards the mining project. Episodes such as 
Brown's visit described here were of theatrical significance in that outward sense of 
providing the project team with confirmation that their activities did not offend 
custodians' sensibilities. 
Taken in terms of inward and outward effects, theatres such as this have a bearing 
upon the analysis in Part 2 in two respects. The outward effect meant that the 
external agents who registered responses of this kind from the custodians would 
then bring with them, to any of the more formal consultation events in which they 
participated, presuppositions regarding what the J awoyn really thought. These 
could then operate as a subtle scene-setting influence in those theatres. Informal 
liaison relationships might thus intensify the containing influence upon the 
custodians of the scene-act ratio. It meant also that where such formal theatres 
produced an outcome that challenged those presuppositions, there was a search for · 
secondary rationalisations to protect the presuppositions: pressure, cultural 
ineptitude, and so on. I have begun looking at some such rationalisations in this 
chapter. 
The inward effect is similarly of significance with respect to formal development 
consultations, though perhaps better described as preparatory than anticipatory. If, 
as I have suggested, the theatres of formal development consultations are 
understood as momentary public manifestations of an underlying discourse 
favouring development, then the identification by custodians with that discourse on 
each such occasion could be more readily achieved from the prepared ground of 
familiarity with the miners and their activities that was fostered on informal visits 
such as this. The description above of the visit of Brown and his wife to the project 
site is apt for the sense it gives of the personalised access that the team offered. The 
project team's accounts of these interactions present this appearance of familiarity 
and ease as uncomplicated and transparent. 
This section has addressed the significance of the project team's informal liaison 
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campaign for informing its view of J awoyn interests and concerns in the upper 
South Alligator valley. In the interests of maintaining analytical continuity, I have 
approached that task by asking to what extent the team's liaison efforts could be 
usefully conceptualised in theatrical terms. This has led to two distinctions, one 
between more substantial encounters that framed senior J awoyn in a custodial role, 
and other briefer or more secular interactions, and the other between the inward and 
outward influences of theatres. The first distinction has indicated the criteria that 
might sensibly be applied in deciding which liaison events should count as theatres 
of the kind analysed in Part 2, that were generative of texts of value for interpreting 
J awoyn responses to Coronation Hill. The second distinction is the more relevant to 
the argument of this chapter, in that it allows that any participation framework 
could have an outward effect on the project team's views, giving it reason to 
believe that the custodians consented to its activities. Not all participation 
frameworks are usefully analysed as theatres. 
Finally, however, these thoughts concerning the project team's liaison program 
bring us to a fuller understanding of the significance of theatres within the political 
process. The sequence of inward and outward effects, of scenic factors containing 
the custodians' acts, and of custodians' selection of text legitimating further steps 
in management of the issue, make theatres into moments of reciprocal influence 
between custodians and external agents. Further, that reciprocal influence explains 
how programs of informal liaison between an external agent such as the project 
team and the senior J awoyn, can intensify the relationship between different 
theatres that I identified at the end of chapter 4, the relationship of scenic similarity, 
whereby like scenes contained like acts. 
Cooper's dissent 
The development consultation of early June occurred in the middle of a period of 
fieldwork by David Cooper and a rock art consultant, Ben Gunn, aimed at 
documenting the art and mythological sites of the region across Gimbat and 
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immediately neighbouring areas affected by the presence and signs of Bula. This 
was the first major site documentation effort in the area since the trip that Cooper 
did in September 1985 which led to registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula 
Complex. This renewed program was intended to provide custodians with the 
opportunity to identify other sites they wished to have registered. Those 
registrations would install an Aboriginal legal interest at particular locations in an 
area of the upper South Alligator and Katherine River catchments over which the 
Federal Government was contemplating allowing a mineral exploration program 
(see chapter 8). Cooper's site documentation work continued over the dry seasons 
of 1987 and 1988. Apart from adding to the number of registered sites, his reports 
sought to substantiate from the testimony of custodians a concept of Sickness 
Country as a large unified sacred and dangerous area across which the sensitivity 
and powers of Bula extended, radiating from and connecting the major sites. The 
boundaries that Cooper tentatively drew marked out an area of about 3 000 sq kms 
and included a number of BHP' s tenements. Moreover, the concepts of 
mythological presence and danger that he expounded proposed an Aboriginal view 
of the region that precluded any form of mineral exploration or recovery. 
I do not have the space here in which to trace the elaboration of notions of religious 
presence and power that emerged from these documentation trips. I confine my 
discussion to the implications that Cooper's work had for the management of 
Coronation Hill. The term 'Sickness Country' is one that the BHP project team had 
already encountered from its early research in Arndt's published papers (1962: 303; 
1966: 232), and again in some text written by Cooper and contributed by the 
Authority to induction material compiled by the team for new workers at the 
Coronation Hill site. Arndt's papers need have given the project team no concern 
with respect to Coronation Hill. The first paper associated the concept of sickness 
vvith the deformed shape of the creator being following the sting of a hornet, as 
represented in rock art motifs and the features left by his final acts at the Sleisbeck 
site (Arndt 1962: 304-6). The threat of apocalyptic response to disturbance was 
attributed only to that site. The second paper suggested a more general semantic 
195 
A Perspective on the Political History of Coronation Hill 
connection between sickness and the creation era. Cooper's account for the 
induction program briefly stated the wider extent and dangers of the region 
associated with Bula but did not attribute those dangers to Coronation Hill any 
more directly than had Ellis at the time of the site registration. 
In July 1987, Ellis sent Rush an extract from a site registration report that Cooper 
had prepared for a large triangular sandstone outlier on the western side of the 
Katherine River which he called the Ngartluk-Jeywunay Site Complex. While the 
areas discussed in this extract were many kilometres south-east of Coronation Hill, 
Cooper here set out the implications of the concept of Sickness Country for mineral 
exploration in more absolute and detailed terms than the project team had yet 
encountered. Danger, he explained, is assessed by J awoyn custodians as a function 
of the level of disturbance and its distance from the important Bula sites. These 
sites would sense the large-scale use of explosives at distances of several 
kilometres. In view of the massively destructive forces that might arise, the 
custodians regarded a prohibition against mining as imperative across the entire 
region. Again there was no mention of Coronation Hill; the report itself referred 
only to the BHP tenements within the proposed registered area. Rush offered to 
discuss the matter at a convenient time. 
The time for the project team to address the results of Cooper's work arrived 
several weeks later, when another of his reports came into its hands. Entitled 
Traditional Concerns Regarding Mining Activity in the Conservation Zone of 
Kakadu Stage 3 and written by Cooper in discussion with Ellis, this report was 
intended to influence current Federal Government deliberations over resource 
management across a large portion of Gimbat and neighbouring Goodparla 
Stations, designated as Conservation Zone (see chapter 8). The report argued for 
the removal of large areas from the Conservation Zone on the grounds that they 
were a part of Sickness Country and therefore considered by J awoyn custodians as 
in need of protection from such high-level disturbance as would accompany 
mining. While BHP disputed the general argument that J awoyn concerns about 
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sacred sites in Gimbat were anywhere so extensive in nature as to imply broadscale 
proscription of mining, the company took up in most detail Cooper's comments 
about development consultations over Coronation Hill. 
Cooper's discussion of the consultation process began in terms consistent with the 
views of Ellis. He argued that while land rights and sites protection legislation in 
the NT had enhanced the position of Aboriginal custodians in protecting places of 
traditional significance and required that development be approached in a 
consultative manner, certain conditions as to time, effective communication and 
respect were required to allow custodians to genuinely exercise their rights. 
Whether they had been able to do so was a matter for culturally sensitive 
observation. 
Europeans involved in consultation witp Aboriginal people tend to 
underestimate the complexities of Aboriginal culture and frequently 
misunderstand what is being said, often in quite subtle ways. This, together 
with imposed time constraints often results in a process which gives the 
impression that proper consultation and agreement has occurred when in 
fact it has not. (Cooper 1987: 7) 
Cooper argued that the behaviour of custodians at consultation events could be 
affected by their lack of education and past experiences of control by European 
authority, and that their discomfort at such events could cause them to equivocate, 
say what they think is wanted, or avoid attending altogether, rather than honestly 
reject a proposal. He further criticised the incremental approval strategy for 
postponing an informed decision about a final mining operation until the company 
and other agencies expect it to proceed. 
Many such problems, he said, were evident in the management of the Coronation 
Hill issue. He stressed again the limited and conditional nature of the consent to 
resume exploratory drilling given on 1 July 1986, and the external political 
intervention that had · 'fuelled the anxiety and confusion which pervaded the 
atmosphere' (Cooper 1987: 9) surrounding that meeting (chapter 6). He claimed the 
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incremental approvals strategy had raised apprehension among custodians that they 
were caught in an open-ended process of cumulative concessions. Cooper argued 
that senior custodians did not understand what a mining operation would entail, 
especially with regard to the use of explosives. Even the approvals given so far 
were, he said, influenced by the personal relationships fostered by the project team 
and the employment and material assistance it had provided to the J awoyn. 
As Cooper's report had been sent to a number of Government Ministers, a senior 
BHP executive responded to some of its points. With respect to the consultation 
process, he pointed out that the incremental approvals strategy had been adopted 
under the advice of the Sites Authority to allow time for the custodians to 
assimilate a complex project, and the custodians had taken advantage of it by 
deferring their decision on so1ne matters to allow fuller discussion. With respect to 
the permission granted to resume drilling on 1 July, he noted that that outcome had 
been reviewed by the Sites Authority ten days later and their authorisation to 
proceed confirmed. 
By implication, then, BHP's rejoinder to Cooper read his criticisms as a dissent 
from the Authority's own procedures. Ellis replied in defence of Cooper's report 
without directly addressing that implication. He presented the incremental 
approvals strategy as properly advised but nevertheless problematic in its nature, 
and he acknowledged the pressures surrounding 1 July without drawing any 
inference regarding the propriety of the authorisation from the Authority that had 
followed. He concluded that 'the situation remains that BHP and this Authority 
have worked closely together and much has been achieved towards a concensus 
[sic]' .85 The point of Cooper's report, he asserted, was to propose that the 
Conservation Zone boundaries be withdrawn to the north-west, outside Sickness 
Country, and Coronation Hill was not discussed other than by way of example. 
85 R.W.Ellis, 2.11.87, Letter to Sen. G.F.Richardson, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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This exchange between BHP and Ellis further revealed that they held opposing 
conceptions of the relationship between Coronation Hill and the rest of the 
Conservation Zone. For the company, successful negotiation of Coronation Hill 
was an argument in favour of allowing it primary exploration rights in the 
Conservation Zone by demonstrating its ability to accommodate Aboriginal 
interests. Ellis, despite the general tenor of the Traditional Concerns document, 
tried to establish a sharp distinction between the two, believing that Aboriginal 
preparedness to accept mining at Coronation Hill, which the Authority's approvals 
program had fostered, did not imply any willingness to agree to an expansion of 
activity elsewhere in the Zone. He denied, 
that opposition to a regime of further and persistent exploration activity in 
the "Sickness Country" represents a going back on the negotiations over 
Coronation Hill. It does not, ( or need not). 86 
The Traditional Concerns report, he asserted, was addressed to forthcoming 
Government decisions on the Conservation Zone, and did not deal with the 'quite 
separate issue' of Coronation Hill. 
But Cooper's critique of the Coronation Hill approvals process went beyond the 
points that BHP had thought to dispute or Ellis to defend. In treating it as a 
demonstration of the problems that could be expected to arise in the event that the 
Government allowed a wider program of mineral exploration across the 
Conservation Zone, Cooper in effect did indeed dissent from the authorisations for 
development works at Coronation Hill that the Authority had given. Having made 
the point _above about culturally sensitive observation in the abstract, he repeated it 
with respect to Coronation Hill, attributing the difficulties of giving effect to 
genuine J awoyn wishes in part to 'the inability of some to "hear" or "see" what the 
J awoyn are saying in many instances and to overlook subtle messages and social 
86 R.W.Ellis, 2.11.87, Letter to Sen.G.F.Richardson, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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undertones which run counter to the overt expected responses of "yes" and "no"' 
(Cooper 1987: 11) . 
. Moreover, he claimed, the Coronation Hill issue was having social and cultural 
impacts upon the Jawoyn of a kind 'rarely witnessed outside their own 
communities' (1987: 11). These impacts, such as fear of the repercussions of 
disturbing Bula and consciousness of their custodianship being judged by other 
Aboriginal groups, manifested themselves overtly in alcohol abuse, interpersonal 
conflicts and expressions of frustration. Though the interpretation of Cooper's 
report could be disputed on matters of emphasis and choice of words, it seems clear 
that he regarded the consultation process not only as flawed in itself, but also as 
having missed those indicators evident elsewhere that most accurately revealed 
people's real feelings about Coronation Hill. In effect, then, while it had to be 
acknowledged that the custodians had formally consented to development, Cooper 
wanted to argue that they had not genuinely consented. 
After sending the Traditional Concerns report to relevant Ministers in Canberra, 
Cooper, using a model of the Conservation Zone, broadly explained its content to a 
meeting of about 25 members of the J awoyn Association on 5 October. He 
subsequently wrote (for Ellis) to the Secretary of the ongoing Senate Inquiry that 
the report had 'been adopted by the J awoyn custodians as their submission to the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in relation to the proposed reassessment of the 
boundaries of the Conservation Zone'. 87 Rush made independent inquiries to 
ascertain whether the J awoyn were aware of its contents. During discussions in the 
Katherine area on 14-15 October, he found that two prominent political figures, 
Bennett and Fordimail, believed the report ·argued only for the protection of sites 
located around the edge of the Conservation Zone. It should be said that this would 
have been an understandable misapprehension, because although the bulk of the 
report addressed the sacred values of the general area and concern over past and 
87 R.W.Ellis, 11 .11 .87, Letter to L.Rymer, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files . 
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present m1n1ng development, most of the specific recommendations related to 
exclusion from the Zone of particular areas containing sensitive sites (Cooper 1987: 
iv-v). Nevertheless, Rush's discussions could only have encouraged suspicion of 
manipulative intent on the part of Cooper. Finding once again that local opinion, 
with the exception of Jatbula's, remained generally supportive of the Coronation 
Hill project, Rush took the opportunity to encourage a number of J awoyn people to 
tell the Government and NLC directly that they wanted Coronation Hill to go 
ahead. 
Conclusion 
I argued in Part 2 that the record of Aboriginal testimony with respect to 
Coronation Hill undermines the presumption of an authoritative Aboriginal centre 
as understood by all external agencies involved; in that it does not reveal any 
consistently articulated endogenous view of the religious values of the place or of 
the mining proposal that is unitary at least as to theme if not detail. Very clear 
statements of view could be made in any one of those contexts of elicitation that I 
have treated as theatres, but the totality is so insistently contradictory that I have 
offered an interpretation of it in terms of texts generated as a function of those 
contexts. 
So far in this Part, I have looked at the salience of that presumption of an 
authoritative Aboriginal centre for the way the issue was managed and debated. In 
these two chapters I have concentrated on two satellite organisations that sought 
access to people, their knowledge, opinions and feelings, and took what they were 
given in response to be indicative of an Aboriginal disposition towards the project 
that was, for Cooper and the project team in their opposite ways, consistent and 
reliable, and for Ellis and the Authority, considered and emergent. I have shown 
that the efforts of these external agencies entailed a level of inter-organisational 
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friction that amounted to a contest for the control of those theatres in which senior 
J awoyn were framed in their custodial roles. 
The next chapter is less concerned with theat~cality and more with that external 
contest for control. It traces the means by which a third organisation, the Northern 
Land Council, transformed itself from marginal observer to central participant in 
the management of the issue, and examines the NLC's own attempts to assert 
control over theatres as a concomitant of the advisor-client relationship it 
established with the J awoyn. 
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THE RISE OF THE NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL 
· In chapters 6 and 7 I began the task of analysing the process of consultation from 
the perspective of those organisations interested in the management of the 
Coronation Hill issue. Those chapters concentrated on the Aboriginal Sacred Sites 
Protection Authority and the BHP project team, and the contest that developed 
between them over their actions towards and interpretations of the Aboriginal 
centre. In this chapter I extend the analysis to another organisation, the N orthem 
Land Council, that shared the same presumptions with respect to the status and 
integrity, though not the composition, of that centre. I trace the history of relations 
between the NLC and those two other agencies to -the end of 1987, setting out the · 
stages through which the NLC was able to transform itself from a marginal 
observer to principal representative of the Aboriginal interest. In so doing, I show 
how the Coronation Hill issue began to move beyond the possibility of negotiation 
and to become a dispute. 
The protection of Aboriginal interests in land 
In previous chapters I gave introductory accounts of the Northern Land Council 
and the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority, dealing with their respective 
Acts and functions. For the purposes of this chapter some further discussion is 
needed concerning these arrangements for the protection of Aboriginal land 
interests. One matter concerns the class of people from which each organisation 
was required to take instructions. The Land Rights Act (s.23(3)) prevents the Land 
Council from taking any action with respect to Aboriginal land unless it has the 
informed consent of the traditional owners of that land and has obtained the views 
of any other affected Aboriginal groups. Traditional owners are members of a 
group or groups, such as patrilineal clans or language groups, that fit the concept of 
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' local descent group' in the Act and occupy the appropriate relationships of 
spiritual attachment and responsibility towards sites on the land. Traditional owners 
are thus determined by reference to the mythologically sanctioned formal social 
structures that mediate relationships between people and land. These structures are 
described from anthropological research and validated by claimant testimony 
before the Aboriginal Land Commissioner in the case of Aboriginal land won 
through the land claims process. The development of anthropological 
understandings of traditional ownership of the Gimbat area was discussed in 
chapter 2. 
While, in a land claim, at least some members of the group will have to show 
knowledge of the country concerned, those lacking such knowledge retain the 
status of traditional owners by reason of their me1nbership of the relevant group. 
Structural entitlement is thus the principal determinant of traditional ownership, but 
while participation in consultations on matters of land management is therefore in 
principle open to any competent member of the owning group, those with personal 
attributes of knowledge, relevant life expe1ience, seniority or prestige will play the 
largest roles in deliberations and will be those to whom a land council has most 
resort for its instructions. 
By contrast, the category of people empowered by the sacred sites legislation is the 
'custodians' . The Authority receives requests from them for site registrations and 
records from them information regarding traditional significance, and it must 
consult them regarding requests for access to and work upon sites. A very (1993: 
123-24, 125-26) notes that the identification of custodians is not constrained by the 
principles governing traditional ownership under the Land Rights Act, and it 
therefore does not have to derive from a unified model of attachment to land, but is 
open rather to the indeterminacy of Justice Blackburn's earlier conception of 'the 
diverse circumstances in which Aboriginal people legitimately occupy land ' (Avery 
1993 : 123), articulated in the Gove Case of 1971. Avery then distinguishes between 
custodians as narrowly defined within Aboriginal society, being those with some 
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prior structural entitlement and any others 'identified with particular sacred sites ' 
on other grounds, and a broader surrounding Aboriginal public which has an 
interest in site values that is relevant where non-Aboriginal designs have a bearing 
upon those sites. He later explains how that distinction may become politically 
salient according to the object of consultation. Where the Authority seeks simply to 
ensure that a proposed land usage avoids sites, then consultation will focus on a 
s1nall number of people found among that narrow group holding custodial status 
from within, who are identifiable as senior custodians, and their decision will then 
be referred to the larger group. Where custodians are being asked to consider an 
agreement for site disturbance, both they and the Authority have to more cautiously 
ensure that negotiations encompass the concerns of others in the regional 
population with more remote custodial interests who might claim compensation 
(Avery 1993: 127-28). 
Thus, the identification of traditional owners under one Act and that of custodians 
under the other Act proceed from divergent principles. The distinction between the 
two in law indicates that the Authority is guided in its site protection role by fewer 
individuals, determined more specifically on criteria of personal capacities, than is 
the NLC which, in its broader land acquisition and management decisions, is 
referred by its Act to the membership of a category defined in group terms. For 
some purposes, the practice of consultation under both will converge on the same 
set of people. That set generally numbers no more than a few individuals, and their 
status derives from a combination of entitlement arising from knowledge, seniority 
in age and a privileged structural relationship with the place or area. 
Another matter derives from policy history. The two separate regimes have in fact a 
common origin in Federal Government land rights policy. The Land Rights Act 
provided the definition of a sacred site as, in part, 'a site that is sacred to 
Aboriginals or is otherwise of significance according to Aboriginal tradition' (s.3), 
and further created the offence of unauthorised entry onto a sacred site (s.69) . The 
Northern· Territory's own sacred sites legislation, however, originated from a 
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decision by the Federal Government not to provide for all relevant matters within 
its own land rights legislation, but to allow subsequent 'reciprocal' legislation 
(s.73) to be passed by the Northern Territory parliament, then approaching self-
government. This has been an object of criticism by Land Councils who resent the 
denial of jurisdiction over a matter they perceive as properly a part of land rights, 
and who especially mistrusted the placing of that jurisdiction in the hands of a 
Northern Territory government dominated, from self-government in 1978 until 
2001 , by an openly pro-development Country Liberal Party. Once the Authority 
became established as a presence in the land rights field, with its separate statutory 
base, the Land Councils continued to oppose the development consultations that 
Ellis regarded as central to Authority procedures, and argued that Authority 
functions should be confined to site registration (Avery, Ritchie pers comms) . 
The common policy origin of land rights and sites protection also enshrines an 
underlying difference in the nature of the land interest being recognised. A sacred 
site takes on different implications when located on land available for claim. 
Sacred sites are protected regardless of whether they are located on 
' claimable land' within the meaning of the Act. However, it is assumed in 
the Land Rights Act that the protection of sites normally will have no affect 
on land title. . .. It is only with respect to lands available for claim that 
these spiritual connections with sites may become the basis for a grant of 
land. On other land the protection of Aboriginal sacred sites, which reflect 
the interests of particular Aboriginal custodians in these places, is treated as 
an administrative interest in the land. (Ritchie 1996: 211) 
Whether the control over access and activities that passes to site custodians under 
this legislation is properly considered as merely an administrative interest is 
unsettled (Ritchie 1996: 217), but clearly the range of rights exercisable by 
Aborigines with respect to Aboriginal-owned land are of a different order than 
those exercisable with respect to registered sites on non-Aboriginal land. 
The regimes for the recognition of Aboriginal land interests administered by the 
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NLC and the Sites Authority thus contrast in significant respects. Among these are 
the extent of land involved, the Aborigines with whom they must consult, and the 
range of issues on which they are required to consult. Generally, the NLC assists in 
claiming and managing areas of land, while the Authority assists in the protection 
of particular places of religious significance, mostly of much smaller size. 
However, the Authority's charter extends across the entire Northern Territory, 
while the NLC is restricted to unalienated Crown land with respect to its land claim 
function, and Aboriginal land for its other functions (subject to an important 
exception to be discussed later). The NLC must have regard to the wishes of those 
identified as traditional owners, while the Authority consults with the site 
custodians, again a generally more limited group. The NLC must consult regarding 
the full range of land use purposes bearing upon Aboriginal land, while the 
Authority specifically manages requests for site registration from the custodians, 
and requests for site access from others. In summary, then, the laws under which 
these two authorities operate allow the registration of indigenous land interests of 
different extent and according to different criteria, and require each organisation to 
seek instructions from different categories of Aboriginal authority. All of these 
points had a bearing upon the roles of the Authority and the NLC with respect to 
Coronation Hill. 
The NLC and Coronation Hill 
After October 1985, registration of the Upper South Alligator Bula Complex 
created a legal impediment to further mineral exploration, and the Authority was 
the only agency with the power to regulate the project team's access to the deposit 
according to Aboriginal wishes. With a future land claim in mind, however, the 
Northern Land Council also maintained its interest in the area. It remained satisfied 
that the J awoyn opposed mining development at Coronation Hill and represented 
their position as such. Two NLC officers recorded statements of concern about 
works at Coronation Hill from a small group of J awoyn during a visit to the area in 
November 1985. The Senate Inquiry into the resources of the Kakadu area had by 
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then begun its work, and the first NLC submission to it in December stated J awoyn 
opposition to the mining project. In January 1986 NLC officers attending a Jawoyn 
Association meeting recorded statements asserting the dangers of mining and 
calling for talks with the company, and the following day NLC officers visiting 
Canberra expressed concern over the sacred significance of the area to the Federal 
Ministers for the Environment and for Resources and Energy. A meeting in March 
of NLC Regional Members passed a resolution supporting J awoyn opposition to 
the project. This marked the culmination of the first stage of the NLC response to 
the issue. It was a period in which NLC officers were able to maintain a role only 
. 
as observers and informal advisors to the J awoyn, in which they had no standing to 
formally oversee land use or site access, but in which their view of J awoyn interests 
and wishes with respect to the area, and specifically regarding Coronation Hill, was 
based on a consistent record of expressed anti-mining sentiment. 
During this time and in the following months, the dimensions of the relationship 
between the Authority and the NLC with respect to Coronation Hill began taking 
shape, manifested in an uneasy balance of cooperation and mutual reserve. Ellis 
wrote to the Federal Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and circulated a video about 
the region's sacred sites featuring extracts of testimony recorded from senior 
Jawoyn at the meeting of 3 February (see chapter 3). Like the NLC before, he 
sought to insert the Aboriginal interest in the proposed Kakadu Stage III area into 
the Government policy debate, and into regional land-use planning. When the BHP 
project team embarked on its campaign of informal liaison and information, 
including field trips to ascertain from the J awoyn the location and extent of sacred 
places in the upper South Alligator valley, it evoked objections from the NLC and 
the Sites Authority, both of which wanted communications contained within 
channels that allowed for proper consultation procedures and representation of 
J awoyn interests. As noted in chapter 6, Ellis insisted on the legitimate role of 
Dodson, and Dodson insisted on that of the Authority, each instructing the BHP 
project team that the other could not be by-passed in dealings with the Jawoyn. 
Consistent \Vith this, there was ongoing cooperation between the local field staff of 
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both organisations. David Cooper routinely visited the NLC Katherine office and 
liaised with its staff during his visits to the region. These people were conscious of 
the lack of local institutional support available to the J awoyn during the 1980s, 
before the J awoyn Association developed its own structure and resource base. They 
therefore felt a responsibility to provide a source of counselling and support to 
Jawoyn people caught up in dealings externally instigated by the project team and 
the NT Government (Cooper pers comm). In addition, the Authority and the NLC 
also exchanged material from their files regarding the issue. 
In terms of possible outcomes with respect to Coronation Hill, a divergence 
appeared early in their assessments of Jawoyn views. While insisting on the 
genuineness of Jawoyn concerns for the area and on the legitimacy of the site 
registration, Ellis thought the question of mining was not foreclosed. He offered the 
project team the assistance of the Authority in presenting new information on the · 
project to a Jawoyn meeting, and told the Senate Inquiry that the anti-development 
decision of6 March might not be final (SSCNR 1986b: 842). In a speech to the NT 
Chamber of Mines (Rush 1986), he discussed his experience of Aboriginal 
willingness to negotiate accommodations between development and sacredness, 
and emphasised that the consultation process had to be approached with patience 
and sensitivity. In meetings in March with relevant Ministers and Aboriginal 
Affairs bureaucrats in Canberra, he indicated a compromise might be possible 
between site protection and mining. 
Senior NLC officers · were disturbed by this. Everything that they had heard from 
the J awoyn to this time seemed to rule out mining in the region containing the Bula 
sites. As the BHP project team's liaison efforts advanced towards seeking approval 
at another Jawoyn meeting, senior NLC lawyer Robert Blowes worried that the 
process had been too driven and that the Jawoyn were not being given the time they 
needed to re-consider the issue. When Darren Bennett sought NLC assistance 
following the decision of 1 July, Blowes made himself available for the meeting of 
4 July (see chapter 4), put to it the options of rejecting development, agreeing to 
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exploration, or agreeing subject to a negotiated agreement, and encouraged the 
J awoyn to reach their own decision regardless of external opinions. 
In the absence of any change in the land status of Gimbat station, the NLC 
remained constrained during the remainder of 1986. Branch Managers meetings 
discussed the mining issue again in October prior to another public hearing by the 
Senate Inquiry. They noted strong differences of opinion among Jawoyn leaders 
and almost daily vacillations, but queried the approval given by the Authority for 
the resumption of work in the light of what the NLC took to be a J awoyn decision 
against development at the meeting of 4 July. Appearing at the Senate Inquiry 
hearing on 29 October, the NLC Director John Ah Kit asserted that the NLC had no 
doubt that the J awoyn considered Coronation Hill a sacred site, that this 
significance derived from its location within a wider area affected by Bula, and that 
if the NLC had carriage of the issue it would seek to place any statements by senior 
J awoyn individuals with respect to that sacred significance under scrutiny by a full 
J awoyn meeting. Later that day, Ellis and Ritchie, as officers of the Authority, told 
the Inquiry that they were bound to consider the wishes of the senior custodians, 
and that the Authority had not accepted the outcome of the meeting of 4 July 
because it was conducted by the J awoyn Association in a manner that did not 
recognise the genuine wishes of those custodians. The Authority came to that view 
after deliberations that included discussing the matter with the main participants at 
its own meeting of 11 July in Katherine. 
During August and September 1986, Rush and Leckie had begun developing a 
-
broader engagement between the project team and the J awoyn. The authorisation 
flowing from the meeting of 1 July required that a custodian monitor development 
activities at Coronation Hill, but none was appointed, so Leckie brought Brown 
from Pine Creek for two days to inspect the progress of drilling and pumping 
( chapter 6). After the negative outcome of the meeting of 4 July, they had to 
negotiate renewed access to Barunga, which was forthcoming. They continued 
asking for a monitor to be appointed, and discussed the prospect of employing 
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Aborigines on site and of hiring machinery from Barunga Council, and of making 
further visits to the upper South Alligator valley and another trip to Groote Eylandt 
with interested individuals from the Katherine region. In early September Rush 
discussed these matters widely and addressed two small J awoyn meetings. He 
noted favourable responses to all these suggestions, and found his private 
discussions with significant individuals encouraging. Even people who had 
previously opposed or obstructed the project team's plans, such as Jatbula, now 
appeared accommodating. When Federal Ministers Cohen (Environment) and 
Evans (Resources and Energy) announced in September that Stage III of Kakadu 
National Park would be declared but an adequate lease set aside for Coronation Hill 
to proceed subject to normal clearances, national reporting of this decision was 
framed primarily in terms of a contest between miners and environmentalists. That 
Aboriginal issues were given lesser mention reflected the state of relations between 
the project team and the Jawoyn. In October, Larry Ah Lin and three young trainees 
began working at El Sherana. Rush began discussions concerning the provision of 
assistance to the J awoyn tourism and cattle development on Eva Valley station, and 
arranged a second visit to Groote Eylandt. 
The project team were hopeful of securing J awoyn approval for a mine before the 
NLC had legal grounds for intervention. The team's sensitivity to NLC 
participation in management of the issue was demonstrated when Ah Kit and three 
other officers arrived unexpectedly at El Sherana during the major development 
consultation of 31 October. After the meeting agreed to the further works being 
discussed, Ah Kit was invited to talk to the J awoyn present, and the NLC group 
was then shown the Coronation Hill site by the project team. In the following days, 
Rush made private inquiries as to how the NLC had been notified of and invited to 
the meeting. When Ellis proposed his further site consultation in November, Leckie 
'made it clear tactfully that BHP did not expect to see NLC personnel on the trip ' . 88 
88 J.F.Leckie, 21.11.86, Note to file , Aboriginal Affairs, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and 
Reports. 
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That the team found cause for concern even at this passive participation signals its 
perception of the NLC as a threat. Again, both sides claimed support from the 
Jawoyn. At El Sherana in Nove1nber, Leckie raised the matter with Ellis. 
I expressed our concern about behaviour of the NLC officers at the previous 
meeting and the fact that a number of aboriginals had been upset by this. 
Ellis told me that John Ah Kit had said to him by phone in Darwin after the 
meeting that the J awoyn group had been pleased to see the NLC officers 
and welcomed their participation on behalf of the J awoyn. 89 
The next day, they asked the J awoyn. 
The aboriginals did not have much to say about this. When pressed for 
guidance on the future involvement of the NLC, Ray [Fordimail] said that 
they (the Jawoyn) would invite the NLC to meetings if they required 
them. 90 
Indeed, apparently arising from the private talk Ah Kit had had with the J awoyn at 
the end , of the October meeting, Fordimail had already sent the NLC a letter 
requesting their support and advice. This was presumably intended to legitimise the 
existing role of officers such as Dodson and Blowes, and was the next in a series of 
steps by which the NLC ultimately entrenched its position as a manager of the 
issues surrounding the proposed Kakadu Stage III, including Coronation Hill. 
By the end of the year, the drilling program had proven the existence of a 
commercial mineral deposit. Alongside good exploration results and successful 
dealings with the J awoyn, the Federal policy environment was also looking 
favourable for 1nining. Federal Cabinet announced in December that two thirds of 
Gimbat and Goodparla pastoral leases would be declared as Kakadu Stage III and 
the remaining third would be made a Conservation Zone available for mineral 
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significance that would be approved subject to environmental, Aboriginal and other 
clearances. 
While senior NLC people had misg1v1ngs about the Sites Authority and its 
management of Coronation Hill, a number of inconsistent J awoyn statements and 
the further development works approved at the October meeting had created new 
doubts as to the Jawoyn position with respect to mining. The NLC considered a 
land claim as essential to protecting J awoyn interests in the . area, especially if they 
decided finally to reject mining at Coronation Hill. With the Government 
announcement in December, Robert Blowes recommended that a land claim 
application be made ready to lodge as soon as the pastoral leases were resumed. In 
the meantime the NLC hoped, by way of J awoyn requests for assistance, to 
manouevre itself into the role of protective intermediary and to overcome any 
objection to its right to be present and to advise the Jawoyn in all their dealings 
over Coronation Hill. This it achieved early in 1987. Up to this point, the NLC had 
been requested by Darren Bennett to attend the meeting of 4 July, and later 
requested by Ray Fordimail to provide support and advice. In January it arranged 
for formal instructions from the J awoyn Association to act as sole J awoyn 
representative in all matters concerning the proposed Kakadu Stage III area. The 
letter received by the NLC included the following: 
Please advise us of the names and addresses of Northern Territory 
Government bodies and Mining Companies so that we can write to them to 
inform them that we wish the Northern Land Council to represent us and 
that they should not contact us except through th~ Northern Land Council. 91 
This plainly had implications for all of the principal relationships that had so far 
predominated in the Coronation Hill issue. In April the NLC wrote directly to the 
project team to advise it of the instructions it now had, and reiterated the new 
channel of communications that followed from that advisor-client relationship. 
91 G.McDonald, 21.1.87, Letter to Director, Bureau ofNLC, Northern Land Council files. 
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That being the case, we request that all future communications from your 
Company relating to the J awoyn peoples' interests in Coronation Hill be 
conveyed via the N orthem Land Council, Darwin office .... 
We look forward to receiving future communications directed from your 
company to the Jawoyn people ... 92 
The NLC thereby attempted to consolidate its intermediary role by situating itself 
across the interface of contact between the J awoyn and the company. Over 
subsequent months, however, NLC strategy encountered difficulties on a number of 
fronts. The first of these was in determining the views of its new clients. At the 
Senate Inquiry hearing at Barunga in March 1987, Ah Kit, Dodson and new senior 
legal advisor Ian Gray heard a series of statements from senior J awoyn, including 
two of the three male custodians, denying the significance of Coronation Hill and 
affirming that it could be mined (see chapter 3). While these proceedings were later 
criticised for cultural insensitivity including in the style of questioning, they were 
nevertheless registered by the NLC as a change of J awoyn position. After a 
transcript of the hearing arrived, the matter was referred to the J awoyn. At a 
meeting on 2 April, NLC officers noted the feeling of those present that the 
transcript did not represent their position and that they had felt pressured at the 
hearing. Then on the 24th , an NLC officer met with five senior Jawoyn whose 
statements had been recorded at the hearing, not including Brown or J atbula, to 
discuss a response to the transcript. He reported their advice that the area had no 
significance and there was no reason to prevent mining. The NLC now had before 
it a sequence of texts, largely from the same individuals, in favour, against, and in 
favour, of mining, produced from theatres convened over a period of seven weeks. 
Having at last achieved formal standing as J awoyn legal representative, it could not 
now effectively advocate its client's position because it was unable to determine 
with certainty \Vhat that position was. On 27 April an LC Branch Managers 
meeting admitted that there was little to be done. Their position was no better 
92 LL.Gray 7.4.87, Letter to BHP Minerals, BHP ewcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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clarified at a J awoyn Association meeting in May where an NLC officer recorded 
that those present appeared undecided about the issue. 
The NLC encountered further difficulties in having its role acknowledged by the 
BHP project team. The letter referred to above, advising the project team of the 
. NLC' s instructions to represent the J awoyn, was sent in the midst of the events just 
described. That letter further offered 'to discuss BHP's current involvement at 
Coronation Hill in a preliminary manner at your convenience' .93 Up to this point 
the BHP project team had regarded its direct personal relationships with Jawoyn 
site custodians and political leaders as central to its strategy for understanding, 
recognising and accommodating Aboriginal interests in Coronation Hill and the 
upper South Alligator valley. It had from the outset been wary of the NLC and 
suspicious of its motives for intervening, perceiving its tactics as manipulative of 
the Jawoyn and inimical to successful development of the project. 
Direct dealings: the project team and the Jawoyn 
After November, no further approvals were sought from the Authority during the 
1986 work season. The defer:ral of approval for the access road and treatment plant 
site by an Authority meeting in late November ( chapter 4) represented a departure 
from what was a generally gratifying series of events for the project team during 
the latter part of 1986. Its management of the 'Aboriginal affairs' aspect of the 
project had demanded considerable commitment. The team often found that the 
promotion of the company's interests among a limited number of competent leaders 
and significant custodians had to compete with an array of other issues and projects 
demanding Jawoyn attention, as well as with the personal priorities of those 
significant individuals. Rush and Leckie experienced the frustrations of broken 
appointments, long pointless drives, and incidents of determined and chaotic 
drunkenness. Nor was their success unequivocal: they recognised that one senior 
93 Ibid. 
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and central custodian, Peter J atbula, did not approve of their intentions. They also 
remained unconvinced that Coronation Hill was a sacred site. Indeed, after the 
meeting of 19 November, Leckie was advised by one of the Aboriginal employees 
that most of the custodians had denied the sacredness of the area. They had at times 
found their relationship with Ellis difficult and his management of the issue 
frustrating, as the Authority provided authorisations for further work that were 
more limited and conditional than team officers felt were warranted by what 
transpired at the consultations themselves. 
Rush continued direct dealings with the J awoyn, maintaining that broad 
engagement established in 1986. In mid-February, with the 1987 drilling program 
just begun, he resumed liaising in the Katherine area. He mixed with a group 
assembled at Rockhole camp before an NLC meeting, and returned there after the 
meeting to give some people a lift back to their own camps. He contacted the 
project's Jawoyn employees and noted that they were all keen to resume work, and 
checked that their bank accounts for deposit of wages were still active. The four 
workers were re-employed on 3 March, Ah Lin classified as supervisor and the 
three younger men as utility workers. Having learnt the techniques of drill core 
handling, they were now introduced to core cutting. On 10 April he discussed with 
Ray Fordimail plans for the project team to meet the cost of the public address 
system for the upcoming Barunga festival, to assist with the development of Eva 
Valley station, and to hire another three J awoyn workers for Coronation Hill. At the 
festival itself the new manager of the project, Bill Hewitt, presented a saddle to 
Sandy Barraway as a symbol of the continuity of Jawoyn involvement in the cattle 
industry and of the team's wish to help the new venture at Eva Valley. The 
1nessage sent by Allen Linke to accompany that presentation reveals his conception 
of the team's good neighbour policy to be a seamless combination of corporate 
support and individual friendship: 
Dear friends at Burunga [sic] 
I am sorry my family and I are unable to attend and enjoy your Burunga 
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Festival. My wife and I had hoped to meet you again and introduce our 
children to you. However, I'm sure we will hear all about the fun you have 
up there from Bill, Foy, Peter, Allan and their families. 
I am particularly disappointed to have missed out on the presentation of the 
BHP saddle to Sandy Barraway. 
Sandy and I have discussed saddles many times and have even been to 
inspect and price them. I have asked Bill Hewitt the Manager of the 
Coronation Hill Project to present the saddle to Sandy on my and BHP's 
behalf. 
The saddle is a gesture by BHP to the Jawoyn People of BHP's wish to help 
you in making Eva Valley a success. We know how hard Sandy, Dooley 
and Arnold are working to get the cattle station going again. The J awoyn 
Association are continuing to make good progress with the station since 
buying it under Larry Ah Lin's direction. 
It is eight months since I last visited the outstation and look forward to 
seeing your improvements and hearing of any further assistance we can give 
you when I next visit. 
In presenting the saddle to Sandy I am reminded of your people's long 
association with the cattle industry and what good stockman [sic] you have 
produced. With your background and determination I am sure you will 
succeed with your plans and the J awoyn Association can depend on BHP 
providing support. 
I congratulate Robert, Raymond, Willie, Phyllis and Stephen on organising 
such a good festival. 
Good Luck, 
Allen Linke 
Manager Gold Operations94 
Through such gestures, Linke wanted to promote among the J awoyn a feeling that 
their relationship with the project team was sufficient unto itself for managing 
whatever business arose . between them, that mediators were an unnecessary 
94 A.Linke, 14.4.87, Letter, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports . 
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violation of the interpersonal quality that had been nurtured within that relationship 
and that external agencies should therefore remain as external as possible. 
Policy, however, was now pushing against those sentiments. Rush recognised that 
to satisfy the Government requirement for clearances with respect to Aboriginal 
concerns, the Joint Venture would have to reach a full 'terms and conditions' 
agreement with the J awoyn, regardless of the progress of'a land claim, and that that 
agreement would probably have to be reached through the NLC. Nevertheless, 
while the company began preparing preliminary heads of agreement, the project 
team continued to keep the NLC at a distance. On 21 April, Rush scribbled a 
check-list of outstanding matters and the steps required to advance each of them. 
He noted that an ethnographic survey would be necessary for the Environmental 
Impact Study, partly by way of assuring the government that all relevant 
Aborigines had been consulted, and he favoured contracting an independent 
authority such as the NT Museum to provide one, rather than the NLC. One week 
later, he recommended the appointment of an on-site project officer who would be 
responsible for maintaining close routine contact with all J awoyn communities 
from Pine Creek to Eva Valley. Finally, Rush addressed the NLC's request that all 
company communications with the J awoyn concerning Coronation Hill be directed 
through its offices. He replied: 
The Coronation Hill Joint Venture is willing to deal with whoever the 
J awoyn Association selects as its representative. However, because of the 
wide range of matters concerned and the already close and direct 
involvement of the Jawoyn community in the Project, we would like 
clarification from the J awoyn Association itself as to its wishes. This is 
sought as we have been in contact with them for over a year now and have 
been advised on a number of occasions that they wish, on a number of 
matters, to have direct dealings with the Joint Venture. 
Subject to Jawoyn Association confirmation, we would be prepared to 
involve the Northern Land Council in formal matters relating to the Project. 
However, there are a large number of day to day matters for which we need 
to continue to work directly with the J awoyn community and in relation to 
these matters it would be impractical for us to communicate via your 
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office.95 
In its first direct response to the developing NLC involvement in Coronation Hill, 
the project team thus refused to defer to the privileged relationship of legal advisor 
and client that the NLC now asserted with the J awoyn Association, and countered 
with an insistence on the priority of its own contacts with the community. 
At the end of May the project team prepared to proceed to the next stage of 
development approvals for final planning of the mine. During the last three days of 
May, Rush resumed direct discussions in the Katherine region, taking with him Jim . 
Green, temporarily recruited from BHP's Groote Eylandt operation to act as the 
day-to-day liaison officer that Rush had recommended. Once again Rush recorded a 
satisfactory trip. All the people he approached welcomed the idea of a visit to the 
site in the following week, and a number of indi~iduals raised expectations of what · 
might flow from the company's involvement in the region, such as vehicles and 
royalties. Bennett and Fordimail, encountered on the road to Barunga, expressed 
disapproval of NLC interference, Bennett adding that its proper role was advisory 
and that it should not impede direct dealings between the Jawoyn and outsiders. 96 
Rush encouraged him to make that view known to government, and also inquired 
whether the J awoyn Association was incorporated, something that would facilitate 
direct agreements. The team proceeded to organise a large meeting of J awoyn 
people attended by Sites Authority officers, at which further works on the project 
were explained and substantially approved (see chapter 4), in disregard of the 
NLC's attempt to establish a formal role for itself. 
The next day, Hewitt appeared before the Senate Inquiry and described the three 
aspects of the project team's developing relationship with the Jawoyn: recruitment, 
training and employment; liaison and information; community aid. The number · of 
95 P.M.Rush, 30.4.87, Letter to The Director NLC, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
96 P.M.Rush, 1.6.87, Note to File, Various Meetings, Aboriginal Affairs, Coronation Hill Project 
N.T., BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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Aboriginal employees had been increased to eight,97 and the project team intended 
to plan for as many future positions as possible to be filled by Aborigines. Liaison · 
had been ongoing since his appoint1nent in March, an effort intended to ensure full 
Jawoyn awareness of project activities and plans and to promote mutual 
understanding. Community aid had concentrated on assisting the Eva Valley cattle 
project (SSCNR 1987b: 2687-88). As indicated above, the BHP officers 
responsible for implementing these approaches encountered encouraging local 
feedback. 
To that irregular network of people in Darwin who were concerned with Aboriginal 
or environmental issues, some of whom were employees or consultants for the 
NLC or associated with the NT Environment Centre, much of this looked like 
bribery. Even those who were less inclined to activism but professionally 
concerned to protect Aboriginal interests, such as .the NLC lawyers ·Robert Blowes 
and Ian Gray, felt uncomfortable with the lack of an arm's-length relationship 
between BHP and the J awoyn. NLC officers familiar with the area generally held 
the view that the project team's face-to-face dealings were constant and crude and 
amounted to humbugging, a matter on which they received J awoyn complaints 
relayed to them through the NLC Katherine office. In fact the team's local liaison 
efforts, at least prior to the appointment of Jim Green, appear to have been 
intermittent. Even for the period of 'ongoing' contact since March reported by 
Hewitt, available records show a period of six weeks, from mid-April to the end of 
May, in which no contacts occurred. They probably became more regular after 
Green began work. Having been introduced to the region and its people the 
previous week, he now undertook to travel the circuit of J awoyn camps for one 
week each month to maintain consistent contact. 
At the same time BHP was turning its attention again to the external policy 
enviromnent. The boundaries of Stage III of Kakadu National Park and of the 
97 The project team 's Fortnightly Site Report to 5.6.87 lists seven Jawoyn employees, with three 
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Conservation Zone were gazetted in June 1987, and the Federal Government's 
Conservation Zone Advisory Committee released guidelines for the allocation of 
mining tenements in the Zone. The project team's exploration work to this point 
had found promising indications of mineralisation at four localities in the upper 
South Alligator valley apart from Coronation Hill. As the host rocks were known to 
be widespread, BHP urged public recognition of the South Alligator valley as a 
significant mineral province (SSCNR 1987b: 2658-61). Before the continuing 
Senate Inquiry into the resources of Kakadu, the project team argued the case for 
giving the Coronation Hill Joint Venture 'the major role in exploring the 
Conservation Zone' (SSCNR 1987b: 2671). It pointed to the resources that the 
company had devoted to fostering relations with the J awoyn and argued that those 
relations could be endangered and the project jeopardised if ill-informed or ill-
intentioned interference by other companies caused confusion among custodians 
(SSCNR 1987b: 2667, 2671). The BHP -submission refers also to the 
complementary danger that problems arising from the interference of other 
companies would: 
result in the immediate involvement of other parties who could then play a 
major continuing role and interfere in both the Coronation Hill project and 
the Conservation Zone exploration. This would have an adverse impact on 
Coronation Hill development, cause major delays and arouse uninformed 
prejudices. (SSCNR 1987b: 2668) 
This comment is most readily interpreted as an expression of apprehension at the 
involvement of the Northern Land Council in management of the Conservation 
Zone. It highlights the awareness of the company of the importance of its 
relationship with the J awoyn for its broader interests and overall strategic position 
in the upper South Alligator mineral province. For the NLC, the policy 
environment was a cause of anxiety. Not only was the pastoral lessee of Gimbat 
resisting negotiations for resumption of the station, thereby delaying a land claim, 
new utility workers having started on 27 May. 
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but the environmental impact assessment process, which could lead to the issuing 
of mining titles, was to proceed independently of progress in changing the status of 
the land. The company might thereby achieve its aim of mining approval before the 
NLC was legally enabled to represent Aboriginal interests. 
Challenge from the NLC 
Events up to rriid-1987 thus left the NLC uncertain of its client's views regarding 
the management of the upper South Alligator valley, lacking confidence in the Sites 
Authority's handling of the central issue of development works at Coronation Hill, 
lacking also proper recognition from the mining company as its opposite in 
negotiations, and without legal standing to intervene in the mining approvals 
process. At that point, the basis of the NLC's participation in the affairs of the 
region was transformed by a raft of legislative amendments passed by the Federal 
Government. 98 The major effects of these amendments were, firstly, to declare 
Gimbat and Goodparla Stations to be unalienated Crown land and therefore 
available for land claim, and secondly, to empower Aboriginal Land Councils in 
the Northern Territory to negotiate mining agreements over land under claim, 
extending their existing power to negotiate only over land already won. The Land 
Councils were also given the additional function of assisting Aborigines to protect 
sacred sites, whether or not on Aboriginal land. In anticipation of these 
developments, the J awoyn Association instructed the NLC to lodge a land claim 
over the area and to invite the company to enter negotiations for an agreement over 
exploration and mining. The NLC lodged the land claim on 26 June, and wrote to 
the company on 2 July. 
The BHP project team recognised these new developments, but after considering 
entering preliminary general discussions with the 1\TLC, replied instead that they 
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wished to delay negotiations until their project plans for Coronation Hill were more 
advanced, and Federal policy regarding mineral exploration in the wider region had 
become clearer. This refusal to engage with the NLC occurred as the project team 
was preparing to move to a new stage in the process of gaining Aboriginal approval 
for the project. Development approvals to date had covered test drillings to 
establish the dimensions of the mineral deposit and the suitability of the back valley 
for processing and waste facilities, and local road works. There had so far been no 
use of explosives, although it had been discussed and deferred at the consultations 
in June. Blasting had always been seen as a more serious interference with the site 
than any of the previous works, and David Cooper repeatedly drew a distinction 
between exploration and mining in his discussions of the approvals so far given, a 
distinction which turned largely on the use of explosives. 
The project team and the Authority arranged a c_onsultation for 18 August 1987 at 
which the use of small quantities of explosives at Coronation Hill would be 
demonstrated for the J awoyn. About eighteen J awoyn were in attendance, including 
the senior male custodians. The NLC seized the opportunity to radically assert its 
standing in the issue. Indeed, the blasting itself, which at least one observer 
anticipated would shock the J awoyn, in the end caused less consternation than the 
NLC's intervention. Before the meeting began, two NLC officers arrived and 
handed to Allen Linke a letter drafted the previous day by their senior legal officer. 
It referred to the NLC's :frustration over having 'our clients complain to us about 
direct approaches by your company' ,99 reasserted the privileged nature of its 
relationship with the Jawoyn, and objected to the company's failure to advise of this 
meeting and the matters to be discussed. With J awoyn consent, the group then 
moved to Coronation Hill to observe three successively larger detonations, 
culminating in a line of four half-sticks of gelignite on a hillside drilling bench. 
98 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) A1nendment Acts (Nos 2 and 3), Lands Acquisition 
Amendment Act, Environment Protection (Alligator Rivers Region) Amendment Act, National 
Parks and Wildlife Conservation Amendment Act and Amendment Act (No 2), all of 1987. 
99 LL.Gray, 17.8.87, Letter to BHP, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files . 
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Before the meeting re-assembled for discussion, an NLC officer privately explained 
to the J awoyn that the NLC now had the legal power to negotiate a comprehensive 
agreement with BHP including exploration works and site protection, and 
suggested that they should withhold a decision about blasting unti_l after the first of 
these discussions in a few days time. When, after retiring to consider the matter 
alone, the J awoyn announced that their decision would be delayed until the NLC 
reported to them on the outcome of the proposed discussions, the tensions already 
evident at this meeting manifested themselves as a direct challenge by the NLC to 
the positions of both the project team and the Sacred Sites Authority. 
The decision to delay had two implications for the management of the issue. It 
meant that the progress of the mining project was now contingent upon the project 
team's dealings with the NLC instead of upon its dealings with the Jawoyn. 
Realising this, Allen Linke responded initially with what one observer described as 
intense anger. He then attempted to reassert the priority of the project team's direct 
relationship with the J awoyn, describing it as one of trust that should not be 
undermined by the imposition of outsiders. He tried to re-establish what he had 
previously understood to be a separation between the questions of blasting and of 
dealings with the NLC, arguing that any negotiations would be directed only 
towards a final terms-and-conditions agreement for mining and would not cover the 
exploration stages. Finally, he pronounced a caveat upon any negotiations at all, 
that they would only happen if the project team could be satisfied that the Jawoyn 
genuinely wished to be represented by the NLC. 
Maintaining a separation between the immediate question of whether blasting at the 
scale demonstrated was an acceptable level of disturbance within the registered site, 
and the later question of the conditions under which a mining project might 
eventuate, was equally urgent for the Director of the Sites Authority. Ellis 
attempted to impress upon the J awoyn the legal and functional distinction between 
what he needed to know - whether the custodians of the site would authorise 
further exploration works involving explosives - and the larger matter that the 
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NLC wanted to argue out - the material relationship that might finally emerge 
between the mining company and the prospective Aboriginal land owners. Ray 
Fordimail replied that the senior custodians of the site accepted blasting at the level 
demonstrated but no greater. An NLC officer again tried to dissolve that separation, 
explaining that the NLC could negotiate everything with the project team, and 
protect the site better than the Authority. When the tenor of the discussion then 
shifted to adverse reflections on the NLC's past record in local J awoyn affairs, Ellis 
concluded the meeting by stating that he would issue a permit for works involving 
blasting, but would delay it until after the proposed initial discussions between the 
NLC and the project team. 
There ensued over the fallowing weeks a contest between the NLC and the 
Authority over the issuing of the authorisation to the company. The contest turned 
ultimately on yet another distinction, discussed earlier, that was fundamental to the · 
legitimacy of the Authority's claim to an independent role in the issue. That is, 
whereas the NLC claimed to represent the interests of the J awoyn people as a 
whole, the Authority was responsible only to the custodians of the sacred site. This 
distinction between the J awoyn collectivity and the small group of senior 
custodians of Bula sites in Gimbat reflected both the contrasting statutory charters 
of the NLC and the Sacred Sites Authority, and recent land claim history. The 
entire J awoyn language group as a unitary local descent group had been proposed · 
as traditional owners in the claim over Katherine Gorge, to the south ( chapter 2). In 
the mid-1980s then, the NLC approached the prospect of another land claim and 
mining negotiations over this more northerly portion of Jawoyn country under the 
constraint of that precedent already argued before the Land Commissioner. Indeed 
in the previous year the NLC had made clear its own view of where sovereignty in 
the matter properly lay, when it told the Senate Inquiry that mining development at 
Coronation Hill was a matter for the J awoyn people as a whole to decide, and that 
any state1nent by a site custodian that denied the sacredness of the place should be 
put before a full J awoyn meeting for verification. 
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In the wake of the consultation of 18 August 1987, this disagreement came to a 
head in a remarkable scuffle between the two organisations. The Authority Director 
began by attempting to re-institute a clear demarcation between their respective 
roles and responsibilities. He wrote a conciliatory letter to the NLC a few days after 
the meeting at Coronation Hill in which he offered to discuss a cooperative and 
coordinated approach to the representation of Aboriginal interests, but also made 
plain that the Authority could receive instructions only from the custodians of the 
site, not from the Jawoyn Association or from the NLC acting as the Association's 
representative. The NLC responded by having the three senior custodians of the site 
sign a letter instructing the Authority not to issue a permit for blasting pending the 
outcome of discussions, now postponed, between the NLC and the project team. 
This was an attempt to rescue the position the NLC had advocated at the blasting 
consultation, to make progress of development works dependent on progress 
towards an overall negotiated package. It furthermore again positioned the NLC as 
the channel through which custodians' instructions were communicated to the 
Authority. Ellis advised the NLC that he considered himself bound by the decision 
of the custodians at the time of the consultation that the blasting was acceptable, 
and proceeded to issue an authorisation to the project team. 
The NLC considered that the Authority had failed to act in accordance with J awoyn 
wishes. A meeting of the J awoyn Association on 1 September was told that the 
NLC now had the same power as the Authority to protect sacred sites. NLC officers 
took the three senior custodians to one side and explained to them and had them 
sign another letter to the Chairman of the Authority, this time advising that the 
J awoyn Association should henceforth be the source of the Authority's instructions. 
It said in part: 
We want future permit applications to be directed to the J awoyn 
Association .... The J awoyn Association will be expressing our wishes in 
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decisions about permit applications. We would like you ... to accept our 
instructions in this way from now on. 100 
In response the Authority at its next 1neeting formally noted 'the request of the 
J awoyn custodians that future consultation be conducted with the assistance of the 
Jawoyn Association' .101 
The Authority's legitimacy as a manager ofthe Coronation Hill issue rested then on 
its specific responsibility for approving works on a registered sacred site, and its 
obligation to seek instructions from the site custodians. In August and September 
1987 the NLC sought to subvert the Authority's independence firstly by trying to 
subsume sacred site approvals within a general package to be negotiated over all 
development works at Coronation Hill, and then by trying to subsume the source of 
the Authority's instructions, the site custodians, within the source of its own 
-
instructions, the J awoyn Association. This attempt to assert hegemonic 
representation of Aboriginal interests was based on a number of perceptions within 
the NLC: that proper protection of Aboriginal interests in the upper South Alligator 
valley required comprehensive negotiations over all aspects of BHP's activities, 
and that removing exploration from the purview of those negotiations constrained 
real Aboriginal options; that the Sites Authority was neither competent nor 
authorised to handle such negotiations; that the Authority's effectiveness was in any 
event subject to a political calculus that balanced the protection of Aboriginal 
interests against the need to demonstrate to its political masters that protection of 
those interests could be managed in a manner consistent with economic 
development of the Northern Territory. These perceptions informed what the NLC 
took to be a tactical imperative to neutralise the independent role of the Authority 
in the Coronation Hill project. For its part, the Authority maintained its concern, 
. first expressed during the contradictory episodes of July 1986, that approvals for 
100 P.Jatbula, S.Barraway, N.Brown, nd, Letter to M.Harvey, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority 
files. 
227 
A Perspective on the Political History of Coronation Hill 
works on a registered site should be decided according to the views of the site 
custodians as bearers of the relevant tradition, and were not properly treated as a 
negotiating instrument. 
During this period of postponements, the project team's liaison with Jawoyn 
custodians heightened its suspicion of NLC intentions and methods. On 27 August, 
nine days after the blasting demonstration but before the permit had issued, Leckie 
held discussions with significant individuals in the Katherine region and reported 
them still supportive of the project. The following evening, the project team 
received a fax copy of the letter to Ellis, signed by the three senior custodians and 
witnessed by an NLC field officer, instructing Ellis not to issue the blasting permit 
until after NLC meetings with custodians and the project team to be held the 
following week. The three signatories included two to whom Leckie had spoken the 
previous day. The next day, 29 August, Leckie and Hewitt again travelled to Pine 
Creek and Barunga and spoke to, among others, two of the signatory custodians, 
including the one Leckie had not earlier seen. Both these men, they reported, 
believed they had signed an approval for blasting. Ellis advised that he was not 
allowing the letter to overturn his understanding of the decision at the site 
consultation, and proceeded to issue the permit. 
At the same time, the project team responded to Gray's insistence that all company 
dealings with the J awoyn over Coronation Hill be conducted through the NLC. In a 
letter of 26 August, Linke proposed three lines of communication: firstly, regarding 
' formal matters' which presumably meant agreement negotiations, 'we will deal 
with the N orthem Land Council subject to confirmation that this is the wish of the 
J awoyn people'; secondly, regarding day-to-day relations with the · J awoyn over 
matters such as employment, direct dealings with the community will be continued; 
thirdly, regarding sacred site matters, direct communication with the Authority and 
senior custodians will be continued. Elaborating the second point, Linke wrote: 
101 Minutes of the 38th Meeting of the Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority held on the 14th 
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Over the past 18 months, we have, we believe, established a very good 
working relationship with the J awoyn people based on trust and our respect 
for their desires. It is essential that this be maintained by us continuing to 
hold direct discussions with them on the progress of our activities and by 
taking all necessary members of their community on regular visits to the 
site. 102 
Link:e's letter was a neat summary of the position the project team had reached in 
response to the political developments of 1987. It conditionally surrendered only 
the minimum necessary space to the NLC and preserved those direct contacts with 
the J awoyn that it plainly saw as essential. In this it found some common ground 
with Ellis. In his letter to Gray of 21 August, a copy of which was faxed to Hewitt, 
Ellis said he had found the custodians to be 'unaware of any request to the N orthem 
Land Council to conduct [ site clearance] negotiations on their behalf' .103 
The events of August 1987 thus confirmed the project team's susp1c1ons 
concerning the intervention of external organisations, and caused it to perceive new 
links and dispositions in the political landscape. Its response was an intensification 
of the essential company strategy. 
It would seem that there are underlying tensions between ASSP A and NLC. 
Possible relationships between [the Australian Conservation Foundation] 
and NLC staff have also become apparent ... 
It is concluded that CHN staff will have to redouble their efforts in 
maintaining close contact with the J awoyn community, in training J awoyn 
employees, and in assisting Jawoyn community projects such as Eva Valley 
cattle station (post hole borer and some fencing wire was donated during 
August). A further visit by Jawoyns to Groote Eylandt is being planned for 
early October. 104 
For the project team, then, the legacy of these events was a sense that their relations 
with the J awoyn were vulnerable to subversion by manipulative outside interests 
and 15th day of October,_ 1987. 
102 I.A.Linke, 26.8.87, Letter to The Director BNLC, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
103 R.W.Ellis, ·21.8.87, Letter to The Director BNLC, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files . 
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pursuing a covert environmentalist agenda, and that this subversion had to be 
actively countered. 
The Conservation Zone 
While the NLC's intervention on 18 August had failed to achieve its immediate 
objectives, it had directly challenged the primacy of those relationships that had 
governed conduct of the Coronation Hill issue up to that point, and had served 
notice that a new player, strategically aggressive and with a much broader mandate 
to represent Aboriginal interests, was now in the field. Moreover, that field itself 
was now much larger than Coronation Hill. Prior to the July 1987 elections, the 
Federal Government had declared Stage III of Kakadu National Park over the area 
of Gimbat and Goodparla Stations, subject to about one-third being reserved as a 
'Conservation Zone' in which mineral exploration would be allowed for five years. 
The Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service began preparations to take over 
management of the other two-thirds of the area. The boundaries of the 
Conservation Zone were drawn tentatively, to be refined later in the year, and the 
Coronation Hill Joint Venture was one of many mining interests expected to 
compete for exploration rights over the Zone. What was immediately clear, 
however, was that the southern half of the Zone intruded into the region of the Bula 
Dreaming, and included, or lay very close to, a number of powerful sites (Maps 2, 
4). 
Having established its prominence with respect to Coronation Hill, the NLC in 
September moved to engage comprehensively with the new complexities of policy 
iri the region. The first requirement was to consolidate its relationship with the 
J awoyn. In his report on the blasting consultations of 18 August, an NLC officer 
had noted the project team's success in building relationships with the Jawoyn, and 
advised that the NLC had now itself to carefully win their confidence. The first 
104 
na, nd, Aboriginal Affairs, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
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step, he suggested, should be to consult with them again to confirm their 
instructions and clarify their relationship. 
The NLC's meeting with the J awoyn Association on 1 September ranged widely 
over the problems and possibilities facing the Aboriginal claimants of the area. As 
most of the Conservation Zone was not protected by sacred site registrations, and 
as Federal Government policy at that time appeared to be moving strongly towards 
allowing at least some exploitation of what was known to be a highly prospective 
mineral province, the NLC's program had to be concerned with advancing the 
J awoyn position broadly within the emerging mix of competing interests. The NLC 
Director, John Ah Kit, pointed out that continued contradictions from the Jawoyn 
over the Coronation Hill project could ultimately be used against them, and assured 
them that the NLC would support whatever their final position turned out to be. 
Following the meeting, the NLC organised for -consultations to begin between a · 
group of senior J awoyn and the Parks Service regarding a lease of Stage III to the 
Service for management as a national park should the land claim be successful. It 
also renewed communication with the BHP project team to arrange discussions 
towards a mining agreement. 
Most importantly, however, the NLC, in concert with the Sites Authority and the 
Australian Conservation Foundation, lobbied the Federal Government to delay any 
decision on the final boundaries of the Conservation Zone and the allocation of 
mining tenements until a survey of cultural and natural resources, and the 
Authority's sacred site documentation program, were completed, and the Aboriginal 
claimants of the area were properly consulted. This renewed lobbying effort 
showed that the NLC and the Authority, even at the height of inter-agency tensions 
over their respective mandates with respect to Coronation Hill, were still able to act 
in concert to enhance recognition of Aboriginal interests in the Stage III area at 
senior policy level. Notably, senior opinion in both organisations regarded 
Aboriginal acceptance of mining at Coronation Hill as a possibility. At the meeting 
of 1 September, Ah Kit addressed the J awoyn on the prospect of negotiating a deal 
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for them with BHP, should that be their wish. When he wrote to the Environment 
Minister the following day arguing for recognition of Aboriginal concerns in the 
Conservation Zone, he made no representations about Coronation Hill. At the same 
time, Ellis argued to that Minister that the so-far difficult but successful 
negotiations to allow exploration at Coronation Hill would be jeopardised if 
Aboriginal concerns were disregarded in decisions over the larger area. The NLC at 
this point acknowledged both the Authority's role in establishing the extent of 
Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone and their joint effort in lobbying 
government. However, the request for the Government to delay its decision set the 
stage for a further elevation of the NLC's strategic position in the region. 
Five Federal Ministers, Prime Minister Hawke and the Ministers for Aboriginal 
Affairs, Environment, Primary Industry and Resources, with advisors, met on 24 
September 1n Canberra to discuss Conservation Zone policy. Two 
environmentalists were there to press both conservationist and Aboriginal values, 
and a Bureau of Mineral Resources officer argued for mining. Shortly before, three 
of the Ministers had been sent copies of Cooper's Traditional Concerns report, 
discussed in the previous chapter, arguing that Aboriginal notions of sacredness 
and danger were so extensive as to make mining-related activity inappropriate over 
the entire southern half of the Conservation Zone, that is, the section considered 
most prospective and in which the Joint Venture' s most important interests were 
located. The Minister for the Environment, Graham Richardson, had had previous 
exposure to Aboriginal disagreements over Coronation Hill, and the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, Gerry Hand, was also aware that Aboriginal opinion had been 
unsettled. 
The Ministers decided that final determination of the Conservation Zone 
boundaries would be delayed until there had been further consultation regarding 
Aboriginal concerns. In a policy debate that to this point had been dominated by 
environmentalists and miners and in which Aboriginal issues had been seen as a 
secondary complication, a high-level decision now turned on the Aboriginal 
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interest in the area. More significantly for the strategic disposition of the players, 
the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs charged the NLC with responsibility for 
determining Aboriginal views and removing confusion over the J awoyn position. 
The NLC thereby became primary advisor to the Federal Government concerning 
Aboriginal interests in the Conservation Zone. The NLC took this as legitimation of 
its claim to sole running of the Aboriginal issues in the region. A Branch Managers 
meeting determined that both the J awoyn and the Sites Authority were to be 
apprised of the NLC's position as representative of Jawoyn interests in the Kakadu 
Stage III area, and that the J awoyn should provide the NLC with relevant 
instructions. 
The project team continued to believe that its best defence in a changing political 
environment was to secure J awoyn goodwill and engagement. Finding local 
opinion still supportive of the Coronation Hill project, the project team continued to · 
enhance its good-neighbour relationship. In September, Leckie hired two more men 
from Barunga, fitted them with work clothes and safety boots and brought them 
back to El Sherana. The team arranged for all Aboriginal employees to attend a 
driver training course at the Northern Territory Open College, from which all 
obtained Provisional A Class licenses. During his visit of 14 October, Rush 
discussed with the headmistress of the Barunga school possible means by which the 
company might be able to assist the students. 
The NLC position: from issue to dispute 
An event of more dramatic impact, however, occurred again over Coronation Hill. 
After some dilatory communications, the NLC and the project team agreed to meet 
on site on 5 November to inspect the project and begin substantive discussions 
towards a mining agreement. A small J awoyn group were present to observe and 
later receive advice from the NLC. This meeting marked the high-water mark of the 
project team's campaign to achieve Aboriginal approval for the project. The 
following day, fifteen members of the newly convened Jawoyn Working Party 
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( established by the NLC to manage Katherine Gorge and Kakadu Stage III issues 
for the Jawoyn), including two of the senior custodians, met with ten NLC officers 
at Barunga and told the NLC that they did not want any mining in Sickness 
Country, including Coronation Hill. This instruction sparked significant criticism of 
the NLC decision to negotiate, including from within the organisation. The NLC 
advised BHP that it was withdrawing from the process until the Federal 
Government had arrived at a final decision concerning mining development in the 
area. In other words, the NLC would not further discuss development of the 
Coronation Hill project unless the Government decided that the project would 
proceed. 
Unlike the Sites Authority, then, the NLC did not now recognise any separation 
between mining-related activity at Coronation Hill and elsewhere in the southern 
half of the Conservation Zone. As had happened previously, there remained the 
possibility that the Authority might independently authorise further works. The 
NLC was therefore explicit in again identifying the Aboriginal constituency to 
whose interests the Government should attend. In a letter to the Minister for the 
Environment, Ah Kit argued that the NLC's presentation of a position on behalf of 
the J awoyn traditional owners should be preferred over any inconsistent statements 
made by the Authority on behalf of the site custodians. Ellis had long believed that 
the custodians' concerns over Coronation Hill did not amount to a total opposition 
to development and that the project could be negotiated if carefully presented for 
approval in incremental stages. By December 1987, however, he perceived a shift 
in the views of the senior custodians against mining. In February 1988, the 
Autho1ity deferred to the larger processes in train and agreed not to issue any 
further development approvals to the project team until the NLC-Jawoyn 
submission to Government on the Conservation Zone was finalised. 
1987 thus proved to be a deceptive year for the BHP project team. On the surface 
of things it appeared to be a period of steady progress at every level. Development 
approvals had extended to the use of explosives, and by November it had embarked 
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on the initial stages of negotiating a mining agreement with Aboriginal interests, 
and was able to mount strong arguments for favoured treatment in the allocation of 
exploration rights in the Conservation Zone. At the same time, however, its 
fortunes were being undermined by the major transformation of that year, 1n the 
role of the NLC. From its early position as occasional advisor, the NLC had 
succeeded, through a combination of enabling legal change and evolving political 
strategy, in inserting itself as the project team's opposite in negotiations, and had 
been recognised by the Federal Government as its chief source of policy advice 
regarding Aboriginal interests in the area. 
Pursuant to its new expanded brief, the NLC set about the task of ascertaining the 
extent and nature of J awoyn concerns in the area, and of formulating political 
submissions to advance those interests. The first advice sent by the NLC Director 
to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs cited the anti-mining instructions received on · 
6 November and put the position of the traditional owners in terms that were a 
summary of Cooper's Traditional Concerns report, seeking revocation of the 
Conservation Zone southeast of UDP Falls, or the entire Gimbat section. This may 
have been a hasty response. Subsequent communications in January and February 
1988 to the Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs and the Environment were submissions 
for delay in finalising Conservation Zone policy, now treating the issue as unsettled 
and in need of further consideration by the traditional owners. This renewed 
caution arose from the first of two reports that the NLC received in the first half of 
1988. 
The NLC generally relied on periodic community meetings for ascertaining its 
instructions, and local field officers would also report back on their contacts with 
local people on any matters. The kind of research undertaken for these two reports 
was aimed at supplementing such procedures in order to underwrite the NLC' s 
understanding of its instructions with the digested findings of more thorough 
inquiry. In December 1987 and January 1988, two consultants, Francesca Merlan 
and Paul Josif, undertook a survey of Jawoyn awareness and opinions with respect 
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to the intertwined issues awaiting resolution over Stage III of Kakadu: the land 
claim, finalisation of the boundaries of the Conservation Zone, mining at 
Coronation Hill or elsewhere, and National Park management of the area. In their 
report, they took pains to distinguish a number of schools of opinion within the 
Jawoyn on the matter of Coronation Hill, relating them to the likely constitution of 
the traditional owner group for the forthcoming land claim. Within the claimant 
group as narrowly defined and . consisting of a few clans, a sub-set of people, 
including the identified senior custodians, understood the issues and viewed mining 
with unequivocal opposition, they reported, while the remainder of this primary 
traditional owner group had had little participation in the issue and had no clear 
opinions. Among the wider J awoyn language group, another small number, mostly 
the families of the Coronation Hill Aboriginal workers, supported mining, but the 
majority occupied an uncommitted or indifferent middle ground. The consultants 
found further that the question, or even the existence, of the Conservation Zone 
boundaries was little understood and proposed that a major field expedition in the 
early dry season intended to advance land claim research could also be used to 
define a more precise J awoyn position on that boundary issue (J osif & Merlan nd: 
4-6, 12, 24). 
The Ministers accepted the request for delay even as further consultancy research 
was being pursued by Josif. He continued to canvass Jawoyn opinion widely and 
submitted his report in June. The Josif report did two things. Its substantive content 
widened the terms of the anti-mining position. Josif (1988) took as his starting 
point a state of essential conflict between J awoyn cultural values and development 
plans for Coronation Hill. He cited increasing awareness of the issue in the months 
since his report with Merlan, and concluded that opposition to mining was 
spreading amongst the J awoyn. While the religious grounds of this opposition were 
as presented by Cooper, J osif went to greater pains to argue that the development 
work that had occurred to date was by itself responsible for major social stresses 
within the Jawoyn community. He cited anxiety-related behavioural problems and 
said that instances of illness and death among local people were being attributed to 
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improper interference with country. He claimed that J awoyn authority structures 
were under threat from internal -dissension over the project's employment of young 
men, and community standing was at stake in the eyes of surrounding language 
groups concerned to see responsibilities carried out towards important places. 
Mining threatened loss of access to country, control over knowledge and security of 
sites. In short, the prospect that mining would be allowed to violate the religious 
preserve of Sickness Country had by itself amounted to an assault on the general 
social well-being and cultural integrity of the J awoyn people. At stake, then, was 
not only the personal investment of the old men in protecting regional landscape 
sensitivities, but fundamental matters of community survival. 
Following from this, the report was also important in a strategic sense. In his 
judgment on the Jawoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim in late 1987, Justice 
Kearney had accepted the J awoyn language group as the local descent group · 
satisfying the requirements of traditional ownership for some southern areas of 
Jawoyn country (ALC 1988: 23, 30, 34-37). In their report in January, Josif and 
Merlan (nd: 21) had proposed that a land claim for the Gimbat area could be argued 
on alternative broad and narrow models of the local descent group, either as the 
undivided language group or as a set of particular clans. The J osif report, unlike 
that earlier report and also unlike Cooper's, made no mention of clan attachments 
to the Bula sites, but spoke unilaterally of the J awoyn as the responsible group, 
differentiated internally only between knowledgeable senior men and others. For 
the NLC, to proceed on this basis with respect to the issues of the Conservation · 
Zone and Coronation Hill would mean that there was only a small minority 
difference between the broad definition of its client traditional owner group for the 
land claim, the J awoyn language group, and the source of its anti-mining 
instructions with respect to the future of Stage III. 
It had taken from September 1987 to June 1988 for the NLC position to be settled, · 
and it was drawn from three sources. Cooper's Traditional Concerns report set out 
the full extent and intensity of what it was in the . Stage III landscape that attracted 
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Aboriginal concern. The instructions received from the meeting of 6 November 
declared that Coronation Hill was not separable from the range of those concerns. 
Lastly, the J osif report said that all this was of concern not just for those J awoyn 
who had been caught up in the varied consultations to date, most often the senior 
custodians and secular leaders, but in almost every J awoyn camp. This was the 
position that the NLC passed to the Federal Government and publicly campaigned 
on for the next three years. 
Conclusion 
As this discussion of events shows, it took over two years, from September 1985 to 
early 1988, for the Coronation Hill issue to become a dispute. The Authority 
approval that was forwarded to the BHP project team on 27 August 1987 was the 
last to be granted. Development work at Coronation Hill was able to proceed for 
several months on the basis of existing approvals, but came to an end in July 1988. 
Thus, the events of 1987 established the conditions for the eventual defeat of the 
mining company. That defeat came, in the end, at the volition of Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke acting from a minority position in Cabinet. But the propositions that he 
accepted as truthful concerning the religious values of Coronation Hill were those 
that had been taken on board, promoted and circulated by external agents that took 
them to be the legitimate convictions of the Jawoyn people. By reason of the 
enhanced standing it had achieved over the course of that year, the NLC was the 
most important of these agents. Its opposition to the mine solidified early in 1988, 
on the basis of instructions that indicated that differences on the ground were non-
negotiable, and survey evidence showing opposition to development to be 
widespread throughout its . client group as broadly defined. From that time it 
supported and advanced a case both against mining and in favour of Aboriginal 
ownership and National Park management of the Conservation Zone. 
Significantly, however, the NLC operated throughout from a position of weakness 
relative to that which it usually occupied in mining issues under the Land Rights 
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Act, as the representative of traditional owners of freehold Aboriginal land. As 
early as 1986, NLC legal officers had pointed out the strategic importance of 
finalising a land claim and thereby fixing an Aboriginal legal interest over the area 
before decisions about mining were made. As Federal policy processes with respect 
to the Conservation Zone advanced, the NLC argued that Aboriginal concerns 
could best be met if the land were simply transferred to J awoyn ownership without 
a drawn-out claims process. When the Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry 
was instituted in 1990 to advise the Government on the issue, the NLC again made 
representations to have the Inquiry empowered to hear a land claim over the entire 
Stage III area. This argument drew on the precedent of the Ranger Uranium 
Environmental Inquiry in the mid-1970s, which had guaranteed that due regard be 
paid to Aboriginal interests in Kakadu Stage I by hearing and granting the land 
claim first, before establishing the National Park or allowing mining to proceed. 
The NLC was unsuccessful in press.ing the same approach to Coronation Hill and 
the Conservation Zone. Throughout the Coronation Hill dispute, Gimbat was not, 
in a legal sense, Aboriginal land, and the NLC perforce intervened in the affairs of 
the area more as an act of political volition to assert an Aboriginal stake, than as an 
act of administration of an existing legal right. 
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DISPUTE AND THEATRICALITY 
By early 1988, the NLC and Cooper believed the era of inconsistency had ended 
and their anti-mining instructions were clear. Similarly, Keen and Merlan (1990: 
75-77, 80-82) considered that this period marked a return by the custodians to their 
original and genuine convictions as to the inviolability of Sickness Country and the 
urgency of excluding mining-related activity from it, following a period of 
vacillation and uncertainty. In this chapter I show that in fact, while the tenor of 
relations between the NLC and the project team had moved from issue 
management to political dispute, nothing had changed among the custodians. My 
purpose here is to document the continuing theatricality that characterised the 
relationship between senior J awoyn and each of the three principal external 
. 
agencies. 
Theatricality and NLC instructions 
At a meeting at Barunga on 6 November 1987, a small Jawoyn group instructed the 
NLC that it opposed mining at Coronation Hill. There are no videos or transcripts 
of the proceedings, only one set of meeting notes, but available information offers 
some indications as to the character of this consultation event as a theatre. Unlike 
most development consultations, it occurred away from the project site and no 
members of the project team were present. It was attended by ten NLC officers and 
fifteen J awoyn, of whom four of the former and six of the latter were members of 
the recently appointed J awoyn Working Party. The Party was established to deal 
with matters arising from the successful land claim over Katherine Gorge National 
Park, but soon took carriage of a range of local issues including Coronation Hill 
and the Conservation Zone. 
Dispute and Theatricality 
It seems, however, that the large NLC presence, including the Chairman and 
Director, was not a scenic element likely to contain the J awoyn act of opposing 
mining. Several points tend to this interpretation. In the months before the meeting, 
dominant opinion within the NLC had been that the Coronation Hill mine would 
proceed. This was based on indications that the mining industry's promotion of a 
multiple land-use paradigm was receiving a sympathetic hearing from important 
Federal ministers and senior bureaucrats, and that Kakadu was an immediate focus 
for its implementation. NLC officers assessed that the political momentum in 
favour of recognising both the mineral and conservation values of Stage III was 
strong, and that the NLC had to attend to protecting Aboriginal interests within that 
emerging land-use regime. Moreover, pursuant to instructions received from a 
J awoyn meeting in June, ten NLC officers had attended an on-site briefing on the 
project the day before the Barunga meeting, followed by informal preliminary 
discussions with the project team towards a mining agreement. Critics of the NLC 
decision to open these discussions accused senior officers of having transmitted 
their 'fatalism' about Coronation Hill to the J awoyn, and indeed, notes of the 
Barunga meeting of 6 November include several references to the probability that 
the mine would proceed. 
It is thus unlikely that the behaviour of this NLC group at Barunga established a 
scene that implied a reading by the J awoyn from the script of religious power and 
danger. Indeed, documentation regarding the arrangements for the meeting indicate 
that the NLC did not expect Coronation Hill itself to be discussed, but only the still 
unsettled question of Conservation Zone boundaries and some other matters. It 
appears , rather, that the anti-mining instructions received there took senior officers 
by surprise and caused an internal reassessment of NLC strategy, the first 
manifestations of which were letters from Ah Kit to the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs reporting that the traditional owners \Vere opposed to exploration or mining, 
and from Ah Kit to Rush suspending further discussions of the project. 
Available details of what transpired at the meeting of 6 November draw attention 
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instead to the role of Darren Bennett. In chapter 4, I presented an analysis of the 
meeting of 4 July 1986 that identified Bennett's introductory statements and 
subsequent remarks as the critical scenic element containing that meeting's act of 
endorsing anti-mining resolutions. Unlike that theatre, here we have no video or 
transcript to show us what people said and did, but meeting notes suggest at least 
an equivalently scene-setting performance. Among those present, Bennett alone is 
mentioned by name and he is said to be representing the group in transmitting its 
wishes to the NLC: that the entire area affected by Bula had to be protected from 
mining, that Jatbula and Barraway did not want a big hole in Coronation Hill, and 
that the area should be transferred to Aboriginal ownership without a claims 
process. If any other J awoyn did in fact contribute to the discussion, it seems their 
contribution was in accord with this. 
While this interpretation of the theatre in train here can only refer to such 
incomplete appearances as the data affords, it can be supported with some historical 
review. I have already pointed to a precedent in Bennett's performance on 4 July 
1986, but the parallel there is more substantial. As discussed in chapter 4, Bennett 
had attended the first half of the meeting of 1 July, was surprised and unhappy 
when later advised of the pro-development decision reached, and called for NLC 
assistance at the subsequent meeting where he opened the way for the reversal of 
that decision. At an Authority meeting one week later, Bennett rationalised his 
position as a means of delaying development of Coronation Hill until a land claim 
gave the Jawoyn negotiating rights. Similarly here in November 1987, Bennett had 
been part of a small but important group of J awoyn, including Fordimail, J atbula 
and Barraway, that was present on the 5th to observe the day's discussions between 
the NLC and the project team at Coronation Hill and El Sherana, so he was aware 
of how far the project team had come to realising a mine on land that the J awoyn 
still did not own. The next day, he again sought to reverse that trajectory by 
framing the consultation event of 6 November as a theatre appropriate for a reading 
from the script of religious power and danger by the two senior men among the 
fifteen people present. As I have indicated, it is possible that not only the scene-
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setting, but the act of reading itself was left to him. 
If the appearance of such a parallelism after the passage of sixteen months and 
many intervening events seems too slight, it should also be noted that following the 
meetings of July 1986 Bennett withdrew from J awoyn Association affairs for 
eleven months to attend to other business, and attended neither committee meetings 
nor development consultations concerning Coronation Hill. He thus had no role in 
the series of theatres that allowed development to proceed regardless of stasis in 
Jawoyn legal standing. He then attended the meeting of June 1987 that instructed 
the NLC to lodge the land claim and invite BHP to enter negotiations. He had 
throughout this period cooperated with the project team in their liaison and good 
neighbour efforts. While, in common with all other local actors, he had limited 
influence on the larger processes in play, the totality of his interventions seem 
consistent with a desire to open all necessary doors leading, most importantly, to 
J awoyn land ownership, and to a mining agreement negotiated from that position of 
strength in the upper South Alligator valley. Indeed, Linke refers to 'continuing 
suggestions' (nd: 65) made by Bennett to the project team that the Joint Venture 
and the J awoyn approach the Federal Government to propose a mutual 
accommodation under which the land be transferred to J awoyn ownership without a 
claims process, and mining title be issued for Coronation Hill. In this view, his 
framing of the consultation events of 4 July 1986 and 6 November 1987 as theatres 
appropriate for a reading from the script of religious power and danger was 
motivated by a perception that progress towards those two goals was 
uncoordinated, and that the NLC advisors present should be instructed to advance 
land ownership and retard the progress of development. 
A few days after the Barunga meeting, Rush phoned Bennett to discuss its 
outcome. Bennett reported that the custodians had, with some unease, approved 
negotiations over Coronation Hill because it was located on leases that pre-existed 
any Aboriginal legal interest, but were less likely to approve development 
elsewhere in the Conservation Zone. The project team thus was given the 
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impression that the J awoyn were prepared to treat Coronation Hill as a separate 
case, while the NLC understood its instructions from that meeting to be that the 
J awoyn regarded Coronation Hill as part of Sickness Country, to be negotiated only 
if the government insisted it be treated separately. 
Theatricality continued: the project team · 
The Northern Land Council now regarded the Jawoyn Working Party as the 
appropriate channel through which all approaches regarding land and development 
issues should be made. The Party was created under the aegis of the privileged 
relationship that the NLC claimed with its J awoyn clients, and was the instrument 
by which the NLC hoped to contain the problem of multiple lines of 
communication and liaison. But while the NLC had succeeded in having 
development consultations suspended, thereby closing down the alternative source 
of authoritative instructions available to the Authority, it could not monopolise the 
creation of theatres. Later in 1988, when the Joint Venture sought to expand its 
activities and presented its El Sherana Exploration Programme (Kinhill nd) for 
public comment, the NLC commented in relation to the section dealing with 
Aboriginal heritage: 
In regard to the other J awoyn persons apart from the eight workers that 
CHJV may have held discussions with, it is pertinent to note the repeated 
complaints by J awoyn as to the methods of CHN consultation. In addition 
to collecting inappropriate groups and talking to younger persons, the 
situation has often been that persons consulted are not fully cognizant of the 
issues or eventualities of those discussions. 
The Primary representative body for Jawoyn is the Jawoyn Working Party 
whose responsibilities are to deal with all land and exploration/mining 
matters currently affecting Jawoyn. (NLC nd: 4) 
As the political dispute over Coronation Hill intensified, the Jawoyn Working Party 
provided a regular means of advice and coordination between the NLC and a senior 
cohort of Jawoyn decision-makers. Public statements from the NLC and 
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communications signed by Bennett or F ordimail for the J awoyn Association or the 
Working Party repeatedly represented the J awoyn collectively as the group 
responsible for the Conservation Zone area in Gimbat. The Josif Report of June 
1988 finalised the terms of their argument against development: that it was the 
J awoyn community that bore the stress and social detriment attendant upon any 
inappropriate interference with Sickness Country. 
Against its own background experience of routine cooperative engagement with the 
Jawoyn, the project team looked with suspicion and disbelief at statements to 
contrary effect represented as the Jawoyn position by the NLC, the Authority, or 
this new body. Since mid-1986, such points of dispute had concerned consents for 
development at Coronation Hill and matters of sacredness there and elsewhere in 
the Conservation Zone (see chapter 7). On each of these occasions, the project team 
had been able to refer back to its own record- of interactions with significant · 
individuals to substantiate its own perceptions, and in some cases to put contrary 
claims to such individuals for comment. In August and September 1987, the team 
found that the letter sent to the Authority instructing it to delay authorisation for 
blasting, and the Traditional Concerns report, were not understood by the J awoyn 
people said to have signed or been consulted about them. Most recently, following 
the instructions given at the J awoyn meeting of 6 November, the NLC Director, 
John Ah Kit, advised the project team that the Jawoyn wished to defer further 
negotiations over Coronation Hill until the Federal Government had decided final 
Conservation Zone policy. Peter Rush, who had already received contrary advice 
about that meeting from Bennett, pointed out that current policy regarded the two 
matters as .separate and there was no need for the former to depend on the latter. 
Arising from both the initial promising meeting we had on site on the 5th 
November and the views of the Jawoyn's as given to us previously, was the 
understanding that an agreement was of benefit to all parties and that 
discussions should continue. 
We are perplexed as to why the situation has apparently altered in such a 
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h · 105 s ort time. 
Just as officers of the Authority and the NLC expressed misgivings about cultural 
insensitivity and pressure exerted by the project team, so team officers, mystified 
by such developments as this; thought in terms of pressure being exerted upon the 
custodians or even outright fabrication of their statements. This they rationalised as 
arising either under the influence of conservationists or because such manipulation 
suited the interests of the NLC, which the team, especially Linke, perceived as 
unpopular with its Aboriginal constituency and not above the use of standover 
tactics. 
From pre-existing attitudes of mutual reserve exacerbated by a common tendency 
to interpret J awoyn contradictions as signs of manipulation, overt hostility emerged 
in 1988. By the end of the previous year, development consultations and agreement 
negotiations had been suspended, so the management processes that had at least 
sustained a level of practical communication between the organisations were 
absent. The changes that occurred in the early months of 1988 in the NLC's 
understanding of its instructions· and its consequent disposition towards the 
company 1neant that the project team's entire relationship with the Jawoyn now 
came under challenge, this time in more absolute terms than it had during the early 
stages of its liaison program. As the year progressed, aggravation and suspicion 
further intensified, especially around the issue of employment. While there is no 
room here to detail all the arenas of conflict, it is important to show how the 
certainties that the NLC settled upon through the means discussed above and in the 
previous chapter, were balanced by equivalent and opposite certainties within the 
project team. 
The solicitous attitude that all participants 1n this issue had taken towards the 
custodians is illustrated by the fact that at no time since contradictory testimony 
105 P.M.Rush, 2. 12.87, Letter to J.Ah Kit, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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had begun emerging had any of the senior J awoyn been confronted with evidence 
of their own or another's contradictions and asked to explain. Senator Zacharov had 
raised the problem at the Barunga hearing of the Senate Committee in March 1987, 
but had not pushed the question past Ray F ordimail to require a response from any 
of the seniors. There were a few other occasions on which the problem of 
inconsistencies had been raised in the presence of custodians, but as a complication 
that had implications for management of the issue rather than as a substantive 
question calling for resolution. The production of another video by the Sites 
Authority was taken by the project team as occasion to refer the problem of 
contradictions, if not directly to the senior custodians, at least to a J awoyn 
audience. 
Bulajang, meamng Bula Dreaming, was the second video produced by the 
Authority for the purpose of representing J awoyn concerns over matters of 
sacredness to policy-makers and the interested public. Following Shake Im This 
Country in 1986, Bulajang presented Sickness Country as 'an entire region which 
is sensitive' (ASSPA 1988), and argued against any mining being allowed there 
and for the cancellation of that section of the Conservation Zone inside the former 
Gimbat Station. Edited by Cooper, it put substantially the same case as had his 
Traditional Concerns report, enhanced here by appearances by the three senior 
custodians, Brovvn, J atbula and Barraway. It varied from that report, however, in 
not discussing the approvals that the J awoyn had given for development works at 
Coronation Hill, but rather representing them as being in a unilateral state of 
'conflict with the powerful interests of the mining industry'. This was indicative of 
the transition of Coronation Hill from an issue into a dispute that had taken place in 
late 1987 and early 1988. 
When the project team acquired a copy of Bulajang, Linke took advantage of the 
presence at El Sherana of some visiting J awoyn to put the matter to them. This was 
the team's first chance to test the veracity of the Cooper model of sacredness, but it 
also specifically broached the problem of contradictions from one custodian. The 
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staff organised a screening of the video one morning in the camp television room 
which was attended by three of the visiting group and three trainees. A 'very frank 
discussion' (Linke nd: 54) followed in which various people came and went. 
This was the first time that any of the Coronation Hill Joint Venture staff 
had sat down with any Jawoyn to openly discuss how claims such as these, 
made on behalf of the Jawoyn by the Authority and the NLC, in reports, 
videos and letters sent to the Government, contradicted the statements made 
to us by the J awoyn custodians and other J awoyn, and the approvals they 
and the Authority had given us to carry-out exploration activities at 
Coronation Hill and El Sherana. 
In the ongoing discussion of the "Bulaj ang" video which showed Nipper 
Brown stating that Coronation Hill was a sacred site and that this part of the 
South Alligator Valley was all "sickness country", I pointed out how this 
was very different to what Nipper had said to Foy [Leckie], the Jawoyn 
employees and myself on numerous occasions, as well as when he gave 
evidence to the Senate Hearing. 
Phyllis [Wiynjorrotj] said many times during the discussion that Nipper was 
not speaking true, and that what Nipper said on the video was different to 
what she knew. She added very strongly a number of times that she knew 
about her country and knew what was true - that there was only one very 
important sacred site, a Bula place, and that it was not at Coronation Hill, 
and that the Bula site was further up the valley, near Sleisbeck, and that 
there was "nothing all around". Willy Byers only agreed when questioned 
that what Nipper says on the video is not true, whereas Phyllis made strong 
comments which were voluntary. When asked, all the J awoyn agreed that 
the "sickness country" was not a true story. 
Foy and I then raised with the Jawoyn what we white people ·should do 
about this video which showed Nipper making these contradictory claims. I 
stressed that I did not want to make trouble for Nipper or see him pushed 
anymore. 
When I questioned why Nipper would say that the Bula country was 
everywhere and Coronation Hill was a Bula site, when Nipper and the other 
J awoyn had told me the opposite, our employees Mick Moreen and Larry 
Ah Lin said that the NLC pressured their people and gave them grog. The 
other young J awoyn men agreed that this sort of thing happened and that 
Nipper may have been pressured this way since they knew of it being done 
to the old men before. Foy Leckie, Jim Green and I said that this was 
dangerous ground, and we did not want to get involved in it. Phyllis did not 
speak about this subject at all. 
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I concluded saying that the Joint Venture staff would try to fight directly 
with our opponents like David Cooper and the NLC and avoid putting the 
J awoyn into the conflict situations, particularly Nipper. (Linke nd: 54-55) 
Given the location, the identity of the organisers and interlocutors and the tenor of 
their questions, this was plainly a theatre appropriate for a reading from the script 
of jobs and royalties. Perhaps in Wiynjorrotj's performance, given Linke's 
emphasis here on her comments being voluntary and his further reference to 
'Phyllis strongly stating that nobody can make her say things against her will' 
(Linke nd: 54), one might see her operating within the act-agent ratio, like Jatbula 
elsewhere, rather than the scene-act ratio that contained the other J awoyn present. 
Yet she was capable of equally voluntary and emphatic performances to the 
opposite effect in other theatres, as documented at the beginning of chapter 3. The 
significance of this theatre and others like it, however, is precisely that they 
provided external agencies like the project team with an escape from the 
theatricality that perplexed them by generating further theatricality. In so doing, in 
the respective understandings of each such agency they displaced the source of its 
troubles away from the J awoyn custodians and onto its organisational opponents. 
Thus it began to appear, as indeed some J awoyn insisted around this time, that this 
was not an Aboriginal dispute, but one between whitefellas and for the government 
to sort out. 
Two further occasions are documented in that year on which the project team was 
able to test Cooper's Sickness Country model directly with senior custodians. 
According to an account provided by Allen Linke to the Aboriginal Land 
Commissioner during the Jawoyn (Gimbat Area) Land Claim, in September 1988 
Sandy Barraway was among a Jawoyn group visiting the upper South Alligator 
valley and suggested to Linke a helicopter flight that would allow him to show the 
location of Bula. Barraway nominated four people, Linke and three Jawoyn, to 
come. He first directed the helicopter to land near a site located above Koolpin 
Creek, guided the group to a large gallery and indicated the point nearby where 
Bula had entered the ground. He emphasised that no exploration activity should 
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occur there, to which Linke replied that the project team's interests came nowhere 
near, and would remain at a distance. Barraway then directed the helicopter along 
the northern Gimbat escarpment and identified another site from the air. The 
helicopter returned to the river and flew upstream to Big Sunday, where Barraway 
pointed out an important feature, expressing anxiety that the helicopter keep some 
distance above the ground to avoid any disturbance. He then directed the flight 
across the Gimbat valley to the Sleisbeck site. After landing again, the group 
proceeded to the site centre and looked around a cluster of galleries. 
Ostensibly this remarkable exercise was instigated by Barraway for the purpose of 
presenting Linke with a series of extra-theatrical readings from the script of 
religious power and danger. Not only did he express concern that the Koolpin site 
not be disturbed by exploration and that the Big Sunday site not be disturbed even 
by walking, but Linke also noted his agitation at sighting a group of campers too 
close to the Koolpin site and a CSIRO camp too close to the Sleisbeck site. 
Barraway tried to demonstrate the seriousness of his concerns by showing these 
locations of power, and upon the return of the group to El Sherana he recounted _ 
what had been shown to other project team employees. Linke restated Barraway' s 
claims, and all agreed to observe the restrictions requested. Barraway then asked 
Linke to repeat the trip himself with Jim Green and three other J awoyn, so that they 
would know. 
However, while Barraway' s performance of his custodianship was intended to 
make the team employees aware of the nature of the region in which they were 
operating, by demarcating a number of no-go areas he left the rest of the country 
free. Barraway said there was nothing of concern at Coronation Hill, and responded 
to Linke's inquiries around Cooper's notion of Sickness Country in a manner that 
removed large stretches of country from the scope of religious power and danger. 
I asked whether there was some way that the sites were linked, or whether 
there was an area surrounding each of them that formed the Sickness 
Country idea. Sandy Barraway emphatically said that each place · was 
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separate, meaning an isolated centre of concern, not the total area covering 
these sites - nor was there any connection between them underground. He 
said Cooper did not know about the country's stories. (Linke nd: 63) 
In chapter 5, I discussed another instance of a semor custodian who chose to 
gratuitously reveal and discuss cultural knowledge, when the final decision against 
mining was announced. Merlan understood Brown in that instance to be enthused 
by the success of the custodians in sustaining their claims to the legitimacy of the · 
Bula tradition in the eyes of European political authority. Linke's understanding of 
Barraway's motivation was the same, this time operating within the terms of the 
opposite script. The day before Barraway suggested the helicopter trip, Senator 
Peter Cook, Minister for Resources, visited the project site. According to Linke, he 
held private discussions with the J awoyn employees and some senior J awoyn 
visitors, including Barraway, after which Barraway offered to show him the 
Christmas Creek art site. They flew there, and were joined later by Linke, who 
described the visit as 'very cordial and relaxed' (nd: 60). The following evening, 
Barraway 
said he would like to take me and others to see the "Bula site" .... He was 
in a very relaxed mood and talked of how pleased he had been in the 
interest Cook had shown in the Aboriginal concerns. (Linke nd: 60-61) 
I have spoken of Barra way's helicopter performance as being extra-theatrical, and 
remain undecided as to whether it would be more appropriate to consider it a 
theatre of Barraway' s own making. In any event, not long afterwards another 
consultation event occurred that was a theatre in the terms I have used, and in 
which Cooper's Sickness Country model was tested for the third time. In 
November 1988, Foy Leckie sat with Nipper Brovvn, Jerry Dempsey and Larry Ah 
Lin in front of a video camera at three locations in the upper South Alligator valley 
to ask again about places that were important to Aboriginal people. Brown, as one 
of the three senior c~stodians with respect to Coronation Hill, was the main object 
of Leckie ' s questions. The main part of the video was filmed at a crossing of the 
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South Alligator River near Koolpin Creek, about ten kilometres downstream from 
Coronation Hill. As Leckie mentioned a number of locations, Brown identified two 
as art sites which women should not visit, and one as an important Bula place. 
When Leckie asked about Sickness Country, Brown associated the notion of 
Sickness with three locations, the Sleisbeck site, Big Sunday and a location on the 
upper Katherine River where Peter Jatbula was born, and denied that there was any 
Sickness Country around their present location or further downstream. Compared 
to his characteristically lethargic responses on most of the tape, Brown became 












Well Nipper, what about that Coronation Hill, where we've 
got that work that we've done. You know that one? 
Yeah, I know, but that one, you can keep going. Nothing 
there, no Sickness. 
True, ay? 
Yeah, I savvy. Not that. Don't believe 'em. Jatbula, 
Barraway, nothing. They been talk them Sickness Country. 
Nothing. 
True, ay? So you haven't got any worries there Nipper? 
No, I don't worry. [unclear] That mine, you can work. 
[unclear] 
What if we want to dig him, dig him, you know, dig a big 
hole there? Is that all right? 
Yeah, you can dig him, that one. Nothing there. 
Nothing there, ay? 
Nothing, no. [unclear] But, you wanna dig 'im might be, 
well. It's all right, nothing there. 
We want to get that gold there. 
252 
Dispute and Theatricality 
Brown: Yeah. 106 
Jerry Dempsey concurred with Brown's statements. At the second filming point in 
the old pit at Coronation Hill, Brown confirmed that he had no problems with 
anything there. Finally in the El Sherana camp office, Leckie used the scale model 
of Coronation Hill to show visually what the 'big hole' would look like after the 
completion of mining. Brown said 'good'; Dempsey said 'better'. 
Theatricality continued: the Sites Authority 
In October 1988 the Sites Authority received a copy of a proposal prepared in July 
by the project team for a program of blasting, removal and sampling of material 
from existing benches on Coronation Hill. It appears that this was referred to the 
Authority not by the project team but pursuant to the inter-agency administrative · 
processes established to rnanage the Conservation Zone, and that the team itself 
regarded the new work as simply more of what had already been done pursuant to 
the approval for blasting they had received in August 1987. Ellis sought to defer 
consultation on the matter until the following year on the grounds that the level of 
political dissension over various aspects of the Coronation Hill issue was at that 
time too high to allow sober consideration to take place. By December the project 
team were becoming impatient. 
We would like to record our deep concern regarding your advice, especially 
your planned time frame. Although, as you pointed out, we would hope for 
a "yes" vote from the J awoyn community, our proposal is a continuation of 
the previous bench vvidening, and vve would expect J awoyn agreement to be 
+' 1· 107 a 1.orma 1ty. 
Ellis replied that the scale and nature of the new work did require fresh approval, so 
a meeting was ultimately arranged for 28 February at the Katherine Low Level 
106 B .H.P. Interviews, 8.11.88, Supervision Productions, video . 
107 J.F.Leckie, 8.12.88, Letter to R.Ellis, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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Reserve. When he also suggested that the meeting might not provide a final 
decision, the project team replied in terms that revealed again their confidence in 
the effectiveness of past consultations and the validity of approvals arising 
therefrom, and, unlike the Sites Authority (see chapter 7), their reliance on notions 
of precedent and consistency from one consultation event to the next. 
We are led to believe from recent discussions with Ray F ordimail ... that 
this meeting will resolve the bench widening proposal. We certainly do not 
see the meeting as an information session as we have had extensive 
discussions and on site briefings, and a blasting demonstration prior to last 
year's work. Many Jawoyn and most of the Working Party were present at 
those meetings. 108 · 
According to the project team's record, the meeting was attended by three members 
of the team and eight of its J awoyn employees, nearly thirty other J awoyn 
including the three senior men, Ellis and Cooper from the Authority and an NLC 
observer, Chips Mackinolty. Among the Jawoyn employees was Andy Andrews, 
who was employed in the project team's newly opened Katherine office and later 
emerged as a public advocate for the mine. Ellis introduced the matter as usual and 
a project team geologist followed, using an enlarged photograph to explain the 
drilling, sampling and blasting involved, and re1ninding those present of the 
blasting demonstration that some had witnessed in 1987. Ellis asked so1ne 
questions, then invited questions from the J awoyn. Barraway said he had repeatedly 
rejected development at many meetings and the work should not be allowed. The 
J awoyn then discussed the matter heatedly in private for twenty minutes and 
continued to do so after the full meeting reconvened. The whites left again, but 
Ellis was invited to stay. Upon reconvening a second time, the full gathering was 
told by Ellis that no decision could be reached and he would seek advice from the 
Authority. Andrews reported to the project team that Jatbula alone opposed the 
proposals. According to Leckie' s report of a subsequent phone discussion, 
108 J.F.Leckie, 24.2 .89, Letter to R.W.Ellis, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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Ellis' interpretation of the meeting was that Nipper Brown supported the 
bench widening, Sandy Barraway initially had doubts but later in the 
meeting came around to the view that ultimately the "white fellas" were 
going to make a decision to go ahead so he might as well go along with this 
decision now. Peter Jatbula was opposed. 
Ellis said he felt that the J awoyn were really asking him to make a 
decision. 109 
Mackinolty had attended none of the Authority's previous development 
consultations over Coronation Hill, and recalled that, 
the surprising thing about this was that split, and, I was really surprised. I 
mean throughout Jatbula was the one that's always been the firmest. 
There's never been any document anywhere, a thing that said he said 
'maybe' .... And this was one of the few times where Sandy really sort of 
did jump quite dramatically into the other camp .... It surprised me at the 
time. 110 
When Ellis raised the matter at the next Authority meeting, two of its Aboriginal 
members, the Chairman Musso Harvey and Wenten Rubuntj a, were delegated to 
'undertake informal discussions with the senior J awoyn custodians, in order to 
determine a genuine feeling on behalf of custodians with respect to the proposed 
bench sampling project' .111 They, with Ellis and Cooper, met with the three senior 
J awoyn custodians again at Low Level Reserve on 5 April. No notes or minutes of 
this meeting are available, but in another phone conversation with Leckie, 'Ellis' 
comment was that with aboriginal authority members conducting the meeting there 
was "a resounding no"' .112 Ellis called the outcome 'most unexpected' , 113 Leckie 
109 J.F.Leckie, 1.3 .89, Note to File: Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority, BHP/Newcrest 
Correspondence and Reports. 
11 0 Interview 7.6.94. 
111 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority, 10.3.89, Minutes of the Forty-Fourth Meeting, 
Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
112 J.F.Leck.ie, 13.4.89, Note to File: CHN ASSPA, BHP/Newcrest Correspondence and Reports. 
l 13 Ibid. 
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called it 'somewhat of a shock' .114 The Authority declined to approve the proposed 
works at its meeting on 7 April. 
Considered in theatrical terms, these two consultation events had put the same 
proposal to the same three custodians at the same place. Ellis and Cooper attended 
both meetings. The principal differences appear to have been the presence at the 
former of the kind of gathering usually collected for a development consultation, 
consisting of project team members, J awoyn employees and other J awoyn, and the 
familiar introductory scene-setting episodes of Ellis explaining the purpose of the 
exercise and the project team geologist, with computer simulations and 
photographic enlargement, keying the audience in once again to the underlying 
discourse of cumulative development at Coronation Hill. 
Mackinolty had had long experience of the J awoyn and comparative experience in 
NLC consultation processes, and his memories of this, his first Authority 
consultation, offer some interesting scenic detail. He noted that after the project 
team geologist had presented the work proposals, team members remained with the 
assembled group and continued to press their case during the public discussion 
period, withdrawing only when the J awoyn entered their own closed discussions. 
As well, no additional or alternative information on the proposed development was 
offered to the J awoyn from an independent source. Mackinolty favoured a more 
structured and separated arrangement that allowed the proponents of development a 
fixed opportunity to present their material to the J awoyn and another formal slot for 
presentation of independent advice. Such independent advice was part of NLC 
process, but the Authority did not have the same broad expertise on staff and, in 
any event, as Ellis had had cause to argue at other stages of the issue, the Authority 
was concerned with a more specific question than the NLC. Still, Mackinolty 's 
observations, and his sense of such meetings as 'very one-sided ', accentuate a 
condition of theatricality to which I have drawn attention, that the circumstances of 
114 F.Leckie, 14.4.89, Letter to R.W.Ellis, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
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a development consultation tended to align the scene with an underlying discourse 
of development. 
Mackinolty noted further how some scenic details took on a new appearance within 
the tensions now building around the issue. The continued employment of young 
Jawoyn men on the project, in particular, had been a focus of intra-Jawoyn debate 
and the subject of an especially tense community meeting in August of the previous 
year. The efforts of the project team in promoting the future employment potential 
of the project among Katherine area Aborigines had tended to tum employment 
into a focus around which a pro-mining interest group now circulated. Mackinolty 
describes how this manifested itself in the scene of the meeting of 28 February: 
And things were very factionalised then too, where you did have this camp 
of people brought down from El Sherana with their baseball caps and t-
shirts and so on, and the BHP mob, the whitefellas were standing with this 
sort of group around Andy and so on and it was very much an us and them 
situation. 
I guess it's something you can't put on paper too. It's all that body language 
things, you know. The meetings that I go to, everyone sits down, round a 
circle or however people v\rant to arrange themselves. People may or may 
not stand up to talk but then they sit down and so on, whereas the mode of 
the BHP people was always to be standing up and, sort of physically 
surrounding people a bit. At those sort of meetings all the El Sherana 
workers would be standing in one sort of block to one side and, the rest of 
it. There was nothing relaxed about the meetings. 115 
This theatre produced a selection of text similar in substance and tone to other such 
development consultations, with some quenes surrounding Barraway's 
performance. It was thus largely consistent with the expectations held by the 
project team on the basis of prior consultations. Allowing that it was held away 
from the project site, and that aspect of scenic difference may have given Barraway 
-
115 Interview 7 .6.94. 
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latitude for his apparently vacillating performance, the broad assent given to the 
development proposal, against J atbula' s continuing dissent, also appears to be 
generally in accord with the relationship of scenic similarity with other 
development consultations. 
At the second event, the majority of participants were replaced by two members of 
the Sites Authority, both senior men from their respective regions, Borroloola and 
Alice Springs, and there were no visual props. This theatre produced a different 
reading. In the next section I address the question of the scenic effect of the 
presence of senior men of other language groups at theatres concerned with 
Coronation Hill. 
Non-Jawoyn law-men: theatricality transcended? 
Just as Cooper's dissent from the sequence of development approvals was based on 
his view that the consultation process had failed to penetrate to an underlying local 
J awoyn sentiment against mining, so he felt that the NLC' s steps towards 
negotiations. in late 1987 were being internally influenced by officers who had little 
local contact, but were simply proceeding according to formal instructions as they 
would in any other situation. J osif, returning to J awoyn affairs at the end of 1987 as 
an NLC consultant, also had reservations about the formal processes by which the 
issue had been managed. From his perusal of the files he believed that consultations 
had been rushed and, citing the analogy of the legal rules of evidence intended to 
protect Aboriginal defendants in criminal cases, that the custodians' expressions of 
assent to development, recorded in the presence of miners and other authority 
figures, were not safe. Moreover, Josif and Cooper joined the view that the resolve 
of the senior custodians was being weakened by the fatalism of their own advisors 
with respect to likely outco1nes over Coronation Hill. Josif commented that there 
were very few individuals who 'kept faith' 116 with the senior J awoyn men 
116 Interview 29 .4.94. 
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throughout. Mackinolty, an NLC officer during the late 1980s, was another 
concerned with the way existing processes of issue management had produced 
weariness over endless consultation and the stress of internal political division 
among the J awoyn. He was however the least inclined to discriminate between 
authentic and inauthentic texts from the custodians by appeal to secondary factors. 
He rather emphasised the context of each consultation event, especially the factor 
of the organising party, in a manner closely approximating my notion of theatres. 
Approaching the start of the Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry in early 
1990, he believed that management processes to date had obscured and confused 
rather than clarified the custodians' genuine feelings about Coronation Hill, and 
like Cooper and Josif, he saw the involvement of women in meetings to do with the 
exclusively male domain of Bula as a long-standing flaw in those processes. 
As the Coronation Hill dispute intensified during 1988 and 1989, people such as 
these who supported the J awoyn custodians in what they believed to be their 
genuinely anti-mining position began thinking about moving beyond the 
organisational relationships that had so far dominated management of the issue, and 
mobilising men from neighbouring language groups to provide assurance to the 
three J awoyn seniors that they had support from others who shared their 
understanding of the power of Bula. The idea was about trying to create at least one 
moment when governance of the issue was returned to an entirely Aboriginal 
domain, away from all the parties and processes that had, by reason of political or 
administrative necessity, so constrained and framed the participation of the relevant 
Aborigines that their authority was being smothered and their truth lost. Action on 
this idea was frustrated by limitations of time and resources. Then as the RAC 
Inquiry began in mid-1990, Josif and Mackinolty, operating as part of a Jawoyn 
Research Group that had put itself at the disposal of the J awoyn Association, 
organised a meeting on the creek at Barunga consisting solely of men and 
addressed by a number of senior non-J awoyn ritual leaders. This group declared 
itself opposed to mining. For those with misgivings about past consultation 
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practices, and especially as expressed by Josif, this was a moment of truth. 
89-90 was when I actually facilitated a meeting of some sixty senior men, 
who were hand-picked by the J awoyn custodians, those three particular 
custodians, who attended a business gathering, I don't want to call it a 
meeting because it wasn't a meeting, which was held purely by Aboriginal 
people, this was held at just on the creek there at Barunga. And they 
decided unilaterally that 'this thing was completely ·wrong, and here's what 
we say, and why wasn't this done a long time ago?' So basically they were 
saying 'look all this other stuff, these working parties and all the rest of it, 
has been irrelevant, and it hasn't had a lot of power because it's been 
wrong, and we've got to deal with this in a cultural way'. And they were 
only too glad to lend their total and unanimous support to fight the whole 
business, to defend to look after those Bula sites .... 
And in fact that decision was conveyed immediately to the Ministers and all 
these other kinds of people. But that was when the resolve really was made 
clear in an Aboriginal way as opposed to sort of these constructs of working 
parties and anthropologists explaining for and politicians fact-finding and 
all the rest of that, which was by and large a separate way of dealing with 
things, it was a fire-fighting method. And it was responding to this 
continual question, you know, about mining at Guratba, 'can we do it?'. 
The question was continually asked. And the answer was never acceded to, 
whereas in this solid group of appropriate men, it was quite clear the 
position the people had and why they had it. And it was kind of a big relief 
after that happened. 117 
Josif here contrasts this 'business gathering' involving men from surrounding 
Arnhem Land language groups with the various theatres through which the issue 
had been managed until then. Those other events were 'meetings', 'a separate way 
of dealing with things ', management instruments intended to consider specific 
proposals. 
I'd suggest the way in which consultations were conducted, were just 
consultations. As in, 'I'm the doctor and I'm telling you, does it hurt when I 
press you here?' There was no real dialogue that was ever conducted .... 
117 Interview 29.4.94. 
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The whole system was not geared to competently and comprehensively deal 
with this across-cultural matter. 118 
The Barunga business gathering, on the other hand, was the right kind of arena in 
which to deal with this kind of issue, one in which a culturally true position, 
consistent with what the senior custodians really felt, could be enunciated. 
People said 'yes' to the mining company, then they said 'yes' to the land 
council. But then, privately, when you just spoke with people just quietly 
and privately, those three custodians on their own, and when a group of that 
sixty-odd very senior people, those custodial holders, and the ceremony 
people, were left alone. Chips and I absented ourselves from that, we went . 
away. All _we did was just facilitate the gathering, and we went away. And 
then we did the cooking after, basically. Now, in those kinds of 
circumstances, people were adamantly saying, those responsible people, 
were adamantly saying 'no' .119 
For J osif, this was a moment of liberation from the alien pressures of liaison, 
lobbying, and consultation, when the custodians could say what they truly felt. 
Similarly, with respect to the final development proposal discussed in the last 
section, Cooper contrasted the first consultation, a conventional theatre in the 
presence of various parties which led to an uncertain outcome, with the second, a 
private talk between the custodians and the Authority members, away from the site 
and the project team, which ended development work at Coronation Hill. Cooper's 
claim distinguishes context that produced an invalid text from context that 
· produced a valid text. Josif seems to go further, to see in the Barunga creek 
gathering a unity in an act of Aboriginal solidarity that obliterates the separation 
between text and context. Both these approaches are founded in acceptance of the 
script of religious power and danger as that to which the three senior men were 
committed as a culturally authentic bottom line with respect to Coronation Hill, 
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They just said 'Look, this can't happen because of these reasons and that's 
it. No rnatter that there is opposition by certain members. But it doesn't 
matter, they can have their own view. But we have the primary 
responsibility, we have the last say'. And that was the point, and it's a very 
powerful cultural force, if you want, that 'We have the last say, and anyone 
else can say whatever they want, they can argue, they can do anything, but 
really, there's nothing that can alter the fact that we're responsible'. And 
that was the point which everything else continually tripped over, because 
people tried to change their minds on an issue that they couldn't change 
h . . d 120 t eir min son. 
A theatrical approach that refuses such a priori commitment, but that treats the data 
of the relationship between context and text, or between scene and act, as the 
relevant grounds from which to begin an analysis of motivation, will find other 
possibilities in the gathering of senior law-men at Barunga, or in the encounter with 
Authority members. 
What kind of scene was constituted by the presence of non-J awoyn ritual leaders at 
Barunga? When Mackinolty and Josif organised that gathering, they were acting 
from prior knowledge of the relationships that governed religious business in south-
west Arnhem Land. Commenting on his experience in the region since 1981, 
Mackinolty recalled the responsibilities assumed by men of neighbouring language 
groups in J awoyn affairs. Since the death of a prominent J awoyn ceremonial figure 
in about 1980, religious performance at Barunga and Beswick had been conducted 
for J awoyn by Rembarmga and N galkbon men. This included life-cycle rituals for 
initiations and funerals, and the major regional events of Kunapipi and 
Y abuduruwa. Cultural education at Barunga school was conducted by two men, 
again Rembarmga and Ngalkbon, while the paintings on the walls of the school 
,vere done by Mayali and Djinang artists. Even senior J awoyn men, while they had 
in most cases attended important ceremonies, were not principals in their 
organisation and conduct. 
120 Ibid. 
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Moreover, these neighbours were conscious of the danger of inappropriate activity 
in the area of the Bula dreaming. I mentioned in chapter 2 the concern, recorded by 
Maddock at Beswick in 1964, of two Ngalkbon men with respect to a Bula site, 
probably at Big Sunday. Similarly, Mackinolty knew of deaths among non-Jawoyn 
people of the region being attributed to BHP's activities at Coronation Hill. 
Just before the 1988 Barunga festival, I'd been up, based at Barunga for 
about three weeks beforehand sort of organising. This was the big one 
where [Prime Minister] Hawke came up and promised a treaty and so on. 
There was a Y abuduruwa at Beswick. And I went up and camped, not at the 
business camp but just at the general camp, sort of two or three nights 
leading up to that. ... Now there was an earth tremor that morning, and the 
next day Mick Painter died, and people attributed that to interference in 
Bula country. And there was attribution of a number of deaths through that 
period ... to BHP' s involvement in the area. And that was coming from 
people like [several senior non-Jawoyn men] .... Mick Painter, he was, he 
wasn't a Jawoyn, but he was a very long-term resident, a very respected 
.d B 1 . d 121 -res1 ent at arunga over a ong peno . 
The presence of senior non-J awoyn ceremony men at the Barunga creek meeting in 
1990 brought into the scene of that theatre an historical circumference of 
established and practised religious authority vis-a-vis the J awoyn. That presence 
was implicitly coercive in the abstract in that it embodied an authoritatively 
Aboriginal discourse on questions of ultimate power, to which any participating 
Aborigine would feel obliged to accede. More concretely, it consisted of a set of 
individuals who carried the symbolic weight of high religious practice within the 
J awoyn social universe, and who themselves felt the consequences of any perceived 
failure of J awoyn responsibility to the Bula sites. In other words, their presence as a 
scenic factor amounted to a compelling theatrical gesture towards a reading from 
the script of religious power and danger by the custodians. 
If it seems ungenerous to replace Josif's view of the Barunga meeting as a moment 
of benign solidarity by the image of a theatrical transaction dominated by a 
121 Interview 7.6.94. 
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currency of hard law, it is instructive to consider Peter J atbula' s view of the uses of 
non-Jawoyn spiritual power. The first time I met Jatbula was two months after the 
commencement of the Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry into the now 
reduced Kakadu Conservation Zone. 122 My questions to him began in a general and 
unfocussed way, but J atbula soon turned to what was on his mind. Andy Andrews 
was by that time known as · the activist representative of a pro-mining 'faction' 
among the J awoyn, the size of which seemed to vary with circumstance and the 
observer, but was taken to consist most clearly of the project team Jawoyn 
employees and some of their family members. At the final development 
consultation at Katherine Low Level in February 1989, Andrews had argued to 
Ellis that majority opinion at the meeting in favour of the project team's proposals 
should carry the day. In late 1989 he had sent a petition to the Prime Minister with 
signatures from Katherine area Aborigines in support of the mine, and now he 
sought more signatures as the RAC Inquiry approached. 
Jatbula was aware of this petition, and aware also that the RAC comm1ss1oners 
would be meeting in the forthcoming months with J awoyn people to directly 
ascertain the Aboriginal view of the Coronation Hill project. Up to this time, 
J atbula had become acquainted with some male Aboriginal members of the Sites 
Authority123 on three occasions when Ellis had sought their assistance in consulting 
with the Jawoyn, most recently at Katherine Low Level Reserve in April 1989 (see 
above). He knew that these men were watching to see the outcome at Coronation 
Hill, and that they could call up the deadly power of dreamings from their own 
countries in a way that J awoyn could not. If a meeting of J awoyn before the RAC 
commissioners ignored his warnings and voted for mining, and their numbers 
carried the day, then a moment of accounting would follow. 
122 In October 1989, the Federal Government decided that the Conservation Zone would be reduced 
from its original size of about 2250 sq krns to 47.5 sq kms, consisting of two adjacent parcels of 
land from El Sherana to Coronation Hill. At the same time it decided the Resource Assessment 
Commission would inquire into future management options for that remnant area. Its Inquiry ran 
from April 1990 to April 1991. 
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That nother mob from Western Australia, and Alice Spring and Borroloola, 
when they give me, they asking me 'why you been sell your culture?', if 
they say that, then I tell 'em 'here, here's the paper, this mob been make 
decision, not me'. All right. They do something. 124 
J atbula proposed to use the petition and the minutes of the meeting to identify the 
people who voted for mining to the Authority members. He anticipated they would 
back him up, that they would return to their countries and visit retribution by 
sorcery upon each individual Jawoyn who had usurped his right to speak for 
Coronation Hill. There was nothing benign about the deployment of such power. 
J atbula' s preference for turning to the Authority members rather than the more 
local men who Josif and Mackinolty gathered on the creek at Barunga probably 
arose from the personal inclination he had always shown to keep apart from the 
Barunga community. His independent character was nowhere so sturdily · 
demonstrated as during the events around Coronation Hill, when he struggled first 
to sustain the integrity, and later to impose the authority, of performances within 
Burke's act-agent ratio. Whatever success or failure he had experienced in 
influencing the selection of texts in a succession of theatres, he would not now 
ignore a challenge from among the J awoyn to what he considered his pre-eminent 
right to tell white authority what should happen at Coronation Hill. Any J awoyn 
person that supported the wrong thing, by voting for mining, would be found out. 
I'm the bloke, the boss. I've just been make decision. But no, they put me 
one side, they longa front. Well that man looking for graveyard. 125 
In the last section I discussed the two Authority consultations at Katherine Low 
Level that dealt with the project team's final development proposals, but offered a 
theatrical interpretation of only the first. I left in abeyance the question of how the 
123 Now re-named and re-constituted by new legislation as the Aboriginal Areas Protection 
Authority. 
124 Interview 26.6.90. 
12s Ibid. 
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scene of the second, involving two Authority members in place of the project tea1n, 
its workers and other J awoyn, might be accountable for the different outcome, the 
'resounding no' from the three custodians. Jatbula's understanding of the 
disposition of the Authority men towards this issue now suggests the character of 
that scene at Katherine Low Level in April 1989 as perceived by the custodians, 
and how it contained their act in choosing that 'resounding no' as the appropriate 
text for that theatre. 
To return to the gathering on the creek at Barunga, we do not know what was said, 
whether any retribution was threatened or even implied. But even while J osif 
prefers to represent that meeting in an idiom of support for and solidarity with the 
custodians, there is important common ground between our interpretations of the 
event. He emphasises that the position put forward there was not a matter of 
individual volition or preference, but one of cultural imperatives. It was a theatre 
that offered no choice but to tell what mattered most. 
They couldn't accept, no-one could accept that people said 'no', and the fact 
that it was a non-negotiable position, like the bottom line had been arrived 
at, was very hard for politicians and bureaucrats to swallow, and the mining 
industry. And that was the big difficulty. It was just an incredible cultural 
clash at that point of, like, 'You can't negotiate any more. Sony. This is the 
end of it. And we can't give away anything. This is, this is the bottom 
1. , 126 1ne. 
There is power at play in this, located in a discourse of traditionality that 
commands adherence. Josif sees the script of religious power and danger as one 
that, by its own terms, must be selected. He thus understands the text he invokes in 
this passage as a sign of a compelling interiorised allegiance to that script by the 
custodians, who 'can't give away anything'. I locate power rather in the conditions 
of theatricality, in Burke's relationship of containment between a scene that 
included a number of speakers who, for the Jawoyn, had long carried the mantle of 
126 Interview 29 .4.94 . 
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an authoritative Aboriginal centre, and the custodians' act of selection from the 
script recommended by that gathering. Taken as a product of one event among the 
many over the preceding four years that I have reviewed in this thesis, J osif' s 
conjectured text is no more legitimately treated as transcendent of context than any 
other. Indeed, elsewhere Josif acknowledges that the potential that Jatbula saw in 
the intervention of Authority men from distant countries was relevant also to 
Jawoyn awareness of being watched by their Arnhem Land neighbours. In his 1988 
report to the NLC, he found a warning of payback killings and sorcery implicit in 
the interviews he had conducted with non-Jawoyn men at Beswick (Josif 1988: 11). 
Indeed, if I am correct in seeing that context as compelling, then the historical 
motivations for the script of religious power and danger that I explored in chapter 5 
are of correspondingly reduced salience in this theatre. I wrote there of the 
custodians' implicit act of choosing to align themselves with a future political 
trajectory by realising a particular set of values from Coronation Hill. Here, that 
seems less clear than an act of deferential endorsement when, as on the creek at 
Barunga or ih small meetings with Authority members, the power of the script is 
personally embedded in the scene of the theatre. 
Conclusion 
Theatricality then, did not disappear when the Coronation Hill issue became a 
dispute in early 1988. As the custodians continued to select text appropriate to their 
interpretation of each theatre, so each external agency understood the readings it 
was given to signal an identity of purpose between the Jawoyn and itself. Jawoyn 
theatricality thus sustained two opposed and disconnected processes of political 
involution, and across the fence that now separated them, the contending 
organisations became entrenched. 
As my account has shown, such an outcome was not inevitable. The dispute was 
not a necessary outcome of ideological conflict at the organisational level. The 
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weave of individual commitment and passion through the structures engaged with 
Coronation Hill was a sometimes potent source of contingency, but it was at times 
aligned with, weighed against or at a loose end within the larger policy or strategic 
logics to which organisations as a whole were required to orient themselves, and 
both of these were subject also to the continuing effort to understand what the 
J awoyn were thinking. The durability, through various -political and policy phases, 
of the status of the custodians as an authoritative Aboriginal centre within the 
formal processes of issue management, caused much to be focussed on them. Their 
role was played out primarily through a long series of interactions with other 
agencies and individuals, most importantly in the form of consultation events that I 
have analysed as theatres. 
But while I have denied any unilateral interpretation of the custodians' values and 
motivations, the field does not therefore consist of only complexity and 
unpredictability. While the multiplicity of agents and elements that could bear upon 
such events was another common source of contingency, Burke's formulations of 
the dynamics at play allow structure and process to be seen. And while the refusal 
of the custodians to adhere to a consistent selection of script speaks to a 
fundamental indeterminacy in their apprehension of the issue, it too has identifiable 
dimensions in the relationship between J awoyn historical concerns and the distinct 






Texts and authenticity 
At the beginning of chapter 3 I commented that the debate over Coronation Hill 
was conducted as a secondary discourse, that is as a contest between the 
understandings held by several external agents about a primary discourse notionally 
located among the J awoyn. Both the Authority and the project team had sought to 
offer policy-makers direct access to J awoyn statements by the use of video, and 
those policy-makers themselves, as members of the Senate Inquiry and later the 
Resource Assessment Commission or as individual Federal Ministers, came north 
to question Aborigines directly. But video footage and transcripts of testimony 
were never allowed to stand alone. They were accompanied by contextualising 
documents or challenged by secondary commentary, presented by one or other of 
these external agencies. This repetitive and competitive exercise in the 
recontextualisation or recentreing of texts (Hanks 1989: 6; Bauman and Briggs 
1990: 74-75) made up an intermediate level of political process by which the 
external agencies involved in managing the Coronation Hill issue attempted to 
make a persuasive connection between the first level of process that I have 
analysed in this thesis, and the final level that was carried on through inquiry 
reporting, parliainentary debate, and Cabinet decision-making. The scope of this 
thesis does not extend to any detailed consideration of these intermediate and final 
levels, but to the extent that they were conducted as evaluations of representations, 
or re-sayings for the J awoyn of what the J awoyn had said, they too were 
accompanied by claims for the authenticity of the re-sayings based on the quality of 
communication achieved at consultation events. 
Conclusion 
That the J awoyn position and performance in this issue had an insistent appearance 
of fluidity and indeterminacy is illustrated by how widely such claims for 
authenticity and effective communication needed to be made. Joe Callanan, the 
former Gimbat pastoralist, asserted that same pioneer's knowledge of the area that 
Joe Fisher did, challenged the accuracy of more recent anthropological accounts of 
language and culture in contexts such as land claims, and repudiated J awoyn 
concerns about Coronation Hill. 
There's one thing I must tell you, with blackfellas. They are quite smart. If 
they know full well that you know nothing about blackfellas and their habits 
and their traditions, they'll tell you exactly what they want you to believe. If 
they can bullshit to you mate they will. [On a point of dispute with an 
anthropologist,] I said 'I learnt the lingo from growing up with them, 
hunting with them, blooming playing with them, and ... you know, you'd 
learn. And that way' I said 'they tell you the truth. 'Cause' I said 'you lot, 
they'll tell you anything they like to teJl you because you don't know 
bloody difference' .... I said 'you believe 'em', I said 'they're happy that 
you believe 'em, they're happy. They've pulled the wool over your eyes ... 
. You take it from somebody that been born and reared with them. Fight 
their spear games and their boomerang games and the whole flaming works 
with them. I was noted around this country as being a bloody white 
blackfella' .127 
In the immediate aftermath of the Davis inquiry in 1986, Bob Collins, then Leader 
of the NT Labor Party, was asked by an ABC journalist: 
ABC: Now we have at least three groups of people talk to the Aborigines 
at Katherine and around Coronation Hill if we count the Sacred Sites 
Authority, yourselves and Steven Davis. How can anybody be sure 
that anybody has the truth about how those people feel? 
COLLINS: John, it's difficult. The only reason - I might add - it is 
something I was very conscious of which is why I did it very quietly 
indeed without any upfronting, but I guess I have a distinct 
advantage, certainly over Steven Davis which is why I was able to 
do it in that the people I was talking to are people I have known for 
twenty years and indeed some of the J awoyn people I can still 
127 Interview 21.7.90 . 
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remember, and indeed they remember me working with them, 
certainly nineteen years ago when I first worked in Katherine so 
they are people I have known for a very long time and it-wasn't a 
question of sort of approaching them as Leader of the Opposition. It 
was just a situation that I was able to sit down with them in a private 
house in fact, in Katherine for half a day and just talk the whole 
thing through very quietly. 128 
In their report to the NLC at the politically unsettled time of January 198 8, J osif 
and Merlan emphasised the pains they took in approaching the question of 
Coronation Hill with the senior custodians. 
Despite what appears to some others to have been their concessions, long 
unhurried attempts to elicit their views in what we hope and believe was an 
unbiased way reveals that these people are deeply opposed to the mining. 
(J osif and Merlan nd: 4) 
Commenting in retrospect on this and his subsequent work on the issue, J osif 
added: 
I didn't care whether they said yes or no. I just cared that what they said 
was what they really meant. ... But professionally I was really concerned 
that there was no real consultation that had occurred. And I actually saw 
that, ' 88, that work from then, as being kind of the final word. 129 
Finally, in February 1991 the Resource Assessment Commission's draft report gave 
J awoyn concerns a central place in its consideration of the issue and found that the 
senior custodians were unequivocally opposed to mining. Answering questions at 
the National Press Club, the head of the Commission, Mr Justice Stewart, 
denied the commission had placed the Aboriginal people under any pressure 
during the RAC inquiry, saying many different groups and individuals were 
interviewed. 
128 Transcript, 12.8.86, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority files. 
129 Interview 29.4.94. 
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"I feel in my heart of hearts that there was no undue pressure," he said. 
(Cooper 1991) 
An interpretation of the J awoyn role that takes the theatrical frame as its central 
explanatory metaphor will have no appeal to those so convinced, because it is an 
affront to their own experience. Though Callanan, Cooper, Collins, Rush, Linke, 
J osif and others held flatly opposed views about sacredness and mining in the 
Gimbat area, one thing they had in common was a conviction as to the authenticity 
of their own experiences of the Aboriginal word. It is a corollary of my argument 
about theatricality that all those who sought to represent an Aboriginal view on this 
issue could honestly and for the most part reasonably claim to have, in the course 
of careful and thorough consultation, elicited from the custodians genuine 
expressions of both pro- and anti-mining sentiments. My own interpretation is an 
attempt to respect the totality of those expenences and to make sense of their . 
incompatibility. 
In other words, my disagreement with each of the external parties that sought to 
advocate one or other interpretation of the J awoyn position is limited. I do not 
contest the truth of the story each side heard, only that the truth value claimed had 
any reliable status outside the context in which it was asserted, or to put it another 
way, that either story was an exclusive or exhaustive statement of the position of an 
authoritative Aboriginal centre with respect to the questions of sacredness at 
Coronation Hill and the acceptability of the mining proposal. 
The failure of the challenge to the Sites Authority and its legislation in 1986 
preserved the position of the senior custodians in the management of this issue. It 
meant that the ongoing problem of documented contradictory testimony could not 
disqualify them from their status as bearers of an authoritative Aboriginal discourse 
to which all contending external agencies must have resort. In the face of contrary 
representations of t~e Jawoyn perspective, each contending party worked more 
carefully, repetitively, or extensively to validate by documentation the position that 
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it understood the custodians to genuinely hold. In addition, each agency sought to 
invalidate opposing testimony by questioning the integrity of the circumstances of 
its elicitation. 
But in the end, the corpus of texts leaves an impression of distance, that after all 
that activity the minds of the custodians were still not known. As agents of the 
policy process occupying different points in the structures of issue management, 
various interlocutors grasped the texts that the custodians produced as tokens of 
some unified interiorised state of belief and being, reified them and argued about 
them. In the face of dispute, these interlocutors constantly returned to the 
custodians to elicit more texts to reassure themselves that they had achieved some 
connection with that interiorised state, but the persistence of contradiction as 
interpreted through theatricality shows that all any of them ever had was a sample 
bag of texts in which they had to assume the custodians had invested something of 
themselves. 
I do not wish to deny that assumption, only to question the status - the wholeness, 
reliability, position - of the custodial self being invested. Goffman, at least in his 
later work, offers an approach to locating the self amongst the data of performance. 
He places it as an underlying generator of the variable expressions seen in all the 
roles that are played. 
There is a relation between persons and role. But the relationship answers to 
the interactive system - to the frame - in which the role is performed and 
the self of the performer is glimpsed. Self, then, is not an entity half-
concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for managing oneself 
during them. (Goffman_ 1975: 573) 
If only a changeable formula, then this conception of self, and any model of 
theatricality built around it, leaves us agents with no stable interior life. Giddens 
(1988: 278) comments that 'Goffman makes it clear enough that there is a unitary 
person behind the roles that are played in the diversity of social contexts, but his 
discussion of this self tends to be very rudimentary indeed'. Collins calls this 
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self the 'core motivational unit', or 'a thread through all the various selves which 
are enacted', before adding: 
But this in tum spins off many levels of self-presentation, performative 
exigencies, frame breaks, transformations, and so forth, which differentiate 
the stances of many "selves", most of them quite temporary. The 
underlying, motivating "self' has no enduring description, but is simply the 
human capacity for negotiating all these performances and transformations. 
(Collins 1988: 57-58) 
Goffman offers us another passage, however, in which he invests the self with 
something more. 
Our understanding of people seems to be linked to a tacit theory of 
expression or indication. We assume that there are such things as 
relationships, feelings, attitudes, character, and the like, and that various 
acts and postures somehow intentionally -or unintentionally provide direct 
evidence concerning these things. But the position can be taken that in the 
main what exists are doctrines regarding expression, gestural equipment for 
providing displays, and stable motives for encouraging certain imputations. 
It could then be granted that certainly feelings, relationships, and attributes 
can be faked and that indications can be provided in absence of their proper 
referent. ... But what is real in each case, it could be argued, is merely a 
differently grounded - usually more stable and more acceptable - motive 
for maintaining a particular appearance. And insofar as this is the case -
insofar, for example, as a personal relationship can be defined as a coalition 
between two players to provide each other with expressions of the existence 
of a desirable bond - then, of course, two-person worlds are vulnerable 
indeed. The indication that each party provides the other that nothing 
whatsoever could break them apart is itself the substance, not the shadow, 
and should the motives of either or both change in this matter of supporting 
a particular appearance and encouraging a particular imputation, then the 
displays themselves can be very quickly altered. 
(Goffman 1975: 462-63 - italics in original) 
The assumption made by the various external interlocutors that the custodians ' 
texts represented something of the custodians' selves is thus, for Goffman, the 
inescapable conditio_n of all human interaction, one of his 'vulnerabilities of 
experience'. While this passage shows us a Goffman who treats people as tacticians 
first and last (Giddens 1988: 278), it 
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performances registered by the custodians in the theatres of Coronation Hill, in 
which the displays could indeed very quickly alter from one event to the next. It is 
an apt analysis not for the tactics, but for his emphasis on expressions as the sole 
available data, and their genesis in 'what is real in each case'. This passage 
rehearses the structure of Part 2 of this thesis. There I began with the custodians' 
choice of text from the script of religious power and danger in this theatre, and 
from the script of jobs and royalties in that (the sole available data), then looked 
back to find · the differently grounded motivations for each script in the 
experientially intertwined, but analytically separable, themes of J awoyn history 
(what is real in each case). 
Jawoyn agency: what is real? 
While my analysis must look backwards from the data, I am proposing that the 
J awoyn looked forward. The argument rests on my inability to discern any grounds 
for prioritising what they saw as the implications of mining, or not mining, 
Coronation Hill. Here my position differs in different ways from the protagonist 
positions in the dispute. Despite the site registration, the miners were never 
convinced that Coronation Hill fell within the geographical range of concerns about 
religious significance in the Gimbat area, and they were thus confident that, left to 
themselves, the senior J awoyn ( except J atbula) would continue to favourably assess 
the project in the light of observable benefits accruing from it. There is no serious 
issue acknowledged here about an intra-indigenous weighing of values. My 
disagreement with this position is therefore simple. 
My disagreement with the other side, as acknowledged in discussions with its more 
thoughtful advocates, emerges as the net effect of a dialogue of mutual concessions 




seems to be greater acknowledgement on this side130 of the complexities and 
imponderables that permeated the Aboriginal articulation with this development 
proposal, and a more willing admission that the Aboriginal position that they 
worked to in the end had not been the unilateral position of all individuals 
throughout. This view recognises both religious concerns and material inducements 
arising from the Coronation Hill proposaL Josif, for example, recalls, 
Nipper actually said to me once, he said 'I'm getting old now, ... I want to 
have a bit of good life, you know, I want to be comfortable a bit.' ... He 
was living under terrible conditions in ... the Compound at Pine Creek 
before it was done up. All he's known is hardship. And he was feeling old, 
and not looked after, and I think that, you know, responsibility for the 
b . · · 131 1gger group was waning at times. 
For people such as Josif and Mackinolty, settling on a determinate view of 
Aboriginal priorities in this issue was a matter of referring back to their own 
experience of the J awoyn prior to 1985, before Coronation Hill emerged as an 
issue. They both worked in Katherine in 1981 for Mimi Arts and Crafts, an 
organisation offering a commercial outlet to Aborigines as well as cultural research 
and advocacy. Mackinolty recalled hearing incidental comments from senior 
Arnhem Land people from whom he bought paintings in places such as Beswick, 
referring to the Gimbat area as one of danger, and linking it to other sites far to the 
east. Josif was contracted by the Sites Authority to carry out a quick site survey and 
inspect the extent of Mobil's exploration activities in the north of Eva Valley, from 
which he recalls 'I had never seen such an incredible concern about a site or site 
complex amongst people' .132 Soon after, Josif, as the first NLC field officer 
stationed in Katherine, again observed J awoyn concerns with respect to the Bula 
area during research trips for the J awoyn (Katherine Area) Land Claim. 
130 This has to be a tentative finding. While I was able to have lengthy conversations with several 
people who held this view, few miners agreed to be interviewed. Rush and Leckie were among 
those who refused and Linke was uninterested, so I have been more confined to the documentary 
sources in representing their position. 
131 Interview 29.4.94. 
132 Ibid. 
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Such experiences grounded the judgment of these observers that a priority within 
J awoyn concerns was discernible, that culturally proper management of religious 
power and danger was their 'bottom line'. The material rewards that they could 
anticipate from a mine, and the packaging of that anticipation in the benign 
fellowship of BHP project team officers, worked upon the J awoyn to compromise, 
dilute, and lure them away from that original commitment. 
I would · say that yes, there is on the record a whole lot of contradictory 
assertions about whether that area should be mined or not. But I think the 
bottom line always came through, where at the last minute or whatever, 
without any interference from outside, that no, this can't really happen, 
because the consequences just are too bad in the cold light of day. It just 
can't happen. 133 
In this view, the managemenr of country in the Bula area had to be determined in 
the end by the unilateral endogenous force of tradition. Instead, I understand 
tradition in this case in terms similar to those proposed by Keen and Merlan (1990) 
and Merlan (1991a), as a domain of meanings that is defined as blackfella law, but 
in which the senior Jawoyn who were conscious of it found an idiom of identity to 
ground their interactions with an encompassing and occasionally intrusive world of 
white purposes that was unconscious of Aboriginal ownership. As the white world 
became more conscious, by means of the formal recognition accorded under land 
rights, so J awoyn interactions over the Gimbat area reflected the new potentials that 
flowed fro1n that recognition. 
In the earliest days of the Coronation Hill issue, this was not yet so, even though 
the new generation of land rights law had been in place for several years. At this 
point, senior J awoyn knew what should properly flow from development on their 
country, but had yet to see it offered. Recall for a moment the meeting of 3 
February 1986, where Ellis first tried to impress upon the Jawoyn the importance of 




people for inclusion in a video to be shown to policy makers ( chapter 3). At one 
point during the first part of the meeting, there are several off-screen comments, 
probably fro1n Barraway, comparing the money received by whites with that 
flowing to blacks - 'blackfella get nothing'; 'we got fuck-all we blackfella' -
during which Phyllis Wiynjorrotj also comments: 'We got no new motor car, we 
got no money. If they want to make him 'bout, you know, make him gold mine 
longa sacred site, we got no money' .134 Just like always, then, Jawoyn could expect 
to get nothing from the use of their land, so the terms of religious power and danger 
in which they expressed their sense of the values of place in their subsequent 
statements for the video were the only relevant ones. 
Talking to the miners over the following months, however, showed them that the 
mining proposal for Coronation Hill for the first time expanded the field of 
possibilities that they could contemplate emerging from development. It did so, 
moreover, with respect to a place that, according to any prior documentation, did 
not figure in their knowledge as a primary locus of sacred power. This was a new 
situation for the Jawoyn. From this point, the data, taken as a totality, cannot 
substantiate a 'bottom line' judgment. My metaphor of theatres and scripts is an 
attempt to model the way in which their performances at times implied an 
alignment with one set of possibilities, and at times with another. Theatres thus 
framed the play of Jawoyn agency with respect to the realisable values of 
Coronation Hill. It could not_ have played in the same manner with respect to any 
part of Gimbat, as Barraway tried to impress upon Linke during their helicopter 
tour in September 1988. In areas such as those then visited, the doctrinal 
ambiguities surrounding Coronation Hill did not apply, and the J awoyn relationship 
to place admitted of only one form of recognition. 
134 Meeting at Low Level About Coronation Hill 3.2.86, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority 
video. 
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The end of the affair 
As the Coronation Hill dispute proceeded after 1987 through successive stages of 
policy management - the Senate Committee's report on the potential of the 
Kakadu region, the Coronation Hill Environmental Impact Assessment process, the 
Public Environment Report on exploration at El Sherana, the Federal decision to 
reduce the Conservation Zone boundaries, the Resource Assessment Commission 
Inquiry into the resources of the diminished Conservation Zone, Mr Justice 
Stewart's concurrent report on protection of sites under the Heritage Protection 
Act, and the final Federal Cabinet decision to abolish the Conservation Zone and 
close the Coronation Hill project in June 1991 - the recordings and recentreings of 
Aboriginal texts in videos, submissions and other documents supporting or 
opposing mining development also continued. This is an aspect of the dispute I 
have not had space to discuss. However, alongside this insistent secondary 
discourse of competing representations about Aboriginal views, policy makers 
continued to seek out direct representations by J awoyn people. There thus 
continued a sporadic theatricality to the highest levels of policy formation. 
Graham Richardson, as a member of the Senate Committee and Minister for the 
Environment, was one who refused to accept the packaging of Aboriginal opinions 
by others as a substitute for direct access to J awoyn custodians. On its first visit to 
the site in May 1986, the Committee apparently received informal J awoyn 
testi1nony asserting the sacredness of the area. Having returned to Darwin for a 
hearing in October, the Committee attempted to make sense of the intervening 
events of July and the NT Government 's attempt to discredit the site registration 
(see chapters 3, 4 and 6). Stephen Davis urged the video record of his theatre at the 
Sleisbeck site upon the Committee as a definitive account of the custodians' views. 
Mr Davis - When we have finished the discussion, I will invite you to look 
at the video. I will be happy to table the transcript of the video which takes 
us right through the matter. I would be quite happy to field any questions on 




Senator RICHARDSON - It seems to me that the only way to resolve it is 
not merely by viewing a video tape. The only way I would consider it 
resolved is if the old people who were sitting on the hill that day have 
changed their minds. If what they were telling us is not true, I would like to 
hear that from them. (SSCNR 1986c: 2633) 
Richardson, aware of the continuing uncertainties in J awoyn testimony, visited 
again in the later stages, carrying a copy of one of the reports prepared by J osif on 
behalf of the J awoyn Association. 
When Richardson came back again later on ... we all had dinner together. 
And Richardson wanted a private meeting with me, after dinner, a pow-
wow. And he basically said to me, 'look, all of this', ... he said 'well that's 
fine', he said 'but how do I know? Is this fair dinkum? ', like 'show me fair 
dinkum. Go away and do it again', you know? Basically. 'I want to know 
absolutely'. And it was this impossible task, and it was again 'always you 
keep asking'. 135 
Contrary to Josif s understanding, the absolute assurance Richardson sought could 
not have come from more research and secondary reporting, incorporating what 
anthropologists have called recentreings of indigenous texts, but from direct 
performance. In November 1988 the NLC brought a Jawoyn delegation to Canberra 
where they were able to meet with Federal Cabinet. Phyllis Wiynjorrotj took the 
opportunity to deliver a monologue opposed to mining. Ah Kit witnessed the scene. 
I remember one occasion when we were down there with old Phyllis 
Wiynjorrotj, who got up and started talking straight, you know, 'I don't care 
who you mob think you are, but this is the position'. Phyllis was an 
important woman for the women's side ... old Phyllis was staunch and 
knew the importance through her mothers and grandmother. . . . Richo 
· slipped [a note] in front of one of my blokes, 'Phyllis' drop-kick went 
straight through the big sticks'. In other words, Richo had wrote a note and 
slipped it to ... one of my staffers, 'that's it, there'll be no mining'. This is 
135 Interview 29.4.94. 
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during Cabinet, we were meeting with Cabinet. Phyllis had got up and 
spoke her mind as Phyllis can, and did. 136 
Unlike this fortuitous exposure to J awoyn performance, the Resource Assessment 
Commission wanted to ensure direct consultation as a matter of principle. I have 
discussed elsewhere (Levitus 1996) the logic of the approach that RAC took to 
assessing the impact of the mining proposal on the cultural values of the 
Conservation Zone. In summary, I showed there that, having identified the 
principal cultural values as those held by the J awoyn people, the Inquiry interpreted 
its governing Act as requiring that the impact on J awoyn cultural values be 
considered with respect to the maintenance of religious tradition and social justice. 
It then adopted the view that attaining these objects of cultural sustainability and 
equity itself required a process that allowed participation and self-determination to 
the Jawoyn. The Inquiry thus perceived an identity between its object of protecting 
Aboriginal cultural values and a means of arriving at that object, the seeking out 
and privileging of Aboriginal wishes. 
Pursuant to this concern, early in the RAC process, the commissioners met a large 
Aboriginal group at Eva Valley. The Chair, Justice Stewart, was aware of the 
record of contradictory testimony, and approached this meeting with his mind on 
the question 'who speaks for these people?' (Keen pers comm). Both the men's and 
women's groups at Eva Valley identified the three senior male custodians as the 
proper people to speak for Coronation Hill. With this, these custodians became of 
primary concern for the Inquiry in its effort to provide space for Aboriginal 
participation in the protection of Aboriginal values. At this penultimate stage of the 
policy process over Coronation Hill, RAC's understanding and application of 
proper process under its legislation thus preserved for the three J awoyn custodians 
the same status as incumbents of an authoritative Aboriginal centre as the Northern 
Territory sites legislation had done in the preceding years. 
136 Interview 3 1.5.94. 
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The Inquiry subsequently met with large groups of J awoyn at Gunlom (previously 
known as UDP Falls) on 20 November 1990, then with the project team's 
Aboriginal employees and some others, who had requested a separate meeting, at 
El Sherana the next day, and again with the three senior custodians at Barunga in 
March 1991. As in the case of the Senate Inquiry hearing nearly four years earlier, 
it is difficult to identify the relevant scenic factors at play at the first of these 
meetings, other than that RAC had accepted a suggestion that the NLC organise the 
meeting for the large number of Jawoyn involved. Some BHP project team officers 
were also present. At the women's meeting, the Commissioners talked in tum with 
each of several groups, all but one of which expressed opposition to mining. At the 
men's meeting a number of individuals spoke, all also in opposition. This majority 
sentiment was significant not so much in its own right as in the support and 
deference that it indicated for the senior custodians. Some people in favour of 
mining also acknowledged their position of authority. The scenic factors at play are 
more readily identified at the small meeting at Barunga in March. Here, in front of 
the same Commissioners that had convened the Gunlom meeting four months 
earlier, and in the company of two senior non-Jawoyn Aboriginal men and two 
NLC officers, the J awoyn custodians expressed their opposition to mining. 
The record of past Aboriginal testimony amounted to a vexing historical problem 
for the Commissioners, so in the end they were guided by those texts produced 
within the theatres of their own Inquiry. Acknowledging the custodians' status as 
bearers of an authoritative Aboriginal discourse, and announcing its decision to 
find in its own consultation events resolution of the difficult tasks of weighing and 
interpreting the substance of that discourse, the Inquiry wrote: 
If a democratic approach were to be taken to the question of whether or not 
mining should proceed in the Conservation Zone, the evidence suggests that 
the majority of Jawoyn people would be opposed to · mining activity 
anywhere in the Conservation Zone. In Aboriginal society, however, 
responsibility-for religious sites and the authority to speak about them rests 
with the recognised custodians. In the case of the Zone the identity of the 
custodians is clear and they enjoy very widespread support in this role. The 
Inquiry believes that it has obtained as clear, as accurate, and as 
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current an understanding of their views as can reasonably be obtained. 
(RAC 1991a: 178 - emphasis 
added) 
The contrary things that the BHP (now Newcrest) project team knew the custodians 
to have said were submitted in the Joint Venturers' written submissions and on 
video. Part of the resentment felt by members of the team with this stage of the 
policy process arose from their inability to make the Commissioners take these 
accounts seriously. The development approvals given under the auspices of the 
Sites Authority, the face-to-face assurances given by a senior custodian to Leckie, 
the Senate Inquiry's Barunga transcript, in the end carried no weight. The project 
team could find no acknowledgement of these things in the deliberations of policy. 
Once an event happens we can assume that a permanent tracing will be left 
of it, and that with sufficient research and interrogation, a record of the 
event could be uncovered. The residue is not lacking, only the reason. When 
there is a reason, as in the checking out of a claimed historical document, 
then retrieval can become extremely impressive. And a fundamental 
disorientation in the world takes place when the individual believes an event 
has occurred and then finds that he cannot prove this to others. Stories of 
The Lady Vanishes genre exploit this theme. (Goffman 1975: 288) 
The point was, however, that in the face of direct J awoyn testimony, submissions 
became a subordinate source. Like Richardson, Commissioner McColl was 
sceptical even of such supporting, but secondary, representations as the Jawoyn 
Association submission that he found had been prepared by the non-indigenous 
researchers of the J awoyn Research Group. 
Policy and theatres 
This thesis argues that the texts produced by the J awoyn are not, as a totality, 
amenable to arguments that seek to discriminate authentic from inauthentic streams 
of testimony. It attempts instead to present an inclusive framework in which the 
interpretive focus is on the conditions that generated contradiction. By refusing to 
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assign relative validity among J awoyn performances, however, it also implies a 
disillusioning of the policy process with respect to an authoritative Aboriginal 
centre. The importance accorded to theatricality and text in this analysis implies an 
acknowledgement that the relationship between the intra-Aboriginal discourse of 
the Katherine region on the one hand and the policy and consultation process on the 
. other was not as presumed by the notion of such a centre. The intensity with which 
secondary representations and debate orbited and competed at various levels around 
that imagined centre signalled that it was not a thing of consistency with respect to 
the questions being asked of it. More directly, the custodians themselves, deemed 
to be the bearers of that authoritative discourse, showed their own motivations with 
respect to Coronation Hill to be segmented. The Aboriginal centre thus refused to 
show the qualities that policy required of it. 
Goffman remarks on the necessity of such qualities in social activity. 
In the case of social frameworks, individuals . . . are defined as self-
determined agencies, legally competent to act and morally responsible for 
doing so properly. In this latter connection, then, individuals have an 
entirely special role in activity. Moreover, this role is diffusely relevant. 
The properties we attribute to normal actors, such as correct perception, 
personal will, a range of adult competencies, access to memory, a measure 
of empathy regarding others present, honesty, reliability, fixed social and 
personal identity, and the like are counted on in a multitude of ways 
whenever interpersonal dealings occur. 
It follows that any apparent need to redefine an actor as possessing other 
than these conventional attributes can have a very pervasive effect upon the 
activity in which the altered person participates. (Goffman 1975: 188) 
Because the status of the Aboriginal centre was guaranteed by the Sites Authority 
and the Resource Assessment Commission under their respective Acts, no 
redefinition of the senior J awoyn actors was allowable. The refusal of their 
performances to conform to some of the characteristics enumerated by Goffinan 
nevertheless had 'a very pervasive effect'. Theatricality firstly posed the problem of 
contradictions to the issue-managers of Coronation Hill, then it sustained involuted 
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political relationships between the same senior J awoyn people a~d-a; -nufuber of 
contending external agents as the latter disputed both the management of 
Coronation Hill and the quality of their respective relationships with the J awoyn. 
The policy process at successive levels continually reproduced theatricality in order 
to resolve the quandaries that theatricality had earlier generated. 
From inside the NLC, Keith Taylor recognised the implications of this. As the RAC 
Inquiry began, he considered the issues that the NLC needed to address, among 
them that of more meetings with the J awoyn to determine their views on the 
Conservation Zone. In response to a pro-mining petition being circulated by Andy 
Andrews, there was talk in the NLC of calling a full Jawoyn meeting to definitively 
ascertain their view as a community. Taylor argued that no meeting at that time 
could be definitive, as the Inquiry still had almost a year to run and any decision 
could easily be contradicted by another later show of group opinion. 
But at some stage of the Inquiry, RAC would require a meeting, and that was a 
matter for concern. Taylor wanted to see it happen towards the end of the Inquiry, 
and he considered that the NLC had a legitimate role in facilitating meetings that 
were culturally appropriate. The precedent of the Senate Inquiry hearing of nearly 
four years earlier had to be avoided. He thought that anthropological assistance and 
interpreters might help J awoyn witnesses deal with the pervasively foreign 
character of the proceedings and ensure some real connection between questions 
and answers. He advised the Inquiry organisers that different consultation contexts 
could result in different responses, and pressed them to avoid holding meetings 
with J awoyn in any location serviced by the BHP project team. In other words, 
Taylor was sensitive to the scenic conditions of consultation theatres and he wanted 
the RAC Inquiry to be similarly aware. 
This was important because the intention behind theatres as an instrument of 
management is that they should provide a mode of administrative containment and 
closure at each policy stage. A site registration or development approval, made on 
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the basis of request" or authorisation from Aboriginal custodians, changes the things 
that can or cannot be done with respect to a place, including by Aborigines. A 
consultation event thus establishes a finite frame, a containing scene, for 
performance, which is then taken by policy to be self-limiting. As Coronation Hill 
arrived at the RAC and Cabinet stages of inquiry and arbitration, performance in 
general had to be curtailed, and some particular performance abstracted from its 
theatrical context and taken as a charter for administrative action. The argument put 
by pro-mining advocates, following the RAC Inquiry and prior to the final Cabinet 
decision, that the matter should be subject to further negotiation with the Jawoyn, 
was a bid to keep open a space for further custodial performance in the expectation 
that a reading from the script of jobs and royalties in another theatre would offer an 
alternative moment of policy closure. 
As a final thought, we can tum from this to a wider policy question by attending · 
not to the containing and limiting function of individual theatres, but to the 
cumulative effects of consultation events in the Coronation Hill issue. In the 
statements recorded on video from the senior people gathered by Ellis in February 
1986, J atbula contrasts their open talking about Bula with the secretive and solitary 
practices of his father in visiting and looking after important sites. Ethnographers 
have also recorded some references to past performance of a Bula ceremony. The 
important difference between both these original expressions of custodianship and 
the consultation events around Coronation Hill is that ceremony and solitary site 
visits owed nothing to any non-Aboriginal agenda, while consultations were 
moments in which relations of articulation were visibly activated. From the 
perspective of contemporary .land management, while consultation theatres 
functioned as an instrument for the containment of J awoyn performance, they were, 
reciprocally, occasions for the practical application of J awoyn agency. 
Indeed, the repeated exercises of field documentation, consultation and inquiry 
concerning the status of Coronation Hill and the distribution of religious meanings 
across Gimbat and surrounding areas had been for some years probably the only 
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occasions that called for the performance of custodianship by senior J awoyn men, 
and on which tradition had to be externally manifested and practically applied 
(Keen and Merlan 1990: 17). In my Report on Registration of Sickness Country I 
cited 'their long-running public performance of the custodial role' (Levitus 1992: 
9) since 1985 as one of the grounds for recognising them as the current incumbents 
of a primary level of custodianship for Bula sites. 
A major dimension of that performance has been substantially omitted from 
analysis here. I mentioned in chapter 7 the program of site documentation carried 
out by Cooper and Gunn in the company of senior custodians which Cooper relied 
upon to substantiate his model of Sickness Country. This is another aspect of the 
Coronation Hill issue that I have not had room to discuss, except to indicate that 
those field trips provided a series of important theatres for readings from the script 
of religious power and danger. In the submission to RAC prepared for the Sites 
Authority, I presented them as the most recent stage in a process of elaboration of 
religious tradition with respect to the Gimbat and neighbouring areas, whereby 
senior custodians vvere able to continue 'restoring specific form and content to a 
religious field of power known from preceding generations' (Levitus 1990: 28). 
We can recognise the end effect of such readings in the cumulative documentation 
and administrative recognition and objectification of Sickness Country. In the 
history that I have discussed, we can similarly recognise the end effect of the 
opposite corpus of readings in the extensive development works at Coronation Hill 
and El Sherana and the first discussions of a mining agreement. These two 
observable sets of physical and management effects were authorised by the senior 
J av. oyn incumbents of an Aboriginal centre that understood, as a central 
proposition, that it owned the land. The question that Coronation Hill raises for the 
policy field of land rights and heritage protection is not that of empowerment, of 
vvhat Aborigines v\ ill be enabled to do, but of agency, of how they will orient 
themselves to what they are enabled to do, and not just \Vith the religious capital, 
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but with the general values of place, that they perceive in the landscape. 
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1937 
1953 June 2 
1954 
1955 




Joe Callanan acquires a pastoral interest over part of Gimbat. 
Uranium discovered at Coronation Hill. 
Beginning of further uranium exploration, m1n1ng and 
associated development in upper South Alligator valley and 
at Sleisbeck. 
Walter Arndt visits Sleisbeck and other sites with mining 
personnel. 
Pastoral lease 668, Gimbat Station, granted to Joseph 
Callanan. 
Eric Brandl reports on J awoyn interests in Gimbat. 
Eric Brandl reports on Aboriginal attitudes to Christmas 
Creek site. 
Gimbat Station transferred from Callanan to Gunn. Uranium 
production ceases. 
1964 July 15-19 Ken Maddock visits sites at Sleisbeck and El Sherana with 
Jawoyn and Mayali group. 
1964 August 1-3 Ken Maddock visits Sleisbeck site with Jawoyn group. 
1970 September 25 Lessees of Goodparla Station surrender area later proclaimed 
as Waterfall Creek Nature Reserve (UDP Falls). 
1972 March 14 Lessees of Gimbat Station surrender Christmas Creek 
Reserve. 
1972-1973 Alligator Rivers Region Environmental Fact-Finding Study. 
1975 December 15 Lessees of Gimbat Station surrender Gimbat Resumption. 
1975-1977 Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry. 
1979 April 5 Kakadu National Park Stage I proclaimed, including most of · 
Gimbat Resumption. 
1980-1982 Gimbat/Goodparla Land Use Study 
1981 Helmut and Joy Schimmel take possession of Gimbat. 
1984 February 28 Kakadu National Park Stage II proclaimed. 
1984 November 3 0 South Alligator Joint Venture changes name to Coronation 
Hill Joint Venture. 
1985 September 18 David Cooper conducts field trip to upper South Alligator 
valley with J atbula, Brown and Ah Lin, encounters 
exploration works at Coronation Hill. 
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1985 October 3 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority registers Upper 




















Jawoyn meeting with Authority and NLC officers discusses Gimbat 
sites and development. Seniors record video footage about dangers 
of Bula. 
J awoyn group visits Coronation Hill with BHP, Authority and NLC 
officers for explanation of development plans. 
J awoyn meeting in Katherine rejects BHP development proposals 
for Coronation Hill. 
BHP officers appear before Senate Standing Committee on National 
Resources hearing. 
Sites Authority publicly distributes 'Shake 'Im This Country' video. 
Senate Committee visits upper South Alligator valley. 
Authority and NLC officers and Joe Fisher appear before Senate . 
Committee hearing. 
Newspaper article 'BHP NT Office Shuts' and editorial 'Stop This 
Madness'. 
BHP officers receive permission to resume development from 
J awoyn meeting at Barunga. 
Sites Authority approves resumption of works at Coronation Hill. 
Stephen Davis visits Sleisbeck site with Brown and Barraway. 
J awoyn meeting at Katherine Low Level Reserve revokes decision 
of 1 July. 
NT Minister for Mines and Energy announces inquiry by Stephen 
Davis into Sites Authority's registration of Coronation Hill. 
Newspaper article by Joe Fisher 'Myth or Mistake' challenges site 
registration. 
Davis submits report to NT Minister for Mines and Energy. 
Sites Authority meeting in Katherine reconsiders and confirms 
authorisation for resumption of works at Coronation Hill. 
Drilling resumes at Coronation Hill. . 
Federal Cabinet decides to extend Kakadu National Park to include 
Goodparla and Gimbat stations and to allow mineral exploration. 
Coronation Hill to be approved subject to normal clearances. 
BHP project team hires four Jawoyn workers. 
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October 29 Authority and NLC officers and Stephen Davis appear before Senate 
Committee hearing. 
October 30-31 Ellis conducts on-site development consultation with Jawoyn group 
and BHP officers. J awoyn agree to further work proposals. 
November 13 Sites Authority authorises further development work at Coronation 
Hill. 
November 19 Authority officers conduct supplementary development consultation 
with J awoyn group at Coronation Hill. 
November 20 Ritchie records video footage with Jatbula and Barraway along 
South Alligator valley for Senate Committee. 
December 16 Federal Cabinet decides to declare 65% of Goodparla and Gimbat as 
Kakadu Stage III and allow five years' mineral exploration in a 













Senior J awoyn appear with NLC officers and Cooper before Senate 
Committee at B arunga. 
NLC advises BHP that J awoyn Association has instructed NLC to 
act on its behalf with respect to Coronation Hill. 
BHP project team hires three more J awoyn workers. 
BHP officers appear before Senate Committee hearing. 
J awoyn group with BHP and Authority officers inspects further 
proposed development works. Meeting agrees to proposals. 
Authority authorises further works. 
Kakadu National Park Stage III proclaimed; Kakadu Conservation 
Zone proclaimed (re-proclaimed June 30). Gimbat and Goodparla 
Stations thereby become unalienated Crown land. 
NLC lodges land claim over Gimbat and Goodparla. 
J awoyn group observe demonstration blasting at Coronation Hill 
with BHP, NLC and Authority officers. Meeting agrees to limited 
use of explosives. 
Sites Authority authorises limited use of explosives. 
NLC and Authority ask Government to delay finalising boundaries 
and allocating exploration rights in Conservation Zone until 
Aboriginal concerns fully documented. Ellis distributes Cooper's 
Traditional Concerns report. 
September 21 BHP project team hires two more J awoyn workers. 
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September 24 Ministerial meeting delays Conservation Zone decision pending 
consultation with Aborigines. 
October 8 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs asks NLC to consult Aboriginal 
· people regarding Conservation Zone. 
October 23 J awoyn Working Party formed. 
November 5 BHP and NLC officers meet to inspect project and discuss heads of 
agreement for mining. 
November 6 Jawoyn Working Party meeting at Barunga instructs NLC to oppose 
mining at Coronation Hill. 
November 26 NLC suspends further discussion of Coronation Hill project until 
Government policy finalised. 
December 1 Gimbat pastoral lease compulsorily acquired for national park. 
1988 
April 19 Ministers accept NLC arguments for further delay on Conservation 
Zone boundaries to allow further Aboriginal consultation. 
May Sites Authority publicly distributes 'Bulajang: Sickness Country' 
video. 
July 3 Josif Report on social and cultural effects of Coronation Hill and 
Conservation Zone upon Aboriginal people released to Government. 
July 15 End of drilling to explore and assess mineral reserve. No further 
development work at Coronation Hill. 
November 2 Jawoyn delegation with NLC officers visits Canberra, tells Prime 
Minister they are opposed to Coronation Hill project. 
November Senate Committee report, The Potential of the Kakadu National Park 
Region, published. Majority report emphasises evidence suggesting 
Coronation Hill sacred, minority report denies sacredness. El 
Sherana Exploration Programme Public Environment Report 
submitted for public review. 
December 23 Exploration authority issued for drilling at El Sherana, exploration 
authority extended for Coronation Hill. 
1989 
February 28 Sites Authority consultation at Katherine Low Level Reserve to 
consider BHP bench widening proposal for Coronation Hill. J awoyn 
group reaches no decision. 
April 5 Three . senior Jawoyn custodians meet with three Sites Authority 
members, reject bench widening proposal, request registration of 
Sickness Country as a sacred site. 
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September 13 NLC requests protection of Sickness Country under s. l O of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act. 
October 5 Government decides to reduce Kakadu Conservation Zone, obtain 
report under s. l 0( 4) of Heritage Protection Act, and ask Resource 
Assessment Commission for assessment of environment and mining 
in reduced Zone. 
November 22 Reduced Kakadu Conservation Zone proclaimed; balance of area of 
first Conservation Zone incorporated into Kakadu National Park. 
1990 
February 13 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs appoints Mr Justice Stewart to 
prepare report under s. l 0( 4) of Heritage Protection Act with respect 
to reduced Conservation Zone. 
April 26 Prime Minister issues terms of reference for Resource Assessment 
Commission's inquiry into the use of the resources of the Kakadu 
Conservation Zone. 
June 30-July 6 RAC Inquiry visits Kakadu National Park and meets interested 
parties, meets large Aboriginal group at Eva Valley. 
November 20 RAC Inquiry meets large Jawoyn group at Gunlom. 
November 21 RAC Inquiry meets BHP Aboriginal employees at El Sherana. 
1991 
February RAC publishes Kakadu Conservation Zone Inquiry Draft Report. 
March 6 RAC Inquiry meets Jatbula, Barraway, Brown, Bennett, two senior 
non-J awoyn men and two NLC officers at Barunga. 
May 2 RAC submits Final Report to Prime Minister. 
June 18 Prime Minister announces Conservation Zone to be incorporated 
into Kakadu National Park, Coronation Hill project disallowed. 
1992 August Jawoyn (Gimbat Area) Land Claim book and site registers 
published. 
1995 June 28 Aboriginal Land Commissioner recommends grant of land 
claimed in Gimbat Area Land Claim. 
1996 January 31 Title to Gimbat area handed to Gunlom Land Trust. 
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